JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal by accused Chhotu Lal is directed against the judgment of learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Kota, dated September 30, 1983, whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 376 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 501/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years. 2. Prosecution story in brief is that on February 6, 1983, at about 9.45 a.m. Smt. Gajri Bai PW 7 lodged an oral report in Police Station, Udyog Nagar, Kota, to the effect that her husband had gone to M/S. J.K. Synthetics Ltd, Kota in the morning for service and she was preparing her meals. Her daughter Gaytri, aged 7 years, had gone away in the front portion of the house for playing. While she was cooking her meals, the wife of the accused appellant Smt. Ghisi came to her and started talking. Smt. Ghisi asked the informant Smt. Gajri Bai to accompany her for transporting bricks. But Smt. Gajri Bai told her that she would first clean her utensils and fill water and thereafter she would go for transporting bricks. Thereafter, Smt. Ghisi kept sitting with the informant Smt. Gajri Bai. After talking her meals, the informant cleaned the utensils and then called her daughter Gaytri but she did not respond. Thereupon the informant went to the house of the accused in search of her daughter Gaytri but she was not found inside the house. There was blood seen on the bed and also on the ground. On seeing the blood the informant got frightened and saw Gaytri in the rear portion of the house. The accused was bringing Gaytri in his lap. On inquiry foom the appellant as to how blood was spreading on the ground, the accused replied that Gaytri had been hurt. Thereupon the informant took Gaytri in her lap and brought her in her courtyard. Thereafter, Gaytri was made to stand. The informant Gajri Bai told Smt. Ghisi that her husband (accused) had committed rape with her daughter. Smt. Ghisi did not utter any word and went to her house. Thereafter, Gajri Bai left her daughter in the house and went to report to her husband in J.K. Synthetics. She told the entire story to her husband. Mohallawalas brought her husband to the house and she came on-foot. Smt. Ghisi did not utter any word and went to her house. Thereafter, Gajri Bai left her daughter in the house and went to report to her husband in J.K. Synthetics. She told the entire story to her husband. Mohallawalas brought her husband to the house and she came on-foot. When she reached her house, the platform was stained with the blood of Gaytri. Chhotu Lal was caught hold by Mohallawalas and was given beating. Gaytri was taken to the hospital by her husband. On the basis of the above oral report FIR Ex. A 9 was recorded in the Police Station. On receiving the above report the police registered a case under Section 376 IPC and started investigation. The accused was arrested on the same day and the police seized blood stained Chaddi (under-wear) and blood stained Pent of the accused. The accused has also got medically examined. Blood was also seized from the Chabutari of the informant. Various articles seized by the police were sealed and sent for chemical examination to Forensic Science Laboratory, Jaipur. After completing the investigation, the police filed a challan in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class No. 2, Kota, who committed the case for trial to the Court of session. The Sessions Judge transferred the case for trial to the court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Kota. 3. The prosecution in support of its case examined 10 witnesses. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. PC totally denied the incident. The accused in defence examined Dr. S.P. Elhance as DW 1. 4. Learned trial Court after considering the entire evidence found the accused guilty for the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC and gave the sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 501/-, in default of payment of fine (o further rigorous imprisonment for two years. 5. Mr. Mehrish, learned counsel for the appellant, first tried to assail the findings of the trial Court but ultimately failing in his attempt argued that the sentence of imprisonment for life was too severe and it should be reduced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment. 6. Mr. 5. Mr. Mehrish, learned counsel for the appellant, first tried to assail the findings of the trial Court but ultimately failing in his attempt argued that the sentence of imprisonment for life was too severe and it should be reduced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment. 6. Mr. Mehrish also argued that the statement of Gaytri who was aged 7 years and a child witness, was not admissible in evidence, as the trial Court did not put any question to her so as to ascertain her competence of understanding the questions put to her or.....................giving rational answer to those questions as provided under Sections 118 of Evidence Act. It was submitted that in the absence of such questions being put to Gaytri, which could have shown her intellectual capacity to understand the questions and to give their rational answers, learned trial Court, ought not to have placed reliance on her statement. Mr. Mehrish in this regard placed reliance on Dhanna v. State, 1950 RLW 357 and Ram Das v. State of Rajasthan, 1979 WLN (UC) 252 . In the above case (2) it has been observed as under:- "It is necessary for a Court before examining a child of tender years as witness to satisfy itself that the child as sufficiently intellectually developed to comprehend what he or she has been and to give an intelligent account of it to the Court. If the Court is of the opinion that by reason of tender years and defective or immature understanding the child could not have perceived the particular incident to prove which he or she is produced as a witness, the Court should not only refrain from administering the oath to him or her but should also decline to examine him or her as a witness. There can be no manner of dispute with the above proposition. However, in our view, it is only a caution for the Court and for its satisfaction to find out whether the witness is a competent one or not. In the present case the Court has put a note in the beginning that the witness Gaytri did not understand the value of oath and as such she was not administered such oath. Thereafter, it has been recorded that when the witness was asked to see towards the accused Chhotu Lal, she did not see towards him and started weeping. In the present case the Court has put a note in the beginning that the witness Gaytri did not understand the value of oath and as such she was not administered such oath. Thereafter, it has been recorded that when the witness was asked to see towards the accused Chhotu Lal, she did not see towards him and started weeping. The Court, therefore, noted that it appeared that the witness was frightened to see the accused. Then questions were put to the witness in the form of questions and her answers of such questions were recorded. A perusal of the answers to the questions put to her clearly shows her intellectual capacity to answer the questions put to her. Some of the answers, she gave simply by nodding her head. In a case of offence like rape committed by an elderly man on a child of 7 years of age. it would be difficult to expect a high standard of intelligence from a child witness. We find nothing wrong if the questions are put to the witness Gaytri in the present case....................and she is able to give answers of such questions. The primary duty of the Court is to elicit truth and no technicalities and objections of the kind can come in the way of the Court to find out the truth and to punish the accused in such inhuman and atrocious crime. If the answers in the present case given by Gaytri are themselves suggestive of the inference that she is a competent witness and was able to give rational answers, we see no reason to discard her testimony simply on the ground that questions were not put by the Court to test her competence before recording her statement. The overall impression, which was given to the trial Court by answering the questions put to her, are itself indicative of the fact that she was a competent witness. In case Gaytri would not have understood the questions, there was no question of recording her answers and in that case the trial court itself would not have proceeded recording her statement. But that is not the case here. Gaytri has been able to answer and explain the act of making a criminal assault upon her. 7. Mr. In case Gaytri would not have understood the questions, there was no question of recording her answers and in that case the trial court itself would not have proceeded recording her statement. But that is not the case here. Gaytri has been able to answer and explain the act of making a criminal assault upon her. 7. Mr. Mehrish also argued that the questions put to Gaytri were in the form of leading questions and the same could not have been asked as contemplated under Section 142 of the Evidence Act. We see no force in this contention as well. An objection of this kind was raised before the trial Court but the trial court repelled the above objection with the remark that the witness was so innocent and was also frightened that it was not possible to put any questions in form other than leading questions. Section 142 of the Evidence Act itself gives power to the court to grant permission for putting leading questions by the party examined the witness. In the circumstances of this case if the trial Court grant permission to put leading questions to Gaytri, we find no error in taking such view by the trial Court. 8. Apart from the statement of Gaytri there is clinching and positive evidence to connect the accused with the crime. The accused was caught red handed soon after the commission of rape on Gaytri and his clothes and GUDRI were found stained with blood. There were blood stains in the door and the Chokhat of the house of the accused. The underwear and the Pent seized from the body of accused soon after the incident were also found stained with blood. Following injuries were recorded on the body of Gaytri vide Ex. P 10:- 1. Lacerated wound 1/2" x ⅛" x ⅛" longitudal on posterior aspect of vagina. 2. Lacerated wound 1/4" x ⅛" x ⅛" on righter lateral wall of vagina. Hymen torn. Reddish white blood oozing. In the medical examination report Ex. P 11 of the accused himself, his penis was found blood tinged. It has been further recorded in Ex. P 11 "forcible insertion of penis in the vagina of female child." Not only this Dr. Y.K. Sharma PW 9 also stated that when he had clinically examined the accused, he had told him regarding the incident. P 11 of the accused himself, his penis was found blood tinged. It has been further recorded in Ex. P 11 "forcible insertion of penis in the vagina of female child." Not only this Dr. Y.K. Sharma PW 9 also stated that when he had clinically examined the accused, he had told him regarding the incident. The accused had told that he was sleeping in his house when the girl came to him. He then got a mood and inserted his penis in the vagina of the girl. Thereafter, he became frightened as the girl had profuse bleeding. We find no reason to disbelieve the above extra judicial confession made by the accused before Dr. Y.K. Sharma. Apart from that there is oral evidence of Chauth Ma PW 6, father of Gaytri, Gajri Bai PW 7 mother of Gaytri supported by Ex. P 9 FIR which was lodged soon after the incident. Thus, all the above direct and circumstantial evidence, medical reports, extra judicial confession made before a doctor and FIR prove the guilt of the accused beyond any manner of doubt. 9. The only question which now remains to be considered is regarding to the sentence to be awarded to the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case. At the out-set it may be observed that imprisonment for life given by the trial Court appears to be wrong and excessive. Mr. Mehrish cited number of cases to show that in such cases the maximum sentence awarded is 7 years and 5 years on the lower side. It may be mentioned that after the substitution of Sections 375 to 376D by Act No. 43 of 1983, the minimum punishment for offences of rape has been prescribed to be not less than 7 years. Mr. Mehrish pointed out that the incident in this case took place on February 6, 1983 which was prior to the coming into force of Act No. 43 of 1983 and as such the punishment in this case should be governed by law as was existing prior to this amendment. We find force in the contention of Mr. Mehrish that the punishment to the accused-appellant in the present case would be governed by the provisions of Section 376 IPC as existing prior to the Act 43 of 1983. We find force in the contention of Mr. Mehrish that the punishment to the accused-appellant in the present case would be governed by the provisions of Section 376 IPC as existing prior to the Act 43 of 1983. Thus, in Section 376 IPC which would govern the case of the accused, there was no provisions for imprisonment for life and there was also no provision of minimum sentence and the maximum sentence provided was to the extent of 10 years. In Baldea v. State, 1977 Cr.L.R. (Raj) 131, K.D. Sharma) (as he then was) considered the case of rape on a minor girl of 4-5 years by a fully grown up man. As regards punishment in that case it was observed as under: "I have considered the rival contentions. It is undoubtedly true that in a case of rape the sentence which is ordinarily passed is three to five years rigorous imprisonment, but in a case like the present one, where a girl of very tender age has been subjected to rape by a fully-grown up man, the -sentence must be severe, because crimes of violence upon girls of very tender age should be severely death with. However, it maybe observed that to my mind, the sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment for an offence of this nature is too severe. In my opinion, the ends of justice would be met if the sentence often years rigorous imprisonment awarded to the appellant is reduced to a term of seven years rigorous imprisonment." We are in agreement with the view taken in the above case and in our opinion ends of justice would be met if the accused is sentenced to 7 years rigorous imprisonment. 10. In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The conviction of the appellant under Section 376 IPC is maintained but his sentence of imprisonment for life is reduced to 7 years rigorous imprisonment. Sentence of fine awarded by the trial Court is maintained.Appeal partly allowed. *******