ANANDAMOY BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) BY the impugned judgement the learned single Judge has declared the Bihar Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1976 to be ultra vireos as being beyond the competence of the Bihar State Legislature. The learned Judge has also held that S. 17 of the Act is also bad for excessive delegation. The reasons which have weighed the learned Judge in coming to these conclusions are briefly as hereunder. ( 2 ) ENTRY 24 of the State List conferring jurisdiction on the State Legislature to legislate on "industries" has expressly been made subject to Entry 52 of the Union List. Entry 52 of the Union List confers exclusive jurisdiction on Parliament to legislate on "industries", "the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest". Parliament has made the requisite declaration in respect of sugar industries in S. 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 read with Entry 25 of the First Schedule thereof. Sugar thus being a declared industry, it goes out of Entry 24 of the State List and comes within Entry 52 of the Union List and hence the Bihar Legislature had no legislative competence to legislate in respect of sugar industries. As the impugned Bihar Act is a Legislation in respect of industrial undertaking in sugar industries, the same is void on account of legislative incompetence. As to the contention on behalf of the State that the impugned legislation was covered by Entry 42 of the Concurrent List conferring jurisdiction on Parliament and also State Legislatures to legislate on "acquisition and requisition of property", the learned Judge observed that "the acquisition is in respect of property, in respect of industry, the control of which has been taken over by the Centre and it is indisputable that the requisition of an industry or acquisition of an industry certainly affects the industry in its essential true sense in its manufacture and production" and that "to construe Entry 42 of List III in such a manner as to permit the requisition or acquisition of an industry the control of which has been taken over by the Centre will defeat the purpose of Entry 52 of List I". ( 3 ) WE have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the process of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge. ( 3 ) WE have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the process of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge. As is well settled, when the validity of a legislation is challenged on the ground of want of legislative competence and it becomes necessary to determine to which entries in the three lists, the legislation is referable to the Court has evolved the theory of pith and substance. If in pith and substance a legislation comes within one entry within the competence of the Legislature concerned, but some portion of the subject matter of the legislation incidentally trenches upon and might come under another entry not within the competence of the concerned Legislature, the legislation would still be valid as a whole notwithstanding such incidental trenching. We have made a thorough examination of the provisions of the impugned legislation and we are satisfied that in pith and substance the same is a legislation for acquisition of some of the sugar industries in Bihar. It is true that sugar is an industry the control of which has been taken over by the Union by the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 under Entry 52 of the Union list. But the Central Act is concerned with the development and regulation of the industries and not with the ownership thereof. Therefore, the acquisition of the sugar industries under the Bihar Act and the vesting thereof in the State or Corporation thereunder would not affect any control exercised by the Union under the provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. ( 4 ) THE preamble to the Bihar Act declares that it is an Act to provide, in the interest of general public for acquisition and transfer of some sugar undertakings. Section 3 deals with vesting and provides for the vesting of the scheduled undertakings in the State or the Corporation. Section 4 deals with certain consequences of vesting. Section 5 imposes obligation to deliver possession. Section 6 imposes obligation to furnish certain particulars. Section 7 provides for amount of compensation to be paid for the acquisition. Section 8 deals with the prescribed authority. Section 9 deals with certain powers and procedure for implementing the Act. Section 10 deals with powers or jurisdiction of Courts. Section 11 deals with the transfer of employees. Section 12 deals with access to books of accounts and other documents. Section 8 deals with the prescribed authority. Section 9 deals with certain powers and procedure for implementing the Act. Section 10 deals with powers or jurisdiction of Courts. Section 11 deals with the transfer of employees. Section 12 deals with access to books of accounts and other documents. Section 13 deals with penalties in certain contingencies. Section 14 provides for the procedure when an offence is committed by a company. Section 15 protects certain actions taken in good faith. Section 16 provides for vacation of orders and abatement of proceedings. Section 17 provides for the amendment of the schedule. Section 18 deals with powers to make rules. ( 5 ) THE above review of the impugned Act would indisputably shows that the Act is eminently and evidently a legislation for acquisition of the scheduled undertakings. It is now unquestionably established by the majority decision in the Banks Nationalisation case AIR 1970 SC 564 that the power to legislate for acquisition of property is exercisable only under Entry 42 of List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists. It is an independent power provided for in a specific entry. The Bihar Act should, therefore, be held to be a valid piece of legislation in exercise of the power conferred by that Entry. ( 6 ) THE position must now be taken to have been concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of U. P. , AIR 1980 SC 1955 where the vires of the U. P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 was challenged on the same ground. The U. P. Act, as would also appear from para 14 of the reported judgement, is in pari materia with the impugned Bihar Act and provides for acquisition of sugar undertakings in U. P. and vesting thereof in the Corporation. The U. P. Act, as would also appear from para 14 of the reported judgement, is in pari materia with the impugned Bihar Act and provides for acquisition of sugar undertakings in U. P. and vesting thereof in the Corporation. The Supreme Court has held that in pith and substance the impugned legislation is one for acquisition of scheduled undertakings and that field is not occupied by anything in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 whereunder the control of sugar industry has been taken over by the Union in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 52 of the List I. The Supreme Court has pointed out that there is a long line of decisions which clearly establishes the proposition that power to legislate for acquisition of property is an independent and separate power and is exercisable only under Entry 42, List III and not as an incident of the power to legislate in respect of a specific head of legislation in any of the three lists. The Supreme Court has ruled that the power of the State Legislature to legislate for acquisition of even a declared industry remains intact and untrammelled except to the extent where on assumption of control of declared industry by law as envisaged in Entry 52 of a List I, the further power of acquisition is also taken over by specific legislation. The decision of the learned Judge declaring the Bihar Act to be ultra vires on the ground of legislative incompetence of the Bihar Legislature must therefore, be set aside. ( 7 ) THE learned Judge has also held that S. 17 of the impugned Bihar Act is bad for excessive delegation of essential legislative function. Section 17 is reproduced below :"17. Amendment of Schedule- The State Government may by notification published in the Official Gazette, by way of amendment of the schedule add to the Schedule any other undertakings, if it considers necessary so to do such added undertakings will be deemed to be vested in the State of Bihar/bihar State Sugar Corporation with effect from the date mentioned in the notification and the payable compensation for acquisition will be determined according to the provisions of S. 7". ( 8 ) WE have hereinbefore noted the various provisions of the impugned Act and we have no doubt that in the Legislation the Legislature has provided for everything reasonably necessary for a legislation for acquisition and has nowhere abdicated its essential legislative function. The learned Judge referred to the Statement of Objects and Reason of the Act and other statements preceding and following the passing of the Act and was satisfied that the Act was passed to revive the sugar industries in Bihar which were in a very deplorable condition and that such revival was necessary for the public interest and that acquisition of the sugar industries was necessary for such revival. In such circumstances, if, after enacting a fairly comprehensive legislation for acquisition in reasonable details, the legislature decides to effect such acquisition by stages and after listing some of the undertakings to be acquired at the first instance in the schedule to the Act, the Legislature empowers the State Government to extend the Act to other sugar undertakings at some later stage, it cannot be said that there was any delegation of essential legislative function. For in that case a Legislature empowering the executive to extend the provisions of an Act to different areas on different dates would also amount to such excessive delegation. But as is well-known, that is not a case of delegated legislation at all but is an instance of conditional legislation. We, accordingly, hold that S. 17 cannot be held to be bad for excessive delegation of essential legislative function. ( 9 ) WE, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgement of the learned Judge and dismiss the writ petition. We, however, make no order as to costs. ( 10 ) SATISH CHANDRA, C. J. :- I agree. Appeal allowed.