The Respondent No. 1 was injured in an accident which had taken place on 9.9.71 when she was travelling in an auto-rickshaw. She claimed an amount of Rs. 97,000/-as compen­sation. The learned Member of the Motor Accidents Claims Tri­bunal, however, awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000/- out of which the appellant was ordered to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and the balance amount was made payable by the owner of the vehicle. Feeling aggrieved, the Insurance Company has filed this appeal. 2. At one stage Shri N. Chakravarty, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the liability of the appellant was to the extent of Rs. 5,000/-only. This submission was advanced by relying on Section 95 (2) (b) (ii) (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This provision has stated that a sum of Rs. 10,000/-for each individual passenger can be awarded only when the vehicle is a motor cab. It was submitted by Shri Chakravarty that the limit of Rs. 10,000/-did not apply in the present case as an auto-rickshaw cannot be taken as a motor cab. Shri D.P. Chaliha appearing for the respondent no. 1, however, submi­tted on the strength of S. A. Rickshaw Sahakari Sangh vs. Direc­tor of Transport, AIR 1967 Bombay 402 that an auto-rickshaw falls within definition of 'motor cab'. After this decision was cited, Shri Chakravarty was fair in not pressing his submission that more than Rs. 5,000/- should not have been awarded agai­nst the insurance company. 3. The main submission ultimately pressed before me by Shri Chakravarty was that the quantum of compensation was high in the present case inasmuch as respondent no. 1 had recei­ved some minor injuries only for which the award of Rs. 25,000/-was not just and proper. Shri Chaliha raised objection to this submission by stating that the appellant could not assail the quantum of compensation. According to the learned counsel the defences which are open to the insurance company are only those which have been specified in Section 96 (2) of the Act. To support this contention Shri Chaliha referred to Hovirah Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Yukti Nath Jha and others, 1974 A.C.J. 18. A perusal of this judgment shows that it had not referred to Section HOC (2A) of the Act which allows an insu­rer under certain circumstances to contest the case on all or any of the grounds available to an owner of the vehicle. A perusal of this judgment shows that it had not referred to Section HOC (2A) of the Act which allows an insu­rer under certain circumstances to contest the case on all or any of the grounds available to an owner of the vehicle. So, this decision cannot assist the respondents. The learned counsel also referred to United India Fire & General Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Parvathy, 1979 A.C.J. 101 in which mind was applied to the aforesaid provision and, it was held that one exception to what has been laid down in section 6 (2) has been contained in Section HOC (2A) of the Act. Let it be seen whether in the present case the requirements of Section 110C(2A) of the Act were satisfied. This Section reads : "(2A) Where in the course of any enquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that. (i) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the the person against whom the claim is made, or (ii) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim. it may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the procee­ding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made." A reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that before the insurer is allowed to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the insured there must be specific order of the Claims Tribunal wherein reasons have to be recorded as to why the insurer was being allowed to be impleaded as a party. It deserves to be mentioned that it is only an insurer impleaded as a party following a specific order of the Tribunal which can take all the defences available to an owner. In the present case there is no order of the Claims Tribunal impleadirng the appellant at a party. Shri Chakravarty contended that the fact that the appellant was allowed to cross-examine the claimants witnesses would show that the learned Tribunal had permitted the appellant to contest the case or all the grounds. In the present case there is no order of the Claims Tribunal impleadirng the appellant at a party. Shri Chakravarty contended that the fact that the appellant was allowed to cross-examine the claimants witnesses would show that the learned Tribunal had permitted the appellant to contest the case or all the grounds. I would hesitate to accept this submission inasmuch as the aforesaid provision requires the Claims Tribunal to give reasons for impleading the insurer as a party which are wanting in the present case. The importance of recor­ding reasons lies in the fact that the same enables the higher courts to know if the insurer was impleaded for good and cogent reasons, As the insurer impleaded pursuant to a specific order clothed with greater power of defence, the reasons for impleading it as a party must be made known. 5. Even if the appellant were to be allowed to challenge the quantum of compensation, it cannot be held that compen­sation ought to have been below Rs. 10,000/-, as was urged by Shri Chakravarty. The discussion of issue No. 3 (which is relatable, inter alia, to the amount of compensation) shows that the learned Claims Tribunal had applied its mind to the broad heads under which the claim could be granted and after giving its reasons it awarded a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. Even if it were assumed that the award of Rs. 25,000/- was on the high side, it cannot be held that Rs. 10,000/- could not have been awar­ded to respondent no. 1. and even if the award would have been of Rs. 10,000/-, the insurer could have been asked to pay the entire amount. 6. Shri Chakravarty ultimately pleaded in passing to waive the interest made payable by the learned Tribunal. As interest has been awarded @ 6% per annum, no reduction in this regard is called for. 7. In view of what has been stated above, no relief can be granted to the appellant. The appeal is therefore dismissed.