JUDGMENT The Writ petition was moved by the petitioners for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents from taking any action pursuant to the Notice No. CS O/HG/84/533 dated 26th July, 1984 issued by the Chief Security Officer, West Bengal State Electricity Board and for quashing the said order. The case of the petitioners in short is that the petitioners were all enrolled as Home Guard which was a voluntary and unpaid service and only when they were called upon for any duty they were paid some allowances. Such Home Guards have been enrolled under the provision of the West Bengal Home Guards Act, 1962. Under section 3 of the said Home Guards Act, 1962, the Superintendent of Police of a District or the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta was given power to constitute for the district and/or for Calcutta, as the case may be, a body to called as Home Guard who would discharge such function in relation to the protection of persons, security, or property or the public safty, as may be assigned to them, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The petitioners, after they were enrolled on diverse dates which have been set out in the Annexures to the petition, were called on for duty and they were performing such duties as Home Guards after receiving required training under the law as provided for the purpose. 2. The State Electricity Board, the Respondent No. 1 herein, sent a request to the Respondent No.3, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Home Guard II for deputing Home Guard personnel from time to time in order to engage such personnel for the purpose of guarding various installations, equipments and machineries in the office premises of the Board located in various place in the City of Calcutta and pursuant to the said request made by the Board, the petitioners were deputed by the Respondent No.3 to the said Board. On such deputation, the authority of the said Board appointed the petitioners as security guards in various offices which is set out in Annexure 'A' to the petition and that of after deputation discharging their dudes as security Guards. 3. On such deputation, the authority of the said Board appointed the petitioners as security guards in various offices which is set out in Annexure 'A' to the petition and that of after deputation discharging their dudes as security Guards. 3. The petitioners' further case is that while the petitioners were posted at different offices of the West Bengal State Electricity Board their services were terminated and the form of the order was that "Consequent to shifting of our (a) 225C, Acharya Jagadish Chandra Bose Road, Calcutta 20, (b) 25C, Karl Marx Sarani, Calcutta–700027 to Salt Lake area your services are no longer required with effect from 1.8.84." and accordingly the petitioners services under the said Board were terminated. The petitioners trained Home Guard Volunteers. The petitioner's case is that relying upon this direction of the Central Government, the Board had already absorved by resolution dated 31st Much, 1980, 16 Home Guards as Security Guards under the Board and that such absorption were made in permanent vacancies lying under the Board. It was further contended that the petitioners have been discriminated in not absorbing in the services of the Board even though the petitioners were duly qualified and were similarly placed like that of 16 Home Guards who were absorbed as Security Guards. It was further stated that the petitioners has applied to the Board for absorption as permanent employee of the Board but the Board did not consider the case of the petitioners for absorption in the permanent services of the Board. It was further alleged that the Board in its meeting dated 29th June, 1984 decided to fill up posts of Security Guards on selection basis and it was decided that minimum qualification and experience of Security Guard, I would be, inter alia, that the personnel must be ''Ex-military/Ex-Police personnel and trained personnel like NVF/Home Guards". It was further stated that on or about May, 1984, the Board declared to shift the office of the Board located at various places to Salt Lake City and decided that "till such time, the entire Security of the Bidyut Bhawan is taken at the hand by the Central Department of the Board, the existing Security Personnel of the respective offices should be utilized for guarding the offices under the administrative Control of the Deputy Secretary (Dist. Wing). 4. Wing). 4. Reliance was also placed by the petitioners to the order passed by the Government of West Bengal on 13.11.83 which reads as follows :– "It has been decided by toe Government that watch and ward duty at the installations of the said Electricity Board cannot be disrupted. Since adequate number of fresh Home Guards and calling up of NVF posts will be made to existing guarding arrangements at the installations of State Electricity Board with Home Guards and NVF should not be disturbed. You are requested to kindly follow this decision of the Government." 5. Further by the letter dated 1.12.84, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Power Department, informed Shri S. N. Menon, I. A. S. Secretary of the Board that "with reference to your letter No. S/40/829 dated 29.11.84 on the above subject, I am directed to inform you that Home Department, in the letter addressed to D.G. and I.G. of police and Commissioner of Police, Calcutta requested them not to disturb the Home Guards and NVF personnel posted in different installations of West Bengal State Electricity Board and that the petitioners in affidavit-in-reply also disclosed the circular which was not disclosed by the Board in the affidavit-in-opposition. By the said Circular issued by the West Bengal State Electricity Board under the signature of T. K. Talukdar, Advisor (S & V) to all concerned it was stated that "There are general report from the site offices that the Police Authorities are temporarily withdrawing Home Guards and NVF personnel from our various installations/site offices. 6. It is clarified that vide Memo No. 7758/SS dated 30.11.84 of the Home Department, Government of West Bengal and Memo No. 1558/Power/III dated 1.12.84 issued from the Power Department, Government of West Bengal (copy enclosed) no Home Guard will be withdrawn from our Installations/site offices and personnel already withdrawn will be deployed to units from where they have been withdrawn. You are requested to convey the contents of this letter up to the officers under your command". 7. The copies of the circular are issued to all the officers of Board, the sub-offices and departments of the Board. You are requested to convey the contents of this letter up to the officers under your command". 7. The copies of the circular are issued to all the officers of Board, the sub-offices and departments of the Board. The Petitioners contended relying upon the said circular issued by the Board dated 11.12.84 which was issued after the services of the petitioners were terminated that the petitioners "should be re-deployed to the units from where they have been withdrawn" It was also contended on behalf of the Board that the Board being a statutory Authority was not bound by any circular and/or directive issued by the State Government as well as the Central Government in this behalf. This submissions on the part of the Board does not appear to be Correct inasmuch as section 78A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 provides that "In the discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such powers on question of policy as may be given by the State Government". Under such circumstances, in my view, the Board is required to be guided by the directions on the question of policy as may be given by the State Government in it his behalf True that the Board is a Statutory Board created under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and it is an autonomous body and is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India as also an instrumentality of the State and as such in my view the Board cannot refuse to be guided by the directions issued by the Government in the matter of deployment of the Home Guards for guarding the installations and/or the units of the Board. Further in the instant case even though the Board suppressed the circular from the affidavit-in-oppositions, by the circular dated 12.12.84, the Board accepted the directions issued by the State Government in this behalf by virtue of the provisions of section 78A of the said Act and decided that “No Home Guard will be withdrawn from our installation/Site office and personnel already withdrawn will be re-deployed to the units from where they have been withdrawn”. As such it appears that the petitioners are right in contending that they are liable to e reinstated and/or re-deployed in the services of the Board. As such it appears that the petitioners are right in contending that they are liable to e reinstated and/or re-deployed in the services of the Board. In view of the fact that the said Circular issued by the Board is binding upon the Board and the Board cannot deviate from the principle laid down by its own circular in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in he case of (1) Dr. Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1975 SC 984 wherein the Supreme Court held that where the State Government issued an administrative instruction not having the force of law, the State Government could not at its sweet will depart from it without rational justification and that if the State Government is allowed to depart from its own circular that would be clearly violative of the provision of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 8. The contention of the Board that the writ petitioners cannot have any grievance against the Board on account of termination of service from the Board and their reversion to the parent organisation of service accepted in view of fact that the Board by the Circular dated 12.12.84 which is Annexure “A” to the affidavit-in-reply had decided pursuant to the directions issued by the State Government in this behalf for re-employing and/or redeploying the Home Guards which were withdrawn from the units from where they had been withdrawn and that this circular of the Board is binding upon the Board and that the Board cannot be allowed to defeat the hopes of the petitioners which have been crystalised into the rights on the basis of the principle of estoppel. Therefore it is not open to the Board should be directed to implement this circular and confer such rights and benefits as provided under the said Circular. The Board is allowed 15 days’ time for implementation of the said Circular dated 12.12.84. 9. Further no material was disclosed by the respondents how and under what grounds the petitioners were not absorbed when 16 other similar Home Guards were absorbed in the Services of the Board pursuant to the decision of the Board taken in its meeting dated 29th June, 1984 and that no ground was disclosed why the petitioners case for absorption under the Board was not taken up. The Board being a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India cannot make any discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that as it well established principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the (2) Manager Government Branch Press v. D. B. Baliappa reported in AIR 1979 SC 429 wherein the Supreme Court observed that protection of Articles 14 and 16(1) would be available even to temporary government servant if he has been arbitrarily discriminated against singled-out for rash treatment in preference to his juniors similarly circumstanced. It was further held that it is true that a competent authority had the discretion under the conditions of service governing employees concerned to terminate the latter's employment without notice. But such direction has to be exercised in accordance with the reason and fairplay and not capriciously. In that case the Supreme Court observed that there was nothing like unfettered discretion immuned from the judicial review ability. The Executive no less than the Judiciary, is under a general duty to act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reason is the essence of the guarantee ewepitomised in Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. In the aforesaid case in the Supreme Court, was argued that where an employee voluntari by accepted the terms and conditions of the service, he cannot complain the action taken on the basis of the mutually agreed terms. The Supreme Court observed that the said argument was wholly mis-conceived as it is borrowed from the archsic common law concept that employment was a matter between the master and servant only. In the first place, this rule in its original absolute form is not applicable to government servants. Secondly, even with regard to private employment, much of it has passed into the fossils of time. This rule held the field at the time when the master and servant were taken more literally than they are now and when as in early Roman Law, the rights of the servant, like the rights of any other member of the house-hold, were not his own but those of his pater familias. The overtone of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the Anglo-American Jurisprudence of the 18th Century and first half of the 20th Century, which rationalised the employer's absolute right to discharge the employee. The overtone of this ancient doctrine are discernible in the Anglo-American Jurisprudence of the 18th Century and first half of the 20th Century, which rationalised the employer's absolute right to discharge the employee. 'Such phylosophy as pointed out by K. K. Mathew, J. (vide his treatise 'Democracy, Equality 'and Freedom') "of the employer's dominion over his employee may have been in tune with the rustic symplicity of bygone days. But that philosophy is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers'. To bright in tune with vastly changed and changing socio-economic conditions and mores of the day, much of this old, antiquated and unjust doctrine has been eroded by judicial decisions and legislation, particularly in its application to persons in public employment, to whom the constitutional protection of Arts. 14, 15, 16 and 311 us available". In the facts and circumstances of the case no material or information was placed before the Court why the petitioners were marked off for discharge on the basis of all intelligible differentia having a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved and it appears that the petitioners were unfairly indiscriminated in violation of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India in not absorbing the petitioners and/or considering the case of the petitioners for absorption in the permanent service of the corporation. The direction issued by the Central Government and/or the State Government in this behalf, in my view, are binding upon the Board and that further when the Board after accepting the direction of the State Government decided to re-employ the Home Guards who had already been removed, the Board is under an obligation and/or duty to reinstate the petitioners into the service of the Board immediately after the issue of the Circular dated 12.12.84. Further on the basis of the said Circular the Board had admittedly re-deployed some of the Home Guards by the Order dated 6.2.85 which is annexed as Annexure 'B' to the affidavit-in-reply, filed by the petitioners. Under such circumstances when the Board had not only issued a circular but implemented the same by redeploying some of the Home Guards by the order dated 6.2.81, in my view, it who obligatory on the part of the Board to redeploy the petitioners with effect from 6.2.85. Under such circumstances when the Board had not only issued a circular but implemented the same by redeploying some of the Home Guards by the order dated 6.2.81, in my view, it who obligatory on the part of the Board to redeploy the petitioners with effect from 6.2.85. I do not find any reason for not implementing the circular issued by the Board in this behalf in case of the petition in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Dr. Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1975 SC 984 where in it was held that "where State Government departs from a principle of seniority laid if down by it, albect by administrative intructions, and the departure is without reason and arbitrarily, it would directly infringe the guarantee of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. It is interesting to notice that in the United States, it is now well settled that executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged and must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. Vide the judgment of Mr. Justice Franx further in (3) Vitaralli v. Seation, (1959) 359 US 535 at PQ 646-54, 3rd Law Ed. (2nd serial) 1012. This view is of course not based on the equality clause of the United States constitution and it is evolved as a rule of administrative law. But the principle is the same namely that arbitariners should the elimenated in State action." Accordingly the Writ petition is allowed and the Board is directed to re deploy the petitioners with effect from 6.2.85 i. e. the day on which some of the Home Guards who were also removed from the service of the Board had already been re deployed. This order for re-deployment of the petitioners with effect from 6.2.85 is passed considering the great hardship which the petitioners have suffered for unemployment since the order of termination was served upon the petitioners with effect from 1.8.84. In these hard days of unemployment when the State Government had taken a policy decision for not putting off the duty of the Home Guards posted at different installations of Board and when the Board had also decided to re-deploy the persons who had been removed from the service. In these hard days of unemployment when the State Government had taken a policy decision for not putting off the duty of the Home Guards posted at different installations of Board and when the Board had also decided to re-deploy the persons who had been removed from the service. I think it fit and proper to pass such an order in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Board is directed to pass necessary orders reinstating the petitioners from the units from which they have been withdrawn and/or their services have been terminated in view of the Circulars dated 12.12.84 issued by the Board within a fortnight from today and the respondents are directed to pay salaries of the petitioners from 5th February, 1985 as expeditiously as possible, but not later than a period or 2 months from today. 10. On the prayer of the learned Advocate for the respondents there will be a stay of operation of this order for four weeks. This order of stay will not prevent the respondents from offering employment to the petitioners under the Board without prejudice to the rights and contentioners of the parties.