JUDGMENT : S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J. - Whether the requirement of moral turpitude governs the ORDER :of a criminal court only or equally the conviction for any offence, for the purpose of the disqualification of a school teacher under Rule 19(c) of the Bihar Primary and Middle Education Rules, 1961, in the significant question necessitating this reference to the Division Bench. 2. The facts are not in serious dispute and lie in a narrow compass. Way back in 1969, the petitioner Bindeshwari Mahto, was posted as an assistant teacher in the Primary School, Fathar Ghatti Dignal Bank, Purnea. On the 26th October, 1969, a criminal case alleging offences under Section 302, read with Section 34, of the Indian Penal Code, against the petitioner and others was registered at police Station Balia, District Monghyr. During the course of investigation, the petitioner was arrested and, after being released on bail, on the 4th March, 1970, the petitioner attempted to re-join his duties at the school, but, was informed that his case would be considered only after the disposal of the criminal case pending against him. Ultimately, the Second Assistant Sessions Judge, Begusaraj, by his JUDGMENT : dated the 26th February, 1974, convicted the petitioner under Sections 325 and 323 of the Indian penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and one month, respectively on the aforesaid two counts. The petitioner appealed against the conviction and the sentence, but the same was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge-of Monghyr on the 13th March, 1976. Thereafter the petitioner preferred a revision in the High Court, and it is claimed on his behalf that therein the conviction under Sections 325 and 323 of the penal Code was maintained, but the sentence was set aside with a direction to the lower appellate court for exercising its discretion under Section 330 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 3. It would appear that the petitioner thereafter approached the authorities to rejoin his post as a teacher. The proceeding remained somewhat protracted and, it appears that the blame thereafter was equally shared by the petitioner's default as well. However, the petitioner’s claim to rejoin was ultimately rejected by Annexure 1' primarily on the ground of Rule 19(c) of the Bihar Primary and Middle. The proceeding remained somewhat protracted and, it appears that the blame thereafter was equally shared by the petitioner's default as well. However, the petitioner’s claim to rejoin was ultimately rejected by Annexure 1' primarily on the ground of Rule 19(c) of the Bihar Primary and Middle. Education Rules, 1961, with the following findings by the District Superintendent of Education, Purnea :- "Keeping in view the direction of the High Court and considering the facts mentioned in your representation it has been round that your conviction under• Section 323 and 325 (of the Indian Penal Code) bas been maintained, and, this matter is also at present, pending before the Additional Sessions Judge, Monghyr. Sections 323 and 325 also are cognizable offences and for a teacher this also is connected with a case of morality, arid, if there is such a convicted teacher in the school, it is certain that there will be effect on the character of small boys. Therefore, keeping in view the above facts, your representation dated the 6th November, 1982, is rejected." Aggrieved thereby, the present petition has been preferred. It originally came up before my learned brother, Ram Chandra Prasad Sinha, J., sitting singly before him the primal ground urged was that the petitioner now stands convicted only under sections 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, which do not necessarily involve any moral turpitude. On that assumption, it was urged that his case could not come within the ambit of Rule 19(c) of the Rules, because the requirement of moral turpitude, according to the petitioner, would govern both the conviction for any offerce as also any other ORDER :of the criminal court. Noticing the significance of the question and the true import of Rule 19(c), the case was referred to the Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. 4. Inevitably the whole question herein turns on the language of the statute itself, and it is, therefore, apt to quote the relevant part of Rule 19 at the very outset for facility of reference :- 19. 4. Inevitably the whole question herein turns on the language of the statute itself, and it is, therefore, apt to quote the relevant part of Rule 19 at the very outset for facility of reference :- 19. DISQUALIFICATION OF TEACHER : A teacher in any school maintained or aided out of the District Education Fund shall be disqualified from continuance in his employment, (a) if he takes part in any political activity or demonstration or becomes, or continues to be, a member of a political organisation or of any other organisation whose activities tend (Sic) to be political; or, (b) if he is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties; or, (c) if he is convicted of any offence, or subjected by a criminal court to any ORDER :involving moral turpitude, which in the opinion of the Department makes him unfit to be a member of the teaching profession." 5. Ere one comes to analyse the very words of clause (c) above, it seems necessary to look at the matter in a somewhat large perspective. The learned Counsel for the petitioner himself very fairly highlighted the somewhat modernistic principle that the construction of a statute, must be illumined by the goal, though guided by its language. This principle, which is sometimes labelled as the schematic or purposive approach to interpretation, indicates a shift from the overly hyper technical grammatical construction of the statute. The latter has been somewhat picturesquarly labelled by Krishna Iyer, J., as the dictatorship of the dictionary. Therefore, the illusive but the basic search herein must remain the intendment of the legislature or the framers of the rules. It is in this context that one must remind oneself that whatever might be the modern conditions, teaching and education has rightly been viewed, and must continue, as a noble profession. It is with an eye to these impeccable standards, which must be maintained in this field, that Rule 19 in its totality seems to have been envisaged by its framers. It requires certain basic norms of conduct for the qualification of holding the post or a teacher. It is from this somewhat altruistic angle, therefore, that clause (c) of Rule 19 has to be approached for seeking its true interpretation. 6. Now an incisive analysis of clause (c) would indicate that it has two distinct and separate objective or factual foundations for coming into play. It is from this somewhat altruistic angle, therefore, that clause (c) of Rule 19 has to be approached for seeking its true interpretation. 6. Now an incisive analysis of clause (c) would indicate that it has two distinct and separate objective or factual foundations for coming into play. To put it in other words, for the very initiation of proceedings against a teacher or the applicability of clause (c) to him, two objective pre-conditions must first be satisfied. These are (i) if he is convicted of any offence, and, (ii) if he is subjected by a criminal court to any ORDER :involving moral turpitude. Thus either of the two aforesaid criteria is indeed the pre-requisite before clause (c) of Rule 19 can come into play. What, however; deserves to be highlighted is that by the self neither of them is adequate or sufficient to involve disqualification. Indeed the dominant and the subjective qualification superimposed upon them is the most material one. Even if either or even both of the objectives or factual requirements were to be satisfied, they would not necessarily lead to any disqualification. It is only if on that foundational base the Department arrives at its subjective opinion that these make him unfit to be a member of the teaching profession, that the disqualification would attach. The final and the ultimate sanction, therefore, stems from the subjective satisfaction or the opinion of the Department in this context. 7. Now, viewing clause (c) in its three parts, it appears to me that the two factual clauses or requirements are distinct and separate. The first and the foremost one is the more serious and requires the conviction for any offence. That criminality by itself would be stigmatic, thought in varying degree, depending upon the nature of the crime seems to be two axiomatic to deserve elaboration. Conviction for a crime by itself for a teacher would involve a stigma, which, in the opinion of the Department might render his unfit to be a member of the profession. It is for this reason that this clause is independently visualised by the legislature and this requirement pertains to the conviction for any offence, irrespective of the fact whether such an offence can also be labelled as one involving moral turpitude or otherwise. It is for this reason that this clause is independently visualised by the legislature and this requirement pertains to the conviction for any offence, irrespective of the fact whether such an offence can also be labelled as one involving moral turpitude or otherwise. Once this requirement is satisfied, it is then for the Department to consider whether the sumes renders the teacher unfit to be a member of the teaching profession or otherwise. It would bear repetition that disqualification is entailed only after the subjective opinion of the Department in this context is satisfied. 8. On a lower pedestal in the ORDER :of a criminal court, such an ORDER :against a teacher to which he may be subjected might well be derogatory, but, by itself it bas not been made the foundational base for disqualification. It is only if the ORDER :of the criminal court involves moral turpitude that any action under this Rule can be visualised against a teacher. Any and every ORDER :of the criminal court does not bring the clause into play and it is only so if it is further coupled by the taint of morol turpitude. 9. Yet again a plain look at the language of clause (e) would then indicate that the two factual requirements spelt out therein have to be read disjunctively and are in the alternative. They are not conjunctive. The word employed for dividing the two is 'or' and thus is clearly a pointer to the disjunctive nature of these two requirements. Once they are to be read disjunctively, then moral turpitude plainly governs the latter or the second requirement and not the independant and the separate first one. 10. No doubt it is true that the punctuation in a statute cannot be conclusive by itself, yet; it is equally well settled that this can be an added factor or aid in the larger aspects of construction. Herein the punctuation also tends to buttress the view I am inclined to take. The phrase "subjected by a criminal court to any ORDER :involving moral turpitude" is an integral one 'separated by commas on both ends. It thus is a complete clause by itself and attaches moral turpitude only to the ORDER :of criminal court. 11. Herein the punctuation also tends to buttress the view I am inclined to take. The phrase "subjected by a criminal court to any ORDER :involving moral turpitude" is an integral one 'separated by commas on both ends. It thus is a complete clause by itself and attaches moral turpitude only to the ORDER :of criminal court. 11. In this context it may, perhaps, be kept in mind that there are serious and stigmatic offences in the realm of crime, which have sometimes been held to be not involving moral turpitude. That the word "moral turpitude" does not admit of a definition and is a somewhat slippery phrase seems to be axiomatic. In Durga Singh v. The State of Punjab A. I. R. 1957 Punjab 97) it was rightly observed as under :- "After all the term 'moral turpitude' is a rather vague one and it may have different meanings in different contexts. The term has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what- a man owes to a fellow-man or to society in general. It has never been held that gravity of punishment is to be considered in determining whether the misconduct involves moral turpitude or not." 12. As in the present case, the petitioner was implicated on the serious and heinous charge of fratricidal murder under Section 302, though he was later convicted of the lesser offences under Sections 325 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. It has, perhaps, been sometimes said that serious offences against the body and causing hurt may not necessarily involve any moral turpitude. Can it, however, be said that a felon convicted of a serious crime 'against the human body under the Indian Penal Code is necessarily a person qualified to continue as a teacher? I do not think so. However, if the proposition canvassed on behalf of the petitioner were to be accepted then inevitably the result would be that even a person convicted of serious crime cannot even be proceeded against under Rule 19(c). A construction which leads to such anomalous results has, therefore, to be avoided. 13. Mr. I do not think so. However, if the proposition canvassed on behalf of the petitioner were to be accepted then inevitably the result would be that even a person convicted of serious crime cannot even be proceeded against under Rule 19(c). A construction which leads to such anomalous results has, therefore, to be avoided. 13. Mr. Indu, Shekhar Prasad Sinha, on behalf of the petitioner, tenuously pin-pointed the other extreme that if moral turpitude were not to qualify the first clause then a teacher would be within the hazard of Rule 19(c) even for very paltry and purely technical offences. It was sought to be argued that even if he were to be convicted of a minor traffic offence, Rule 19(c) would become applicable. This contention loses sight of the factor that the mere conviction for any offence, however serious, is not by itself an automatic, disqualification. Until and unless the Department, on its basis, comes to a fair conclusion that such a conviction renders the teachers unfit to be a member of the profession, no adverse consequences would follow therefrom. To assume that the Department will abuse this power to wrongly penalise a teacher convicted of a paltry and technical offence is unwarranted. It is well settled that a statutes or a power is not to be construed on the assumption that it may be abused and, indeed the settled presumption is that the same would be exercised fairly and bona fide. The word 'department' has been defined in the Rule 2 to mean the Director of Public Instructions. Patently, it is the function of a responsible officer of the Department and the inarticulate premise is that he will exercise the same and arrive at his opinion reasonably and fairly. 14. To conclude on the legal aspect it must, therefore, be held that the requirement of moral turpitude, governs only the ORDER :of a criminal court, and not the conviction of any offence under Rule 19(c) of the Bihar Primary and Middle Education Rules, 1961. 15. Once it is held as above, it is plain that there would be little merit left in this petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, attempted to factually assail the Older that it wrongly proceeded on the assumption that conviction under Sections 325 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code necessarily involves moral turpitude. This argument has only to be noticed and rejected. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, attempted to factually assail the Older that it wrongly proceeded on the assumption that conviction under Sections 325 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code necessarily involves moral turpitude. This argument has only to be noticed and rejected. The relevant part of the ORDER :has already been quoted verbatim in paragraph no. 3 above. Even a plain reading thereof would show that there is not the least hint of a finding that a conviction under Section 325 and 323 necessarily involves moral turpitude. On the other hand, it is clearly an expression of the opinion of the authority that a conviction on a transaction of this nature in its opinion renders the petitioner unfit to be a member of the teaching profession. That opinion has to be of the Department and it is not for the Courts to substitute their opinion therefore, and, cannot be disturbed unless the power has been exercised male fide or for extraneous reasons or in patent violation of the statute. 16. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, the writ petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no ORDER :as to costs.