JUDGMENT - H.H. KANTHARIA, J.:---These four appeals are by the plaintiffs challenging the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Third Joint Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Poona on 30th March, 1974 dismissing their suits. The learned trial Judge had heard all the four suits together and had disposed them of by separate but identical judgments. As the facts and points of law involved are common, the appeals are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment with the consent of the learned Counsel appearing on both sides. 2. The relevant facts are as under :--- Special Civil Suit No. 111 of 1971 and Civil Suit No. 240 of 1971 were filed M/s. Bajaj Tempo Limited having their registered office at Chinchwad, Poona-19 for a declaration that the assessment of house taxes made on their buildings for recovery of Rs. 42,750/- in respect of the years 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1970-71 by a bill dated 31st March, 1971 and for the year 1971-72 by a bill dated 20th August, 1971 respectively was illegal and void and for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants-Respondents, Pimpri-Chinchwad New Township Municipal Council, Pimpri, Poona-19 from recovering these taxes. Likewise, Regular Civil Suit No. 540 of 1971 and Civil Suit No. 1103 of 1971 were filed by M/s. Jay Hind Industries Private Ltd., having their registered office at Chinchwad, Poona-19 against the same Pimpri-Chinchwad New Township Municipal Council, relating to the bills for recovery of taxes for the years 1966-67 to 1970-71 and for the year 1971-72 respectively, for identical prayers. 3. The appellants in all the four matters shall hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiffs and the respondents as the defendants. 4. Shortly stated, the case of the plaintiffs was that the demands by the defendants as regards the taxes sought to be recovered from them were illegal as proper procedure for assessing the taxes was not followed and that they feared that under such illegal demands the defendants were likely to recover the said taxes and, therefore, their main prayer was for an injunction and under the circumstances of the cases they filed suits without giving notice under section 304 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the "Municipalities Act"). 5. 5. The suits were resisted by the defendants raising various contentions and more importantly contending that the procedure followed by them for assessing the taxes was correct and in accordance with law and that the plaintiffs could not have filed suits without serving notice on the defendants under section 304 of the Municipalities Act. 6. The learned trial Judge, on the pleadings before him, framed relevant issues. And on the evidence adduced before him, he came to the conclusion that the defendants did not follow proper procedure for assessing the taxes and that the assessment was not duly authenticated. Thus he held that the defendants committed illegality in preparing the assessment list by not following the proper procedure laid down by the rules framed under Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "Panchayat Act"). However, he was of the view that the plaintiffs' suits were bad in law for want of notice under section 304 of the Municipalities Act. In other words, the learned trial Judge held that the procedure followed by the defendants was illegal but the suits could not succeed because they were filed by the plaintiffs without serving notice on the defendants under section 304 of the Municipalities Act. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's suits. 7. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs came to this Court in first appeals. 8. At the hearing, Mr. Chinoy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, submitted that (i) as the defendants did not comply with the mandatory requirements of the procedure while assessing the taxes, the assessment of taxes was illegal and as such ultra vires the Panchayats Act and if it is thus ultra vires, the question of serving notice under section 304 of the Municipalities Act does not arise and (ii) in any event, these suits falls within the ambit of sub-section (4) of section 304 of the Municipalities Act being suits under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, therefore, notice under section 304 was not required to be served on the defendants and (iii) in any case the defendants had waived the requirement of notice under section 304 by their conduct. 9. Mr. Patankar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants, controverted these submissions made by Mr. 9. Mr. Patankar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants, controverted these submissions made by Mr. Chinoy and urged that there was no non-compliance of any mandatory requirement of the procedure in assessing the taxes and the assessment was thus not illegal and ultra vires the Panchayats Act. Mr. Patankar submitted that the procedure to be followed in this respect was with regard to Rules 11 and 13 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Taxes and Fees Rules, 1960 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Panchayat Rules") which were partly mandatory and partly directory and the mandatory part of it was fully complied with, in the submission of Mr. Patankar, therefore, notice under section 304 of the Municipalities Act had to be served by the plaintiffs on the defendants before the suits were filed and not having done that the suits should fail, as has been rightly held by the learned trial Judge. On the third contention of Mr. Chinoy, the reply of Mr. Patankar is that a contention in the written statement was taken by the defendants that notice under section 304 was necessary and as such it cannot be said that this requirement was waived by the defendants only because such a contention was not raised earlier at the time of filling the say to the application for interim relief. 10. Canvassing his first contention, Mr. Chinoy submitted that the defendants had not followed the correct and proper procedure as laid down under the statutory Rules 11 and 13 of the Panchayats Rules framed by the State Government under section 176 of the Panchayats Act inasmuch as when the notice was published by the beat of drum it was not published that the list of assessment was kept open for inspection at the office of the Panchayat and a date was also not specified for hearing objections. 11. Now Rules 11 and 13 read as under : "11. Publication of notice of time fixed for lodging objections :---When the assessment list is completed, the Sarpanch shall cause a notice to be given by the beat of drum in the village that the list is open for inspection at the off ice of the panchayat and that objections will be considered and decided--- i) x x x x ii) x x x x on a day after thirty days of the date of notice thereof." (Emphasis supplied) "13. Consideration of objections to assessment list and authentication of list :--- (1) All objections to the assessment shall be considered and decided by the panchayat or the Assessment Officer, as the case may be, on the date specified in the notice published under Rule 11 or on any later date and the decision of the panchayat or the Assessment Officer, as the case may be, shall be communicated to the person objecting to the assessment. (2) x x x x (3) x x x x. (Emphasis supplied). A careful perusal of these rules show that what is required to be done under the rules is that a date has to be stipulated for hearing objections as to the assessment of taxes and that date should be informed to the villagers by publication of a notice by the beat of drum. What is further provided is that this date would always be a date 30 days after the publication of the notice. Rule 11 also specifically provides that the panchayat should indicate in the notice that during the period of 30 days the proposed assessment list would be kept open for inspection of the villagers. In my judgment, non-stipulation of a specific date, for hearing the objections, when notice was published would not only be a breach of the expressed statutory provision of the rules but it would also adversely affect the aggrieved persons in depriving them of their rights of raising objections even on the stipulated date. Further, the right to take objections would be meaningless unless the proposed assessment list was kept open for inspection which may be taken by the concerned persons and then raise the objections. In the instant matters the event of publication of notice by the beat of drum did take place but not in strict compliance with Rules 11 and 13 inasmuch as it was not published that proposed assessment list was kept open for inspection at the office of the Village Panchayat and the notice also did not stipulate a date on which objections, if any, would be considered and decided. 12. The evidence in this respect is that of Bhimji Mahadeo Gurav who was examined on behalf of the defendants. He deposed that on lst April, 1969 he had published by the beat of drum the notice in question as incorporated in Exhibit 111. 12. The evidence in this respect is that of Bhimji Mahadeo Gurav who was examined on behalf of the defendants. He deposed that on lst April, 1969 he had published by the beat of drum the notice in question as incorporated in Exhibit 111. In cross-examination he stated that by the beat of drum he had published that the persons who had any objection about the assessment should submit their objections to the Gram Panchayat in the office within a month and that the tax should be deposited in the said office. Thus his evidence does not show that while publishing the notice he had informed the members of the public that the list of assessment would be kept open for inspection at the office of the Gram Panchayat and that on a particular day the objections, if any, would be considered and decided. A perusal of Exhibit 111 also does not show that the list of assessment was kept open for inspection and that the objections would be considered and decided on a particular day. This document only shows that it was published by Bhimji Mahadeo Gurav by the beat of drum and that if anybody had objections regarding the assessment the same should be lodged in the office of the Gram Panchayat during the office hours within a month and if objections are not received in writing the revision in the assessment of taxes would be confirmed after a month. The question is how would people raise objections unless it is shown to them what assessment list was. 13. Mr. Patankar submitted that the stipulation of a date is not a mandatory requirement of Rules 11 and 13 and that the rules have been substantially complied with by inviting objections as to the assessment of taxes. He also submitted that true and proper construction and interpretation of Rules 11 and 13 would show that a notice of 30 days was a mandatory direction and that a date could be fixed for hearing the objections, if any, after 30 days of the notice as it is no use fixing a date for hearing objections without knowing whether or not there were objections. Thus according to Mr. Thus according to Mr. Patankar, the first part of Rule 11 of giving notice is mandatory which was admittedly complied with and so long as the latter part of Rule 13 is concerned, it was directory inasmuch as the date for hearing the objections could be fixed later after a month of the publication of the notice. And in any case, according to Mr. Patankar, the record does not show that any prejudice was caused to the plaintiffs for not specifying a date of hearing the objections because they had not raised any objections. In support of this contention Mr. Patankar relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of (Municipal Board, Sitapur v. Prayag Narain Saigal and Firm Moosaram Bhagwandas)1, (1969)1 S.C. Cases 399 and (Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta and others)2, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 140. I am afraid, I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the submissions of Mr. Patankar as, in my judgment, Rule 11 and Rule 13 have to be read together harmoniously which would very clearly show that while publishing the notice a date had to be fixed for hearing and deciding the objections, if any. We cannot read Rules 11 and 13 torn out of context and accept the contentions of Mr. Patankar. There has to be a harmonious reading of both the rules to avoid "a head on clash" between Rule 11 and, Rule 13. The question of fixing a date later, as submitted by Mr. Patankar, does not arise as it is nowhere provided in these rules as to how and in hat manner such a date is to be fixed later and notified to the villagers. It is quite possible that on the stipulated date the objections may not be considered and decided, for some reason or other, and in that case any other later date could be fixed for considering and deciding them. That would be the correct and right construction and interpretation of these rules. There is also no substance in the submission of Mr. Patankar that no prejudice was caused to the plaintiffs because they had not raised any objections. That would be the correct and right construction and interpretation of these rules. There is also no substance in the submission of Mr. Patankar that no prejudice was caused to the plaintiffs because they had not raised any objections. In this connection all that can be said is that non-compliance of statutory requirements would itself amount to violations of principles of natural justice which would prejudice any person who is deprived of a hearing on a day to be specified as required by Rules 11 and 13. It was observed by the Supreme Court in case of (S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others)3, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 136 : "The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced". But that apart, Mr. Chinoy submitted that these contentions were not taken in the written statement by defendants and in fact the case of the defendants in the trial Court was quite different from the one that is now taken and in most respects totally inconsistent. According to Mr. Chinoy the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants and their written statement show that the defendants had conceded that the assessment regarding the plaintiffs had not been finalised till March 1970 when the Municipal Council was constituted and after the Municipal Council was constituted the assessment was finalised under the Municipalities Act. It was although the case of the defendants, further stated Mr. Chinoy, that objections were invited by the Municipal Council by its letter dated 16th January, 1971 and that the objections were lodged by the plaintiffs by their letter dated 4th February, 1971 and thereafter the assessment was finalised on 13th March, 1971. Then Mr. Chinoy submitted that the defendants cannot in the Appellate Court make out for the first time a totally different and inconsistent case and in any event the contentions raised by the defendants now are incorrect. At any rate, Mr. Patankar could not dispute the fact that the assessment list was not kept open for inspection of the villagers as per Rule 11. 14. At any rate, Mr. Patankar could not dispute the fact that the assessment list was not kept open for inspection of the villagers as per Rule 11. 14. In this view of the matter, I am more than satisfied that the defendants had not observed the correct procedure laid down in Rules 11 and 13 of the Panchayat Rules and that the learned trial Judge was quite right in holding that the defendants had committed illegality in that respect. 15. It appears that after holding that the defendants had not properly followed the procedure laid down in Rules 11 and 13 and thereby committed an illegality in assessing the taxes, the learned trial Judge went ahead to hold that despite that it cannot be said that the assessment was ultra vires inasmuch as, according to him, there was no dispute that the Municipal Council had a right to impose the tax on the plaintiffs. According to the earned trial Judge, all that had happened was that the proper procedure had not been followed in levying the assessment and that in such circumstances benevolent interpretation of the rules should be made, further holding that the wrong procedure as merely an irregularity. It further appears that after coming to such conclusions, the learned trial Judge referred to and relied upon a ruling of this Court in case of (Borough Municipality of Amalner v. The Pratap Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Company Limited)4, 54 Bom.L.R. 451 and unfortunately misread the said judgment as if that ruling laid down law that though the assessment was illegal it was not ultra vires. A perusal of that judgment shows that two question were considered by the trial Court and the trial Court held (!) that the procedure followed by the Municipality for assessing the rate for the plaintiff's property was not followed properly as prescribed by the Act and in consequence the assessment levied against the plaintiff was ultra vires and void and (ii) Rule 3(2) of the General Property Tax Rules which was challenged by the plaintiff was ultra vires on the ground that it was capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable. In appeal this Court held that the assessment list which the Municipality sought to enforce against the plaintiff was invalid as held by the trial Court and that Rule 3(2) which was held by the trial Court as ultra vires was not a correct finding by the trial Court. In the result, this Court confirmed the decree passed by the trial Court to the extent it was declared that the claims made by defendant No. 1 therein under its bill No. 3 was illegal and void and defendant No. 1 was directed to refund to the plaintiff the amount in question and the other part of the decree by which the learned trial Judge had held that Rule 3(2) of the General Property Tax Rules was illegal was set aside. Therefore, if the learned trial Judge in our case were to read this ruling correctly, he would not have come to the conclusion that the assessment was illegal but not ultra vires. This is where the learned trial Judge fell in error. 16. That takes us to considering the second limb of the argument of Mr. Chinoy that if the mandatory requirements of the rules in assessing the taxes were not complied with by the defendants, the assessment becomes illegal and, therefore, ultra vires the Panchayat Act itself and in that case notice under section 304 would not operate at all. In this connection, we may usefully refer to and rely upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of (Sukhdeo Singh and others v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and another)5, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331 wherein it was held: "The words, "rules" and "regulations" are used in an Act to limit the power of the statutory authority. The powers of statutory authority, bodies are derived, controlled and restricted by the statutes which create them and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. Any action of such bodies in excess of their power or in violation of the restrictions placed on their powers is ultra vires. The reason is that it goes to the root of the power of such corporations and the declaration of nullity is the only relief that is granted to the aggrieved party." This judgment was quoted with approval in case of (V.T. Khanzode and others v. Reserve Bank of India and another)6, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 917 by the Supreme Court. The reason is that it goes to the root of the power of such corporations and the declaration of nullity is the only relief that is granted to the aggrieved party." This judgment was quoted with approval in case of (V.T. Khanzode and others v. Reserve Bank of India and another)6, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 917 by the Supreme Court. In case of (Municipal Council, Khurai and another v. KamaI Kumar and another)7, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1321 it was held by the Supreme Court : "Under Article 265 of the Constitution no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. This clearly implies that the procedure for imposing the liability to pay a tax has to be strictly complied with. Where it is not so complied with the liability to pay the tax cannot be said to be according to law." Therefore, the submission of Mr. Chinoy is covered and supported by the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and I have nothing further to add. 17. In this view of the legal position, the irresistible conclusion in the instant matters would be that the defendants had not followed the true and correct procedure as laid down in Rules 11 and 13 of the Panchayat Rules and, therefore, their assessment of the taxes on the plaintiffs would be illegal and ultra vires the Panchayat Act itself and consequently there was no need for the plaintiffs to issue notice under section 304 of the Municipalities Act before filing the suits against the defendants. 18. However, assuming, for the sake of argument, that notice under section 304 would operate, the present suits fell within sub-section (4) of section 304, they having been filed under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, therefore, no notice was required. Thus section 304 of the Municipalities Act reads as under : "304. 18. However, assuming, for the sake of argument, that notice under section 304 would operate, the present suits fell within sub-section (4) of section 304, they having been filed under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, therefore, no notice was required. Thus section 304 of the Municipalities Act reads as under : "304. (1) No suit shall lie against a Council or against any committee constituted under this Act, or against any officer or servant of a Council in respect of any act done in pursuance or executing or intended execution of this Act, or in respect or any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act--- (a) unless it is commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action; and (b) until the expiration of one month after notice in writing has been in the case of a Council or its committee, delivered or left at the municipal office and, in case of an officer or servant of a Council, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode; and all such notices shall state with reasonable particularity the causes of action and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and of his advocate, pleader or agent, if any for the purpose of the suit. (2) x x x x (3) x x x x (4) Nothing in Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) shall apply to any suit under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or under sub-section (1) or (2) of section 96 of this Act." Therefore, as per sub-section (4) of section 304, no notice is required to be served on the Municipal Council if one has to file a suit against such Council under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Now, section 38 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under :--- "38. (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II. (2) When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in Chapter II. (3) When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of, property, the Court may grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely :--- (a) Where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) Where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused, or likely to be caused, by the invasion; (c) Where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings." Therefore, under section 38 suits could be filed for perpetual injunctions. Mr. Chinoy took me through the plaint in Special Suit No. 111 of 1971 and pointed out from para 12 and the prayer Clauses (a) and (b) that although there were two prayers for (1) declaration and (2) pre-eminent injunction made by the plaintiffs in effect the suits were for permanent injunction as the crux of the suits was for injunction and the declaration was not ultimate relief that was sought for. In other words, according to Mr. Chinoy, the substantive prayer in the suits was for injunction and the prayer for declaration was ancillary. Mr. Patankar controverted this submission of Mr. Chinoy and urged that the main prayer was for a declaration and the prayer for injunction was only secondary and as such notice under section 304 was necessary before filing the suits. I am not able to persuade myself to agree with Mr. Patankar and I am entirely in agreement with the submissions of Mr. Chinoy as in my judgment the drafting of the plaint apart, one has to read between the lines and find out what was the true import and substance of the suits. In this connection Mr. Chinoy relied upon two rulings of this Court in case of (Vithoba Bhanji and others v. Vithal Sakroo and others)8, A.I.R. 1958 Bombay 270 and in case of (Bai Radhabai Vasudeo Jethabhoy v. Nandlal Lakhmichand Chanana)9, 1956 Bom.L.R. 127 a perusal of which shows that there is substance in the submissions of Mr. Chinoy. In this connection Mr. Chinoy relied upon two rulings of this Court in case of (Vithoba Bhanji and others v. Vithal Sakroo and others)8, A.I.R. 1958 Bombay 270 and in case of (Bai Radhabai Vasudeo Jethabhoy v. Nandlal Lakhmichand Chanana)9, 1956 Bom.L.R. 127 a perusal of which shows that there is substance in the submissions of Mr. Chinoy. It is pertinent to note here that a similar matter had come up for adjudication in the Court of the learned 2nd Joint Civil Junge, (Senior Division), Poona in Special Suit No. 182 of 1967 wherein it was held that such a notice was not necessary under section 180 of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act. This judgment was taken in appeal before this Court being First Appeal No. 355 of 1970 which was summarily rejected by a Division Bench comprising Vaidya and Pratap, JJ., on 16th December, 1977. And this point was squarely covered by a ruling of the Calcutta High Court in case of (Gowardhandas Rathi v. Corporation of Calcutta and another)10, A.I.R. 1970 Calcutta 539 in which it was held: "Where in a suit against the Corporation for declaration and injunction the relief for permanent injunction restraining the Commissioner from giving effect to his invalid order for demolition of structure is claimed only as an additional relief, the suit is, nevertheless, a suit for permanent injunction within the meaning of section 54 of the Specific Relief Act. Consequently, such suit would be protected under section 586(4) and notice under section 586(l) would not be necessary for the institution of the suit. In such suit, the relief for declaration has to be regarded as ancillary to the relief of perpetual or permanent injunction." It may be noted here that section 54 of the Specific Relief Act referred to above was of the old Specific Relief Act corresponding to the present section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 19. In view of this position in law, there was no necessity for the plaintiffs to have served the defendants with notice under section 304 of the Municipalities Act before instituting the suits and, therefore, the finding of the learned trial Judge that the suits were bad in law for non-compliance by the plaintiffs in serving notice under section 304 of the Act is incorrect and has got to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. 20. It is accordingly set aside. 20. And the last contention of Mr. Chinoy is that an application for interim relief was made by the plaintiffs which application was resisted by the defendants and while doing so they had not raised the contention that a notice under section 304 was necessary which shows that by their conduct the defendants had waived their contention that notice under section 304 was necessary. In reply Mr. Patankar submitted that what had happened at the interim stage cannot preclude the defendants from raising legal contentions and as a matter of fact at the final stage this contention was taken by the defendants in the written statement that notice under section 304 was necessary. However, Mr. Chinoy submitted that this was his alternative contention and that he was not quite keen in pressing for a decision on this point. Hence I do not think it necessary to give a decision on this point. 21. In the result, all the four appeals are allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing the four suits are set aside and the plaintiff's suit are decreed in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph 14 of the plaint in Special Civil Suit No. 111 of 1971. But in the circumstances of the matters, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed. -----