S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has challenged the order dated 4-4-1985 passed by the District Supply Officer Rajkot canceling its wholesale dealer license No. 192 and retail dealer license No. 166 granted to the petitioner under the provisions of the Gujarat Essential Articles (Licensing Control and Stock Declaration) Order 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Licensing Order ). The said Order is at annexure E to the petition. The Order recites that on account of the misconducts found during the inquiry as the petitioner-dealer has committed breaches of secs. 23 (1) 16 and 18 (1) of the Licensing Order and of the conditions Nos. 7 and 9 of the license the said licenses are liable to be cancelled. An appeal to the Collector could be preferred within 30 days from the receipt of the said order. The petitioner has filed the present petition on 15-4-1985 in this court challenging the aforesaid Order directly by way of the present petition and has sought for a declaration that clause 8 of the Licensing Order is unconstitutional and void and also for quashing and setting aside of the Order at annexure E. ( 2 ) IN Order to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner a few relevant introductory fact are required to be noted at the outset. ( 3 ) THE petitioner is a partnership firm carrying on business as a dealer in petroleum products at Morvi in Rajkot district. At the relevant time it held essential commodities retail trade license No. 166 and essential commodities wholesale trade license No. 192. Both these licenses were for dealing in crude kerosene. The aforesaid licenses were issued to the petitioner as per the relevant provisions of the Licensing Order which in turn were issued by the Government of Gujarat in exercise of the power conferred on it by sec. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 It appears that somewhere in later part of November 1984 the Chief Supply Inspector Rajkot inquired into the petitioners working as a dealer of kerosene at its shop at Morvi when he found certain alleged misconduct in the said working. He made a report to the Disciplinary authority viz. District Supply Officer Rajkot respondent No. 2 herein. He made a report to the Disciplinary authority viz. District Supply Officer Rajkot respondent No. 2 herein. Respondent No. 2 thereafter by his order dated 26 1984 ordered that the petitioners both licenses as a wholesale dealer and retail dealer of petroleum product shall stand suspended for 90 days from the date of the order or till the disposal of the case whichever was earlier. That order was passed under the powers conferred on the authority under clause 8 (2) of the Licensing Order. The said suspension order is at annexure A. Thereafter a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 23-1-1985 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why both the licenses granted to it should not be cancelled on account of the alleged misconducts listed in the show cause notice at items Nos. 1 to 4. A copy of the show cause notice is at annexure B. The inquiry was thereafter conducted by respondent No. 2 at his office. Date of hearing was fixed on 5-2-1985. As no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner at the time of hearing and as fresh date of hearing was sought for the inquiry was adjourned to 9-2-1985 at 12. 15 p. m. in the office of the second respondent. In the meantime the petitioner filed a detailed written reply on 16-2-1985 refuting the charges leveled against it about the alleged misconducts as listed in the show cause notice. It appears that on 19-2-1985 the petitioners partner Harshadrai Jamnadas Kotak appeared before the second respondent and gave his statement in writing. Thereafter the second respondent passed his impugned order dated 4-4-1985. . . . . . . . . . ( 4 ) MR. S. B. Vakil learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions in support of the petition. (1) The impugned order is null and void and without jurisdiction in as much as it is passed beyond the time limit as enjoined by clause 8 (2) of the Licensing Order. . . . . . . ( 4 ) MR. S. B. Vakil learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions in support of the petition. (1) The impugned order is null and void and without jurisdiction in as much as it is passed beyond the time limit as enjoined by clause 8 (2) of the Licensing Order. (2) Even assuming without admitting that the requirement of time limit as provided by sub-clause (2) of clause 8 of the Licensing Order is directory and not mandatory even then the impugned order as passed by the second respondent is bad in law as there is not even substantial compliance with the provisions of sub-clause (2) of clause 8 of the Licensing Order and that time taken by the second respondent in passing the order is unreasonable. Consequently the order is liable to be quashed on the ground of under delay. (3) The provision of proviso to clause 8 of the Licensing Order is violative of the guarantee of Art. 14 of the Constitution in as much as the said provision is wholly arbitrary and gives no real opportunity to the dealer to have his say against the charges that may be leveled against him. (4) No reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner on the facts of the present case by the second respondent before passing the impugned order and consequently the impugned order is ultra vires the proviso to clause 8 of the Licensing Order and hence it is liable to be quashed. (5) Lastly Mr. Vakil contended that in any case looking to the charges leveled against the petitioner even if they are held to be proved the ultimate punishment of cancelling both the licenses is grossly disproportionate to the misconducts alleged against the petitioner and hence also the impugned order is liable to be set aside. ( 5 ) MR. G. D. Bhatt learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents on the other hand supported the impugned order and refuted the contentions canvassed by Mr. Vakil and also submitted a preliminary objection that as the petitioner has alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Collector under the Licensing Order the petition must be dismissed on this ground alone. ( 6 ) BEFORE we deal with the contentions of Mr. Vakil on merits it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary objection of Mr. Bhatt. Vakil and also submitted a preliminary objection that as the petitioner has alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Collector under the Licensing Order the petition must be dismissed on this ground alone. ( 6 ) BEFORE we deal with the contentions of Mr. Vakil on merits it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary objection of Mr. Bhatt. ( 7 ) IT is no doubt true that the petitioner is entitled to prefer an appeal against the impugned order before the Collector but the said remedy on the facts of the present case cannot be said to be equally efficacious. The reasons for the conclusion of ours are obvious. The petitioner was challenged the vires of the proviso to clause 8 (1 ). This question can obviously not be examined by the appropriate authority under the Order. Secondly the petition was admitted to final hearing last year. It has been pending for final hearing on the file of this court for almost one year. In the meanwhile time for filing the appeal has elapsed. it will therefore be unfair to the petitioner to dismiss the petition at such late stage on the ground of alternative remedy which has become time barred. Preliminary objection of Mr. Bhatt is therefore overruled. ( 8 ) WE shall now deal with the contentions of Mr. Vakil seriatim. So far as the first contention is concerned a look at the relevant provisions of the Licensing Order becomes at once necessary. Clause 8 which is relevant for our present purpose reads as under :"8 Suspension or cancellation of license for contravention of Order or conditions of license (1) No holder of a license issued under this order or his agent or servant or any other person acting on his behalf shall contravene any of the terms or conditions of a license issued to him and if any such license holder or his agent or servant or any person acting on his behalf contravenes any of the terms or conditions then without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him his license may be cancelled or suspended with regard to one or more essential articles by an order of the licensing authority in writing". Provided that no order small be made by the licensing authority under this clause unless the license holder has been given a reasonable opportunity of stating his case to that authorize against the proposed cancellation or suspension not being suspension referred to in the sub-clause (2) during the proceeding for cancellation of a license. (2) When the licensing authority is prima facie satisfied that where is a case for cancellation of the license it may suspend the license for a period not exceedding so days during which period the authority shall consider and finally decide". ( 9 ) THE earlier noted resume of facts leading to the present petition shows that after receiving report of the Chief Supply Inspector Rajkot respondent No. 2 prima facie took the view that irregularities and illegalities alleged to have been committed by the petitioner as a dealer of crude kerosene called for interim suspension of the licence pending the inquiry. The order suspending the licences is dated 26 As already noted earlier licences were suspended for 90 days from the date of the order or till the disposal of the case which ever was earlier. Thus 90 days would be over on 24-2-1985 while the impugned order was passed on 4-4-1985. It was therefore 39 days beyond the prescribed of 90 days for completion of the inquiry and for passing order therein. Mr. Vakil therefore submits that the impugned order is ultra vires sub-clause (2) of clause 8 of the Licensing Order. This contention of Mr. Vakil on the background of the aforesaid facts clearly raises the most question as to whether the time limit of 90 days for the life of suspension order pending the inquiry and for completion of the inquiry and passing order therein is such a mandate which can be bypassed at the peril of getting the order in the inquiry voided if it is not passed strictly within that time limit. In other words whether the provision of 90 days period for completion of the inquiry as mentioned in clause 8 (2) of the Licensing Order is mandatory in nature or it is nearly directory. In our view in the context of the entire clause 8 of the Licensing Order the provision of the said time limit is merely directory in nature and is not a mandatory provision. In our view in the context of the entire clause 8 of the Licensing Order the provision of the said time limit is merely directory in nature and is not a mandatory provision. The reasons which weigh with us for corning to this conclusion are obvious. Clause 8 caters to the situations wherein the dealers in essential commodities are found to have contravened relevant provisions of the Licensing Order and of the licences granted to them for dealing in such commodities. When such misconducts are detected two types of penalties get attracted qua such misconducting licence holders. Either their licences may be cancelled or may be suspended as contemplated by sub-clause (1) of clause 8 of the Licensing Order. It is obvious that cancellation of licences would debar the licence holder for all times to come from trading in the concerned essential commodity. Such type of penalty would obviously be based on grave misconducts. But in cases where the misconducts alleged against the concerned licence holders are not very grave but all the same the licence holders are required to be suitably dealt with so that they may not commit such irregularities and misconducts in future a less severe penalty is provided by way of suspension of licence which may be for a given period of time. But that suspension is by way of penalty. Before such penalty order is passed the procedure of the proviso to clause 8 (1) has to be complied with so that basic principles on natural justice get complied with and the penalty can be imposed after giving an opportunity to the concerned deglinquent to have his say in the matter and that he may not be condemned unheard. However the cases in which grave misconducts are alleged and the inquiry into the same with a view to ultimately imposing penalty of cancellation of licence on the licence holder is likely to take some time looking to the gravity of the misconducts alleged the disciplinary authority is armed with power to suspend the licence pending inquiry. That power inhers in him as per sub-clause (2) of clause 8 of the Licensing Order. The only safeguard against the protracted suspension of licence pending inquiry is to the effect that in any case such entirety suspension of licence pending inquiry should not exceed 90 days. That power inhers in him as per sub-clause (2) of clause 8 of the Licensing Order. The only safeguard against the protracted suspension of licence pending inquiry is to the effect that in any case such entirety suspension of licence pending inquiry should not exceed 90 days. Thus the order making authority has very clearly expressed its intention that if suspension of any licence for any alleged misconduct is by way of interim suspension such suspension cannot last for mere than 90 days pending the inquiry. It is obvious that if inquiry proceeds beyond 90 days interim suspension would come to an end. Thus life of interim suspension pending inquiry has been clearly limited to 90 days period. That period cannot be extended by any application. To that extent provision of 90 days period of the life of interim suspension as laid down by sub clause (2) of clause 8 of the Licensing Order has to be treated to be mandatory. However the next question is as to be whether further prescription of sub-clause (2) of clause 8 that during that period the authority shall consider and finally decide in mandatory in nature or not. It is obvious that if the licence is to lie cancelled after the inquiry without interim suspension no period for completion of inquiry is contemplated by clause 8 (1 ). However once the inquiry is preceded by interim suspension of licence the question of completion of inquiry within 90 days would assume importance as per the provisions of sub-clause (2) of clause 8. Once the period of 90 days for compulsory of inquiry pending interim suspension of license gets over automatically interim suspension of licence would come to an end and would terminate by efflux of time. Thereafter if the inquiry Continues it would partake the character of an inquiry into charges of misconduct of the concerned dealer in the absence of any interim suspension of the licence. If for such inquiry there is no time limit fixed by sub-clause (1) of clause 8 there is no reason to treat any inquiry proceeding beyond 90 days from the date of interim suspension of licence to be unauthorized or ultra vires. The question then arises as to whether prescription of completion of such inquiry within 90 days of cancellation of license as per sub-clause (2) of clause 8 is redundant or is of any efficacy. The question then arises as to whether prescription of completion of such inquiry within 90 days of cancellation of license as per sub-clause (2) of clause 8 is redundant or is of any efficacy. In our view if it is held as contended by Mr. Vakil that moment 90 days of suspension are over not only interim suspension gets exhausted but the power of inquiry also gets exhausted the very purpose and intention of the order making authority is punish the concerned misconducting dealer would get frustrated. It is easy to visualize that if period of 90 days for completion of inquiry preceded by interim suspension of licence is mandatory the inquiry cannot be completed on 91st day and its such completion and any orders passed therein would be liable to be treated as void. Such nullifying consequences do not appear to have been intended by the provisions of sub-clause (2) of clause 8. Thus it must be held that the mandate of the aforesaid rule about finishing of inquiry within the same period of 90 days during which interim suspension of licence would be current to that extent is a directory provision which should be substantially complied with and not strictly complied with and that if on the facts of a given case the inquiry is completed beyond 90 days by itself it cannot be said to be visited with any nullifying consequences and would not get voided. ( 10 ) IT is now well settled that when the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of such duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no central over these entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory and the neglect of them of affecting the validity of the acts done. Each case will have to be decided on its own merits having regard to the subject matter and the importance of the provision and its relation to the object intended to be secured by the enactment. Each case will have to be decided on its own merits having regard to the subject matter and the importance of the provision and its relation to the object intended to be secured by the enactment. Not only the actual words used but also the scheme of the enactment in the context of the particular provision under consideration the intended benefit of the provision and the material danger by its contravention have got to be seen. In Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes 11 edition principles pertaining to the present issue have been summarized at pages 455 and 456 as under :"when a statute requires that something shall be done or done in a particular manner or form without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance the question often arises: What intention is to be attributed by inference to the Legislature there indeed the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other no doubt can be entertained as to the intention. xxx xxx xxx xxx the reports are full of cases dealing with statutory provisions which are devoid of indication of intention regarding the effect of non-compliance with them. In some of them the conditions forms or other attendant circumstances prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory the neglect of which did not effect its validity or involve any other consequence than a liability to a penalty if any were imposed for breach of the enactment. The propriety indeed of over treating the provisions of any statute in the latter manner has been some times questioned but it is justifiable in principle as well as abundantly established by numerous authorities. It has been said that no rule can be laid down for determining whether the command is to be considered as a were direction or instruction involving no invalidating Consequence in its disregard or as imperative with an implied nullification for disobedience beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. It has been said that no rule can be laid down for determining whether the command is to be considered as a were direction or instruction involving no invalidating Consequence in its disregard or as imperative with an implied nullification for disobedience beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. It may perhaps be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience but the question is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice and when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons or advantage to those guilty of neglect without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment such an intention is not (to) be attributed to the legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded. The general rule is that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly but it is sufficient if directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. A strong line of distinction may be drawn between cases where the prescriptions of the Act affect the performance of a duty and where they relate to a privilege or power. Where powers rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations formalities or conditions shall be complied with it seemsneither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority conferred and it is therefore probable that such was the intention of the legislature. But when a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner or within a certain time or under other specified conditions such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative. (emphasis supplied)" ( 11 ) IT has got to be appreciated that provision for inquiry against the concerned dealer of essential article is meant for the benefit of the public at large. (emphasis supplied)" ( 11 ) IT has got to be appreciated that provision for inquiry against the concerned dealer of essential article is meant for the benefit of the public at large. The innocent consumers who are to get benefit of supply of these essential commodities and for whose benefit provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and the relevant Control Orders are enacted have naturally no control over the acts and omissions of the concerned authorities charged with the duty of enforcing these orders. If these authorities for any reason do not strictly comply with the time table and complete the inquiry in time their acts and omissions would spell disastrous effect on the read beneficiaries of the provisions viz. consumers at large if it is held that inquiry in connection with the misconduct of the dealer of essential commodities would automatically lapse after 90 days if it has been preceded by suspension of the licence pending inquiry. Thereby innocent third parties like the general public or consumers at large would suffer for no fault of theirs. They have no control over the officers enforcing these provisions nor have they control over the licence-holders who may be interested in protracting proceedings. In these circumstances the provision for completion of inquiry in 90 days as prescribed by clause 8 (2) has got to be held to be directory and not mandatory meaning thereby that this provision has to be substantially complied with and not strictly complied with. In that view of the matter the first contention of Mr. Vakil has got to be rejected. ( 12 ) SO far as the second contention of Mr. Vakil is concerned it must be kept in view that the show cause notice was served on the petitioner on 23-1-1985. It is ofcourse true that prior thereto by an order dated 26-11-1984 the petitioners licences both wholesale and retail were suspended pending the inquiry. However so far the actual inquiry was concerned it naturally started after the service of the show cause notice. The show cause notice itself directed that the petitioner should attend the office of the authority on 5-2-1985 at 12-30 p. m. for submitting personal as well as written submissions with evidence. However so far the actual inquiry was concerned it naturally started after the service of the show cause notice. The show cause notice itself directed that the petitioner should attend the office of the authority on 5-2-1985 at 12-30 p. m. for submitting personal as well as written submissions with evidence. However as the date of hearing 5-2-1985 was not convenient to the petitioner and a fresh date was sought for by sending a telegram to the authority the authority fixed the next date of hearing on 19 at 12-30 p. m. On that day the written statement was submitted in reply to the show cause notice and a statement of the petitioners partner was also recorded by the authority. The petitioners partner was heard in his defense. It is thereafter that the impugned order was passed on 4-4-1985. It is obvious that after hearing the petitioners partner on 19-2-1985 some time would naturally be taken by the authority in giving careful thought to the contentions of the petitioner in reply to the show cause notice and only thereafter the final order can be passed. On the peculiar facts of this case therefore delay of one month and 9 days after expire of 90 days from the date of the interim suspension of licences cannot be said to be unreasonable. On the facts of this case the conclusion is inevitable that the authority has disposed of the inquiry as expeditiously as possible and within a reasonable time and it cannot be said to be unduly delayed. It has to be held that it had substantially complied with the provisions of clause 8 of the Licensing Order. That disposes of the second contention of Mr. Vakil. ( 13 ) SO far as the third contention of Mr. Vakil is concerned it has to be stated to be rejected. It is difficult to appreciate how proviso to clause 8 can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable so as to be treated as violating guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution. It must be kept in view that the principles of natural justice are to a straightjacket formula. Various statute and rule making authorities incorporate the provisions of principles of natural justice in diverse manners to suit exigencies of situations meant to be create to by such provisions. It must be kept in view that the principles of natural justice are to a straightjacket formula. Various statute and rule making authorities incorporate the provisions of principles of natural justice in diverse manners to suit exigencies of situations meant to be create to by such provisions. So far as clause 8 is concerned the licence may either be suspended by was of punishment or cancelled on account of the misconduct proved against the licence-holder. When such misconducts are alleged against him he has to be given an opportunity to have his say in the matter otherwise he can be said to be condemned unheard. If that happens provisions of inquiry would fail on the touch-stone of basic principle of natural justice. However in the present case the proviso in terms ensures giving a reasonable opportunity of stating the case to the licence holder who naturally will get thereby all opportunities to have his say in the matter. Thus basic principles of natural justice and fair play are incorporated in the proviso which have got to be followed by the concerned authority before any penal action is taken against the concerned licence holder. It is difficult to appreciate how such benign provision can be dubbed as arbitrary or unreasonable. It is also Difficult to appreciate the contention of Mr. Vakil that the proviso is bad because reasonable opportunity afforded is reasonable opportunity of stating the case and not proving the case. With respect this distinction is without any real difference. Reasonable opportunity of stating the case would necessarily imply reasonable opportunity of proving the case. It is obvious that the case which the alleged delinquent-licence holder has to state is the case to establish his innocence and for discharing the show cause notice that might be give to him. He state his case not for the sake of fun but for the sake of proving the same. May be the proof may be implicit t in the statement of the defense supported by relevant documentary evidence and may not be followed by oral arguments. But that would not affect the nature of the reasonable opportunity of stating the case and establishing it. That opportunity would not remain in any way less reasonable nor will it become arbitrary in any view of the matter it is interesting to note that on the facts of the present case this contention of Mr. But that would not affect the nature of the reasonable opportunity of stating the case and establishing it. That opportunity would not remain in any way less reasonable nor will it become arbitrary in any view of the matter it is interesting to note that on the facts of the present case this contention of Mr. Vakil really becomes academic as the petitioner was given not only the reasonable opportunity of stating the case but he was given personal hearing and he was requested to furnish whatever evidence he wanted to furnish in support of his defence. Thus on the facts of the present case it cannot be said that any reasonable opportunity of stating the case and for that matter proving the case was denied to the petitioner. But that is a different matter. So far as the challenge to the legal efficacy of the proviso to clause 8 goes it must be repelled by holding that the proviso as framed does ample service to the basic principles of natural justice and is in one way arbitrary as to factor on the touch-stone of Article 14 of the Constitution. The third contention of Mr. Vakil therefore stands repelled. (Rest of the judgment is not material for the Reports.) petition dismissed. .