JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Defendant No. 9-ka is the Petitioner. His application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC to set aside the ex parte final decree passed on 29-4-1980 having been rejected by the Subordinate Judge, Second Court, Cuttack, in Misc. Case No. 36 of 1982 and on appeal in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 20 of 1984, the said order having been affirmed by the First Additional District Judge, Cut tack, he has preferred this revision. 2. According to the Petitioner, the final decree proceeding in Title Suit No. 317 of 1959 was pending in the Court of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack and a writ had been issued to the Commissioner for effecting partition. The writ was issued on 11.10.1979. The Commissioner kept the matter pending for quite some time and visited the spot and ultimately submitted his report on 7-4-1980 which was accepted by the Court 011 29-4-80. The Petitioner could not know the date of submission of the report by the Commissioner nor about its acceptance by the Court and according to him no opportunity was given to him to file any objection to the said report. It is only on 4-3-1982, the Petitioner's advocate could know about the report of the Commissioner being accepted by the Court when the said Advocate could hear the clerk of the Plaintiff's advocate making enquiries as to the preparation of the final decree for which he had filed the requisite stamp papers. Thereafter he inspected the records of the case and then filed the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC for setting aside the said order passed by the Subordinate Judge. The Petitioner also filed an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in preferring the said application. The main ground urged in the application under Order 9, Rule 13 was to the effect that in 1980, there was a bifurcation of the jurisdiction of the Court of the Subordinate Judge and Petitioner's counsel could not know to which Court the pending proceeding had been transferred and further the matter before the Commissioner remained with the said Commissioner for quite some time and Petitioner's counsel genuinely expected a notice from the Court after the Commissioner submits his report. 3. 3. The Plaintiff-opposite party filed objection to the Application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the of CPC and has averred that since the Petitioner did not avail of the opportunity which was given to him and the decree has been made final, it would not be in the interests of justice to reopen the matter. 4. In the proceeding under Order 9, Rule 13, the Petitioner was examined and he supported the stand taken by him in the application. The opposite party though cross-examined the Petitioner but did not adduce any evidence. The learned Subordinate Judge on discussion of the evidence came to hold that there was no justifiable reason to condone the delay in preferring the application and accordingly dismissed the same. The Petitioner carried an appeal and the lower appellate court has also affirmed the conclusion of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. 5. Mr. Panigrahi, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, vehomently contends that under Order 36, Rule 14(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Petitioner was entitled to receive a notice from the Court to the effect that Commissioner's report has been received and the said notice not having been given by the Court the ex parte decree is liable to be set aside. In support of his contention the learned Counsel places reliance on the decision of this Court in Durga Devi and Ors. v. Smt. Sarat Kumari Devi S.A. No. 292 of 1976, disposed of on 27-11-1978, Rule 14 of Order 26 of the CPC prescribes procedure for the Commissioner. Sub-rule (2) on which reliance has been placed may be extracted hereunder in extenso: The Commissioner shall then prepare and sign a report or the Commissioner (where the commission was issued to more than one person and they cannot agree) shall prepare and sign separate reports appointing the share of each party and distinguishing each share (if so directed by the said order) by metes and bounds. Such report or reports shall be annexed to the commission and transmitted to the Court; and the Court, after hearing any objections which the parties may make to the report of reports, shall confirm, vary or set aside the same. Such report or reports shall be annexed to the commission and transmitted to the Court; and the Court, after hearing any objections which the parties may make to the report of reports, shall confirm, vary or set aside the same. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the expression "after hearing any objections which the parties may make to the report...." connotes that the Court must give a notice, receive objections, hear and decide the same. I do not, however, find any force in the said contention nor in my opinion the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel in any way supports his contention. The plain meaning of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of Order 26 is that the report or the reports of the Commissioner shall be annexed to the commission and transmitted to the Court and thereafter the Court will hear any objection which the parties may make to the said report or reports and shall confirm vary or set aside the same. A party at that stage undoubtedly is entitled to put forth his objection and get it heard by the Court, but that does not contemplate of another notice to be given to the party indicating that the report in question has been received by the Court. By that time the parties must have appeared in the proceeding and where a party appears in a proceeding through counsel, the Court has no further duty to give notice to the counsel indicating that the report has been received. This being the position, there was no obligation on the Court to give any further notice to the counsel for Defendant No. 9-ka or to him as to the fact of receipt of the report from the Commissioner and thus, there was no infraction of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 of Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Panigrahi's contention on that score cannot be sustained. 6. Notwithstanding the same, I find, however, that the proceeding remained with the Commissioner for quite some time and Defendant No. 9-ka nor his counsel could know about the date of receipt of the commissioner's report. Undoubtedly, they were not watchful, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that they were negligent. 6. Notwithstanding the same, I find, however, that the proceeding remained with the Commissioner for quite some time and Defendant No. 9-ka nor his counsel could know about the date of receipt of the commissioner's report. Undoubtedly, they were not watchful, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that they were negligent. The additional feature of the case, as has been urged in the application, is that there was some bifurcation of the territorial jurisdiction which was to some extent instrumental in not noticing the fact of receipt of the report of the Commissioner in the concerned court. The evidence of the Petitioner which really corroborates the assertion made in the application for setting aside the ex parte decree is to the effect that Petitioner's counsel could only know of the fact on 4-3-1982 and was confirmed when he inspected the records on 5-3-1982 and this evidence remains unchallenged and must be accepted. That being the position, the application having been filed for setting aside the ex parte decree on 5-3-1982 itself, it must be held that the Petitioner approached the Court for setting aside the ex parte decree without any further delay after coming to know of the fact that the decree has been made final. Another feature of the case which also impresses upon me is that the Petitioner's own residential house stands on the disputed plot and he is being deprived of such valuable right without even getting an opportunity of putting forth his objection to the report of the Commissioner. It is true, as contended by the learned Counsel for the opposite party that an application for condonation of delay within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must explain each day's delay in preferring the said application and the period of limitation for an application under Order 9, Rule 13 starts from the date of the passing of the decree and not from the date of knowledge. But in the circumstances narrated above, in my opinion, the Petitioner's application for condonation, of delay in filing the petition under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC must be allowed. It is equally apparent that the opposite party has acquired a valuable right and if the ex parte decree would be set aside then her vested right would be taken away. It is equally apparent that the opposite party has acquired a valuable right and if the ex parte decree would be set aside then her vested right would be taken away. But having given my anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I think, the opposite party can be compensated by way of costs. 7. In the ultimate result, therefore, I would condone the delay in filing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the CPC and set aside the ex parte final decree passed on 29-4-1980. The order of the Subordinate Judge, Second Court. Cuttack, ill Miscellaneous Case No. 36 of 1982 as well as the order of the First Additional District Judge, Cuttack, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 50 of 1984 is set aside subject to the condition that the Petitioner (Defendant No. 9-ka) pays a sum of Rs. 1,000/- (one thousand rupees) to the opposite party (Sakhi Dei) or the counsel appearing for her in this Court, within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. This Civil Revision is accordingly allowed and the matter would now go back to the Subordinate Judge, Second Court, Cuttack, to the stage where it was prior to 29-4-1980 and Defendant No. 9-ka would appear before the said Subordinate Judge on 2-4-1986 and file his objection within a week thereafter. The Subordinate Judge would do well to dispose of the matter after hearing the parties as expeditiously as possible. If the costs as directed above are not paid in time, this Civil Revision shall stand dismissed without any further reference to the Bench. Final Result : Dismissed