JUDGMENT - G.M. KHANDEKAR, J.:---This is an appeal by the accused, who has been convicted by the learned Session Judge, Beed, in session Case No. 26 of 1981 for offence of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and also convicted under section 309, ibid, and sentenced to suffer S.I. for six months. 2. Most of the facts in this appeal are not in dispute. The accused was residing at village Kawadgaon within the jurisdiction of Yusuf Wadgaon Police Station in Kaji Taluka of Beed District along with his wife named Vatsalabai (since deceased) and four children, the eldest of them being a girl named Chaya (P.W. 8). Their house was situated in Maharwada locality of the village and Rukminibai, who is the mother of the accused, was residing separately but near his house. Rukminibai used to work as an agricultural labourer for earning her livelihood. The deceased Vatsalabai also used to work on wages in the fields since prior to the date of incident. For some time prior to the date of incident, the accused was not doing any work and consequently there used to be dispute between the accused and his wife. 3. According to the story of the prosecution, on the date of incident, which was 12th December, 1980, Vatsalabai had gone to work in the field of Baliram. The accused went to the field Baliram some time in the noon and told his wife that she should come to the house since her brother had come. Vatsalabai, therefore, came to the back to the house along with the accused. The accused then asked Vatsalabai to give him food, but she expressed her inability to do so since there was no grain in the house. The accused then asked Vatsalabai to go to the house of his mother and procure the grain from her, but Vatsalabai refused to do so. This enraged the accused, who dragged Vatsalabai into the house and felled her down on the ground. He then picked up a knife and caused injury to the neck of Vatsalabai with that knife. The woman died instantaneously. The accused on seeing the death of his wife pierced the same knife in his stomach which resulted in serious injury and he also fell down on the ground. He then picked up a knife and caused injury to the neck of Vatsalabai with that knife. The woman died instantaneously. The accused on seeing the death of his wife pierced the same knife in his stomach which resulted in serious injury and he also fell down on the ground. This was noticed by the girl Chaya who was playing along with her brothers near the house. When she saw that her parents were lying in a pool of blood, she immediately rushed to her grandmother Rukminibai and told her that the accused had injured her mother as also herself. Rukminibai then returned to the house and she was raising shouts while coming in the house of the accused. One Govindrao (P.W. 5), who was sitting near the Maruti temple followed Rukminibai to the house of the accused on hearing her shouts and he saw that Vatsalabai was dead but the accused was alive, although his intestines had come out of the injury. On his request the injury on the stomach of the accused was bandaged by Rukminibai. The accused heard this talk and he asked Govindrao to save him after telling him that he had inflicted injuries to his wife and also to himself. Govindrao then asked one Yeshwanta to inform the Police Patil, but the latter was not present in the house. 4. Shivaji Pawar (P.W. 3), who is the brother of Police Patil, was returning from his field and when he learnt that the accused had caused injury to himself and also to his wife, he went to the house of the accused to make inquiry. After seeing the condition of the accused and his wife, Shivaji went to the outpost at Bansarola to give information where his compliant was recorded, which is at Exh. 9. Head constable attached to Bansarola outpost managed to send this complaint to the Police Station at Yusuf Wadgaon. In the meanwhile, as per instruction from the Police, Shivaji put the accused in a bullock cart and brought him to Bansarola Outpost. He was then referred the Medical Officer since it was a serious injury. Dr. Deshmukh (P.W. 1) referred the accused to the Medical College Hospital at Ambajogai where he was examined by Dr. Laulkar (P.W. 4). In the meanwhile, as per instruction from the Police, Shivaji put the accused in a bullock cart and brought him to Bansarola Outpost. He was then referred the Medical Officer since it was a serious injury. Dr. Deshmukh (P.W. 1) referred the accused to the Medical College Hospital at Ambajogai where he was examined by Dr. Laulkar (P.W. 4). The accused was then referred to the surgeon for operation and necessary operation was performed on him and he was in hospital for some days. The investigation was taken over by P.S.I. Gazi Mohammed (P.W. 12), who then went to the spot and drew the inquest report about the death of Vatsalabai. The dead body was then sent to the Medical Officer for autopsy and the knife was seized at the spot at the time of Panchnama. After completing the investigation, the police put up a charge-sheet against the accused in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate. First class at Karj for offences mentioned in paragraph 1 above. The learned Magistrate committed the accused to stand his trial in the Sessions Court at Beed. 5. The learned Sessions Judge framed a charge for offence under sections 302 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused, to which he pleaded both guilty. He however, conceded that Vatsalabai was working in the field of Baliram, that he had gone to the field of Baliram to call her, that Vatsalabai returned to the house along with him and that he had asked her to give food to him which she was unable to do. He also did not dispute that the injury to his stomach was inflicted by him. He, however, claimed to have been falsely implicated in the case so far as murder of his wife was concerned. 6. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses in all in the lower Court to prove its charge, out of whom Chaya (P.W. 8), a girl aged about 10 years, was the only eye-witness to the incident. Rukminibai (P.W. 2). Govindrao (P.W. 5) and Vithal (P.W. 6) were examined on the point of extra-judicial confession of the accused. Dr. Deshmukh (P. W. 1) held autopsy on the corpse of Vatsalabai and he referred the accused to the Medical College Hospital at Ambajogai. Rukminibai (P.W. 2). Govindrao (P.W. 5) and Vithal (P.W. 6) were examined on the point of extra-judicial confession of the accused. Dr. Deshmukh (P. W. 1) held autopsy on the corpse of Vatsalabai and he referred the accused to the Medical College Hospital at Ambajogai. On considering all this evidence on record, the learned Session Judge found the prosecution story proved and accordingly convicted the accused in respect of both the offences and sentences him to various terms of imprisonment as mentioned in paragraph 1 above. 7. As observed above, Chaya was an eye-witness to the incident and three witnesses have spoken in respect of the extra-judicial confessions of the accused. This evidence was accepted by the learned Sessions Judge. Shri. S.C. Bora, learned Counsel for the appellant, did not dispute before us, in view of the evidence mentioned above, that the appellant, was responsible for the death of his wife. He only challenged the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and asserted before us that this was a case falling within the ambit of section 304, part II of the Indian Penal Code, since there was no intention on the part of the accused to cause murder of his wife. He, therefore, made a prayer that the appellant should be convicted in respect of offence punishable under section 304, Part II. He did not challenge the conviction of the appellant under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code. Shri R.G. Deo, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, however, canvassed before us that the offence committed by the accused was one falling within the ambit of section 302 and as such the accused was rightly convicted by the learned Sessions Judge for the offence of murder. 8. The learned Sessions Judge observed rightly in his judgement that the incident had taken place on the spur of moment and that it was not a premeditated murder. The evidence shows that the accused had called his wife from the field though under a wrong pretext, but he had done so in order to ask her to provide food to him. When he was told by the deceased that there was no grain in the house, the accused asked her to bring some grain from the house of his mother, but she declined to do so. When he was told by the deceased that there was no grain in the house, the accused asked her to bring some grain from the house of his mother, but she declined to do so. It is at this stage that the accused got annoyed with his wife and he dragged her inside the house, felled her down on the ground, sat on her chest and cut her neck. There is no dispute about the injury, which is found on the person of the deceased, as also the fact that the she met a homicidal death. Shri Bora, learned Counsel for the appellant, streneously argued before us that in the circumstances mentioned above, the accused could not have intended to cause an injury to trachea and thereby to cause the death of his wife. He also canvassed before us that the accused himself felt repented when he saw that suddenly death of his wife had occurred and by way of repentance, he pierced the knife in his stomach. He also contended that this injury, which is vital was never intended to be caused by the accused and as such the case could not fall within the ambit of clause "thirdly" of section 300 of the India Penal Code. He, therefore, advanced before us that the case could fall within the ambit of section 304, Part II only. 9. In (Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab)1, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 126, which was relied upon by Shri Bora on behalf of the appellant, the accused had given a blow with a dagger which landed in epigastrum area and the victim succumbed to the injury. It was observed that Clause 3 of section 300 would not be attracted because it cannot be said that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately found to have been inflicted. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the accused inflicted an injury which is know to be likely to cause death and accordingly altered the conviction of the appellant from offence under section 302 to the one under section 304. Part II of the Indian Penal Code. 10. The question for consideration in this appeal is therefore, whether the accused really intended to cause the death of his wife Vatsalabai. 11. In this connection, it would be important to refer to the decision of this Court in (Bhagwant v. Kadari)2, I.L.R. 25 Bom. Part II of the Indian Penal Code. 10. The question for consideration in this appeal is therefore, whether the accused really intended to cause the death of his wife Vatsalabai. 11. In this connection, it would be important to refer to the decision of this Court in (Bhagwant v. Kadari)2, I.L.R. 25 Bom. 202, which was later on relied on by the Supreme Court in the case of (Smt. Mathri and others v. The State of Punjab)3, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 986, in Bhagwant's case, Batty, J., observed as under: "The word 'intent' by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies 'aim' and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result---foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired---but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made---and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which the action would not have been taken." 12. In Mathri's case (cited supra), it was held that the proposition that every person intends the natural consequences of his act is often a convenient and helpful rule to ascertain the intention of persons when doing a particular act. It is wrong, however, to accept this proposition as binding rule which most prevail on all occasions and in all circumstances. The ultimate question for decision being whether an act was done with a particular intention, all the circumstances including the natural consequences of the action have to be taken into consideration. 13. In the instant case, the act was done by the accused on a spur of moment, since he felt enraged due to the inability of his wife either to supply food to him or to bring grain from the house of his mother. It was not a pre-planned act. The other circumstance, namely, that the accused himself pierced the knife in his stomach, goes to show that he had never intended to cause the death of his wife and he did try to cause injury to himself only after he found the incidental result of his act. The medical evidence shows that the injury to tracless was responsible for the death of the woman and it is difficult to believe that the accused had intended to cause such as injury which would result in her death. The medical evidence shows that the injury to tracless was responsible for the death of the woman and it is difficult to believe that the accused had intended to cause such as injury which would result in her death. In these circumstances, we feel that the offence would not fall within the ambit of Clause 'thirdly' of section 300. 14. It would also be useful to make a reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in (Shankar v. State of Madhya Pradesh)4, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1532. In that case, the accused caused an injury on the neck of the deceased with a dagger which resulted in the death. The occurrence took place without any premeditation, while the deceased along with the accused had finished meals. In this circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that the appellant could not be said to have any intention to cause the particular injury which he caused to the deceased with a dagger on the neck. The conviction of the appellant was accordingly altered from offence under section 302 to the one under section 304- Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The facts in the Supreme Court case more of less similar to the one before us. As observed above, the intention to cause the death of Vatsalabai does not appear to be present in the mind of the accused when he did the act and as such we feel that the conviction of the appellant for offence of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is not warranted. However, knowledge must be attributed to the accused and consequently, we alter the conviction of the appellant from offence under section 302 to the one under section 304, Part II. 15. So far as sentence is concerned, we feel that if would meet the ends of justice if the accused is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years for that offence. The conviction and sentence of the appellant in respect of offence under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code is maintained. 16. 15. So far as sentence is concerned, we feel that if would meet the ends of justice if the accused is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years for that offence. The conviction and sentence of the appellant in respect of offence under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code is maintained. 16. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part; the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant by the, learned Sessions Judge for offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby quashed and set aside; and instead, the accused is convicted for offence under section 304-Part II of the Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer R.I. for five years. The conviction and sentences of the appellant for offence under section 309 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby maintained. Both the sentences to run concurrently. Since the accused is already in jail for more than five years, he shall be released forthwith unless his detention is otherwise necessary. Appeal allowed partly. -----