M. S. NESARGI, J. ( 1 ) THESE are plaintiffs' second appeals. The plaintiffs filed O. S. No. 24 of 1969 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar against the respondents as defendants, 1 and 2 for the following reliefs. (1) For Cancelling the settlement deed dated 6-7-1966 so far as the first item of the suit property is concerned, since the gifts have been revoked, and the gift deed dated 2-6-1966 in regard to the 2nd item of the plaint schedule as the gift has been revoked. (2) Declaring the title of the plaintiffs to the suit schedule properties. (3) Directing the defendants or others on their behalf by a permanent injunction from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties. (4) Directing the defendants to pay costs of the proceedings and any such reliefs as is warranted in the circumstances of the case. The trial Court decreed the suit. Defendant 1 preferred R. A. No. 1 of 1972 and defendant 2 preferred R. A. No. 2 of 1972 in the Court of the District Judge, Kolar. The learned District Judge allowed both the appeals. Hence, these two appeals are filed by the plaintiffs. ( 2 ) THE suit properties are 1 acre 22 guntas in Survey No. 22/2 and 3 acres 25 guntas in Survey No. 23 of Sonisettihalli, Kasaba Hobli, Chintamani Taluk. The suit areas are parcels of the larger areas in the said survey numbers. The facts are that one K. Rajagopaliah Setty, husband of plaintiff 1 and father of plaintiff 2, and defendant 2 are brothers. They acquired these properties jointly. They became divided in the year 1955. Exhibit D-1 recording the division was actually written out on 17-6-1960. 'a' and 'b' schedules have been attached to it showing which properties had fallen to the share of which one of these two brothers. A municipal First Grade College was to be started in Chintamani. A College Committee was constituted. Sri M. C. Anjaneya Reddi D. W. 3 was the Secretary of the College Committee. K. Rajagopaliah Setty settled his properties by a registered document Exhibit P-3. Three schedules are mentioned in it. 1 acre 22 guntas in Survey No. 22/2 is in 'c' schedule. He gifted this property in favour of the Secretary M. C. Anjaneya Reddi for the construction of a College. K. Rajagopaliah Setty settled his properties by a registered document Exhibit P-3. Three schedules are mentioned in it. 1 acre 22 guntas in Survey No. 22/2 is in 'c' schedule. He gifted this property in favour of the Secretary M. C. Anjaneya Reddi for the construction of a College. Thereafter on 2-8-1966 plaintiff executed a registered gift deed in favour of the said Secretary as per Exhibit D-2 gifting away 3 acres 35 guntas in Survey No. 23 for the College. Later on it was found that 10 guntas more had been gifted under Ext. D-2 and therefore D. W. 3 executed a registered reconveyance deed Ext. P-4 on 8-8-1966 in favour of plaintiff 1 reconveying 10 guntas out of 3 acres 35 guntas. Ultimately some-where in June 1968 it was decided that these two properties were to be sold. Plaintiff 1 filed an application as per Ext. D-12 on 12-6-1968 to the Deputy Commissioner, Kolar, through an Advocate under Ss. 304, 305 and 306 of the Town Municipalities Act stating that in the event of the building for the College not being erected the grant would be deemed to have been cancelled and in the result ineffective and that the property is worth Rs. 30,000/- while she had information that it was being sold to defendant 2 for a paltry sum of Rs. 15,000/-, though she was prepared to offer initial bid of Rs. 18,000/ -. The Deputy Commissioner issued endorsement as per Ext. P-11 that the gift was in favour Sri M. C. Anjaneya Reddy, Secretary First Grade College, the Municipal Council did not come in the picture and no action was called for by the Deputy Commissioner. According to the defendants it was publicly announced by tom that the said two properties were going to be auctioned in public auction while according to the plaintiff it was done in a hush manner to favour defendant 2. Defendant 2 purchased these properties and a sale deed in his favour was executed and registered on 22-6-1968 as per Ext. D-5. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER on 27-6-1968 the suit was filed in the Court of the Munsiff, Kolar, and ad interim injunction was secured. In view of the pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit was re-filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Kolar on 5-7-1969. The plaintiffs secured temporary injunction in the suit. D-5. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER on 27-6-1968 the suit was filed in the Court of the Munsiff, Kolar, and ad interim injunction was secured. In view of the pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit was re-filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Kolar on 5-7-1969. The plaintiffs secured temporary injunction in the suit. That is still in force as this Court also has granted injunction. ( 4 ) THE two Courts below have held that the transactions evidenced by Exhibits P-3, D-2, P-4 and D-5 are genuine transactions. In view of this fact, I consider it unnecessary to go into the various allegations made by the plaintiffs in this behalf. ( 5 ) THE trial Court has by adopting a curious process of reasoning held that thee plaintiffs have been in possession. The reasoning of the trial Court is that when the College building was not constructed in the suit areas, the defendants were trespassers and an equity Court would not come to their rescue and therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to an order of permanent injunction. It has just referred to Ss. 11 and 31 of the Transfer of Property Act and has relied on the decision in AIR 1959 SC 24 in regard to the interpretation of the various clauses found in the same document and thereafter come to a conclusion that construction of College building on 1 acre 22 guntas in Survey No. 22/2 and 3 acres 35 guntas in Survey No. 23 was a condition necessary to be performed to make the gift deed legally valid and failure to perform that condition rendered the gifts invalid and therefore the gifts stood revoked. I am pained to state that analysis of the legal position flowing from Ss. 11, 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act is not found in the judgement of the trial Court. ( 6 ) THE lower appellate Court has disbelieved the evidence of plaintiff-1 (P. W. 6), P. W. 2 Village Accountant from 1966 to 1968 and P. W. 3 Village Accountant after the year 1968 and also Exhibits P. 1 and P. 2 the Patta Books relied upon by the plaintiffs. It has thereupon held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they were in possession of the suit areas any time after Exhibits P. 3 and D. 2. It has thereupon held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they were in possession of the suit areas any time after Exhibits P. 3 and D. 2. It has, in regard to the validity of the gifts, concluded that construction of the College building on the suit areas was not a condition in view of the simple fact that the suit areas are not contiguous but were away from each other to a considerable extent and that College had already started functioning in 1965 in some other building constructed by the Town Municipal Council in another land and further that provisions of S. 11 of the T. P. Act came to be attracted. According to the learned District Judge the gifts were absolute and possession of the suit areas was handed over by Rajagopaliah Setty and plaintiff-1 and therefore the clause relating to the construction of the College building on the suit areas could not in law be operative being hit by S. 11 of the T. P. Act. It is on this basis he had allowed the appeals filed by defendants 1 and 2. ( 7 ) SRI H. B. Datar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellantsplaintiffs, argued that the gifts in Exhibits P-3 and D-2 ought to be considered separately and that the gifts had been made on condition that the College building was to be constructed on the suit areas as is clear from the narration in Exhibit P-3 and therefore it was a conditional gift and when once the defendants tailed to construct the College building or made it impossible to construct in the suit areas by selling the suit areas to defendant-2, their interest it the property ceased to exist as provided by S. 31 of the T. P. Act. He nextly argued that the gift evidenced by Exhibit D-2 is supplemental to the gift in Exhibit P-3 and when Exhibit P-3 is hit by the provisions in S. 31 of the T. P. Act, it would automatically follow that the gift in Exhibit D-2 also has to fall as what is stipulated under Exhibit D-2 is utilisation of the property for the construction of the College building on the area of 1 acre 22 guntas in S. No. 22/2 gifted under Exhibit P-3. On the question of possession, he argued that the lower appellate Court has misread the evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3 and 6 and has wrongly rejected to act on Exhibits P-1 and P-2 which are the Patta Books. He further buttressed this argument by saying that the lower appellate Court has overlooked the evidence of D. W.-2 a Talati who has sworn that he had collected land revenue from K. Rajagopaliah Setty until his death and thereafter from plaintiff-1 in regard to these lands. ( 8 ) SRI V. Krishna Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of defendant-2, argued that what is narrated in Exhibit P-3 in regard to the construction of the College building is only a direction or the wish of K. Rajagopaliah Setty or at the most a desire on his part. Gift of the land has been made absolutely under Exhibit P-3. When that is so, on transfer of the first suit item, as interest in it got created absolutely, this clause relating to the construction of the College building amounts to a direction that the interest in the property shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner and as such would be squarely hit by the provisions in S. 11 of the T. P. Act. The next argument advanced by Sri V. Krishna Murthy is that perusal of Exhibits P-4 and D-2 showed that Rajagopaliah Setty was very much aware of the gift by plaintiff-1 and in fact the gift under Exhibit D-2 had been made by plaintiff-1 in consultation with her husband K. Rajagopaliah Setty and hence it must be held that Rajagopaliah Setty is also a party to the said gift under Exhibit D-2. He developed this argument further and urged that Rajagopaliah Setty is seen to have attested Exhibit D-2 and therefore what is contained in Exhibit D-2 would also bind him. He read over Exhibits D-2 and P-3 and pointed out that the narration in Exhibit P-3 that the College building is to be constructed on suit item No. 1 and if not constructed no relationship between the College Committee and suit item No. 1 would remain is not found in Exhibit D-2. He read over Exhibits D-2 and P-3 and pointed out that the narration in Exhibit P-3 that the College building is to be constructed on suit item No. 1 and if not constructed no relationship between the College Committee and suit item No. 1 would remain is not found in Exhibit D-2. He also pointed out that Exhibit D-2 specifically authorises sale of suit item No. 2 advantageous to the Committee and use of that amount for the construction of the College evidently referred to in Exhibit P-3 and part of the amount for erecting a statue of the father-in-taw of plaintiff-1 in the College premises. He on this basis argued that even if it is for the sake of argument understood that Exhibit P-3. contains an express condition that the College building must be constructed on suit item No. 1 and if not the interest of the College Committee in the land would cease, it has to be held that K. Rajagopaliah Setty has waived this condition while the gift under Ex. D-2 came to be made. ( 9 ) SECTION 11 of the T. P. Act reads as follows :-"where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction. "it is plain that the ingredients are (1) there should be transfer of property; (2) an interest in that property should be created absolutely in favour of a person and (3) the terms of the transfer should direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by the said person in a particular manner. ( 10 ) SECTION 31 of the T. P. Act reads as follows :"subject to the provisions of S. 12, on a transfer of property an interest therein may be created with the condition superadded that it shall cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, or in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen. Illustrations (a) A transfers a farm to B for his life, with a proviso that, in case B cuts down a certain wood, the transfer shall cease to have any effect. B cuts down the wood. Illustrations (a) A transfers a farm to B for his life, with a proviso that, in case B cuts down a certain wood, the transfer shall cease to have any effect. B cuts down the wood. He loses his life-interest in the farm. (b) A transfers a farm to B, provided that, if B shall not go to England within three years after the date of the transfer, his interest in the farm shall cease. B does not go to England within the term prescribed. His interest in the farm ceases. "it is plain that the ingredients are (1) there should be transfer of property; (2) an interest therein should be created and (3) a condition should be superadded while creating the interest. ( 11 ) IN my considered view, the basic distinction between these two provisions relates to (i) direction envisaged in S. 11; (ii) a condition envisaged in S. 31 of the T. P. Act; (iii) an interest being created absolutely under S. 11 and (iv) an interest being created (not qualified by the word 'absolutely') but with a condition superadded in S. 31 of the T. P. Act. ( 12 ) 'transfer of Property' is defined in S. 5 of the T. P. Act as follows :-"in the following Sections 'transfer of property' means an act by which a living person conveys property in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and 'to transfer property' is to perform such act. In this Section 'living person' includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals. "such a transfer of property can take place either by means of sale, gift, will, lease etc. Transfer of property is always made to convey property to some one or in other words to create an interest in the property in favour of such a person. "such a transfer of property can take place either by means of sale, gift, will, lease etc. Transfer of property is always made to convey property to some one or in other words to create an interest in the property in favour of such a person. If the interest so created is absolute but in the terms of the transfer there is a direction that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by the transferee in a particular manner (though the interest created is absolute), provisions of S. 11 of the T. P. Act squarely apply. It is to be noted here that the direction in the terms of the transfer has to be in regard to the application of the interest created or enjoyment of the interest created in a particular manner (though the interest has been created absolutely ). In such cases, the law makes the term or direction disappear allowing the interest created absolutely to survive. On the other hand, when an interest in the property transferred is created but with a condition that it shall cease to exist on the happening of a specified uncertain event or on the non-happening of a specified uncertain event, the provisions of S. 31 of the T. P. Act squarely apply. The absence of the word 'absolutely' in extension of the words 'an interest' in S. 31 is very significant. Illustration (a) to S. 31 takes into consideration a case of limited interest. Illustration (b) to S. 31 appears to take into consideration a case where a limited interest has not been created, but a condition which is unconnected with application of the interest or enjoyment of the interest so created is superadded. These two illustrations clearly highlight the basic distinction between the provisions in S. 11 and S. 31 of the T. P. Act. In a case falling under S. 31 of the T. P. Act the superadded condition survives and the interest created disappears. ( 13 ) IN the case on hand the transfers are by way of gifts. Section 122 of the T. P. Act makes acceptance of the gift during the lifetime of the donor necessary for the gift to be legally valid. ( 13 ) IN the case on hand the transfers are by way of gifts. Section 122 of the T. P. Act makes acceptance of the gift during the lifetime of the donor necessary for the gift to be legally valid. Section 126 of the T. P. Act reads as follows :"the donor and the donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revokable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor is void wholly or in part, as the case may be. A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded. Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked. Nothing contained in this Section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for consideration without notice. "reading of the above provision makes it plain that if a donee that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor, a gift shall be suspended or revoked, it shall so happen. The basic facts in the decision in Venkatarama Aiyer v. Aiyasami Aiyer, AIR 1923 Mad 67 are as follows. The plaintiff therein was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to transportation for life. On the event of his departure for Port Blair he executed a deed of gift in favour of one Singam Aiyar a relation of his. By the said deed he transferred his properties to Singam Aiyar with specific stipulation that Singam Aiyar should obtain possession of and enjoy the properties both moveable and immovable with the rights of gift, sale etc. He superadded a condition to the effect that in case the sentence passed on him should terminate and he should come back to his village, Singam Aiyar should hand over the said properties to him. Their Lordships held that the provisions in Ss. 31 and 126 of the T. P. Act squarely applied. They also ruled that the defeasance clause would be subject to two limitations, namely, that no rule of Hindu Law should be infringed and that the rights of transferees for consideration without notice should be safeguarded. Their Lordships held that the provisions in Ss. 31 and 126 of the T. P. Act squarely applied. They also ruled that the defeasance clause would be subject to two limitations, namely, that no rule of Hindu Law should be infringed and that the rights of transferees for consideration without notice should be safeguarded. It is subject to these limitations, the gift falling under these provisions would fail. It is already seen that superadding of a condition is permissible in law under S. 31 of the T. P. Act and acceptance of a gift by the donee is necessary for rendering the gift valid in law. Therefore, when a donee accepts a gift which is burdened by a condition that is superadded, it is nothing but a donee agreeing to that condition and therefore the consequences provided in S. 126 of the T. P. Act have to follow. That is how exactly the principles of law have been applied in the said decision. ( 14 ) ANOTHER decision of the Madras High Court which illustrates this aspect is found in Krishnaraya v. Sarvothama Kodgi, AIR 1951 Mad 798 . Provisions of Ss. 11, 14, 31 and 32 have been considered in this decision. In the said case a lift executed by one conveyed absolutely all rights to the General Secretary of the Theosophical Society, Benares for the use and benefit of the local lodge of the Coondapur Theosophical Society. The condition superadded was to the effect that in the event of the site and building stated in the gift not being required for the above purpose the property should revert to him on the condition of his paying to the Society the then estimated value of the building alone. It was held that the reverter clause was not at all one of repugnancy to the absolute estate created by the deed but was, if at all, only one of defeasance. It was also held that it was a covenant between the donor and the donee and the latter ought to reconvey to the former in a certain contingency and that the rule against perpetuity did not apply to agreements. This incidentally meets one of the arguments advanced by Sri V. Krishna Murthy on the basis of rule of perpetuity being affected. It is clear that the defeasance clause would not always affect the rule of perpetuity. This incidentally meets one of the arguments advanced by Sri V. Krishna Murthy on the basis of rule of perpetuity being affected. It is clear that the defeasance clause would not always affect the rule of perpetuity. That aspect must depend on facts and circumstances of each case. ( 15 ) IN Potti Swami and Bros v. Govindarajulu, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 605 gift of money was made with a condition that the amount should be used to establish and maintain a Hospital at Bezwada after collecting public funds and donations and in case the construction of the building was not commenced before the end of 1946, the amount donated should be returned to the donors. It was held that it was a conditional gift. The Hospital building was not constructed in fulfillment of the condition. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to refund of the money gifted. The argument on the basis of cy pres doctrine was rejected as the donations were collected for construction of a Hospital at a certain place and as there was no charitable intention by the donor. In fact it was found that the Hospital had been constructed on some other site that too on a larger scale and it was argued that the amount was used for that purpose. That argument was rejected. ( 16 ) IN State of U. P. v. Sham Sundar, AIR 1961 All 418 a person donated an amount to the Government for the specific purpose for building a female Hospital. It was held that it was not an outright gift and if the purpose of the gift fails the donor was entitled to the refund of the amount as the Government was under the same obligation such as private citizen when soliciting and obtaining donations for a public purpose. ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court has in State of U. P. v. Bansi Dhar, AIR 1974 SC 1084 held as follows :"where a gift is for a specific charitable purpose, the performance of which is rendered impossible the courts have to consider the gift as a conditional one. An old man while donating a large sum to the Collector for the construction of a 'women's hospital' had particularised that the hospital should be six-bedded one on a choses spot to be constructed by himself with matching contribution from Government and other voluntary donations. An old man while donating a large sum to the Collector for the construction of a 'women's hospital' had particularised that the hospital should be six-bedded one on a choses spot to be constructed by himself with matching contribution from Government and other voluntary donations. The old man died and his human agency for construction became unavailable. After the legal action for return of the sum donated was instituted by the sons of the donor the Government constituted a new Committee and built a 22 bed hospital in the same place. It was total departure from the project which induced the alleged conditional gift. Held that the transaction was a gift simpliciter but was subject to the matching grant from Government, building having to be made with such augmented amount by the donor etc. Assuming substantial compliance as sufficient in law, the Government had no case that any of the conditions has been carried out, not even the equal contribution from the State exchequer without which the construction of the hospital would have been a half-done project. Thus the conditions falling, the charity proved abortive, and the legal consequence was a resulting trust in favour of the donor. The State could not keep the money and the suit was liable to be decreed. As the donation was conditional the Government was a mere condition of the cash till the condition was complied with and as the performance thereof was defeated by Government, the gift did not take effect. "the aforecited decisions make it abundantly clear that the crux of the question is whether the gift Ex. P-3 is for a specific purpose with a superadded condition relating to the purpose or subject. ( 18 ) THE relevant portions in Exhibit PW 3 will be excerpted in their chronological order. (Translation) :"i have given for this College the property mentioned in 'c' Sch. , worth Rs. 500/- for building of the Government College, conducting B. Sc. (Courses) situate in Chintanoni town and sanctioned last year and I have given up possession of this property in favour of the College Committee today itself. In the event of the building for B. Sc. College is not built in this property, the College Committee has no rights whatsoever in this property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . In the event of the building for B. Sc. College is not built in this property, the College Committee has no rights whatsoever in this property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . "the argument of Sri Datar is that the gift has been made by Sri K. Rajagopaliah Setty for the specific purpose of construction of the College building on the very site with a superadded condition that in case the College building is not constructed on the very site, the interest of the College Committee in the suit property would cease. According to him, this is a conditional gift, the condition being superadded and also providing the defeasance clause and therefore would fall squarely within the ambit of S. 31 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 19 ) SRI V. Krishna Murthy argued that by the earlier portion of the recital excerpted above, K. Rajagopaliah Setty made an absolute gift of the property in favour of the College Committee and also handed over possession of the property. It is in the latter portion that there is reference to construction of the College building on the site. Therefore, the reference by the said words amounts to a direction in regard to enjoyment of the property by the College Committee and hence it is S. 11 of the Transfer of property Act that would be attracted. ( 20 ) THE words "for the purposes of building College etc. , I have given for the College the property mentioned in 'c' schedule hereunder worth Rs. 500/-", though read in isolation with the words in portion excerpted above would lead to one and only one meaning, that is K. Rajagopaliah Setty. gifted the property for the purpose of the Government B. Sc. , College construction etc. The gift was for the specific purpose of constructing the said College. The remaining words only adumbrate this by providing that the college construction has to be erected on the very property and that is followed by the defeasance clause. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the gift under Exhibit P-3 has been made for a specific purpose and there is a superadded condition coupled with the defeasance clause. Sections 31 and 126 of the T. P. Act are attracted. ( 21 ) IN this connection Sr. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that the gift under Exhibit P-3 has been made for a specific purpose and there is a superadded condition coupled with the defeasance clause. Sections 31 and 126 of the T. P. Act are attracted. ( 21 ) IN this connection Sr. V. Krishna Murthy argued that when a condition subsequent by way of defeasance that any interest created shall cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event shall happen or in case a specified uncertain event shall not happen, can be valid, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it should be enforced in every case as nun-performance of a condition subsequent in a contract may be fully compensated by a decree for damages actually sustained. He placed reliance on the decision in Munshi Lal v. Ahmed Mirza, AIR 1933 Oudh 291. Perusal of the decision shows that that was a case of contract which carried an element of punishment in the nature of penalty and therefore S. 74 of the Contract Act was applied and this relaxation in the rigour of application of S. 31 was made. ( 22 ) THIS takes me to the recitals in Ex. D-2. Here again the excerpt of the relevant portions will be in their chronological order. " (I) For the fund of the College building of yours, the land mentioned and bound as hereunder has been given free of cost, it being Survey No. 22, Sub Sy. No. 2 of Sonashettyhally within the rg. of Chintamani, a dry land measuring 3 acres guntas assessed at Rs. 6/ -. This is a reference to the gift deed Exhibit P-3," " (ii) You have to use for the purpose of College the property given by me today, in the same way if the property given by our Yajman has been used. This property can be exploited on profitable basis by sale etc. , and the proceeds be used for College building fund and for not other purpose. "sri H. B. Datar argued that the fact that Ex. D-2 refers to the gift in Ext. P-3 and the fact that in Ext. D-2 gift has been made by plaintiff 1 in favour of the College Committee to facilitate the specific purpose of the gift in Ex. P-3, would show that the gift in Ext. D-2 is supplemental to the gift in Ext. D-2 refers to the gift in Ext. P-3 and the fact that in Ext. D-2 gift has been made by plaintiff 1 in favour of the College Committee to facilitate the specific purpose of the gift in Ex. P-3, would show that the gift in Ext. D-2 is supplemental to the gift in Ext. P-3 and therefore if Ext. P-3 has to fail in the eye of law, Ext. D-2 the gift, also has to fail. On the other hand it was argued by Sri V. Krishna Murthy that K. Rajapopaliah Setty being an attestor to Exhibit D-2 and it being in evidence that after Exhibit D-2 was registered plaintiff 1 had discussion with K. Rajagopaliah Setty and found that she had gifted 10 guntas more than what they had decided and because of that Ext. P-4 the reconveyance deed came to be executed and registered reconveying 10 guntas out of the land gifted under Ext. D-2, showed that K. Rajagopaliah Setty is as much a party as plaintiff 1 to the gift under Ex. D-2 and it is seen from the recital that the College Committee was empowered to sell in an advantageous manner and use the proceeds for construction of the College only. It is on this basis he further argued that the conditions found in Ex. P-3 and the defeasance clause found therein have been waived by K. Rajapopaliah Setty under Ex. D-2. There is no material to support the contention that K. Rajagopaliah Setty was a party to the gift under Ex. D-2. It is no doubt true that he has attested it, but the gift is made by plaintiff 1, his wife, that too after the property gifted was settled on her by Rajagopaliah Setty under Ex. P-3. The property in Ex. P-3 did not belong to her. She was not competent to stipulate under Ex. D-2 that the College Committee had all the powers to sell the property gifted under Ex. P-3. Therefore, the word found in Ex. D-2 can apply only to the property gifted under Ex. D-2. It is no doubt true as contended by Sri Datar that the gift Ex. She was not competent to stipulate under Ex. D-2 that the College Committee had all the powers to sell the property gifted under Ex. P-3. Therefore, the word found in Ex. D-2 can apply only to the property gifted under Ex. D-2. It is no doubt true as contended by Sri Datar that the gift Ex. D-2 has been made by plaintiff 1 to the College Committee for the purpose of seeing that the specific purpose for which the gift has been made by Rajagopaliah Setty did in fact materialise i. e. , by providing this property to the College Committee and empowering the College Committee to sell this property advantageously and making use of the money for construction of the College. But, I am not able to agree with his further contention that this gift is supplemental to the gift under Ex. D-3. There is no defeasance clause in Ex. D-2. Therefore S. 31 of the T. P. Act would not be attracted to the gift in Ex. D-2. ( 23 ) WHEN S. 31 of the T. P. Act applies, there would be no need to cancel the gift deed in question. The property involved automatically reverts to the donor. In that view of the matter, the first relief prayed for by the plaintiffs is rendered superfluous. ( 24 ) CONSEQUENTIAL relief of injunction has been prayed for and in fact that is the crux in this case. This is not a suit for possession of the suit properties. It cannot be forgotten that the finding of the trial Court is that the plaintiffs are in possession. I have already narrated the way of reasoning of the trial Court in this behalf. According to the District Judge the evidence analysed by him on the point of possession of the plaintiffs was not sufficient to establish that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit properties. He has disbelieved the evidence relied on by the plaintiffs in this behalf. The only argument advanced is that the District Judge has overlooked the evidence of D. W. 2 a Talati. ( 25 ) THE reasons narrated by the trial Court in Para 16 of the judgement to the effect that the defendants are at best trespassers on the land and equity Court would not come to their rescue cannot at all be sustained. Apart from the oral evidence of P. Ws. ( 25 ) THE reasons narrated by the trial Court in Para 16 of the judgement to the effect that the defendants are at best trespassers on the land and equity Court would not come to their rescue cannot at all be sustained. Apart from the oral evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3, 4 and 6 reliance has been placed on Patta Books Exs. P-1 and P-2 and some Kandayam receipts to establish that the plaintiffs have been in possession even after the documents Exs. P-3 and D-2. P. W. 2 is the witness speaking to Ex. P-1 which is Receipt Patta. He has sworn that he had issued it on 22-6-1967 and that he had collected kandayam from plaintiff 1 on 4-6-1968 as per Ex. P-1 (a ). He has further stated that Ex. P-1 (a) is a true copy. The learned District Judge has rightly observed in Para 19 of his judgement that Ex. P-1 was issued in the year 1967-68 but it contained a reference to a payment made on 22-6-1967 which would be for the year 1966-67, while the next payment shown in it is for the year 1967-68 as made on 4-6-1968 Ex. P-1 (a ). He has further reasoned that it was not found why that entry was made and P. W. 2 had not properly explained it particularly when it was shown as a copy. It is on this basis that the District Judge has held that the explanation given by P. W. 2 was not acceptable. The pahani extracts produced at Ex. P-5 to Ex. P-8 and Ex. D-7 have also found not to be helpful to the plaintiffs, by the District Judge. Those pahanies do not show exclusive possession of the plaintiffs of the suit lands. It is in this connection that the District Judge has held that even if the entries in Exs. P-1 and P-2 are acted upon, those entries would not be sufficient to establish actual possession of the plaintiffs as they only show that kanadayam has been paid by the plaintiffs. To the very effect is the evidence produced by defendant 2. He has also produced the evidence of having paid kandayam. P-1 and P-2 are acted upon, those entries would not be sufficient to establish actual possession of the plaintiffs as they only show that kanadayam has been paid by the plaintiffs. To the very effect is the evidence produced by defendant 2. He has also produced the evidence of having paid kandayam. ( 26 ) IT is in this background the evidence of D. W. 2 which has not been adverted to by the District Judge and which is made much of by Sri Datar, has to be looked into by me. D. W. 2 has sworn that Rajagopaliah setty was in possession of the lands and he had collected kandayam from him. He has referred to Ex. P-14 and stated that he had collected kandayam from plaintiff 1 for two years. He has nowhere stated during what agricultural years he has collected kandayam from Rajagopaliah Setty. Therefore that evidence of his is vague to establish possession of Rajagopaliah Setty or the plaintiffs after the dates of the gifts in question. Ex. P-14 shows that D. W. 2 has received Rs. 46-94 paise from plaintiff I towards the land revenue for the lands Survey Nos. 22/2 and 23 for the years 1965-66 and 1966-67. Here again Ex. P-14 does not stand on a footing better than Ex. P-1 (a) and P-1 (b ). The very reasoning applies here also. Therefore, the conclusion of the District Judge that the evidence relied upon by the plaintiffs to prove their actual exclusive possession of the suit properties falls short of such proof and only payment of land revenue by plaintiff 1 can be said to have been established. Another important proved fact is that plaintiff 1 applied as per Ex. D-12 to the Deputy Commissioner, Kolar. She offered to purchase the lands for Rs. 18,000/ -. If in fact she was in actual possession, she would not have made such an offer. In that view of the matter, the consequential relief of injunction cannot be granted to the plaintiffs though it is held that the gift Ex. P-2 is hit by S. 31 of the T. P. Act. That would be only in favour of the plaintiffs which if the law permits the plaintiffs may work out. ( 27 ) IN view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs have to fail and as such these appeals are dismissed. P-2 is hit by S. 31 of the T. P. Act. That would be only in favour of the plaintiffs which if the law permits the plaintiffs may work out. ( 27 ) IN view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs have to fail and as such these appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs under the facts and circumstances of the cases. Appeals dismissed. --- *** --- .