K. C. AGRAWAL, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Dabur (Dr. S. K. Burman) Private Limited, Sahibabad, district Ghaziabad and Jagat Singh Bisht, who was the wholesale dealer of Dabur products, carrying on his business in Almora. The reliefs sought for by this petition is for quashing of the notifications, the details of which would be given at appropriate places in this judgment, and for mandamus directing the State of U. P. and the Excise commissioner as also its officers from interfering with the business of the petitioners in ayurvedic medicines, including Mrit Sanjiwani Sura, in pursuance of the impugned notifications and the Rules published by respondents 1 and 2 on 14th September, 1978. ( 2 ) FOR discussing the points urged, since it is necessary to make a brief reference of the relevant provisions of the U. P. Excise Act, we hereby do so. Amongst the various objects of the aforesaid act enumerated in its Preamble, one of them is to carry into effect the policy of prohibition. ( 3 ) SECTION 3 of the Act is an interpretation clause giving definitions of various terms used in the act. The words which are important for our purposes are: "spirit", defined in Section 3 (8), "liquor", defined in Section 3 (11), "intoxicating drug", defined in Section 3 (12), and "intoxicant", defined in Section 3 (13 ). Section 4 confers power on the State Government to declare what is to be deemed "liquor". It reads: the State Government may by notification declare any substance to be liquor for the purposes of this Act or any portion thereof. ( 4 ) SECTION 37-A is the next provision relevant for our purposes. This section was enacted in chapter VI-A by U. P. Act No. 6 of 1972. This section was subsequently declared ultra vires by a full Bench of this Court in Sheo Kumar v. State AIR 1976 All 386. Subsequently, Section 37-A was substituted by Section 4 of U. P. Act No. 30 of 1978 retrospectively (with effect from 1-5-1972 ). It received the assent of the President of India. Section 40 confers power on the State government to make rules for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act or other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue. It received the assent of the President of India. Section 40 confers power on the State government to make rules for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act or other law for the time being in force relating to excise revenue. Sub-section (2) of Section 40 provides for various matters in respect of which rules could be made by the State Government. Section 41 confers power on the Excise Commissioner to make rules with respect to matters mentioned therein, subject to the previous sanction of the State Government. ( 5 ) SECTION 75, with which we are concerned, is one of the main provisions on the interpretation of which the fate of this writ petition hangs upon. Consequently we would prefer to quote this section in full. It reads: 75. Exception of medicated articles--Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act applies to the import, manufacture, possession, sale or supply of any bona fide medicated article for medicinal purposes by medical practitioners, chemists, druggists, apothecaries or keepers of dispensaries, except insofar as the State Government may by notification so direct. ( 6 ) UNDER Section 76 the State Government has the power to exempt any, person or class of persons or any intoxicant, wholly or partly, from the operation of all or any of the provisions of this Act or of all or any one of the rules made under this Act, either throughput Uttar Pradesh or in any specified area comprised therein. The main provision of Section 77 is that all rules made and notifications issued under this Act shall be published in the official Gazette and shall have effect as if enacted in this Act from the date of such publication or from such other date as may be specified in that behalf. ( 7 ) IN view of Section 75 of the U. P. Excise Act nothing contained in Sections 1 to 74 applies to the import, manufacture, possession, sale or supply of any bona fide medicated article for medicinal purposes by medical practitioners, chemists, etc. As a result of this, nothing contained in Chapters I to VIII applies to bona fide medicated articles meant for medicinal purposes. The state Government had materials in its possession that the medicated articles including Mrit sanjiwani Sura, Mrit Sanjiwani, and Mrit Sanjiwani Sudha, which were being prepared or manufactured according to Ayurvedic system, were being misused. As a result of this, nothing contained in Chapters I to VIII applies to bona fide medicated articles meant for medicinal purposes. The state Government had materials in its possession that the medicated articles including Mrit sanjiwani Sura, Mrit Sanjiwani, and Mrit Sanjiwani Sudha, which were being prepared or manufactured according to Ayurvedic system, were being misused. From paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit it appears that in view of a number of complaints against the use or misuse of the Ayurvedic and other medicines, the Government of India in 1963 appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice Tekchand to make an assessment of the magnitude of illicit distillation. At that time numerous complaints had been made to the Government as against Mrit sanjiwani Sura and the reports were that the said Sura was being used as substitute for alcoholic beverage. According to the report its sale had increased tremendously in the prohibition districts. Tek Chand submitted his report. Chapter XXI of the report submitted by him dealt with the misuse of spirituous medicinal, toilet and other preparations. The Committee observed, as it is clear from Annexure "a" to the counter-affidavit, that: the manufacture of Asavas by the addition of alcohol or by distillation should be prohibited. Another class of spirituous Ayurvedic preparations marketed particularly in West Bengal are what are known as Suras and Sudhas (Mrit Sanjiwani Sura ). The only way to put a stop to such a preparation is to subject them to a very high rate of duty so as to make their availability as costly as possible. ( 8 ) IN the year 1986, a Sub-Committee was appointed by the U. P. Government for miking recommendations regarding categorisation of Ayurvedic medicines containing alcohol which were capable of being consumed as ordinary alcoholic beverage. This Committee consisted of the Director of Ayurvedic Medicines, Supsrintendent, State Pharmacy, Director of Post Graduate institute of India (Medicine), Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi, and one Haji Mohammad sabbir Raza of Lucknow. This Committee came to the conclusion that the Ayurvedic preparations could be used for potable purposes at a place where no other alcoholic beverages are available. ( 9 ) IN M. B. S. Ousdhalaya v. Union of India MANU/sc/0077/1962,, AIR1963 SC 622 , [1963 ]3 scr957 , the question before the Supreme Court was about the legality of duties levied on the medicinal and toilet preparations by the State Governments. ( 9 ) IN M. B. S. Ousdhalaya v. Union of India MANU/sc/0077/1962,, AIR1963 SC 622 , [1963 ]3 scr957 , the question before the Supreme Court was about the legality of duties levied on the medicinal and toilet preparations by the State Governments. The Supreme Court allowed the petitions filed before it under Article 32 of the Constitution and directed that Mrit Sanjiwani sura, Mritasanjibarii and Mritasanjibani Sudha were three Ayurvedic medicinal preparations. They could be taxed under the various Excise Acts in force in various States and could further be taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties)Act. The observations, which are material for our purposes in this case, are: they are also capable of being misused as ordinary alcoholic beverages. ( 10 ) THE State Legislature had enacted Section 37-A empowering the State Government to prohibit import, export, transport, possession or consumption of intoxicants in the areas mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 37-A. Sub-section (4) of Section 37-A was, however, subject to Sub-section (3) of the aforesaid section. Sub-section (3) of Section 37-A empowered the State Government to select different areas for prohibition in the State after taking into account any [one] or more of the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (d) of the aforesaid sub-section. Sub-section (3) was enacted in order to give effect to the policy of gradual extension of prohibition. In Clause (iv) of (a), "hill area" is mentioned as an area where prohibition could be imposed. The State Government had earlier imposed the policy of prohibition in twelve districts but subsequently it was confined to five districts, which were pithoragarh, Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, Tehri Garhwal and Pauri Garhwal. They had been declared to be dry, in addition to Hardwar and Brindaban areas in the districts of Saharanpur and Mathura. ( 11 ) IN order to have successful implementation of the policy of prohibition, the State government felt it necessary that it should issue a notification as empowered by Section 75, which reads "except insofar as the State Government may by notification so direct. ( 11 ) IN order to have successful implementation of the policy of prohibition, the State government felt it necessary that it should issue a notification as empowered by Section 75, which reads "except insofar as the State Government may by notification so direct. " The State government issued notification No. 9249-E/xiii-564-77, on 14th September, 1978, the relevant portion of which is quoted below: in exercise of the powers under Section 75 of the U. P. Excise Act, 1910 (U. P. Act No. IV of 1910), the Governor is pleased to direct that with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Gazette, the provisions preceding Section 75 of the aforesaid Act, and the rules, existing and as may from time to time be made with respect to transport, possession, sale or supply of restricted spirituous preparations, shall in areas specified or as the State Government may from time to time specify under Sub-section (4) of Section 37-A of the said Act, apply to the transport, possession, sale or supply by medical practitioners chemists, druggists, apothecaries and keepers of dispensaries of bona fide medicated articles for medicinal purposes as may be declared liquor under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the said Act. ( 12 ) THE issuance of the notification under Section 75 applying the provisions of Sections 1 to 74 to medicinal preparations could not serve the purpose unless some more steps were taken. For this purpose, on the same date, the State Government issued another notification No. 9250-E/xiii-564-77 declaring that with effect from the date of publication of the notification itself the homeopathic dilutions containing alcohol and other spirituous medicinal preparations would be deemed to be liquor for the purposes of transport, possession, and sale within the meaning of this Act. The combined effect of the two notifications was that the medicines mentioned therein were to be regarded or deemed to be liquor for the purposes of transport, possession and sale. ( 13 ) AS a result of the combined effect of the two notifications aforesaid, the medicinal preparations mentioned in the Schedule in the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 were to be regarded as restricted spirituous preparations. Further steps were necessary to make rules under Section 40 by the State Government laying down the details about transport and possession of notified restricted spirituous preparations. Further steps were necessary to make rules under Section 40 by the State Government laying down the details about transport and possession of notified restricted spirituous preparations. Consequently, the State Government in exercise of the powers under Sub-sections (1) and (2) and the proviso to Sub-section (3) of section 40 of the U. P. Excise Act issued notification No. 9251-E/xiii-564-77 on 14th september, 1978, itself, publishing "the Uttar Pradesh Transport and Possession of Notified restricted Spirituous Preparations (Prevention of Misuse) Rules, 1978. " Rule 3 of the said Rules classified spirituous medicinal and toilet preparations in two categories, namely, restricted preparations and unrestricted preparations. A list of restricted preparations was given in the schedule appended to these Rules. This list included, amongst others, Mrit Sanjiwani Sura. ( 14 ) IN exercise of the powers under Section 76, the State Government issued another notification no. 9252-E/xiii-564-77 on 14th September, 1978, exempting throughout Uttar Pradesh the "notified Restricted Spirituous Preparations" as defined in Rule 2 (ii) of the Uttar Pradesh transport and Possession of Notified Restricted Spirituous Preparations (Prevention of Misuse)Rules, 1978, from the operation of the provisions of the said Act, other than sections mentioned therein and of the Rules made under the aforesaid Act other than the Uttar Pradesh Transport and possession of Notified Restricted Spirituous Preparations (Prevention of Misuse) Rules, 1978. ( 15 ) THE only other rule to which mention was made during the course of argument by the learned counsel for the petitioners was Rule 12. It deals with the grant and renewal of licence for the retail vend of notified rsetricted spirituous medicinal preparations. It provides that licence for the retail vend of notified restricted spirituous medicinal preparations in Form 15-B (Appendix II)shall be granted by the Collector of the district to bona fide chemists and druggists who may make an application for the same giving details of the licences held by them under the Drugs and cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Central Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. ( 16 ) FEELING it necessary that sale of notified restricted spirituous preparations was necessary, the excise Commissioner in exercise of the powers under Section 41 of the U. P. Excise Act, with the previous sanction of the State Government, made the rules known as "the Uttar Pradesh Sale of notified Restricted Spirituous Preparations (Prevention of Misuse) Rules, 1978", notifying on september 14, 1978, by notification No. 4487-Licence, with a view to regulate the sale of the notified restricted spirituous preparations. ( 17 ) THE first submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners was that the notifications Nos. 9250,9251,9252 and 4487 aforesaid were ultra vires the powers of the State Government inasmuch as the State Government being the delegatee could exercise only such powers as had been conferred upon it. The occasion to issue the notifications under Sections 4 (1), 40,41 and 76 could arise only when the notification under Section 75 applying the provisions of Sections 1 to 74 of the U. P. Excise Act had been first lifted. So long as the notification lifting the applicability of Sections 1 to 74 had not been published, as was required by Section 77, the State Government did not have the power to issue notifications under Sections 4 (1), 76, 40 and the Excise commissioner under Section 41. Issuance of the notification under Section 75 and its publication in the official Gazette was a condition precedent and so long as that condition had not been accomplished, the publication of other notifications, though simultaneous, was invalid. For the proposition advanced, learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of this Court in Vir narain Tyagi v. The State of U. P. 1978 ALJ 919. This was also a case relating to the validity of the notifications issued under Sections 75, 76, 40 and 41. The sequence of the notifications of that case was: 1. Notification No. 1130-E/xiii-523-72 under Section 4. 2. Notification No. 1128-E/xiii-523-72 under Section 40. 3. Notification No. 1131-E/xiii-523-72 under Section 75. 4. Notification No. 1132-E/xiii-523-72|under Section 76. All the aforesaid notifications were dated February 13, 1978. The fifth notification involved in that case was No. 11719/xxv-19, published on the same date by the Excise Commissioner. Notification No. 1130-E/xiii-523-72 under Section 4. 2. Notification No. 1128-E/xiii-523-72 under Section 40. 3. Notification No. 1131-E/xiii-523-72 under Section 75. 4. Notification No. 1132-E/xiii-523-72|under Section 76. All the aforesaid notifications were dated February 13, 1978. The fifth notification involved in that case was No. 11719/xxv-19, published on the same date by the Excise Commissioner. ( 18 ) BEFORE the Division Bench, the argument was that the power to issue notifications under the u. P. Excise Act, came into being only after the notification containing the relevant direction under Section 75 had been issued, and as the notification under Section 75 was not first in point of time, the other notifications issued under Sections 4, 40, 41 and 76 were invalid. This contention was upheld by the Division Bench by holding that: in view of the words except insofar as the State Government may by notification so direct occuring in Section 75 and the manner of issuing such a notification provided for in Section 77 of the U. P. Excise Act the prior publication of a notification under Section 75 is a condition precedent to the exercise of any power under Sections 1 to 74 insofar as they relate to the import, manufacture, possession, sale or supply of any bona fide medicated article for medicinal purposes by medical practitioners etc, referred to in Section 75. ( 19 ) WE respectfully agree with the view taken in Vir Narain Tyagi v. The State of U. P. 1987 alj 919 (supra) that the notification under Section 75 had to be issued first directing the application of the provisions of Sections 1 to 74 to the medicinal preparations before the notifications under Sections 4, 40, 41 and 76 were issued. We also respectfully express our agreement that publication of the notification under Section 75 was a condition precedent. In other words, so long as a notification under Section 75 had not been published, no action under the Act with regard to bona fide medicated articles for medicinal purposes could be taken. By section 75, the applicability of Sections 1 to 74 to bona fide medicated articles for medicinal purposes had been excluded except insofar as the State Government may direct by notification. The State Government had the power to issue a notification applying the provisions of the U. P. Excise Act to medicated articles meant for medicinal purposes. By section 75, the applicability of Sections 1 to 74 to bona fide medicated articles for medicinal purposes had been excluded except insofar as the State Government may direct by notification. The State Government had the power to issue a notification applying the provisions of the U. P. Excise Act to medicated articles meant for medicinal purposes. As observed above, so long as the notification directing the applicability of Sections 1 to 74 or any other provision preceding section 75 had not been applied to medicinal preparations by the State Government by means of a notification, no action under them could be taken. ( 20 ) THE difficulty, however, arises when the learned Counsel for the petitioners want us to apply the ratio of the aforesaid case to the facts of the present case. In the instant case, we have given the details of all the relevant notifications with the object of demonstrating that the notifications issued in this case were in proper order and after Sections 1 to 74 had been applied by means of notification No. 9249, that other notifications followed by Section 4 (1) declaring spirituous medicinal preparations as "liquor" were issued. , Notification No. 9249 being prior in point of time, the notification No. 9252 was not beyond the powers of the State Government. The State government had acquired the power to declare-spirituous medicinal preparations as "liquor" inasmuch as Sub-section (1) of Section 4 had become applicable by reason of the lifting of the exception provided for by Section 75. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel urged that irrespective of the sequence in which the notifications were issued in Vir Narain Tyagis 1978 case ALJ 919 (supra), the law laid down in that case was that the relevant notifications could not be issued on the same date inasmuch as the State government could acquire jurisdiction to issue other notifications only after the publication of the notification under Section 75 had been finalised, and since at the time when the notifications under Sections 4 (1), 40, 41 and 76 had been prepared by the State Government in the instant case, the notification under Section 75 had not seen the light of the day, the State Government did not have the power or jurisdiction to declare under Section 4 (1) that the Spirituous Medicinal preparations were liable to be treated as liquor. Similar argument was made by the learned counsel with regard to the notifications issued under Sections 76 and 40. We find it difficult to accept the submission of the petitioners learned Counsel. The power of the State Government had to be found from the various provisions of the U. P. Excise Act. Section 75 could not restrain the State Government from thinking about the policy which it had to apply with regard to medicinal preparations. The decision of imposing prohibition under Sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 37-A is inter-linked, in the circumstances of the present case, with Sections 75, 40 and 41. There could be no successful implementation of the policy of prohibition unless the State government had taken decisions simultaneously with the matters enumerated therein. It is not the requirement of law that there should be time lag before the notification under Section 75 and other notifications under Sections 4, 40, 76 and 41 had been issued. For implementing the policy of prohibition, several steps were necessary and decision with regard to all the steps had to be taken at one and the same time. ( 22 ) FOR what we have said above, we agree with the submission of the learned Counsel that section 75 was a condition precedent. But, we are unable to uphold the contention that publication of this notification with others could not be simultaneous. One aspect of the matter which we wish to emphasise here is that it is the same authority, that is, the State Government which had to issue all the three other notifications. It was emphasised by the learned Counsel that the earlier judgment being that of a Division Bench, this Court is bound by the same and if it wishes to differ, the case will have to be referred to a larger Banch. We must have thought of referring the case to a larger Bench had we decided to differ from the earlier decision. We, in fact, agree with the ratio of the aforesaid case and, therefore, there is no occasion or question of referring the controversy involved before us to a larger Bench. What is binding on a subsequent bench is the principle of the radio decidendi. We, in fact, agree with the ratio of the aforesaid case and, therefore, there is no occasion or question of referring the controversy involved before us to a larger Bench. What is binding on a subsequent bench is the principle of the radio decidendi. It has been said by Dias in his book on jurisprudence at page 49 that statements which are not part of radio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not binding. The author says: no rule could be regarded as being the ratio decidendi which would not support the ultimate result. ( 23 ) ANOTHER aspect of the matter which needs a mention is that a decision is to be read in the light of facts in which it is given. If it is divorced from facts, the true principle laid down cannot be found. In Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495, Lord Chancellor Halsbury said at page 506, indicating some of the principles on which the law of precedents is based, that [the] first principle is that every judgment must be read in the context of the facts of that particular case. The second principle is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not for the proposition that seems to follow logically from it. ( 24 ) IF we take into account the facts of the case of Vir Narain Tyagi 1978 ALJ 919 (supra), there would be no difficulty in finding that the ratio of the decision was that the notification under section 75 had to precede before the notifications under Sections 4, 40, 41 and 76 had been issued. In that case, the learned Judges neither had any occasion nor did they say that irrespective of the sequence of the notifications, all of them were invalid simply on the ground that they had been issued on the same date. We are unable to find anything in the U. P. Excise act which prohibited the State Government to have simultaneously published the notifications. In the interpretation of statutes, it is as important to read the statute as it is to read about it. If we were to keep this thing in mind, there would be no difficulty in accepting that the notifications could be made simultaneously. In the interpretation of statutes, it is as important to read the statute as it is to read about it. If we were to keep this thing in mind, there would be no difficulty in accepting that the notifications could be made simultaneously. It would be impossible to think that the State Government would publish the notification under Section 75 without any purpose in view. It may be noted here that it is not passible for the Court to control the process of thinking of the State Government and to rule it that first it must decide about Section 75 and only then start thinking about other steps necessary to be taken for achieving the purpose for which the notification under Section 75 is issued and the provisions of Sections 1 to 74 are made applicable to medicinal preparations. If we look for the meaning of a particular word, phrase, sentence, paragraph or section, the context also includes the relevant factors outside the item under examination that are contained in the statute itself (Reed Dikerson "the Interpretation and Application of Statutes", page 110 ). ( 25 ) IF the Legislature would have intended, what was argued before us by the learned Counsel, it could have said so by making a provision in the U. P. Excise Act itself. Something which is not intended in the section, cannot be imported into it. ( 26 ) IT has been said in Introduction to English Law by Phillip S. James, Seventh Edition, at page 12, that: it is the duty of the Judges to know it and to apply the principles which emerge from the case law of the past, to adapt them to the conditions of the present, and so to mould them that they may be fit to serve for the future. Not every thing which a Judge says in the course of his judgment creates a precedent, but only his pronouncement of law in relation to the particular facts before him This pronouncement as already stated above, is called the ratio decidendi of the case. ( 27 ) RELYING on the following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Somwanti v. State Punjab MANU/sc/0038/1962,, AIR1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 , learned Counsel urged that the sequence of the notifications has an important role to decide the controversy before us. ( 27 ) RELYING on the following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Somwanti v. State Punjab MANU/sc/0038/1962,, AIR1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 , learned Counsel urged that the sequence of the notifications has an important role to decide the controversy before us. The passage is quoted below: the serial numbers of the notifications are Nos. 5809/41 (B) (1)/61/1875and dated August 18, 1961 and 5809-4 IB (1)/61/18760 dated August 19, 1961, and it would appear from them that the preliminary notification did in fact precede the final declaration. ( 28 ) WE find that the notification under Section 75 was first in point of time and thereafter others were made. The Court should follow the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case where as well on the basis of serial numbers the Supreme Court held that the notification under Section 4 preceded the final declaration made under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the aforesaid case, by dispensing with Section 5-A, the State government had published the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 on the same date. The controversy was whether the State Government had the power to issue the two notifications on the same date, when the requirement of law was that Section 4 notification should precede the notification under Section 6. The Supreme Court repelled the argument raised on behalf of the appellant before it who had challenged the validity of the two notifications. The Supreme Court observed that the two notifications could be issued on the same date. ( 29 ) DISTINGUISHING Somwantis case MANU/sc/0038/1962,, AIR1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 , the learned Counsel for the petitioners urged that as prior publication of the notification under section 4 was not necessary as it is in respect of Section 75 notification, the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act could be issued simultaneously. For this proposition, our attention had been drawn to the observations made by the Division Bench in Vir Narain Tyagis case 1978 ALJ 919 (supra), which distinguished Somwantis case MANU/sc/0038/1962 , air1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 from the facts of the case before it and stated: this observation was obviously based on the language of the two sections. For this proposition, our attention had been drawn to the observations made by the Division Bench in Vir Narain Tyagis case 1978 ALJ 919 (supra), which distinguished Somwantis case MANU/sc/0038/1962 , air1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 from the facts of the case before it and stated: this observation was obviously based on the language of the two sections. Had the language of these sections made prior publication of a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 a condition precedent to the publication of a notification under Sub-section 6 the decision of the supreme Court would obviously have been that notifications under Section 4 and 6 could not be issued simultaneously. ( 30 ) AT this juncture, we wish to make a reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court wherein it has been found that prior publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land acquisition Act is necessary before issuing a declaration under Sub-section (1) of Section 6. ( 31 ) IN Collector v. Raja Ram MANU/sc/0270/1985,, AIR1985 SC 1622 , 1985 (1 )SCALE1044 , (1985 )3 SCC1 , [1985 ]3 SCR995 , the Supreme Court said: A bare perusal of Section 4 (1) clearly shows that in order to comply with the statutory requirements therein set out, a notification stating therein the land which is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose has to be published in the official Gazette. The second part of the sub-section provides that the Collector has to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. ( 32 ) THE further observations made in this case, which are helpful for us, are: the Court also referred to Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab MANU/sc/0034/1962 , AIR1963 sc 151 , [1963 ]33 Compcas745 (SC ), [1963 ]2 SCR774 and quoted with approval the statement therein made that a valid notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 is a condition precedent to the making of a declaration under Sub-section (1) of Section 6. This view has been consistently followed and was approved in State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib (1973) SCR 856 : AIR 1973 SC 2861, wherein it was observed that in the case of a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the law has prescribed that in addition to the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette, the Collector must also give publicity of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality. ( 33 ) ANOTHER decision to which reference may be made is Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of delhi MANU/sc/0228/1984. , AIR1984 SC 1721 , 1984 (2 )SCALE239 , (1984 )4 SCC308 , [1985 ]1 SCR588 , 1985 (17 )UJ237 (SC ). In this case, the Supreme Court held: publication in the official Gazette and public notice are two vital steps required to be taken under section 4 (1) before proceeding to take the next step of entering upon the land under Section 4 (2 ). The time factor is not a vital element of Section 4 (1); publication in the official Gazette and public notice in the locality are the essential elements of Section 4 (1 ). ( 34 ) WE may also point out against (sic) passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Babu singh v. Union of India MANU/sc/0403/1979,, AIR1979 SC 1713 , (1981 )3 SCC628 , which is as under: a notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 is a condition precedent to the making of notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 6. If this Government, therefore, takes a decision to make such a notification and thereafter two further decisions, i. e. , to dispense with compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A and to declare that the land comprised in the notification is in fact needed for a public purpose, there is no departure from any provision of the law even though the two notifications are published on the same day. ( 35 ) IN this case, the Supreme Court was considering the question about the publication of the notification under Section 6 where the enquiry contemplated under Section 5-A had been dispensed with. After having referred to Somavanti v. State of Punjab MANU/sc/0038/1962,, air1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 , the Supreme Court had ruled that after the publication of the notification under Section 4, the notification under Section 6 could be issued. After having referred to Somavanti v. State of Punjab MANU/sc/0038/1962,, air1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 , the Supreme Court had ruled that after the publication of the notification under Section 4, the notification under Section 6 could be issued. What is important to note in all of these cases is that the publication of the notification under Section 4 had been found to be mandatory or, in other words, a condition precedent for proceeding with acquisition by making a final declaration where Section 5-A had been dispensed with. The Supreme Court in babu Singhs case MANU/sc/0403/1979 , AIR1979 SC 1713 , (1981 )3 SCC628 said that section 6 notification could be immediately issued after the notification under Section 4. They could be one after the other. ( 36 ) FOR what we have said above, we find that the view taken by the Supreme Court in somavantis case MANU/sc/0038/1962 , AIR1963 SC 1 , [1963 ]3 SCR22 about simultaneous publication of the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 is of great help to us in deciding the controversy. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the petitioners learned Counsels argument that the notification under Section 4 (1) is since (sic) a limited section only for enabling the officials to enter upon the land for inspection and for determination of compensation for keeping the value of the land fair with reference to the date of its publication, therefore, it could not be given as much importance as has been given to Section 75. He urged that a notification under section 4 (1) was not a condition precedent to the publication of the notification under Section 6 (1 ). Whatever may be the purpose of Section 4 (1), it is first [the] step and [a] mandatory one for acquisition without which further action cannot be taken. Its publication is also mandatory, as would be clear from the decisions cited above by us. ( 37 ) THE question whether a particular piece of delegated legislation, whether a rule or regulation, is in excess of the power of subordinate legislation conferred on the delegate, has to be determined with reference only to the specific provisions contained in the relevant statute which conferred the power to make the rules. ( 37 ) THE question whether a particular piece of delegated legislation, whether a rule or regulation, is in excess of the power of subordinate legislation conferred on the delegate, has to be determined with reference only to the specific provisions contained in the relevant statute which conferred the power to make the rules. It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the statute can best be implemented and what measures substantive as well as procedural would have to be taken for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It is not for the Courts to examine the merits or demerits of the policy laid down by rule making body because its scrutiny is to be confined only to the question as to whether the rule falls within the scope of the regulation making power conferred on the delegate by the statute. ( 38 ) IN the instant case, we have mentioned above that one of the objects of the U. P. Excise Act is to provide for prohibition which is provided for by Article 47 of the Constitution. Article 47 requires the States to endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption for the purposes of improvement of public health-Article 47 is founded largely on Gandhian puritanism and directed primarily towards socially and physically depressed classes of people living in India. The notifications issued by the State Government in respect of which it had been duly empowered, cannot be quashed on the technical ground which has been urged, before us, even if we would have been in agreement with the petitioners counsel. We would have thought in that event that Article 226 of the Constitution is not to come to the aid of such persons. We have noted above that the notifications were valid. We have already emphasised the distinction in facts of the present case and those which were for consideration before the Division Bench deciding Vir Narain Tagirs case 1978 ALJ 919 (supra ). ( 39 ) IN his article "the Theory of Judicial Precedents" 16 L. Q. B. , page 376, J. W. Salmond observed: The only thing in a Judges decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. ( 39 ) IN his article "the Theory of Judicial Precedents" 16 L. Q. B. , page 376, J. W. Salmond observed: The only thing in a Judges decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. ( 40 ) FOR the purpose of appreciation of the points decided, the Court must look into the facts of the earlier cases as well as that of the case before it. If the two cases are distinguishable on facts, the earlier decision would not be binding. Every case has certain facts which every body recognises would be material and the ratio decidendi is all the material facts plus the conclusion. ( 41 ) IN the instant case we have noted above that the decision of the earlier case turned on its own facts. Divorced from facts, it is not possible to hold that in Vir Narain Tyagi v. State of U. P. 1978 ALJ 919 {supra) even if the sequence of the notifications would have been in the same order, as it is in the present case, the law would have been the same. ( 42 ) HAVING thus disposed of the main argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, we come to the other submissions made before us. Some of these grounds have been either rejected by the Full Bench in Sheo Kumar v. The State AIR 1976 All 386 (supra) or by the Division bench in Vir Narain Tyagi v. State of U. P. 1978 ALJ 919 (supra ). ( 43 ) LEARNED counsel urged that since Mrit Sanjiwani Sura is a medicine, which is being used by the public at large for the last more than hundred years and which has great medicinal potentiality, the State Government could not have included the said medicine in the list of "liquor". It has been said in paragraph 50 of the counter-affidavit that Mrit Sanjiwani Sura, which is manufactured by the process of distillation and fermentation, contains alcohol more than 24% v/v and is being generally misused as alcoholic beverages in the prohibition areas of the State. It was on this account that Mrit Sanjiwani Sura and other medicinal preparations in homeopathic System have been declared as liquor. It was on this account that Mrit Sanjiwani Sura and other medicinal preparations in homeopathic System have been declared as liquor. ( 44 ) THE State Government had picked up 17 medicines out of 600, as according to the material in its possession, those medicinal preparations were being widely misused. This point had been raised earlier in Vir Narain Tyagis case 1978 ALJ 919, and in paragraph 25 of the said judgment, the argument was repelled. Since the same material exists in the instant case, as it was before the Bench deciding Vir Narain Tyagis case, we respectfully agree with the decision given in that case. In M. B. S. Ousdhalaya v. Union of India MANU/sc/0077/1962,, AIR1963 SC 622 , [1963 ]3 SCR957 , the Supreme Court held that Mrit Sanjiwani Sura is also capable of being used as ordinary alcoholic beverage. It has been seen earlier that by the notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4, spirituous medicinal preparations and homeopathic dilutions containing alcohol have to be treated as liquor. ( 45 ) BROADLY speaking, the word "liquor" signifies any sort of liquid or fluid substance, but it is employed more particularly in characterising intoxicating beverages. However, the word "liquor" is sometimes used in a general sense denoting an alcoholic or spirituous liquor, either distilled or fermented, and as including all kinds of intoxicating decoctions, liquids, or beverages, whether spirituous, vinous, malt, or intoxicating, and it has frequently been defined by statute as including all distilled or rectified spirits, wine, and fermented and malt liquor. The State governments decision, therefore, with regard to Mrit Sanjiwani Sura cannot be challenged as incorrect. ( 46 ) SECTION 3 (11) of the U. P. Excise Act defines the expression "liquor" as meaning intoxicating liquor. The expression "intoxicant" has been defined in Sub-section (13) of Section 3 as intoxicant means any liquor or intoxicating drug as defined by this Act. ( 47 ) SECTION 4, as has been noted by us above, confers power on the State Government to declare by notification any substance to be liquor for the purposes of this Act. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 4 (1), certain medicinal preparations have been declared as spirituous medicinal preparations. The word "spirituous" has been defined in Webstors Dictionary as rum, whisky, brandy and other distilled liquors. The Century Dictionary defines "spirituous liquors" as containing much alcohol. In exercise of the power conferred by Section 4 (1), certain medicinal preparations have been declared as spirituous medicinal preparations. The word "spirituous" has been defined in Webstors Dictionary as rum, whisky, brandy and other distilled liquors. The Century Dictionary defines "spirituous liquors" as containing much alcohol. The use of the word "deemed" introduces statutory fiction and thus has artificial conceptions imbeded therein. ( 48 ) IN Com v. Grey, 502, 61 AM DEC, 476, Metcalf, J. , said: all spirituous liquors are intoxicating ( 49 ) LEARNED counsel had argued that since the medicinal preparations were wrongly notified as spirituous medicinal preparations, prohibition laid down by Section 37-A in the five hill districts had been wrongly applied in respect of Mrit Sanjiwani Sura, and others which are notified in the schedule as such. The general test for determining what medicinal compound or preparations containing alcohol may be considered intoxicating within the meaning of the term "intoxicating liquors" is the capability of the article in question for use as a beverage. Where, as here, therefore, a preparation had medicinal qualities and had been classed as a medicine, but that does not prevent its being within the prohibitory laws so far as liquors retain their intoxicating character and are capable of being used as a bevarage. Liquor traffic is dangerous to public health, safety and morals and, therefore, prohibition with regard to its transport, possession and sale is fully justified. This power is incidental to societies right to self-protection. It rests upon the right of the state to care for the health, morals and welfare of the people. ( 50 ) THE next argument of the petitioners counsel was that by issuing notifications impugned by this petition, the State Government has put a ban to trade in the medicinal preparations in respect of which fundamental right has been conferred by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. This argument was repelled by this Court in Vir Narain Tyagis case 1978 ALJ 919 (supra) by observing: in our opinion, for this reason too the challenge to the impugned notifications on the ground that they are hit by Article 19 of the Constitution cannot be sustained. Consequently, the challenge to the impugned notifications on the ground that they contravene the provisions of Article 19 (1) (g)of the Constitution also fails. . Consequently, the challenge to the impugned notifications on the ground that they contravene the provisions of Article 19 (1) (g)of the Constitution also fails. . ( 51 ) IN fact, the aforesaid Division Bench while negativing the claim of fundamental right had relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Sheo Kumar v. State AIR 1976 All 386 (supra ). The Full Bench had held that no person has any right to trade in intoxicants or drugs. The State has the exclusive privilege in respect of manufacture, possession, sale or consumption of intoxicating liquors and drugs. While taking the aforesaid view, the Full Bench had referred to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court. In paragraph 8, the Full Bench held: in this context, if the State totally prohibits transport or possession of intoxicating liquors or drugs, it will be placing reasonable restrictions on the freedom of inter-State trade and commerce in such business. Narendra Kumar v. Union of India MANU/sc/0013/1959,, AIR1960 SC 430 , [1960 ]2 SCR375 , M/s, Fatehchand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra MANU/sc/0041/1977,, air1977 SC 1825 , (1977 )79 BOMLR553 , (1977 )2 SCC670 , [1977 ]2 SCR828 , Suresh chandra v. State of U. P. MANU/up/0138/1977. , AIR1977 All 515. It cannot be said that section 37-A violated Article 301. ( 52 ) THE next argument of the petitioners learned Counsel was that the Drugs and Cosmetics act, 1940, as well as Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955, which are central Acts, control and regulate the manufacture, production, distribution and sale of medicines containing alcohol. Consequently, the State had no jurisdiction to make any laws regulating the transport, possession and sale of medicines containing alcohol and narcotic drugs. ( 53 ) A similar argument was raised and rejected in Vir Narain Tyagis case 1978 ALT 919 (supra ). We may recall that the aforesaid case was also a case challenging the notifications issued under Sections 75, 4, 40 and 41 with respect to medicinal preparations, including Mrit sanjiwani Sura. After having elaborately discussed all the aspects on the aforesaid controversy, the Division Bench held: as a necessary corollary provisions regulating misuse of medicinal preparations and drugs containing alcohol can be made by the State Government as also by the Excise Commissioner in the exercise of powers conferred on them by various Sections of the U. P. Excise Act. After having elaborately discussed all the aspects on the aforesaid controversy, the Division Bench held: as a necessary corollary provisions regulating misuse of medicinal preparations and drugs containing alcohol can be made by the State Government as also by the Excise Commissioner in the exercise of powers conferred on them by various Sections of the U. P. Excise Act. Such an interpretation would be in conformity with the rule of interpretation about harmonious construction, making an endeavour to solve the conflict and attempting a reconciliation as laid down by the Supreme Court in Harakh Chands case. ( 54 ) WE respectfully agree with the view taken in that case and reject the submission of the petitioners counsel. ( 55 ) LEARNED counsel also urged about the selection of areas under Section 37-A of of the U. P. Excise Act for regulating the sale of Mrit Sanjiwani Sura and other spirituous medicinal preparations as arbitrary. Counsel urged that the selection of five hill districts being arbitrary, the prohibition hits Article 14 of the Constitution. It may be noted that Section 37-A confers power on the State Government to choose the districts or areas where prohibition has to be imposed. Sub-section (3) of Section 37-A has provided that from time to time the State Government could select areas in that behalf after taking into account any one or more of the factors enumerated therein. Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) of Section 37-A mentions the hill areas where prohibition could be imposed. It is a matter of common knowledge that hill area is a backward area and for the purposes of development and to eradicate social and other evils the legislature chose five districts for prohibition. The main object of imposing prohibition is to compel the residents not to waste their money on drinks and to spend the same on the members of their families as a result of which their living may be more comfortable by making the money, which is wasted over drinks, available to the members of their families. The main object of imposing prohibition is to compel the residents not to waste their money on drinks and to spend the same on the members of their families as a result of which their living may be more comfortable by making the money, which is wasted over drinks, available to the members of their families. ( 56 ) LEARNED counsel urged that since previously prohibition had been imposed in twelve districts and now it has been reduced to five, the State Government is not acting in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 37-A, which requires gradual extension of prohibition, and not reducing the area by confining it to lesser number of districts than those which had earlier been taken up for that purpose. On this matter the discretion rests with the State Government and if expediency or other administrative difficulties were felt in continuing the policy in all the twelve districts where it had been initially imposed, it is not open to this Court to quash the prohibition imposed in five districts on this ground. Nothing could be pointed out to us that the decision of the State Government was based on considerations irrelevant to the power reposed. Consequently, we are unable to accept the argument that the action was arbitrary, unreasonable or was the result of the abuse of the discretion. It is incorrect to argue that prohibition confined to five district of Uttar Pradesh represents the will and whim of the State Government, rather than its judgment, or that there is no reasonable relation to a lawful purpose. ( 57 ) IN Sheo Kumar v. State AIR 1976 All 386 (supra), the Full Bench held that Section 37-A does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation as it lays down guidelines or standards for selection of intoxicants or areas. This argument is also rejected. ( 58 ) THE next submission was that limit of possession of Mrit Sanjiwani Sura by a person being 36 ml. was ridiculous and resulted in creating unnecessary hardship to patients who are required to travel long distances from their villages to purchase the same from the chemist shops. In paragraphs 33 and 34 of the counter-affidavit reply to this argument has been satisfactorily given. was ridiculous and resulted in creating unnecessary hardship to patients who are required to travel long distances from their villages to purchase the same from the chemist shops. In paragraphs 33 and 34 of the counter-affidavit reply to this argument has been satisfactorily given. It has been stated that the limit Of individual possession of 36 ml of Mrit Sanjiwani Sura has been fixed after obtaining expert advice of Director of Ayurvedic medicines. On the basis of the advice, the limit of possession at one time of 3 litres of Mrit Sanjiwani Sura by a doctor under the permit in Form FL-15 had also been fixed. Annexure f to the counter-affidavit is the copy of the order of the Excise Commissioner dated 14-9-1978 prescribing the quantity of Mrit sanjiwani Sura, Mrit Sanjiwani, and Mrit Sanjiwani Sudha as limit of individual possession. The anxiety of the petitioners to have more in quantity than prescribed by the doctor shows that it is not to be used as a medicine but for the purpose of being used as alcoholic beverage. For successful implementation of the policy of prohibition it is necessary that transport, possession and sale were regulated by means of the legislation. If that is not done, the very object of imposing prohibition would be defeated. The power of a State to regulate and prohibit possession, sale and transportation or use of intoxicating liquors is a matter of universal recognition. This power with respect to intoxicating liquors is said to exist as corelative to the state duty to protect the community from crime, to support paupers, since the liquor traffic is frequently a source of pauperism and crime. ( 59 ) THE next argument of the petitioners learned Counsel was that although it is not necessary for the dealers, wholesale and retail, to obtain licences under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act for dealing in Ayurvedic medicines, but on account of Rule 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Transport and possession of Notified Restricted Spirituous Preparations (Prevention of Misuse) Rules, 1978, it would be necessary even for such a dealer to obtain a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics act. The submission was that as dealers of Ayurvedic medicines are neither required nor can they obtain a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act or other Central Drug Rules, therefore, those persons dealing in Ayurvedic medicines would be thrown out of their business. The submission was that as dealers of Ayurvedic medicines are neither required nor can they obtain a licence under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act or other Central Drug Rules, therefore, those persons dealing in Ayurvedic medicines would be thrown out of their business. The submission of the petitioners counsel is not correct. Rule 12 aforesaid only requires certain facts to be stated by chemists and druggists who have applied or made an application for the licence for the retail vend of notified restricted spirituous preparations, but that does not mean that those who want to trade in Mrit Sanjiwani Sura must possess a licence obtained under the Drugs and cosmetics Act. ( 60 ) THE last submission of the petitioners counsel that the State Government has the policy of increasing sale of liquors with a view to augment its income by realising more revenue by way of excise duty, is not correct. Since under Article 268 (2) of the Constitution the duties levied by the union but collected by the State do not form part of the Consolidated Fund of India but are assigned to the State concerned, we do hot find any merit in the submission of the petitioners counsel that the State Government wanted to curtail the amount of excise duties realizable from the medicinal and toilet preparations. The State Government imposed prohibition with a view to achieve the object behind Article 47 of the Constitution and not for the purpose argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. ( 61 ) FOR what we have said above, we do not find any merit in this petition and dismiss the same with costs. The stay order is discharged. .