JUDGMENT PADMANABHAN, J.: This is one of several petitions filed under section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for transfer of cases from the file of the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trivandrum, constituted as a special Court for the trial of mark list cases. Along with his son the petitioner was prosecuted in C.C.No,9/84 for offences punishable under sections 120-B, 463, 466, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34 thereof. Shri D. Vijayaraghavan is the Judicial Officer presiding over that Court. He has disposed of some of the cases, out of which many ended in conviction and some in acquittal or discharge. The necessity for constitution of such a Court arose as a result of unearthing several kinds of frauds as a result of which many rich and influential persons and their children were suspected to have boosted the marks secured in university examinations for the purpose of securing admission to professional and other courses. These frauds were brought to limelight consequent on a decision of this Court. After constitution of the Special Court, considering the gravity of the matters to be decided and the type of persons to be dealt with, this Court has taken particular care to select a proper person to man the Court. 2. It is in the wake of these backgrounds that many petitions were filed before this Court and the Supreme Court to transfer cases from the file of the said Court. All the earlier petitions were dismissed either by this Court or the Supreme Court and Special Leave Petitions filed before the Supreme Court against some of these orders were also dismissed. This is the only petition of that nature now on the file of this Court and it came before us by a reference by the Single Judge before whom it came. This is the only petition of that nature now on the file of this Court and it came before us by a reference by the Single Judge before whom it came. The main grounds relied on by the petitioner to get the case transferred are (1) The Magistrate is having a pre-conceived notion gathered from the evidence tendered before him in identical cases and this has resulted in bias, (2) When the Magistrate was moved for adjournment for moving transfer petition by the junior Counsel he expressed openly from the Bench that bigger persons tried and failed and the junior Counsel is only a big zero, (3) The Magistrate is inconveniently interfering with cross-examination of witnesses, not recording some of the questions and answers and he is also giving clues to the witnesses to answer questions, and (4) Tabulation sheet is the basic record produced in all the cases. In spite of different attacks from different angles in many cases by the defence the tabulation sheet was accepted in many cases and this approach is likely to prejudice his actions in other cases also. 3. Among the grounds taken the major one is ground number one. Before dealing with that ground, we shall consider the other grounds. In this connection it is pertinent to point out that we have called for and obtained the remarks of the Magistrate on the specific allegations contained in the petition. One of the allegations is that when a petition was filed on 28.12.1985 expressing the intention to move a transfer petition the Magistrate remarked “Nobody can do anything against me and several greater persons tried and failed. You are only a big zero.” The Magistrate has denied this allegation. From the remarks of the Magistrate, it is seen that from 10.6.1985 onwards he granted adjournments due to the inconvenience of the senior Counsel who appeared for the petitioner. Finally when he refused adjournment on 28.12.1985 the junior Counsel who was present in Court moved for adjournment on the ground that a transfer petition is going to be moved. After examining the witnesses present, the Magistrate adjourned the case, after a month, to 28.1.1986 giving sufficient time to move for transfer. In his remarks, the Magistrate says when the stay petition was moved I read it over in open Court so that the prosecutor may also hear the allegations. After examining the witnesses present, the Magistrate adjourned the case, after a month, to 28.1.1986 giving sufficient time to move for transfer. In his remarks, the Magistrate says when the stay petition was moved I read it over in open Court so that the prosecutor may also hear the allegations. Becoming conscious of my ‘being’ and my existence after a while due to the impact of the wild allegations so quoted in para.8 what I said was this: “No one can defeat truth in whatever ordeal it may be put. Any one whether great or small who makes utter falsehood against me is only a magnificent zero since 1 have faith in God”. We have no reason to disbelieve the version of the Magistrate in this respect. It was his reaction from the Bench when such allegations came against him after he adjourned the case for more than seven months to suit the convenience of the senior Counsel for the petitioner. We do not think that the Magistrate was casting any aspersions on the junior Counsel when he made the above remarks. He was only showing his resentment against what he found to be falsehood. The reference was not to any specific person. But while disagreeing with the petitioner in his allegation that the conduct of the Magistrate is indicative of bias, we wish to emphasise certain aspect for guidance of judicial Officers. By our words, deeds or pronouncements we should never give room for any litigant or the public to suspect that there is the least possibility of prejudice or bias, conscious or unconscious. Considerations of sobriety, moderation and reserve will have to be our guideline not only in judicial pronouncements but also in our utterances and expressions. Otherwise we are liable to be misunderstood. Even that misunderstanding, whether it is based on factual foundation or not will undermine the judicial process. Justice should not only be done but it should also appear to others also that justice is being done. A situation to the contrary may cut at the root of fair trial. Judicial pronouncements must excell in the matter of simplicity and clarity. Though we do not mean to say that exhibition of literary talents is taboo for a judicial pronouncements, we are of opinion that greater stress should be on simplicity and clarity. A situation to the contrary may cut at the root of fair trial. Judicial pronouncements must excell in the matter of simplicity and clarity. Though we do not mean to say that exhibition of literary talents is taboo for a judicial pronouncements, we are of opinion that greater stress should be on simplicity and clarity. Judgments and orders should not turn out to be literary works from which different interpretations regarding reasonings or conclusions are possible Intention of the Judge regarding his reasonings or conclusions should never be capable of different interpretations requiring a commentary as to what exactly was intended. Use of literary or metanphoric language will have to be avoided whenever and wherever it is likely to give room for different interpretations. By a reading of the judgment or order even an ordinary man must be able to understood without ambiguity what the judicial Officer meant and said. Offensive language will have to be avoided to the extent possible and necessary. Expressions of adverse opinions or comments likely to affect parties, witnesses or strangers will have to be limited to the barest minimum required for the decision of the case and confined to the evidence and circumstances. Expressions of opinions from the Bench must also be limited to cases where it is absolutely necessary and as far as possible it should be couched in such language which is not offensive. Sarcastic comments are likely to be misunderstood and it should be avoided. Particularly when a Judge or Magistrate has to deal with several identical matters he will have to be mould his conduct and expressions extra-cautiously in order to avoid any fear of bias whether reasonable or unreasonable. In this case even the Magistrate in his remark says: “I confess that even this I should not have said”. But he added that he had compelling reasons and in his remarks he proceeded to discuss what the compelling reasons are. We are not proceeding to mention the compelling reasons given by the Magistrate. Suffice it to say that a narration of those “compelling reasons” added unnecessary volume to his remarks. There was no reason or necessity of the Magistrate to read out the allegations in the stay petition and pass oral comments on it from the Bench. These are also matters which will have to be avoided as far as possible. Suffice it to say that a narration of those “compelling reasons” added unnecessary volume to his remarks. There was no reason or necessity of the Magistrate to read out the allegations in the stay petition and pass oral comments on it from the Bench. These are also matters which will have to be avoided as far as possible. Grounds for transfer alleged in the stay petition moved before the Magistrate were allegations intended to be taken up before the High Court and it was not necessary for the Magistrate to offer his oral comments from the Bench. Any how whatever be the indiscretion played by the Magistrate, we do not feel that it involves any reasonable apprehension of bias so far as the petitioner is concerned. 4. Another ground is interference in the examination of witnesses. These are only general allegations which include non-recording of question in cross-examination, expression of displeasure and chastising witnesses, indirectly forcing the witnesses to say the opposite of what they stated, giving advice to witnesses that it is better to say that they do not remember whenever they are in doubt etc. The Magistrate specifically denied these general allegations and stated that he only disallowed a hypothetical question which he considered irrelevant and which had no factual basis. We have no reason to disbelieve the Magistrate. The fact that he accepted a tabular sheet in spite of objection in some cases is also no ground for a reasonable apprehension of bias. 5. Now we shall come to the main question. It is alleged that the Magistrate is having some pre-conceived notions gathered by his experience in the trial of other mark list cases and without evidence those impressions are carried forward and allowed to influence his decisions in other cases. In support of this contention it is alleged that while disposing of C.C.No. 1/84 to which no University Official was a party the Magistrate carried the impression in C.C.No.2/83 to which University officials were parties by observing “In this Special Court for trial of mark list cases, there were accused University officials already convicted for forging of mark lists which they have unauthorisedly issued for money consideration. In that case, it was easy for the accused in this case also to procure such a forged mark list from the University through illegitimate manner and stealthily. In that case, it was easy for the accused in this case also to procure such a forged mark list from the University through illegitimate manner and stealthily. This forgery must have been committed at the instance of first accused or at the instance of both the accused”. It is said that these are involuntary reflections of his mind on the basis of experience gained by disposing of identical cases involving identical evidence and it could be termed as involuntary bias which has to be favourably considered in an application for transfer. Even though University officials were not parties to C.C.No.1/84, from the evidence in that case itself the Magistrate could have known that there were other cases in which University officials were convicted for forging mark lists for monetary considerations. That is only a statement of fact which could have been avoided. But that will not be a ground to say that the magisterial objectivity is such that evidence of bias is apparent. It may not be proper to treat it as having any reflection on his judicial objectivity or impartiality. Voluntary or involuntary bias cannot be attributed on account of it. 6. It is an accepted legal proposition that bias need not be actual. If there is reasonable basis to suggest appearance of bias to a reasonable mind, it is sufficient for transfer. In this case we are concerned only with section 407(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What that provision says is that transfer could be had if “it is made to appear to the High Court” that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto. In this connection the words “appears to the Court” occurring in section 24 of the Evidence Act was also brought to our notice by the Counsel. It is true that these expressions indicate only a lesser degree of probability than would be necessary if ‘proof’ had been required. The test to be applied is whether in the circumstances there would be appearance of bias. That depends on whether a reasonable and fair-minded person with the knowledge of all the relevant facts would reasonably think that it would be impossible for the accused to have a fair trial. The test to be applied is whether in the circumstances there would be appearance of bias. That depends on whether a reasonable and fair-minded person with the knowledge of all the relevant facts would reasonably think that it would be impossible for the accused to have a fair trial. Every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues on judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. The test is not whether in fact bias has affected the decision, but is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable might have operated. (See 1957 S.C.J. 359: (1957) MLJ. (Crl.) 254: A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 425). Courts should be careful that nothing happens during the proceedings which may engender its suspicion and distrust and the conduct of the Court should be such that feeling confidence in the administration of justice is promoted. Nothing calculated to create in the mind of an accused a justifiable apprehension that, he would not get an impartial trial should be done by Courts. (See (1968) Crl.L.J. 1536.) As held in (1976) Crl.L.J. 1799, an accused must get a trial in which he may not have even the remotest feeling of not getting a fair trial. That was a case in which a conviction of the same accused by the same Court in an earlier case on evidence of the same witnesses was considered sufficient apprehension. The fact that there is a right of appeal may not be a sufficient answer to a reasonable apprehension of bias. In the administration of justice top position will have to be assigned to the trial Judge who shapes the case. His ability, efficiency, tact or lack of them can make all the difference in the fate of the case, which sometimes may not be capable of rectification in the appellate stage due to various reasons. So also there are many cases in which appeals are not filed and even in cases where appeals are filed their results may be delayed. There is also the added difference that appellate Courts operate in partial vacuum of printed records. 7. We do not think that it is necessary to refer to the arguments based on P.A. (1985) K.L.T. 190. There is also the added difference that appellate Courts operate in partial vacuum of printed records. 7. We do not think that it is necessary to refer to the arguments based on P.A. (1985) K.L.T. 190. Another decision referred to by the Counsel is L.S. Raju v. State of Mysore L.S. Raju v. State of Mysore A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 435. That was a case in which an accused who appealed against his conviction for having attempted to murder the Chief Justice of the State High Court, applied for transfer of that appeal to some other High Court on the ground that he will not have a fair and impartial hearing of the appeal in the State High Court which is presided over by the complainant. The case aroused considerable local excitement and sensation, and having regard to the position of the complainant as the head of the judiciary, the trial had to be held before a Judge specially brought down from Bombay. That case has no analogy with the one before us. We have no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in (1969) K.L.T. 263 cited by the Counsel for the petitioner. What that decision considered sufficient is the reaction of a fairminded person of ordinary sense and ordinary sensibility who has been informed of all that happened. The facts of Mohd. Abdul Rasoof v. State of Hyderabad Mohd. Abdul Rasoof v. State of Hyderabad (1951) 52 Crl.L.J. 273: A.I.R. 1951 Hyd. 50, are also entirely different, but the position of law laid down need not be and cannot be disputed. So far as the case in hand is concerned what we understand is that without any reasonable basis the petitioner says that he has reason to apprehend bias. 8. But a mere apprehension alleged to be entertained by an accused is not sufficient to form the basis for transfer. It is true that the fact that a Special Court has been constituted for trial of a series of cases belonging to a particular category should not operate as a special reason to disallow the prayer for transfer which would otherwise have been allowed. What is relevant is that it should be made to appear to the High Court that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had. For that purpose what is required is a reasonable apprehension based on reasonable data. What is relevant is that it should be made to appear to the High Court that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had. For that purpose what is required is a reasonable apprehension based on reasonable data. Judicial Officers are trained, but the discipline of law and the rich practical experience they gain, to get themselves rid of prejudices, if any, by familiarisation with the facts of a case as soon as that case is disposed of. The mere fact that the Magistrate had occasion to deal with and decide identical cases relating to other accused should not disqualify him in trying subsequent cases. If such a principle is adopted the functioning of Courts may become difficult. 9. In this particular case, what we find is that he alleged apprehension is based only on the fact that in the manner in which the Magistrate was dealing with cases the petitioner was led to think that there is a reasonable chance of his case ending in conviction. Such an apprehension alleged to be entertained by the petitioner cannot be said to be on account of apprehension of bias either voluntary or involuntary. If such apprehensions are allowed to prevail any accused could move for a transfer alleging that he reasonably apprehends conviction. Conviction or acquittal will depend on the evidence and its appreciation. Admittedly at least some cases ended in acquittal or discharge at the hands of the same Magistrate while some other cases ended in conviction. That means each case is being decided on its own merits. There is no allegation that the Magistrate is entertaining or has reason to entertain any bias towards the petitioner. Under such circumstances, we cannot consider the prayer favourably. Transfer of cases cannot be allowed for the mere asking. If the prayer is intended only to defeat the purpose for which the special Court has been constituted, it has definitely to be viewed with disfavour. What we find is that this petition is only a link in the chain of attempts consciously made to see that cases before the Special Court are taken out of the hands of the present incumbent whom they suspect is likely to enter adverse findings on appreciation of evidence. 10. The petition is without merits and it is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.