JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is directed against the order of the Board of Revenue dated 8.1.79 whereby, the learned Member of the Board of Revenue allowed the revision petition of the non petitioner Budhdan and set aside the mutation order passed by the Tehsildar in respect of the mutation No. 249. 2. A few facts may briefly be stated. 3. The petitioner was granted Parcha Khatoni of the , land comprised in khasras No. 3146 to 3150, 3179 to 3181 and 3183 situated at village Harsolav Tehsil Merta. On the back of Parcha Khatoni,the statement of the petitioner was recorded in which, he stated that his name has wrongly been entered in respect of Khasras No. 3146 to 3150. In respect of these fields, he stated that he cultivates the fields 'Bhade-sate'. The land holder is Govinddan, who has no bullocks and plough but the land-holder gives their price to him and he cultivates. He stated that these fields may be entered as Khudkast in the name of Govinddan. Thereafter all the Khasras of Parcha-khatoni Ex. I were entered in the khudkast of Govinddan in the Khatoni Bandovast of Samvat 2008 to 2027. On 12.8 71, the petitioner and non-petitioner No. 5. Phoosa submitted an application under Section of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act to the Tehsildar Merta stauug that all the khasras numbers mentioned in Ex. 1 Parcha khatoni are in their cultivation since long before Section 2012 but Girdawdri has wrongly been entered in the name of Govinddan. In fact, these khasras are in their khatedari so, under Section of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, these fields may be recorded in their khatedari. The Patwari, Harsolav reported to the Tehsildar that these lauds measuring 112 bighas are in the permanent possession of the applicants Shyama and Phoosa, as enquired from the neighbours and the villagers. At present, they are in possession. The Tehsildar recorded the statements of Kalyansingh s/o Jaisingh Charan r/o Shiv and Prithviraj s/o Shiv Narain r/o Shiv. Bath of them are descendants of the land- holder Govinddan and they deposed that these khasra have been in possession of the applicants before resumption of the Jagir. They used to pay rent to the land- bolder and after resumption of Jagir, the rent is being paid by them to the Government. Bath of them are descendants of the land- holder Govinddan and they deposed that these khasra have been in possession of the applicants before resumption of the Jagir. They used to pay rent to the land- bolder and after resumption of Jagir, the rent is being paid by them to the Government. They stated that they have got no objection in case khatedari is granted to them under Section of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The petitioner submitted the order dated 24.8.71 addressed to the Patwari vide letter No. 421 (Ex. 7). Copy thereof was obtained from the Sub-Divisional Ollicer. Merta in appeal No. 6 of 1974, which records that the applicants Shyama and Phoosa had submitted an application on which after enquiry order granting khatedari was passed and it was directed to the Patwari to effect the mutation in accordance with the Rules. Thereupon, the mutation of the land was effected on 9.9.71. It was entered in it that the mutation has been made as per the orders of the Tehsildar dated 24.8.71. The Naib Tehsildar, Merta made an endorsement of tallying the entries and found them correct on 7.9.71 Mutation was accepted by the Tehsildar on 9.9.71 and entry to that effect was made vide mutation order No. 249 (Ex. 8). Against the order of mutation, an appeal was preferred by 22 lineal descendants of Govinddan impleading respondents No. 3 to 15 also as his lineal descendants. This appeal filed before the Additional Collector was ultimately heard by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Merta, who by his order dated 8.9.75 dismissed the same being barred by limitation. In the memo of appeal (Ex. 9), it was stated that the applicants No. 1 to 22 and respondents No. 3 to 15 are the lineal descendants of the common ancestor Shri Govinddanji. Govinddan had two sons; Bhapatsingh and Khivraj. Bhopatsingh had three sons: Shoolsingh, Shivdan & Roopsingh & Shivraj had three sons; Kushalsingh, Sunderdass & Lalsingh. The applicants and the performa respondents are the lineal descendants of these six descendants, sons of Bhopatsingh and Khivraj and applicants and the performa respondents are the Mukhiyas of their respective families, so. they have been made parties to the appeal. Budhdan s/o Avaddan respondent then filed a revision petition registered as Revision Petition No. 22 of 1976 against the mutation order No. 249 which was allowed by the learned Member of the Board of Revenue. they have been made parties to the appeal. Budhdan s/o Avaddan respondent then filed a revision petition registered as Revision Petition No. 22 of 1976 against the mutation order No. 249 which was allowed by the learned Member of the Board of Revenue. The learned Member of the Board of Revenue accepted the revision petition on the ground that the order of the Tehsildar is without jurisdiction as he had no power of ordering the mutation. Reliance was placed on Balu v Ramdeo (1969 R. R. D. 66) and Suraj Mal v. Hajari (1972 RRD 334) . As the order passed was without jurisdiction by the Tehsildar, so, direct Revision is maintainable. The revision was also accepted on the ground that the Tehsildar had not given any opportunity to the other parties and had thus violated the principles of natural justice. It is this order of the Board of Revenue which is under challenge in this writ petition. 4. I have heard Mr. M. L. Shreemali, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. D. Rajpurohit, learned counsel for Budhdan respondent. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the notification conferring power of entering mutation in the disputed and undisputed cases on the village Panchayats is invalid. He urged that under Section 260 (1) (b) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, powers can be conferred on "any other lawfully appointed or constituted officer or authority specified in the notification" but the officers or authorities, on which the powers have been conferred by the Act, cannot be divested of those powers Beside those officers or authorities "any other lawfully appointed or constituted officers or authorities specified in the notification", can also be directed to perform the duties imposed and exercise the powers conferred on statutory officers or authorities. He submitted that notification dated 11.9.57 divested the statutory officers of their powers under Section (1) and 135 (2) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and conferred powers on the panchayat of the village, in which, the land is situated. He submitted that the view taken by the Board of Revenue is not correct. In support of his contention, reliance was placed by him on the Division Bench decision of this Court in (1) Ghasiram v. State, 1966 RLW 371 . He submitted that the view taken by the Board of Revenue is not correct. In support of his contention, reliance was placed by him on the Division Bench decision of this Court in (1) Ghasiram v. State, 1966 RLW 371 . and Single Bench decision of this Court in (2) Kalyan and others v. Board of Revenue and others (1984 RLR 360) . 6. Mr. S D Raipurohit, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the words used in Section 261 (h) [sic 260 (b)] are by any other lawfully appointed or constituted officers or authorities". These words clearly mean that the powers can be conferred on such officers or authorities exclusively. By use of these words, the Intention of the legislature appears to be that, the State Government may confer the pow:n on any officers or authorities to the exclusion of the officers or authorities on whom the powers have been conferred by the Act. The officers or authorites empowered under the Act can thus be denuded of their powers. if the State Government by notification confers those powers on any officers or authorities. The Full Bench of the Board of Revenue had taken this view, which is being followed consistently by the Board of Revenue and authorities subordinate to it. 7. For proper appreciation of the controversy, I may refer to the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and the notification in question. 8. Chapter VII of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act makes the provisions for Survey and Record operation. It is divided into A to G parts. Part F deals with Annual Registers and Sections 132 to 137 fell under this Chapter. Sections 132 to 136 are reproduced as under: "S. 132. Annual Registers-(I) The Land Records Officer shall main tain the record of rights and for that purpose shall annually or at such longer intervals as the State Government may prescribe, cause to be prepared a set or an amended set, as the case may be, or the registers enumerated in Sections 114 and 120 and the registers so prepared shall be called the annual registers.- (2) The Land Records Officer shall cause to be recorded in the annual registers in the prescribed manner, all changes that may take place and any transaction that may affect any of the rights or interest recorded. Section 133. Section 133. Report of succession and transfer of possession-(1) Every person obtaining possession by secession, transfer, or otherwise of any property or other right or interest in any land or the profits thereof, which is required by this Act, or any rules made thereunder to be recorded in the annual registers, shall bring the fact to the notice of the village Patwari and report it to the Tehsildar, of the Tehsil in which such land is situated either direct or through the village Patwari or Land Records Inspector within three months from the date on which he obtains such possession. (2) If such person is a minor or otherwise disqualified the guardian or other person who has charge of such person's property shall make such report. Section 134. Fine for neglect to report-Any person neglecting to make the report required by Section shall be liable to a fine not exceeding rupees ten. Section 135. Procedure on report-(1) The Tehsildar on receiving such report or upon the facts coming otherwise to his knowledge. shall make such inquiry as appears necessary and in undisputed cases, if the succession or transfer or other acquisition appears to have taken place, shall record the same in the annual registers. (2) If the succession or transfer or other acquisition is disputed. the Tehsildar shall, if competent under this Act or any other law for time being in force, decide such dispute according to law and if not so competent, refer the dispute to any other officer so competent for decision. Section 136. Decision of disputes-All disputes respecting the class or tenure of any tenant or regarding the rent or revenue payable or regarding entries in the annual registers shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of Section 123 or section 124 or section 125 as the case may be it. 9. Section 132 provides that the Land Records Officer shall maintain the record of rights and for that purpose, shall annually or at such longer intervals as the State Government may prescribe cause to be prepared a set or an amended set of the annual registers. It is the duty of the Land Records Officer to cause to be recorded in the annual registers in the prescribed manner all changes that may take place and any transaction that may affect any of the rights or interest recorded. 10. It is the duty of the Land Records Officer to cause to be recorded in the annual registers in the prescribed manner all changes that may take place and any transaction that may affect any of the rights or interest recorded. 10. A perusal of Section would show that in the undisputed cases, the Tehsildar has powers to record the succession, transfer or other acquisition which have taken place. This can be done by him after making such enquiry as appears necessary, when any report is received by him or when the facts come to his knowledge, otherwise. Thus. under sub-sec. (1), the Tehsildar possesses power in undisputed cases. Under sub-sec. (2). if succession, transfer or other acquisition is disputed, then if he is competent under the Act or under any other law for the time being in force, he shall decide the dispute and if he is not competent, he is required to refer the dispute to any other competent officer. Section deals with disputes regarding the class or tenure of any tenant and Section deals with disputes regarding the Revenue payable and Section deals with the disputes regarding the entries in the record of rights .All disputes regarding the entries in the Records of rights have to be disposed of by the Land Records Officer in accordance with the provisions of Sections 123, 124 and 125 Section 125 reads as under:- ''S. 125. Settlement of disputes as to entries in record of rights - (1) All other disputes regarding entries in the record of rights shall be decided on the basis of possession. (2) If in the course of enquiry into a dispute under this Section the Land Records officer is unable to satisfy as to which party is in possession, he, shall ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to possession, and shall decide the dispute accordingly. (3) No order as to possession passed under this section shall debar any person from establishing his right to the property in any civil or revenue court having jurisdiction." 11. It is common ground between the parties that the Land Records Officer is competent to decide all disputes regarding entries in the record of rights. 12. Section of the Land Revenue Act makes provision for delegation. The relevant provision is Clause (b) of sub sec. (1) of Section 260, it reads:- Section 260. It is common ground between the parties that the Land Records Officer is competent to decide all disputes regarding entries in the record of rights. 12. Section of the Land Revenue Act makes provision for delegation. The relevant provision is Clause (b) of sub sec. (1) of Section 260, it reads:- Section 260. Delegation-(1) The State Government may by notification in the official Gazette; (a) .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ... (b) direct that any duties imposed and powers conferred by the Act or the rules made thereunder or by any other law for the time being in force or the rules made under such other law on an officer or authority appointed or constituted under this Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be performed and exercised by any other lawfully appointed or constituted officer or authority specified in the notification whether such other officer or authority shall have been appointed or constituted under this Act or the rules made there under or under law for the time being in force or the rules made under such other law or." 13. Clause (b) vests in the State Government power of delegation The State Government is authorised by notification to direct that any power conferred by the Act or rules made thereunder on any officer or authority appointed under the Act or the Rules made thereunder, shall be performed and exercised by any other lawfully appointed or constituted officer or authority specified, in the notification, whether such other officer or authority shall have been appointed or constituted under this Act or the Rules made thereunder or under any other law. The scope of this Clause is wide in the sense that duties and powers need not have reference only to the Act or the Rules made thereunder. They may have reference even to any other law for the time being in force or the Rules made under such other law and such duties imposed or powers conferred can be directed to be pet formed and exercised by any other officer or authority not only appointed under the Act or the Rules. but also under any other law or rules made under such other law. but also under any other law or rules made under such other law. So far as this petition is concerned, what is required to be considered is as to whether by notification, any other officer or authority can be directed to perform the duties imposed or to exercise powers conferred by the Act on any officer under the Act to the exclusion of such officer or authority or he can he so directed to perform and exercise the power along with such officer or authority constituted or appointed under the Act. Both the notifications dated 26.10 56 and 11.9.57 are reproduced for examination and consideration:- "The notification dated 26 .10. 56 reads as follows:- "No F. (236) Rev. D /56-In pursuance of Clause (b) of section 260 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (No. 15 of 1956), the State Government is pleased to direct that the powers of a Land Records Officer to decide disputed cases referred to in sub-sec. (2) of section 135 of the said Act shall also be exercised by Tehsildar." The Notification dated 11.9.1957 reads as follows:- "No. F. 8 (185) Rev, B/57-In exercise of the power conferred to Clause (b) of Section 260 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act 15 of 1956). the State Government is hereby pleased to direct that the power of deciding the cases conferred on the Tehsildar by sub-sec. (1) of Section of the said Act, as well as the power of deciding cases of the nature indicated in sub-sec. (2) of that section shall be exercised in place of the Tehsildar and the Land Records Officer (whose powers under that sub section have been conferred on the Tehsildar by this Department Notification No. F. 1 (236) Rev. B/56 dated 27th October, (1956) by the village Panchayat of the village in which the land is situated. An appeal against the order of the village Panchayat in such cases shall lie to the Collector in accordance with Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 75 of the Act." 14. By the first notification, the powers of the Land Records Officer to decide the disputed cases referred to in sub-sec. (2) of Section were also directed to be exercised by the Tehstldar. By the Second Notification, powers of Tehsildar under sub-sec. (1) of Section and powers of Tehsildar and the Land Records Officer under sub-sec. By the first notification, the powers of the Land Records Officer to decide the disputed cases referred to in sub-sec. (2) of Section were also directed to be exercised by the Tehstldar. By the Second Notification, powers of Tehsildar under sub-sec. (1) of Section and powers of Tehsildar and the Land Records Officer under sub-sec. (2) of Section were all conferred on the village Panchayat in which the land is situated. It would appear from this notification that the village Panchayat was appointed the sole authority to decide the disputed cases as well as the undisputed cases and it was further provided in the second notification that an appeal against the order of the village Panchayat shall lie to the Collector under section (1) (a). As already noticed, the Tehsildar possesses the power of deciding the undisputed cases under sub-sec. (1) of Section and the Land Records Officer possesses power in respect of disputed cases. Now, under the second notification. the Tehsildar as well as the Land Records Officer both have been denuded or divested of their statutory powers and to their exclusion, the village Panchayat has been conferred those powers in both type of cases. The question is whether it is permissible under Cl. (b) of sub-sec (I) of Section 260 and whether the act of the State Government is within the domain of delegation or it has exceed its powers delegated by the legislature. If it has exceeded the power entrusted to it, the notification would be ultra vires of its power and authority or competence. A bare reading of Cl. (b) would show that what the State Government can do is that by notification, it may direct that some other officer or authority shall perform the duties or exercise the powers. which are imposed or conferred on any officer or authority under the Act. Clause (b) does not specifically make mention that the State Government can substitute other officer or authority in place of officer or authority empowered under the Act. Conferment of power on any other authority does not mean, exclusion or divesting of powers of officer or authority under the Act. Had such been the intention of the legislature, it would have clearly provided that the State Government can even substitute any officer or authority for officers or authorities under the Act. Conferment of power on any other authority does not mean, exclusion or divesting of powers of officer or authority under the Act. Had such been the intention of the legislature, it would have clearly provided that the State Government can even substitute any officer or authority for officers or authorities under the Act. In the absence of such a clear provisions, it cannot be taken that the legislature has conferred such a power on the State Government to create absolutely new officers or authorities in place of officers or authorities under the Act It appears that the legislature simply conferred the power on the State Government that along with the officers or authorities under the Act, other officers or authorities may also be empowered to discharge the duties or exercise the powers under the Act. If Clause (b) is construed in the sense that the power can only be exercised by any other officer or authority other than the officer or authority under the Act, then, simultaneously, Cl. (b) cannot be construed in the manner that the power can be conferred on any other officer or authority along with the officer or authority under the Act if the power is for substitution then the provision cannot be construed in the manner that along with the officer or authority under the Act, there can be an additional officer or authority, which can be empowered to exercise the powers or perform the duties. In 1956 notification, the State Government conferred the powers on the Tehsildar in addition to the statutory power vested in the Land Records Officer under the Act itself, but in 1957 notification, the statutory authority has been substituted by the village Panchayat. In my opinion, the conferment of power on any other officer or authority to the exclusion of statutory officer or authority provided under the Act is beyond the competence of the State Government, as, such power is not vested in the State Government under Clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Section of the Act. 15. In (1) Ghasiram v. State, 1966 R.L.W. 371 , relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a Habeas Corpus petition was filed and one of the question was that the District Magistrate, Pali was not authorised to order his detention under the Rules, Section of the Defence of India Act provided for power of delegation. 15. In (1) Ghasiram v. State, 1966 R.L.W. 371 , relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a Habeas Corpus petition was filed and one of the question was that the District Magistrate, Pali was not authorised to order his detention under the Rules, Section of the Defence of India Act provided for power of delegation. This provision dealt with the power to delegate qua the Central Government as well as the State Government. Sub-sec. (1) related to the power of delegation vested in the Central Government and sub-sec. (2) dealt with the power of delegation vested in the State Government. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 40 provided that the Central Government may by order direct that any power or duty conferred or imposed upon the Central Government by this Act or any Rules made thereunder shall be exercised or discharged also by officer or authority sub-ordinate to the Central Government or by other officer or authority mentioned in Cl. (b) and (c). Under sub-sec. (2), the State Government was conferred with the power that it may direct that any power and duty referred to in sub-sec (2) conferred or imposed on the State Government or on the Central Government, shall be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority not being an officer or authority sub-ordinate to the Central Government. It was contended that under sub-sec. (I) of Section the Central Government retains the power whereas under sub-sec. (2), the State Government could delegate such authority completely divesting it of such authority. The contention was advanced on the basis that in sub-sec. (1) the word 'also' appears after the words -be exercised or discharged". The word "also" was absent in sub-sec. (2). The notification issued by the Home Department of the State of Rajasthan conferred powers of detention on the District Magistrates and it provided that its powers shall also be exercisable by the District Magistrates in their respective jurisdiction. The contention was that the power of detention cannot be retained by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) and the same is not permissible, therefore, the entire notification is illegal and inoperative. This Court also examined the effect of the absence of the word "also" in sub-sec. (2) and it was observed that "we are not prepared to hold that by the language used in sub-sec. (2) and the same is not permissible, therefore, the entire notification is illegal and inoperative. This Court also examined the effect of the absence of the word "also" in sub-sec. (2) and it was observed that "we are not prepared to hold that by the language used in sub-sec. (2), the State Government must have delegated its entire authority to the District Magistrates without retaining any for itself' in that behalf or not at all and the absence of the word "also" in the second clause does not make any Reference to the correct legal position." One of the reason given was that when an authority delegates its power to another, is does not follow that, that authority thereby divests itself of such authority altogether. In other words, when the delegator delegates its authority to the delegate. its authority by itself does cease, for, it may choose to revoke such authority which it could not do if it did not retain the authority itself. In that case, the State Government was empowered to delegate its power to any other authority and such a provision came to be construed. In the present case, the State Government is not empowered to delegate .its power. What the State Government is empowered to do, is to confer power on any other authority in exercise of the power given under the legislation. The legislature empowers some officers or authorities, to perform some duties and exercise some powers. In my opinion, under Cl. (b) in addition to those officers or authorities. the powers can be conferred on any other officers or authority by the State Government and State Government is not conferred with the power to substitute the officers or authorities under the Act. This would mean amendment of the law, enacted by the legislature. Such a power cannot be conceded unless there is an express provision empowering substitution of the officers & authorities under the Act by the State Government by notification. - 16. A similar question came up for consideration in (2) Kalyan & ors. V. Board of Revenue 1984 RLR 360 , cited by Shri Shrimali. In that case, a notification was issued under Section (b) where, in place of Tehsildar, the village Panchayat was conferred with the power of Tehsildar under sub-sec. (1) of Section of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Dr. V. Board of Revenue 1984 RLR 360 , cited by Shri Shrimali. In that case, a notification was issued under Section (b) where, in place of Tehsildar, the village Panchayat was conferred with the power of Tehsildar under sub-sec. (1) of Section of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Dr. K. S. Siddhu, J observed that if the legislature has conferred on the State Government a power to withdraw the jurisdiction and powers of the Tehsildar under Section of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, there should be no difficulty in answering the question in affirmative. The question was whether the power of Tehsildar conferred on him by Section to decide the disputes as to "Rasta" can be taken away by the Government by notification issued by it in exercise of its powers under Section of the Land Revenue Act. It was observed that "this question cannot be answered in the affirmative for the simple reason that the Legislature has enacted section 260 of the Revenue Act in such a manner as to confer only a limited power on the State Government to authorise an officer or authority other than the Tehsildar under section 251 of the Tenancy Act. No power is conferred on the State Government by section 260 of the Revenue Act to take away the powers of the Tebsildar vested in him by section 251 of the Tenancy Act. The effect of the notification issued by the State Government under section 260 of the Revenue Act. in terms of the present case therefore, is that both the Tehsildar and the Panchayat have concurrent jurisdiction to decide disputes regarding rasta. The Tehsildar gets such power directly from the Legislature under section 251 of the Tenancy Act. The Panchayat gets such powers by virtue of a notification issued by the State Government as a delegate of the Legislature. The delegate can validly operate within the strict limits of his powers and not beyond them. Section 260 of the Revenue Act confers a limited and delegated powers on the State Government in that it may authorise a Panchayat to exercise the powers of a Tehsildar under section 251 of the Tenancy Act, but it does not authorise the State Government to withdraw the satatutory powers of the Tehsildar under that section." 17. Section 260 of the Revenue Act confers a limited and delegated powers on the State Government in that it may authorise a Panchayat to exercise the powers of a Tehsildar under section 251 of the Tenancy Act, but it does not authorise the State Government to withdraw the satatutory powers of the Tehsildar under that section." 17. Mr S D Rajpurohit submitted that there was a difference of opinion on this question so the matter came up for consideration before the Full Bench of the Board of Revenue in Balu v. Ramdeo (1966 RRD 66) , wherein the notification was found to be valid. The Board of Revenue held that the jurisdiction vests exclusively in the village panchayats and not in the Tehsildar. For the reasons considered above the view taken by the Board of Revenue does not appear to be a sound and correct one. In my opinion, the authorities created under the Act cannot be divested of their powers in exercise of the power of delegation unless the power of delegation clearly confers such powers on the delegated authority. I, therefore, hold that 1957 notification is ultra vires of the powers of the State Government and hence, invalid as it divests the powers of the officers empowered under the Act. 18. The question of severability of good portion and bad portion of the notification would not arise in the present case. For what has been done in the present case is that for the purposes of Sub-sec. (2) of Section the Tehsildar as well as the Land Records Officer both have been divested of their powers and a new authority has been created by the delegated authority. If this new authority could not be created, it is not known whether the State Government would have continued the power of the Tehsildar under sub-sec. (2) of Section for the disputed cases along with the Land Records Officer. The position in Kalyan v. B. O. Rev. was little bit different. Sidhu, J in that case, severed bad portion from good portion by deleting the words -in place of' Tehsildar and read the notification as if these words do not occur there. (2) of Section for the disputed cases along with the Land Records Officer. The position in Kalyan v. B. O. Rev. was little bit different. Sidhu, J in that case, severed bad portion from good portion by deleting the words -in place of' Tehsildar and read the notification as if these words do not occur there. In case, these words in 1957 notification are deleted, then in that situation, there would be two authorities like Tehsildar and the Land Records Officer as it is in their place, the power has been conferred on the village Panchayat. Basu in his Shorter Constitution of India (VIII Edition) has dealt with the doctrine of severability. At page 17 he has stated in the third test in para (B). "On the other hand, if there is one provision (as distinct from several joined together) and it hits valid objects as well as invalid ones, which cannot be separated without altering the language (which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts) and is capable of being used for a legal purpose as well as for an illegal one it is invalid and cannot be allowed to be used even for the legal purpose." 19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (3) R. M D. Chameroaugwalla and another v. Union of India, AIR 197 SC 628 , inter alia laid down the following tests : "1. In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the invalid parts thereof, it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid. 2 .... .... ....... 3 .... ..... ...... 4 .... ..... ...... 5. The separability of the valid and invalid provisions of a statute does not depend on whether the law is enacted in the same section or different sections; it is not the form, but the substance of the matter that is material and that has to be ascertained on an examination of the Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provision therein. 6. 6. If after the valid portion is expunged from the statue what remains cannot be enforced without making alterations and modifications therein then whole of it must be struck down as void as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation. 7. In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate to take into account the history of the legislation, its object the title and the preamble to it." 20. As already considered, so far as 1957 notification is concerned, how the State Government would have acted in case, it is found that the exclusive power conferred on the village Panchayat is invalid, is not known, so, in my opinion, the notification is bad and the question of severance of good portion and bad portion in the circumstance does not arise. In the view which I have taken the statutory authority will always have the power. 21. The notification also deals with the forum of appeal. Under the Land Revenue Act, it is dependant on the question whether the case is a disputed one or an undisputed one. We have seen that under sub-section (1) of Section in case of undisputed cases, the Tehsildar is the statutory authority and under sub-sec (2) of Section in disputed cases. the Land Records Officer is the statutory Authority. From the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. Merta dated 8.9 .75 (Ex. 10), it would appear that notice was issued for mutation proceedings. the same was affixed on the temple of the village. Further in the mutation proceedings. the statements of Kalyan singh and Prithviraj were recorded, who according to the memo of appeal (Ex. 9) were Mukhiyas of their respective families being the descendants of the grandsons of Govinddan. Viewed from this point, it can be taken that there was no dispute with regard to the mutation in favour of the applicants Shyama and Phoosa and as such, the Tehsildar was competent to pass an order for mutation. But it is note-worthy that on 9.11.72 an appeal was preferred before the Additional Collector, Nagaur challenging the mutation as would be evident from the order Ex. 10 and after dismissal of the appeal on 8.9.75 revision was filed against the mutation order by Budhdan in 1916. But it is note-worthy that on 9.11.72 an appeal was preferred before the Additional Collector, Nagaur challenging the mutation as would be evident from the order Ex. 10 and after dismissal of the appeal on 8.9.75 revision was filed against the mutation order by Budhdan in 1916. From this point of view, it can be said that it was a case of disputed mutation and as such, the Land Records Officer alone was competent to effect the mutation under Section (2). As already stated the appellate forum would depend on the question as to whether the mutation order was passed under sub-sec. (I) or under sub-sec. (1) of Section 135. When there was no challenge before the Tehsildar then it can be found that it was an order passed under Section (1) and so, the appeal against that order would be competent to the Land Records Officer under Section (1) (d). The Collector of the District is the Land Records Officer under Section (a) (i). The appeal is not competent to the Collector tinder Section 75( I) (a) and under C1 (a) in any matters not connected with the settlement or Land Records, the appeal lies to the Collector from an original order passed by the Tehsildar. Admittedly, the mutation is a matter relating to the Land Records or connected with the Land Records. Therefore, the appeal against the order of the Tehsildar is not competent before the Collector under Section (1) (a). But it is certainly competent to the Land Records Officer under Cl. (d) of sub sec. (I) of Section . In Section (viii), it is provided that the Tehsildar shall be sub-ordinate to the Land Records Officer, so, the appeal to the Collector in his capacity as Land Records Officer would be competent against the order of the Tehsildar. So far as the disputed cases are concerned, the appeal against the order of the Land Records Officer shall lie under Cl. (f) of Section 75 (1) to the Director of the Land Records in the matters connected with the land records. The notification dated 11.9.57 providing for appeal would be contrary to the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. As the notification provides that the appeal against the order of the village Panchayat shall lie to the Collector under Section (1) (a). The notification dated 11.9.57 providing for appeal would be contrary to the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. As the notification provides that the appeal against the order of the village Panchayat shall lie to the Collector under Section (1) (a). It may be stated that the village Panchayat shall act as Land Records Officer under Section (2) and it can be said that as the Land Records Officer. if an order is passed, then such an order of the Panchayat would only be appealable under Section (I) (f) to the Director of Land Records and not to the Collector. No appeal. would be competent in disputed cases under Section (1) (a). However, so far as the present case is conceined, I hold that before the Tehsildar, there was no dispute and so, the order of the Tehsildar would fall under sub-sec. (t) of Section and would be appealable under Cl. (d) of sub-sec. (1) of Section (sic Section 75) of the Land Revenue Act. 22. The next important question which arises for consideration in the present case is as to whether the Board of Revenue rightly acted in setting aside the order of the Tehsildar on the additional ground that the order of the Tehsildar violated the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as, the Tehsildar acted without giving any opportunity to the other parties. 23. Mr. S. D. Rajpurohit vehemently submitted that Govinddan was the recorded Khatedar and Budhdan and others were his lineal descendants. The successors-in-interest of Govinddan, were not given an opportunity of hearing, so, the order suffers from grave infirmity being violative of the principles of natural justice. Hence the order is vitiated and is invalid. The contention ex facie sounds, plausible but to my mind. in the particular and special circumstance of the case, it does not stand scrutiny. It may be mentioned that under Section , it is obligatory for the successor-in-interest on obtaining possession by succession that he will bring the fact to the notice of the village Patwari and report to the Tehsildar within three months of opening of the succession. Failure to make such a report, has been made penal under section . It may be mentioned that under Section , it is obligatory for the successor-in-interest on obtaining possession by succession that he will bring the fact to the notice of the village Patwari and report to the Tehsildar within three months of opening of the succession. Failure to make such a report, has been made penal under section . In Parcha-khatoni (Ex I) Shyama was already recorded Khatedar but on his statement, in Khatoni Bandovast only Khasras No 1346 to 3150 could be recorded in the khud-kast of Govinddan but even Khasras No. 3180, 3181 and 3182 were also recorded as khudkast of Govinddan in Khatoni Bandovast (Ex. 2). It is not the case of the respondent Budhdan that the compliance of Section was ever made by the sons and grand- sons. Eve,i in the 3rd, 4th and 5tu generations, no mutation was got effected by the descendants of Govinddan. Apart from that, the applicants before the Tehsildar had proceeded in a bonafide manner, inasmuch as. they got notices issued and not only that, they got two Mukhiyas examined. Besides that a report of the Patwari was also obtained. In the circumstances, it cannot be found that the heirs and successors of Govtnddan had no knowledge of mutation proceedings. Budhdan was not a recorded khatedar, so, there was no question of issuing notice to him personally. A general notice appears to have been issued to the heirs of Govinddan. Further, it is significant to note that the Mukhiyas of the families of grand-sons of Govinddan were parties in the appeal but they lost the appeal. Hinglasdan s/o Awardan was one of the Mukhiyas The respondent Budhdan is the son of Awardan. so. it can be taken that Awardan was a party to the appeal. Budhdan challenged the mutation proceedings as late as in 1976 without coming out with the date of the knowledge of the order of mutation. All these considerations apart, Budhdan in the memo of revision before the Board of Revenue has nowhere stated as to who is in possession of these khasras and in what capacity ? Whether the land in dispute fell to his share and he was in cultivatory possession thereof ? All these considerations apart, Budhdan in the memo of revision before the Board of Revenue has nowhere stated as to who is in possession of these khasras and in what capacity ? Whether the land in dispute fell to his share and he was in cultivatory possession thereof ? In order to advance the claim or ground of audi alteram partem or violation of the principles of natural justice, it is the duty of the party claiming such a right to show as to how his right is effected. If he does not show that his present rights are affected, he is not entitled to assert and seek relief on the ground that he has not been heard, more particularly in face of the provision of Section . The learned Member of the Board of Revenue did not consider this aspect of the matter and simply proceeded on i the basis that Budhdan is a lineal descendant of Govinddan. For that matter, there may be 100 lines descendants not known to the applicants and each one of them would come forward and contend that his right has been affected alleging breach of the principles of natural justice. Further it cannot be lost sight of that Shyama and Phoosa were asserting possession much before Samvat 2012 in the capacity as sub-tenant and on coming of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, they claimed to be khatedars. In the circumstances of the case, it appears that their claim was never refuted and denied. That is why, the mutation order was not timely challenged and none of the Mukhiyas of the various families of the descendants of the grand-sons of Govinddan came forward to persue the matter before the Board of Revenue. On the contrary, two Mukhiyas supported the applicants in mutation proceedings and appeared as witnesses. 24. I may here also state the nature of the mutation proceedings They are in the nature of fiscal enquiries and they are not designed for final settlement of rights. Collection of revenue is facilitated by effecting mutation. Under Section , it is specifically provided that the question of possession can be deter mined by summary enquiry and the disputes shall be decided on the basis as to who is the person best entitled to the possession. Collection of revenue is facilitated by effecting mutation. Under Section , it is specifically provided that the question of possession can be deter mined by summary enquiry and the disputes shall be decided on the basis as to who is the person best entitled to the possession. Further sub-sec, (3) of section clearly lays down that no order as to the possession shall debar any person from establishing his right of property in any civil or revenue court having jurisdiction. Under Section 136, all disputes shall be settled in accordance with Section . In connection with the attracting of the principles of natural justice, a realistic view and approach is required to be adopted. So far as, the present matter is concerned, taking into account the circumstances considered above in their totality in my opinion, the learned Member of the Board of Revenue did not act rightly in setting aside the order of the Tehsildar on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. As already stated, when it has not been shown as to how the rights of Budhdan are affected, he could not claim the benefit of the rule of audi alterarm partem. 25. In the light of what I have discussed above, the order of the learned Member of the Board of Revenue cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. 26. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the order of the Board of Revenue is quashed and set aside. 27. The parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******