Abdul Khalique Choudhury v. State of Assam and Others
1986-07-08
K.LAHIRI, K.N.SAIKIA
body1986
DigiLaw.ai
This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the impugned notices dated 24.4.86, 12.5.86, 30.5.86 and 20.6.86 being Annexures D, E, G. und I, respectively. 2. The petitioner made an application for permission to stand a catering house in front of the Janata Bhavan, Dispur. Vide letter dated 20th March, 1984 issued by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Deptt. of Personnel S. A. (N) (Annexure 'A' to the petition) certain terms were offered. Vide letter dated 26th April, 1984 (Annexure-C) the petitioner was granted permission to start a catering house in front of the Janata Bhavan, Dispur. It appears that the Government agreed to allow the petitioner to start a catering house on certain terms and conditions vide Annexure-C. From Column 2 of the terms it appears that the petitioner was not allowed to construct a structure of permanent nature. Vide Cl. 4 the petitioner was given a temporary connection of electricity. In clause 5 it was stipulated that the 'permission' would remain valid for a period of three years subject to renewal if the authority was satisfied that the services rendered were beneficial to the visitors and the public as well. Vide clause 6 the shed was to be erected at a place to be shown by the Government and as per specification made by them. Clause 7 reads as follows : "You will vacate the place immediately after it is required by this Deptt. without any claim for compensation". Clause 9 reads as follows : "If any doubt arises about interpretation of the agreement, the views of the Govt. will be final". 3. Thereafter a notice vide Annexure 'D' was issued by the Estate Officer, P.W.D. (Building), Assam, Dispur intimating that whosoever running shops without authority of the Government in the premises of the capital complex and in front of the Government quarters, were ordered to shift within seven days from the date of receipt of notice. In was stated in the said notice that on failure to obey the notice the Government shall take appropriate action. A copy of the said notice was sent to one Shri A. K. Choudhury and the petitioner claims that the said copy was sent to him.
In was stated in the said notice that on failure to obey the notice the Government shall take appropriate action. A copy of the said notice was sent to one Shri A. K. Choudhury and the petitioner claims that the said copy was sent to him. In our opinion by the said notice no action could be taken against the petitioner; inasmuch the petitioner was running the catering house with due authority of the Government. However, vide Annexure E the petitioner was informed that the land occupied by him for Janata Catering House was required for improvement of the play ground and plantation of flowers all around the field and the petitioner was requested to vacate the place in terms of clause 7 of the licence or permission. The petitioner showed cause and prayed that the impugned order may be vacated. In may be stated here that the notice (Annexure) was given by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Department of Personnel, SA (E). Thereafter vide Annexure 'G' the Estate Officer, Assam P.W.D. Buildings, Dispur served another notice to the petitioner whereby the petitioner was asked to vacate the land occupied by him at the play ground near Janata Bhawan. The petitioner was further asked to inform th2 Estate Officer about the action taken by him. Thereafter the petitioner made a representation to the Chief Minister, Assam and got an appointment on 2.6.86. On 20.6.86 the petitioner was informed that the premises of the Janata Catering, Dispur was urgently required by the Government for public purposes, namely, for construction of sheds of security forces engaged in duties in the Janata Bhawan and the Assam Sectt., widening of the approach road to Janata Bhawan, making provision for car parking sites etc. The petitioner was requested to vacate the land within 30.6.86 at the latest. The petitioner was also informed that after the expiry of the said stipulated date the occupation of the said land by the petitioner would be treated as without authority and liable to be evicted by the Government at his "risk as per provisions of law in force". In so far as Annexure 'D' is concerned, ws have already held that the said notice did not concern the petitioner. However, in so far as Annexures 'E', 'G' and T are concerned, we find that the notices were in terms of the licence granted by the Government.
In so far as Annexure 'D' is concerned, ws have already held that the said notice did not concern the petitioner. However, in so far as Annexures 'E', 'G' and T are concerned, we find that the notices were in terms of the licence granted by the Government. It also appears that under clause 7 of the agreement the Government had the right to ask the licensee or permit-holder to vacate the place immediately after the same was required by the Department without any claim for compensation. In terms of the said agreement the State Government has demanded vacant possession of the land on the grounds set forth in Annexure 1. Mr. S. K. Sen, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has challenged the validity of the notices on the ground that the impugned notices are violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. We are of the opinion that the notices were issued by the Government in accordance with the terms of Clause 7 of the agreement which is the basic foundation of the petitioner's right. The petitioner took the catering house knowing fully well his rights and liabilities. Clause 7 empowers the Government to ask the petitioner to vacate the land. Pursuance thereto the Government has take a action and reference of the said clause has been specifically made in Annexures E and f. It thus appears that the Government has exercised its power under clause 7 of the terms of the agreement we are of the view that the petitioner has not been able to establish that the action of the Government was violative of Article 14 and/or 19 of the Constitution of India. Further, the agreement does not give the petitioner any statutory right. It was an agreement between the Government and the petitioner and under one of the terms of the agreement the Government has called upon the petitioner to vacate the land. There was an attempt made by Mr. Sen to show that the letter containing the terms and conditions permitting the petitioner to run the catering house did not bind him. Further we find that on the basis thereof the petitioner is running the catering house. Even when clause 10 was added to the terms and conditions, it was sent to the petitioner and the petitioner accepted the same (Annexure Cl).
Further we find that on the basis thereof the petitioner is running the catering house. Even when clause 10 was added to the terms and conditions, it was sent to the petitioner and the petitioner accepted the same (Annexure Cl). In our opinion the foundation of the rights and obligations of the parties is governed by the clauses set forth in Annexures 'C' and 'Cl'. The next contention of Mr. Sen is that the State Government is estopped by its own promise and he relies on a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Godfrey Philps India Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 806 where it has been held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable to the State Government. At present the doctrine of promissory estoppel is well-established in the administrative law of India. This doctrine, though of ancient vintage, was rescued from obscurity by the decision of Mr. Justice Denning as he then was, in his judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees House Ltd., (1956) 1 All ER 256. Referring to Motilal Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 621 and various decisions, in Geoffrey Phillips (supra) it has been held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, is also applicable against Government in exercise of its Governmental, public or executive functions and the defence of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be invoked by the Government to defeat the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Herein on the prayer of the petitioner permission or licence was granted to him by the Government on the terms and conditions set forth in Annexures C and Cl. In exercise of the terms and conditions one of the parties, namely, the Government has issued notice calling upon the petitioner to vacate the land. It is, therefore, seen that the Government is acting strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract. There is no breach of any promise and, therefore, the question of application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not arise in the instant case. The next contention of Mr. Sen is that the entire action is malafide.
It is, therefore, seen that the Government is acting strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract. There is no breach of any promise and, therefore, the question of application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not arise in the instant case. The next contention of Mr. Sen is that the entire action is malafide. It has been stated that there are certain dues to be realised from the officers of the Secretariat and that the v notices have been issued against the petitioner by some interested persons. However, we find that there is no such imputation in the representation made by the petitioner to the Chief Minister (Annexure F). There is no credit vouchers and nor the names of the persons against whom dues are pending have been set out in the petition. Even they are not party respondents. As such we do not know who are the persons responsible. However, the matter went up to the Chief Minister and after the Chief Minister heard the representation of the petitioner a notice was issued by the Government vide Annexure I. The impugned notices have been issued asking the petitioner to vacate the land in compliance with the terms of the agreement. It also appears from Annexure I that the land is necessary for "security forces engaged in duties in the Janata Bhawan and the Assam Sectt., widening of the approach road to Janata Bhawan, making provision for car parking sites, improvement, development and beautification of the Janata Bhawan and the parade grounds etc.", which are public purposes. We do not find that there is any merit in the contentions questioning the validity of the notices. Mr. Sen submits that the petitioner shall be evicted by force without any authority of law. It is true that it has been stated in the writ petition that the respondents had threatened the petitioner that he would be "evicted by force". However, we find that the word 'force' is there in the notice (Annexure-I) but it has been stated that the petitioner would be liable to be evicted by the Government at his risk "as per provisions of law in force''. As such the Government has clearly stated that it will take action in accordance with the provisions of law in force. Mr. Prasad, learned Senior Govt.
As such the Government has clearly stated that it will take action in accordance with the provisions of law in force. Mr. Prasad, learned Senior Govt. Advocate, states that if the petitioner is required to be evicted action shall be taken strictly in accordance with law and not in breach thereof. For the foregoing reasons we do not find any merit in this application and it is dismissed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.