JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - This is a petition, which raises issues in which neither law nor equity is in favour of the petitioner. On the contrary, it is an issue where the petitioner has violated all accepted principles of civic life in a planned environment. 2. The petitioner society has made no effort, subtle or otherwise, to hide the fact that it is a constituent of a powerful political syndicate. It frankly announces in its writ petition that it has amongst its patrons Ministers the Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. There was hardly any justification or purpose in mentioning these irrelevant facts. But, as the petitioner society lays emphasis on them both on record and arguments, the court, has been left with no option but to take note of the petitioner's submissions on record. Thus, according to the petition, in effect it is an organisation with considerable clout. What was the purpose of mentioning this in the petition ? The reason is clear ; ultimate intimidation of the administration. This will be borne out by the facts as are on record of the petition. 3. The present writ petition raises the issue whether a public park can be utilised for a purpose other than a park so as to negate the principles upon which a park is carved out in a planned urban environment. 4. The petitioner is a corporate body calling itself the U.P. Krishak Saniaj (hereinafter called the petitioner society) having its address at 119, Royal Hotel, Lucknow. The petition says that one Abdul Haq is its Organiser. The petition also places on record that the Deputy Speaker to U.P. Legislative Assembly, Mr. Trilok Chandra, is its Honorary Chairman and the Agriculture Minister of Uttar Pradesh its President. These facts are mentioned in the very first paragraph of the writ petition. The petitioner society mentions that, amongst others, one of its business activities is to hold industrial and agricultural exhibitions and fairs. In decided to hold an exhibition and a fair at the Purshottam Dass Tandon Park, Allahabad, during June - July 1986 and to carry out this purpose it made a proposal to the State Government to the effect that it desired to hold an exhibition and a fair for about forty days beginning from mid June at the P.D. Tandon park, Allahabad and that a permission to hold such a fair was sought. In its so - called proposal of 5 April 1986 the Society mentioned that it would pay rent, in effect for the use and occupation of the park and that it would observe the rules and regulations of the Nagar Mahapalika. This proposal of 5 April, 1986 was addressed to the State Minister for Urban Development, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. A copy of this proposal is addressed, to the Duputy Chairman of the Vidhan Sabha, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, the Agriculture Minister, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, the District Magistrate, Allahabad and the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika. The proposal itself is a wrong bengining for a wrong end. 5. The petitioner society conceals from the State Government that the intention to occupy the P.D. Tandon park was not so innocent as suggested. The initial proposal was devoid of details. The petitioner society was intent in bullying the administration with declarations on record that its patrons were high dignitaries, in Government. Initially, the petitioner society concealed its intentions that the public park would be occupied by shopkeepers, more than one hundred in number to carry out private business from a public place. Could this be done ? The society was the modality, a powerful consortium as it claims, to achieve this purpose. It was not an exhibition as it was so innocently declared, but a virtual lease and a sub-lease of a public park for private business. The society did not approach the heads of administration at .Allahabad. But, the society chose to approach the Minister for Urban Development Straightaway for seeking permission to occupy a public park on rent. The society endorsed a copy of its proposal to the Minister of Agriculture, Uttar Pradesh, the Chairman of the idhan Sabha, the District Magistrate, Allahabad and the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. The endorsement also carries a post script for all the aforesaid four : two Ministers and two local heads of administration. The post script says, in effect, that it is for information and necessary action. But, by whom? The purpose of this exercise is clear from the letter of the Joint Secretary, U.P. Government addressed to the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad dated 24th May 1986. The post script says, in effect, that it is for information and necessary action. But, by whom? The purpose of this exercise is clear from the letter of the Joint Secretary, U.P. Government addressed to the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad dated 24th May 1986. The Joint Secretary places on record, that in pursuance to the letter of the Society to the Minister of Urban Development he has been instructed to say (by whom the letter in reference does not say) that the Administrator should in accordance with law take the necessary steps and intimate the Government accordingly. The exercise was to encroach and occupy a public park. Why approach the Minister for it ? The public park is in Allahabad. Why was the illegal exercise initiated in Lucknow ? 6. The State Government with its minister at Lucknow ought to have negatived the proposal straight away, instead of marking it down to the Administrator at Allahabad. Likewise the Administrator also, indeed, if there was a slip in Lucknow, was obliged to prevent the illegal occupation of a public park. This he did not do. Otherwise how this public park occupied, is shrouded in mystery. 7. The society alleges in its petition that on 2 June, 1986 it deposited in advance rent of Rs. 5000/ - with the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad for use and occupation of the P.D. Tandon Park from 20 June, 1986 to 28 July, 1986 for the shops which would occupy this park to participate in a fair or an exhibition. On 11 June, 1986 another amount of Rs. 1500/- was deposited as rent for occupation of the park from 20 July, 1986 to 2th July, 1986. But how was monetary consideration for the occupation of a park deposited with and accepted by a local body ? 8. Strangely the petition does not explain how the money was deposited with the Nagar Mahapalika. There is no order of any official, responsible or otherwise, that a public park has b en permitted to be used for occupation by shops for participating in a fair or an exhibition. 8. Strangely the petition does not explain how the money was deposited with the Nagar Mahapalika. There is no order of any official, responsible or otherwise, that a public park has b en permitted to be used for occupation by shops for participating in a fair or an exhibition. This Court does not desire to make any comment except for the fact that there is no order on record of the petition to say that the permission have been granted to occupy the park notwithstanding whether the permission was regular or irregular and in pursuance of this order rent consideration was to be received by the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, for alienating the park for a purpose otherwise. The petition mentions that the petitioner "met both the respondents for allotment of land at P.D. fandon Park " The petitioner is a society and the petition does not disclose which representative of the society met the respondents. Further, the respondents are the Administrator, Nagar Mahapalika and the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika. Both the persona - designata are the same persons, the administrator is the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari Having Succeeded in depositing the monies as rent for use and occupation of the P.D. Tandon park, the society contends in its petition that it wrote to the persons interested to further sub-lease the park @ Rs. 3/- per sq. feet. The petition mentions that this was advertised by the pamphlets and hand - bills distributed throughout the State. The petition places on record the site plan of the proposed manner in which the public park would be occupied. The site plan reveals that along the parameters of the park running contiguous to its boundary wall there would be one hundred shops. In the centre of the park another twelve shops, and within the periphery of the park six additional shops would face the entrance of the park. The fact that a public park would be violated and utilised for private business is a naked admission on record of the petition. 9. The park would thus be rendered useless as a park and will be occupied by nearly 120 shops. The society mentions in the petition that it has already carried out "written standard form of contract to be made (sic) by the stall holders in the exhibition". 9. The park would thus be rendered useless as a park and will be occupied by nearly 120 shops. The society mentions in the petition that it has already carried out "written standard form of contract to be made (sic) by the stall holders in the exhibition". The circumstances of the occupation of a public park, are in short, that the petitioner society in collusion with the Nagar Mahapalika arranged to deposit rent for the illegal use and occupation of a public park and it further subleased this park to shop keepers for private business. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for the supply of electricity to these shop keepears. It appears that the electric connection was granted and evidently so, as the park has already been occupied, and private business is in full swing. The petition mentions that the goods for use at the exhibition and the fair have arrived and continue to arrive. The petition also mentions that it has also arranged with the State Government fire brigade service to stand by and that it had paid the requisite charges for this. 10. The petitioner mentions that on 23 June, 1986 some officials of the Nagar Mahapalika came to the park, and demanded from the shop keepers, who had occupied the park, the rent receipt on the basis of which they had squatted inside the park. The shop keepers told the officials of the Nagar Mahapalika that the receipts are with the Organiser of the society. The petition further mentions that the officials of the Nagar Mahapalika threatened the shop keepers or the stall holders not to occupy the park in future, or else the shops - would have to be demolished. In pursuance of the aforesaid threat, the petition records that certain building materials out of which shop or stalls are constructed were carried away by the officials of the Nagar Mahapalika. 11. The petition mentions that thereafter the organiser of the society went to the office of the Nagar Mahapalika to meet the respondents, where he was told that the respondent no. I was on leave, but he met the respondent No. 2 to whom he showed the receipt for the deposit of money as rent for use and occupation of the park and that he was told by the respondent No. 2 that the permission earlier granted to him to hold the exhibition has been cancelled. I was on leave, but he met the respondent No. 2 to whom he showed the receipt for the deposit of money as rent for use and occupation of the park and that he was told by the respondent No. 2 that the permission earlier granted to him to hold the exhibition has been cancelled. But, both the respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 i.e. Administrator and the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari are the same person. Whom had the petitioner met if the respondent No. 1 was on leave ? 12. The petition makes an issue of the fact that the society was not given any notice or opportunity before cancelling the permission for use and occupation of the park and that the respondent No. 2 Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, Nagar Mahapalika did not supply the order by which the earlier permission for use and occupation of the park had been cancelled. One glaring fact which emerges from the petition is whether there was an order permitting the Society to occupy the park ? The fact that the Society managed to deposit the advance rent for use and occupation of the park is separate from the fact that there was no tacit or formal order as a consequence of which the park had been occupied. 13. That the occupation of this public park was collusive and Surreptitious, is apparent from the writ petition itself. The petition in paragraph 13 narrates that on "23 June, 1986 some officials of the Nagar Mahapalika suddenly came to the exhibition site and asked for the production of rent receipts issued by the respondents". Also on record is a letter of the Administrator (Prashasak) J.N. Dwivedi. The date is 23 June, 1986 and reference No. 382/Prashasak-86. This is the only reference which admits that P.D. Tandon Park was allotted to the petitioner society. The letter does not say when and by whom. In this letter the Administrator says in effect that he has received complaints that the park is being misutilised and that thus the society is to cease its business in the park and its representative is to appeal before the Administrator on 27 June, 19&6. 14. The society has appended photocopies of receipts of the moneys received by the Nagar Mahapalika in consideration for the occupation of this public park for business. 14. The society has appended photocopies of receipts of the moneys received by the Nagar Mahapalika in consideration for the occupation of this public park for business. The details of the receipts are; On 2 June, 1986, against Book No. 3539 receipt No. 88 a sum of Rs. 5000/ - as security in pursuance of allotment and rent from 20 June to 18 July, 1986. On 11 June, 1986, against Book No. 3581 receipt No. 25 a sum of Rs. 1500/- as rent from 20 July, 1986 to 28 July, 1986 and on 19 July, 1986 against receipt No. 5205 a sum of Rs. 450/-, as rent for 30 days from 19 July, 1986 to 18 August, 1986. 15. The collusion to have private business conducted from a pubic place is apparent from the face of the record. Under the law a public place like a park cannot be encroached upon for private business; but the petitioner society nakedly set out on such an exercise by involving the higher echelons of the State Government and the heads of local administration. Instead of extricating themselves from such an illegal exercise, the administration permitted itself to be involved in it. There is no order of allotment but the park was occupied. There is no order of allotment but the moneys to rent the park for private business was accepted. There is no permission to occupy the park (as there cannot be in reference to the context), but the Administrator in his letter of 23rd June, 1986 aforesaid, refers to an allotment having been made, and of cancelling it. When was the allotment made and who made it ? According to the letter of 23rd June, 1986 the Administrator ought to know. 16. The callousness in violating the law by the administration itself is evident from the communication between the Additional district magistrate (Finance and Revenue) Allahabad and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad. This is latter No. 25/40/Ma - Ka/86 - 87, dated th8 July, 1986. The letter refers the case of the occupation of the park to the Senior Superintendent. It contains notings by several local administration authorities and of the Police. This is latter No. 25/40/Ma - Ka/86 - 87, dated th8 July, 1986. The letter refers the case of the occupation of the park to the Senior Superintendent. It contains notings by several local administration authorities and of the Police. The text of the letter is reproduced below:- Preshak Aparzila Magistrate (Vit Avam Rajasve) Allahabad Seva men, Varisht Police Adhikchak Allahabad Sankhya 25/40/MA-KA/86-87 Din Ank July 8,1986 Vishaya, Adhyogik Krishi Pradarshini Avam Mela P.D. Park Allahabad Men Dinank 10-7-86 SE 40 Din Tak Chalane Ke Sambandh Men Mahodaya, Uprokt Vishai Ke Sandarabh Men Nivedan Karna Hai Ki Shri Abdul Haq, Sanyojak U.P. Krishi Samaj 219 Royal Hotel Lucknow Ne Pradarshini Avam Mela P.D. Park Allahbad Men Dinank 10.7.86 Se 40 Din Ke Liye Lagane Ki Anumati Chahi Hai. Atah Apse Anurodh Hai Ki Uprokt Ke Sambandh Men Shanti Evam Vivastha Ke Dristikon Se Koyi Apati to Nahin Hai. Bhavadiya Bhairo Prasad 8-7-86 Aparzila Magistrate (Vit Avam Rajasva) Allahabad 17. This letter reveals that between the two authorities communicating with each other there was ignorance of the law that a public park could not be used for private business, and the assessment of breach of peace and public law and order was an irrelevant exercise. A park is to be left as a park. The authorities forgot the law. 18. The concepts of urban planning have laid down principles which put constraints on the use and occupation of certain public areas notwithstanding whether occupation is by a person, local body or a Government organisation. There can be no concept of urban planning without planned public roads and streets, a planned drainage system, public parks and spaces left open as a green belt. Like a public street, which is for the use of a pedestrian, who even has a limited right, a public park also is inviolate from trespass and encroachment. Like a public street, a public park is a facility for the better enjoyment of a planned city whether it is by infants, children, or infirm and the old. The use of a public park knows no class. A public park is a breathing valve of a planned city. 19. The powerful syndicates encroach upon parks and public streets and at times it is difficult for the citizen to voice their grievances in resenting such illegal occupation of public places and spaces. The use of a public park knows no class. A public park is a breathing valve of a planned city. 19. The powerful syndicates encroach upon parks and public streets and at times it is difficult for the citizen to voice their grievances in resenting such illegal occupation of public places and spaces. In such circumstances there is intimidation and fear of threats from syndicates of persons who forcefully occupy and encroach upon parks and roads. At times there are class actions in a court of law when citizens take courage to seek protection from Courts in reinforcing the local bodies in the performance of their statutory duties to keep public places free from encroachment and illegal occupation. It is at this juncture where the courts are obliged to call upon local bodies to administer, plan and maintain urban areas in accordance with their statutory obligations. Public parks, open spaces, and public streets are for the thousands and millions in the towns, cities and metropolises. Such areas are not to be occupied by a few', so that they hold the entire city to ransom by denying access to such areas in derogation of the purpose for which they were created. 20. When public streets were encroached and occupied by squatters, the attempt to clear public streets were resisted in a class action against the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The matter engaged the attention of the Supreme Court to resolve a public issue. Firstly, whether public roads, streets or footpaths (parks inclusive) can be encroached and whether such enoachers could resist the action of the Municipal Corporation, Bombay in evicting them without notice. The Supreme Court laid down the law on what exactly was the purpose of public properties like footpaths, pavements and public streets. Having declared the law that a public property like public street, causeway, footway passage, sidewalk, street, road, garden or playground could not be encroached upon or occupied, it further held that persons who occupy such public properties negate the purpose for which they were created, were liable to eviction without notice. The petitioner society is no exception to this rule. 21. In the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation ( AIR 1986 SC 180 ) the Supreme Court held that even the public had a limited right of using such public properties only for the purpose for which they had been created. The petitioner society is no exception to this rule. 21. In the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation ( AIR 1986 SC 180 ) the Supreme Court held that even the public had a limited right of using such public properties only for the purpose for which they had been created. For instance, in reference to a sidewalk, pavement or public road or street the Supreme Court held , .'No one has right to make use of public property for private purpose without the requisite authorisation and, therefore, it is erroneous to contend that pavement dwellers have the right to encroach upon pavements or constructing dwellings thereon. Public sreets, of which pavements form a part are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and even pedestrians have but limited right of using pavements for purpose of passing and repassing. So long as a person does not transgress the limited purpose for which pavements are made, his use thereof is legitimate and lawful. But, if a person puts any public property to use for which it is not intended and is not authorised so to use it, he becomes a trespasser" (emphasis supplied). 22. In fact in the case of a public park, notwithstanding the fact that on a public park, streets or a footpath a pedestrian has a limited right, the standards of entry are slightly different. A public street or footpath is a thoroughfare to be constantly used, if on road by traffic and on the footpath by pedestrians for passing and repassing so that the law enjoins that there will be no obstruction of public roads, sidewalks and footpaths. A public park is not a thoroughfare and cannot be made use of in a manner that makes it so. 23. Thus what applies to a public property like a sidewalk, pavement, street or road, likewise also applies to a public park. In fact, even this aspect the Supreme Court has clarified in its judgment. In re Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (supra) when it emphasised in paragraph 57. "To summarise, we hold that no person has a right to encroach, by erecting a structure or otherwise on footpath, pavements or any other place reserved or earmarked for public purpose, e. g, a garden or a playground"(in reference to the context emphasis supplied). 24. In re Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (supra) when it emphasised in paragraph 57. "To summarise, we hold that no person has a right to encroach, by erecting a structure or otherwise on footpath, pavements or any other place reserved or earmarked for public purpose, e. g, a garden or a playground"(in reference to the context emphasis supplied). 24. A public park like Purshottam Das Tandon Park in the heart of Allahabad is thus not different from any other public property. Even the proposal sought by the petitioner society to hold fair with shops in this park ought to have been negatived straightaway. The fact that the matter was kept pending at the Ministry of Urban Development so that the Administrator of the Nagar Maha-palika, Allahabad could look into the matter in accordance with law was not resolving the problem but creating an issue. If a pedestrian has even a limited right to walk on the said walk of footpath for purposes of passing and repassing only, a person entering a public park likewise has a curtailed and limited right to enjoy the use of a park, as a park only and no other. The public, or any person in all its grammatical variations cannot park itself in a public park as such an act would be trespass and violate the purpose for which such public property had been established. 25. This principle of law, was apparently laid down by the Supreme Court in yet another decision delivered one week before the decision of the issues in re; Olga Tellis case (supra). In the case of Bombay Hawkers Union v. Bombay Municipal Corporation. [ AIR 1985 SC 1206 ,] the Supreme Court again noticed the herculean taks it to plan or maintain a modern city. In this case the Supreme Court also noticed the encroachment of public properties, the like of which have been mentioned above is in effect a collusion "from several quarters not unexpectedly, even from those who wield considerable political influence. In ultimate analysis it is the ballot box that matters,"While denying the right to the Bombay Hawkers' Union to encroach upon pubic streets "notwithstanding the economic compulsions", the Supreme Court held : " No one has any right to do his or her trade or business so as to cause nuisance, annoyance or inconvenience to the other members of the public. Public streets, by their very nomenclature and definition, are meant for the use of the general public. They are not laid to facilitate the carrying on of private trade or business. If hawkers were to be conceded the right claimed by them, they could hold the society to ransom by squatting on the centre of busy thoroughfares, thereby paralysing all civic life. Indeed, that is what some of them have made it impossible for the pedestrians to walk on footpaths or oven on the streets properly so called " 26. Thus again this court feels that a public park is in no different category than a public street. Holding of a fair by allotting a public park to more than 100 shopkeepers, or even one shop keeper, for a purpose which defeats the very principle of a public park is not a right which is guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. If the petitioner's contentions were to be entertained it would tantamount to subverting the very purpose for which a park is created. The use of a public park by the public, irrespective of the economic class bias, is a right which shall remain with the public and cannot be defeated by an order of any authority. A public park like a public footpath or sidewalk or pavement must remain free for use for the purpose for which it is intended, and like a public footpath or a street, cannot be violated by encroachment. Likewise, a public park is meant for all the city dwellers and is to be made accessible to the public free from hindrance for use as a park only and no other purpose. 27. The fair which the petitioner society has been holding, and continues to hold, is illegal and the sooner the petitioner society removes its activities from the public park known as Purshottam Das Tandon Park, the better, so that the park can be used by citizens of Allahabad for the purpose for which it is intended. The petitioner society mentioned that it has procured temporary electric connection for distribution of electricity in favour of shop-keepers who participate in the exhibition and that the fire brigade is also standing by at its request. The petitioner society mentioned that it has procured temporary electric connection for distribution of electricity in favour of shop-keepers who participate in the exhibition and that the fire brigade is also standing by at its request. In fact, should these facilities continue at the hands of those authorities who have granted them, this will tantamount to abetting the illegal use of a public park by these authorities. The petitioner society has had adequate opportunity, even that which it sought in its writ petition, to wind up its business within forty days from 17th July, 1986. On 25th August, 1986, even the illegal arrangement the petitioner society had with the local administration came to an end. This Court will deal with this aspect, subsequently in this judgment. 28. There can hardly be any element of doubt that the two Supreme Court judgments (supra) were not applicable to a "public place"as has been defined under Section 2 (60) of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. The definition is same as in the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 and is not different in its intent. The two definitions in their text are: 2. Definitions. - In this Act unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context (60) "public place"includes any public park or garden or any ground to which the public have or are permitted to have access; ............................................. (an extract from the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959) 2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context (18) "public place"means a space, not being private property, which is open to the use or enjoyment of the public whether such space is vested in the board or not. ............................................. (an extract from the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916) 29. The two decisions of the Supreme Court are, in fact, law to the effect that a public place"cannot be usurped or encroached and further that such places are not meant for private business as it defeats the purpose for which they are dedicated. 30. This then is the law which deals with public places, in reference to the context. It is law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India to be followed by all courts within the territory of India. But this is not all. 30. This then is the law which deals with public places, in reference to the context. It is law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India to be followed by all courts within the territory of India. But this is not all. Such law, like any other, is to be followed not only by all courts in India, but, by all authorities, judicial and civil. 31. When the Supreme Court declared in its two decisions that certain public spaces in a city were inviolate from encroachment and trespass, this then became the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, to be followed by all courts throughout the territory of India. But, in reference to a judgment of the Supreme Court there is more to it, in our Constitution. Such law is to be followed by all authorities, judicial and civil. This is the mandate of our Constitution under Article 144, it reads : "144. Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court. All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court." 32. The Supreme Court had already declared the law as applicable to public properties like a "footpath, pavements or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose e. g. a garden or a playground". In re : Olga Tellies v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (supra). It was a writing on the wall to be followed by every authority without any let. We are constrained to make these observations as the petitioner society enveloped, in its illegal exercise to occupy a public park, the entire department of urban development from its ministry at Lucknow to the Head of the local body known as the Nagar Mahapalika at Allahabad. No authority passed a specific order of allotment for the occupation of a public park, as indeed such an order could not be passed and if passed would have been grossly illegal. Yet, a public park was occupied in the heart of the city with all the civil authorities watching totally oblivious of the judgments of the Supreme Court and the law as it has always been. 33. Then, it appears that the Department of Urban Development was oblivious of an enactment of the State of Uttar Pradesh, viz., The Uttar Pradesh Parks, Playgrounds and Open Spaces (Preservation and Regulation) Act, 1975. 33. Then, it appears that the Department of Urban Development was oblivious of an enactment of the State of Uttar Pradesh, viz., The Uttar Pradesh Parks, Playgrounds and Open Spaces (Preservation and Regulation) Act, 1975. This was a legislation to provide for preservation and regulation of parks, playgrounds and open spaces in Uttar Pradesb. There is a restriction in the occupation of public places like a public park even in this Act. Any use of a park which negates the very purpose for which it was laid out, or is meant to be illegal. The restrictions laid down by the Supreme Court, to protect the occupation of public places would apply to a park also. Occupation of a park for carrying on a business, like the consortium encouraged by the petitioner society is illegal. Even the permission contemplated in Sections 6 and 13 of the Act, aforesaid, cannot negate the purpose of a park, conducting business from a park errodes the purpose of a park. Such an act would amount to trespass of a public place or a park, as so declared by the Supreme Court. 34. Even a permission the like of which is contemplated in Section 6 of U.P. Act. 55 of 1975 cannot negate the constraints which have been put by the Supreme Court; occupying public places for private business is only one of them. Under Section 6 such a permission cannot be for any other purpose than the purpose for which the park is meant to be used. A park must always remain park. Private business is an activity which cannot be conducted in a public park or a public place. 35. There are certain public places, not all of them, and Purshottam Das Tandon Park may be one such public place, which may permit a public meeting. But even such a public meeting, if it is to be permitted in a reference to this park is subject to the constraints of public law and order. This implies that a permission for a public meeting may be granted yet the local administration may ways decline permission for reasons of its assessment that it may not be conducive to public law and order. This implies that a permission for a public meeting may be granted yet the local administration may ways decline permission for reasons of its assessment that it may not be conducive to public law and order. We are clarifying this in reference to Purshottam Das Tandon Park, as this is a park which has for more than half a century seen public meetings, public meetings are by their very nature and name of a very short duration and even such a meeting is held with the requisite permission so stipulated under Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 55 of 1975. It is repeated that .the activity of a public meeting will be subject to public law and order, the assessment of which will be the obligation of the District Magistrate and/or the police. But, this does not mean that every park or public place in the State of Uttar Pradesh can be used for public meetings. 36. After this court had heard learned counsel Dr. R.G. Padia, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Asholc Mohiley, Advocate for the respondents at length and expressed its views to the effect that it could not permit the illegal occupation of a public park more so, after the Supreme Court had given its two decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner made a feeble plea for the return of the writ petition or to have it dismissed on the ground that it was not being pressed. This court declined both the requests as the submission was in disregard of law, and was not made with an offer or an undertaking that the park would be vacated immediately. In these circumstances, this court announced its decision to dismiss the writ petition, and observed that detailed reason would be given subsequently. This court felt that stipulations of law were to be followed, not ignored; if this had been done the administration would not have permitted the usurpation of a public park. Then, the issues erroneously raised in the writ petition were, as stated earlier notwithstanding the law, settled by the Supreme Court, in two major decisions of public importance. Having ignored the law, the administration and the petitioner could not be permitted the indulgence to by-pass the decisions of the Supreme Court in the context. This detailed decision has been delivered in these circumstances. 37. Having ignored the law, the administration and the petitioner could not be permitted the indulgence to by-pass the decisions of the Supreme Court in the context. This detailed decision has been delivered in these circumstances. 37. The petitioner society and its consortium of shopkeepers ought to have cleared out of the park by now even upon their illegal logic. Tire relief sought is the occupation of the park "for full period of 40 days from 17th July, 1986."This court has already announced the dismissal of the writ petition, and declared the occupation of the park as illegal ab initio. The petitioner society has encroached and trespassed into the Purshottan Das Tandon Park. Thus, the petitioner society and its constituents are liable to eviction from this park immediately, as the act of occupation constitutes trespass and encroachment in the face of the law and as declared by the Supreme Court. The State Government and the local body, the Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad is obliged and is under a mandate of law to prevent the encroachment and trespass of a public place; the Purshottam Das Tandon Park is one such place. The petitioner society and its consortium or anyone claiming through them have not only violated the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 but also the U.P. Parks, Playgrounds and Open Spaces (Preservation and Regulation) Act, 1975 and are to be removed and evicted, as unauthorised persons without further notice under Section 11 of the 1975 Act under the circumstances, if necessary by the police. The State Government and the local bodies of Allahabad will ensure that the Purshottam Das Tandon Park will be rid of all encroachments and left free and open for use of the public of Allahabad, as a park. This park is part of the heritage of Allahabad and part of its history. It is Allahabad's Hyde park Corner, and it boasts of the finest democratic tradition in offering its octagonal platform to public figures of distinction in arriving their views for the benefit of the public. This park, like any other in the State or the nation is to be preserved and maintained as a park. This court directs that this should be done and that in the future the State Government would pay heed to preserve the environment and the ecology, whether rural or urban. This park, like any other in the State or the nation is to be preserved and maintained as a park. This court directs that this should be done and that in the future the State Government would pay heed to preserve the environment and the ecology, whether rural or urban. Permitting illegal occupation of public places negates a planned development of towns and villages, and offends laws which are meant to preserve the environment. 38. The writ petition is dismissed, and as both parties have violated the law there is no order on costs.