JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition is directed against the acceptance of petitioner's resignation by Secretary of the Colvin School Society, Lucknow. 2. The petitioner was working as Officer on Special Duty in Colvin Taluqdars College, Lucknow. He was appointed to the post by order dated 23rd November, 1985, Annexure No. 1. This order is signed by Secretary, Colvin School Society. On 5th March, 1986 the petitioner submitted his resignation addressed to the Secretary-cum-Manager, Colvin Taluqdars' College, Lucknow, Annexure No. 3. In the first paragraph of the letter it has been mentioned thus - "I hereby tender my resignation due to my personal reasons with the one month notice period as per your appointment letter." On 21st March, 1986 petitioner sent another letter addressed to the Secretary-cum-Manager, Colvin Taluqdar's College, Lucknow wherein he stated that if his resignation has not been accepted it may be treated as withdrawn. The petitioner sent a reminder on 5th May, 1986 in respect of his letter dated 21st March, 1986. The Secretary-cum-Manager, Colvin Taluqdars' College, Lucknow informed the petitioner through a memorandum dated 11-7-86 that his resignation has been accepted with effect from 11-7-1986. It is this memorandum which is under challenge in the present petition. 3. The opposite-parties to the writ petition are Management Committee of Colvin Taluqdars's College, Lucknow through its Manager, Colvin School Society, Lucknow and Commissioner, Lucknow Division, Ex-Official President, Colvin Taiuqdar College, Lucknow. 4. On behalf of opposite-parties No. 1 and 2 a short counter-affidavit has been filed in which the maintainability of the writ petition has been challenged. The submission of the learned counsel for the opposite-party Nos. 1 and 2 is that opposite-parties No. 1 and 2 are private bodies and they are not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and therefore, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute the fact that opposite-parties No. 1 and 2 are not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution but he submits that a writ petition can be maintained even against a private body Learned counsel has invited our attention to 1986 (4) Lucknow Civil Decisions Page 51 - Sri Niwas Upadhya v. Basic Siksha Adhikari, Gonda for pointing out that the question has been referred by a Division Bench to a larger Bench. On the basis of this order learned counsel sought admission of the writ petition so that the matter may be decided by Full Bench and then this petition may be taken up. We find that the matter that has been referred to Full Bench is whether the writ petition is maintainable against the Management of a private institution relating to services of its employees violating a statutory provision. In the present case, there is no allegation by the petitioner that any statutory provision has been violated by opposite-parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Colvin School Society is a Society governed by the provisions of the Societies Registration Act and it was obliged to frame bye-laws and the impugned order has been passed in violation of the said bye-laws. In the writ petition no reference has been made to the bye-laws which have been allegedly violated. In the circumstances the authority relied upon is of no assistance to the petition. 6. Miss Kumkum Khanna v. The Mother Acquinas, Principal, Jesus and Marry College, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi, AIR 1976 Del 35 . has been relied upon for the proposition that the writ petition can be maintained even against private bodies. Reliance has been placed upon the observations made in paragraph 6 of the Report. It has been observed, thus in Paragraph 7. Under Article 226 of the Constitution a writ petition lies against"any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government." The meaning of the word "person" is coloured by the context. Firstly, it appears in the Constitution which is the basis of public law. Secondly, it is associated with the words "authority" and "Government". Thirdly proof of private rights such as those based on contract or tort cannot be given by way of a writ petition which is confined to rights arising out of the public law and the public law remedies specified in Articles 32 and 226." The observation reproduced here in above, instead of supporting the petitioner go against him. In the absence of any reference to any statutory provision it is obvious that the petitioner is basing his claim on contract. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that this claim is not based on contract but it is based on law inasmuch as the settled law is that before a letter of designation has been accepted it can be withdrawn by a party. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that this claim is not based on contract but it is based on law inasmuch as the settled law is that before a letter of designation has been accepted it can be withdrawn by a party. The facts remains that the basis of petitioner's claim arises from the service contract entered into between the parties and the petitioner is claiming enforcement of that contract which he pleads that he continues in service. 7. Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC. page 1416 has also been relied upon D. Reliance was placed upon Paragraph 95 of the report. This paragraph deals with principles of natural justice and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is not an authority for the proposition that writ petition lies against a private body even though no allegation of breach of a statutory provision is alleged. 8. In J. C. Reddy v. State of U.P.; AIR 1986 All 154 ., it was laid down that a writ petition lies against private body for enforcement or performance of any legal obligation or duty imposed by a statute. With this observation we respectfully agree. However, it has also been laid down in this very judgment that no writ petition lies against a private body where there is neither a statutory for public duty imposed on it by a statute nor is there any corresponding legal right for enforcement of such statutory or public duty. We have already observed here in above that the petitioner has not alleged violation of any statutory provision by opposite-parties. This authority is therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner, 9. On consideration of the authorities referred to here in above and particularly the judgment of this Court in J. C. Reddy's case (supra) we are of the opinion that the present writ petition is not maintainable as opposite parties No. 1 and 2 are private bodies and there is no allegation of violation of statutory duty by them. The petition is, therefore, without merit. 10. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed in limine. The interim order, if any, shall stand discharged. 11. Immediately after the above judgment had been dictated learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for certificate of fitness for preferring appeal before their Lordships of Supreme Court. The petition is, therefore, without merit. 10. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed in limine. The interim order, if any, shall stand discharged. 11. Immediately after the above judgment had been dictated learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for certificate of fitness for preferring appeal before their Lordships of Supreme Court. Our judgment is based upon settled principles of law and there is nothing in our judgment which needs to be decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The certificate prayed for is, accordingly refused.