JUDGMENT 1. - M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd. has filed this appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated December 6, 1985, by which its writ petition has been dismissed. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be briefly stated here. Respondent No. 2 Rameshwarlal Saadhya was employed in the Zinc Smelter, Debari of the petitioner-company as an Electrician on January 13, 1977. It was alleged that Rameshwarlal was in the habit of remaining absent from his duties unauthorisedly. On the last occasion when he absented himself without permission, a registered letter was sent to him on April 29/30, 1981 to join duties immediately, but he did not report on duty and continued to remain absent. Thereupon, an order was passed on May 15, 1981 stating that Rameshwarlal had remained absent from duty unauthorisedly for a continuous period of more than eight calender days without any authority and, therefore, his services have been terminated in terms of clause 12(f)(1) of the Standing Orders of the Company. It was further observed that his name had been removed from the Muster Rolls and he can collect his dues and compensation, admissible to him as per the Industrial Law on any working day during the working hours. On this Rameshwerlal filed an application under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (here in after to be referred as 'the Act') before the Industrial Tribunal Udaipur, but that application was rejected on April 24, 1982. Thereafter, the Joint Secretary of the I.T.I. Trade Employees Association (here in after called as 'the Union') raised a dispute and, ultimately, the State of Rajasthan made a reference to the Labour Court to the following effect: Was the act of the petitioner in not taking respondent No. 2 back in service on 21-5-81 just and valid? If not, to what relief is the workman entitled? The Union filed a claim petition before the Labour Court and the petitioner company filed reply to it. Later, the petitioner-company also moved an application on October 11, 1983 for amendment of the reply, in order to incorporate the plea that Rameshwarlal was habitual absentee and as per clause 19(4) of the Standing Orders, this amounted to misconduct and, therefore, respondent No. 2 was discharged from service on account of misconduct, although the immediate cause for discharge was remaining absent without leave from April 11, 1981. This application was, however, dismissed by the the Labour Court, by its order dated October 11, 1983 on the ground that the plea was an after-thought. Ultimately the Labour Court, after hearing both the parties, answered the reference in positive and held that the termination of the services of the petitioner amounted to retrenchment, without following the provisions of Section 25F of the Act and, therefore, it was illegal. Consequently, the order of termination of the petitioner's service was set aside and he was directed to be re-instated. Full back wages were also awarded. It was against this order of the Labour Court dated Feb. 29, 1984, that the petitioner-company filed a writ petition before this Court, which was rejected by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge held that the termination of the services of Rameshwar Lal was in pursuance of clause 12(f)(1) of the Standing Orders, which reads as under: If a workman remains absent from his duties unauthorisedly for a continuous period of 8 calendar days, his service will stand terminated after the expiry of 8 days absence. He further held that such termination of service amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act, and in arriving at this conclusion, he placed reliance on Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji and Ors. 1977 LIC 1695 and L Robert Disouza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Ors. AIR 1982 Supreme Court 854 . Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji and Ors. 1977 LIC 1695 and L Robert Disouza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Ors. AIR 1982 Supreme Court 854 . He further found that the contention of the petitioner-company that according to the allegations made in the claim petition, the termination of Rameshwar Lal's services was on account of victimisation and punishment, in breach of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the management should have been given an opportunity to lead evidence after allowing the amendment prayed for in the reply by the Labour Court, was without any substance in as much as the order of termination clearly shows that it was in pursuance of clause 12 (f)(1) of the Standing Orders and, therefore, the question of victimisation or punishment did not arise He further mentioned that the petitioner-company had itself unequivocally stated in the reply's paras 10 and 11 that the termination was in terms of clause 12(f)(1) of the Standing Orders and, therefore, it cannot now be allowed to turn round and try to support the order on the ground that the termination was by way of punishment. The learned Single Judge has further held that the amendment of Section 2 in 1984 did not in any way alter the position and he rejected the plea that in view of the amendment, the unamended Section 2 should be interpreted to mean that the termination, in pursuance of Clause 12(f) of the Standing Orders did not amount to retrenchment as the amendment is only clarificatory and the legislative intention has been clarified by this amendment on account of some conflict of decisions preceding the amendment. The learned Single Judge also rejected the application for amendment, as already stated above. Back wages were awarded as a result of holding the termination of the services as illegal and as no peculiar circumstances were brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge in order to deprive the workman of the back wages. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 4. It is not disputed before us that the services of Rameshwar Lal had been terminated vide order dated May 12, 1981 with specific reference to clause 12(f)(1) of the Standing Orders of the Company, without following the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 4. It is not disputed before us that the services of Rameshwar Lal had been terminated vide order dated May 12, 1981 with specific reference to clause 12(f)(1) of the Standing Orders of the Company, without following the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. Therefore, the first and the foremost question, which arises for consideration is whether such termination amounts to retrenchment. 5. 'Retrenchment' has been defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act to mean the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason what so ever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include--(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the Workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. This term 'retrenchment' had been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hari Prasad Shiv Shanker Shukla v. A D. Divekar AIR 1957 Supreme Court 121 and after a thorough discussion of the subject and considering certain earlier decisions, the Constitution Bench observed as follows: For the reasons given above, we held contrary to the view expressed by the Bombay High Court that retrenchment as defined in Section 2 and as used in Section 25F has no wider meaning than the ordinary, accepted connotation of the word; it means the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason what so ever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action..... The matter was further considered by another two Judges Bench decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Gupta v. The State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1219 and relying on the Constitution Bench decision referred to above, the Bench observed as under: If the definition of 'retrenchment' is looked at unaided and unhampered by precedent, one is at once struck by the remarkably wide language employed and particularly by the use of the words "termination.....for any reason what so ever". The definition expressly excludes termination of service as a 'punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action'. The definition expressly excludes termination of service as a 'punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action'. The definition does not include, so it expressly says, voluntary retrenchment of the workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation or termination of the service of the workman on the ground of continuous ill-health. Voluntary retrenchment of a workman or retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation can hardly be described as termination, by the employer, of the services of a workman. Yet, the Legislature took special care to mention that they were not included within the meaning of 'termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason what so ever.' This in our opinion, emphasizes the broad interpretation to be given to the expression 'retrenchment'. In our view if due weight is given to the words 'the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason what so ever' and if the words for any reason what so ever' are understood to mean what they plainly say, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the expression 'retrenchment' must include every termination of the service of a workman by an act of employer. The underlying assumption of course, is that the undertaking is running as an undertaking and the employer continues as an employer but where either on account of the closure of the undertaking the basic assumption disappears, there can be no question of 'retrenchment' within the meaning of the transfer of the undertaking or on account of definition contained in Section 2. This came to be realised as a result of the decision of this Court in Hari Prasad Shiv Shanker Shukla v. A.D. Divakar AIR 1957 Supreme Court 121 . The Parliament then stepped in and introduced 25FF and 25FFF by providing that compensation shall be payable to workman in case of transfer of undertaking or closure of undertaking as the workmen had been retrenched. We may rightly say that the termination of the service of a workman on the transfer or closure of an undertaking was treated by the Parliament as 'deemed retrenchment'. We may rightly say that the termination of the service of a workman on the transfer or closure of an undertaking was treated by the Parliament as 'deemed retrenchment'. The effect was that every case of termination of service by act of employer even if such termination involved was a consequence of transfer or closure of the undertaking was to be treated as 'retrenchment' for the purposes of notice, compensation etc. What ever doubts might have existed before the Parliament enacted 25FF & 25FFF about the width of 25F there cannot now be any doubt that the expression 'termination' of service for any reason what so ever now covers every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in Section 25F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as Sections 25FF and 25FFF. The matter again came up for consideration before another two Judges Bench of the Court in Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd., AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1253 and the same view was reiterated. So also, it was reiterated in the L. Robert D'Souza's case (2). Again in Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. M. Boroish, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1320 , after referring to all these earlier decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) covers every case of termination of service except those which have been embodied in the definition, discharge from employment or termination of service of a probationer would also amount to retrenchment. In view of all these decisions, we are clearly in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the termination of services in the present case amounts to retrenchment. 6. In view of all these decisions, we are clearly in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the termination of services in the present case amounts to retrenchment. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, urged that this was the view before the amendment of Section 2(oo) in 1984, but in 1984, Section 2(oo) has been amended and Clause 2(bb) has been added to the following effect: (bb) termination of the service of the workmen as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or and this amendment declares or clarifies that intention of the Legislature to the effect that the termination of service as a result of non-renewal of the contract of employment on its expiry or of such a contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf in that contract, does not amount to retrenchment. He further urged that this provision of Clause (bb) in Section 2 has been incorporated by the Legislature in order to obviate the difficulty which has arisen on account of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. He continued to urge that when such an amendment is made, it clarifies or declares the initial intention of he Legislature, which probably had not been properly expressed in the unamended provision and which has led to decisions to the contrary and, therefore, in view of this amendment, this Court should hold that the earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Court to the contrary did not hold field and that the termination under clause 12(f)(1) of the Standing Orders does not amount to retrenchment. We are unable to agree with this contention. There was no ambiguity in the provision of Section 2 even before the amendment and what ever terminations were sought to be kept out of the purview of the term 'retrenchment', had already been incorporated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 2, as it stood before amendment. Therefore, when Clause (bb) has been introduced by amendment in the year 1984, it cannot be deemed to be by way of any clarification or declaration of earlier intention. It cannot, therefore, have any retrospective operation and can only be deemed to be prospective. Therefore, when Clause (bb) has been introduced by amendment in the year 1984, it cannot be deemed to be by way of any clarification or declaration of earlier intention. It cannot, therefore, have any retrospective operation and can only be deemed to be prospective. The earlier decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreting Section 2(oo), will still hold good, so far as the cases which arose before the amendment go, as in this case. It will no be out of place to refer to the statement of objects and reasons for this amendment introducing Clause (bb) as it would clearly show the intention of the Legislatures. Clause 2 of the statement of objects and reasons, reads as under: (2) The amendments proposed in the Bill are mainly to clarify certain doubts expressed by Courts on the validity of certain provisions of the Act. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to make the following amendments in the Act, namely: (i) Difficulties have arisen in the interpretation of the expression "retirement". It is proposed to exclude from the definition of a "retrenchment" as contained in the Act termination of the service of a workmen as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment on its expiry and of the termination of such contract in accordance with the provisions thereof; (ii) Following the decision of the Supreme Court in The Excel Wear case ) some High Courts have declared invalid the special provisions relating to lay-off and retrenchment contained in the Act which applied to establishments employing 300 or more workmen. It is proposed to redraft these provisions on the same lines as the amended provisions relating to closure, which was inserted by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (46 of 1982), after taking into consideration the observations of the Supreme Court in the above case. This would clearly go to show that the introduction of Clause (bb) was not at all retrospective or in order to explain any earlier intention of the Legislature, it was for the further proposal to exclude certain types of terminations from the definition of retrenchment. The proposed exclusion can, therefore, only to prospective and not retrospective. We, therefore, reject this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 7. The proposed exclusion can, therefore, only to prospective and not retrospective. We, therefore, reject this contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. 7. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the subsequent events, and specially the changes in the law, have to be taken into consideration by the Court while deciding a case, & he referred to certain authorities in support of this contention It may at once be stated that this course is open to the court if on account of the subsequent events or changes in the law, the original relief claimed has become inappropriate and the court has to modulate the relief in accordance with the change of the events or change of law in order to make the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accordance with the current realities. Reference in this connection may be made to Lachmeshwar v. Keshwar Lal AIR 1941 FC 5 and P. Venkateshwarlu v. Motor & General Traders, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1409 . But if the original relief asked for has not become inappropriate and the subsequent events have no bearing on it, the subsequent changes need not be taken into consideration. In the present case, as already stated above, the change is not retrospective and does not affect the relief asked for. 8. Next, it was urged by the learned Counsel that the Labour Court wrongly refused the amendment prayed for in the reply and the learned single Judge also did not take into consideration the amended plea. In this respect he placed reliance on Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. The Management, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 1227 and Rubber Co. of India v. The Workmen Employed represented by Firestone Tyre Empleyees' Union 1981 LIC 1110 . We are unable to accept this contention also. In the first place, allowing or refusing the amendment in the pleadings is the matter within the discretion of the court concerned and ordinarily this court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, would not interfere with such a discretion unless it has been exercised perversely or results into failure of justice. This is not a case of that type. In the first place, allowing or refusing the amendment in the pleadings is the matter within the discretion of the court concerned and ordinarily this court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, would not interfere with such a discretion unless it has been exercised perversely or results into failure of justice. This is not a case of that type. In the second place, when it has already been held that the termination in this case amounts to retrenchment, the question of amendment of the reply in order to incorporate the plea of punishment etc. becomes redundant. In this view of the matter, the authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel are of no avail to him. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant, then, urged that the reference in this case was incompetent and relied upon Workman, M/s Wings Wear Corpn. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi 1884(1) LIC 798 . We are unable to agree with him. The reference was fully competent and has rightly been answered. The authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. Lastly, it was contended that in any case, respondent Rameshwar Lal should not have been allowed back wages. We are unable to accept this contention either. When the termination or retrenchment has been found to be illegal, back wages have to be allowed as a matter of rule, unless there are very special circumstances refusing the same. No such circumstances exist here. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon Gwalior District Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. Gwalior v. Ramesh Chandra Mangal and Anr. AIR 1985 Supreme Court 337 and Jaswant Singh v. Pepsu Roadways, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 355 but both these authorities are distinguishable. In the first case, fifty per cent of the back wages were awarded. In that case the order of termination was passed by an unauthorised person. In the second case, back wages were refused as the workman was found guilty of intemperate performance. 11. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss the same with costs, which we assess at Rs. 500/-.Appeal dismissed with costs. *******