JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwal, J. - Before admission, notices were issued, Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been filed. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 3. The petition is directed against an order passed by the court below releasing the accommodation in favour of the respondent No. 3. The application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. Against the said order, an appeal a filed by the petitioner. In appeal, the petitioner did not challenge the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority as regards the bonafide need nor in regard to the comparative hardship. The only technical point, which was taken up by the petitioner was that when the property was let out to him, the property had come under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, and, as such, it could have been let out only by virtue of an allotment order. Since no allotment order had been made, he is not a tenant in the eye of law, and, as such, the application under Section 21 of the Act was not maintainable. This defence taken up by the petitioner is wholly mischievous. He cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same breath. He entered into an agreement with respondent No. 3 and took the property from the petitioner on rent for a period of two years, and, as held by the Prescribed Authority, he promised to vacate the premises after two years. 4. Since the petitioner took the sole question in appeal, the lower appellate court examined the matter thoroughly and, ultimately, it came to the conclusion that the property was constructed in 1970 after necessary sanction of the Nagar Mahapalika recorded in 1970 to Smt. Raisa Khatoon and that it was not more than ten years old from the date of the inception of the tenancy, which was 1st February, 1978, and, as such, there was no question of getting an allotment order in respect of the property in dispute. 5. In view of the above, in my opinion, there is no legal infirmity in the finding recorded by the appellate court. 6. Learned counsel, however, has further urged that in accordance with the provision of Rule 16(i)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act, only a part of the accommodation could be released and the Prescribed Authority did not consider that matter at all. 6. Learned counsel, however, has further urged that in accordance with the provision of Rule 16(i)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act, only a part of the accommodation could be released and the Prescribed Authority did not consider that matter at all. Rule 16(i)(d) framed under the Act reads as under : "16(i)(d). Where the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the land- lord's needs would be served by releasing the other part, the prescribed authority shall release only the latter part of the building." 7. In fact, the finding in regard to bonafide need and in regard to comparative hardship was not challenged by the petitioner before the lower appellate court. The only point, which was urged by the petitioner was in regard to the applicability of the Act to the property in dispute when he took the property on rent on 1st February, 1978. 8. In any case, even on merits, in my opinion, this question, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not have merit. The Prescribed Authority has in detail considered the need of the respondent No. 3. Considering the fact that the respondent No. 3 has got many married sons and unmarried sons and daughters, it cannot be said that if part of the property is released, it will serve the purpose of the landlord. In the circumstances, this point also in my opinion, does not have any substance. 9. In the result, the petition is dismissed in limine. The interim order dated 17th September, 1985, is hereby vacated.