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1986 DIGILAW 857 (ALL)

VASHISHTA NARAIN KARWARIA v. STATE OF U. P.

1986-10-29

K.P.SINGH, R.M.SAHAI

body1986
R. M. SAHAI, J. ( 1 ) AGGRIEVED by detention of petitioner under National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) his son has approached this Court for issuing a writ of Habeas Corpus and quashing the detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad as the incident which led to arrest and detention of petitioner was not only concocted but it did not amount to endangering public order within meaning of sub section (2) of section 3 of the Act, therefore, the occasion to exercise the power was non-est. Political rivalry and official antagonism leading to petitioners arrest and detention procedural irregularity, casual approach in dealing with his representation, undue and explained delay in its disposal non-application of mind by authorities, failure to forward relevant material by the District Magistrate to State Government, vagueness in the order, omission to forward the representation to Central Government have also been pressed as vitiating the detention and violating the constitutional protection of liberty under Article 22 (3) of Constitution of India. ( 2 ) ON 21st June the petitioner was arrested at 5. 30 p. m. for committing offence under-section 153 of I. P. C. from crossing of - Dhoomangaj. Immediately thereafter telegrams etc, were sent on his behalf complaining of unwarranted arrest. At 8. 00 P. M. a written representation on his behalf was presented to the District Magistrate through half a dozen persons including an Ex. M. P. It was received at 8. 45 p. m. On next day that is 22nd Jun. 1986 copy of F. I. R. , general diary etc, were received by the District Magistrate. He is stated to have examined the same, considered petitioners activity and involvement and was satisfied that petitioners coming out of jail was likely to act in a manner prejudiced to maintenance of public order, therefore, he passed the order detaining petitioner under the Act. The grounds of detention were communicated to petitioner on 23rd June, 1985 to enable him to make representation against it. On same day copy of the order together with grounds of detention along-with report of District Magistrate were sent to State Government, which received it on 24th June and approved it on 28th June, 1986. It also informed Central Government of its approval on 30th June, 1986. On same day copy of the order together with grounds of detention along-with report of District Magistrate were sent to State Government, which received it on 24th June and approved it on 28th June, 1986. It also informed Central Government of its approval on 30th June, 1986. The petitioners representation dated 10th July, 1986 against detention was sent by the Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad on the same day to the Government which was received by the Home Secretary on fifth July, 1986. It is explained that 12th and 13 July, 1986 being second Saturday and Sunday were holidays it was marked for confidential section on 14th July, 1986. Since the assistant in the confidential section, who was dealing with the file of petitioner, left for Allahabad for filing counter affidavit on 15th July, 1986, the radiogram was sent by him, on return on 17th July to the District Magistrate, Allahabad for his comments, copies of petitioners representation were also sent to the Advisory Board on 21st July, 1986 as 20th July was Sunday. The comments of District Magistrate and copy of representation of petitioner were received on 22nd July, 1986 which was forwarded by the Government to the Advisory Board. On the representation of petitioner which was received on 22nd July the office put up a detailed note on 23rd July, 1986 which after examination by Deputy Secretary, on 24th July, was placed before the Special Secretary, and Home Secretary who also examined the same on 25th July, 1986. It was ultimately rejected by State Government on 27th July, 1986. ( 3 ) THE grounds of petitioners detention were that he along with his three or four companions had collected at the crossing of Doomanganj police station and was inciting that Hindus should not sit silently. They must organize themselves, burn mosques and shops of Mohammedans to teach them a lesson. Due to this the shops in the vicinity commenced closing and crowd started collecting resulting in spread of fear and danger among public and peace was disturbed. They must organize themselves, burn mosques and shops of Mohammedans to teach them a lesson. Due to this the shops in the vicinity commenced closing and crowd started collecting resulting in spread of fear and danger among public and peace was disturbed. For this action case had already been registered but since there was already communal disturbance in one part of the city because of which the situation was tense which had been aggravated due to unwarranted provocation by petitioner and it had caused fear and public peace had been disturbed, the District Magistrate was satisfied that in order to protect public interest and to prevent any further activity it was necessary to detain petitioner. ( 4 ) PRINCIPLE for differentiating between law and order and public order have been explained by Supreme Court in various decisions. The one relates to individual and the other to the community. Breach of law endangering individual security may be a law and order problem only but activities and actions which are apt to disturb even flow of society and endangering tempo of community, certainly disturb public order. In Ajai Dixit v. State of U. P. 1, the Honble Court observed, act by itself is not determining of its gravity. In its quality, it may differ from another but its potentiality may be different. Therefore, the question whether a man had only committed a breach of law and order and acted in a manner likely to cause or disturb public order is a question of degree or reach of the Act upon society. Inciting communal passion or giving provocative speeches at a time when communal riot is going on in one part of the town is certainly a problem of public order. Its gravity is not lessened nor it becomes problem of law and order because it is indulged in a locality other than the one where tension is prevailing. The degree or reach of the act upon society are no doubt relevant and material but not in those incidents which by their nature are apt to endanger public order. Sensitivity and emotions on such delicate occasions are so brittle that even the least shake to it disrupts the social chord. Delivering speech at crossing of a public place rules out any argument of surroundings. Inciting persons of a locality where there is peace and calm is more dangerous. Sensitivity and emotions on such delicate occasions are so brittle that even the least shake to it disrupts the social chord. Delivering speech at crossing of a public place rules out any argument of surroundings. Inciting persons of a locality where there is peace and calm is more dangerous. as it has the potentiality of disrupting public life there to. Provocative speeches at a time when social harmony is disturbed due to communal riot in any part of the city is as inflammatory and disturbing of public peace and tranquility as doing it in the same locality. To argue, therefore, that in absence of material that the speech of petitioner resulted in communal tension, or who were the persons who had gathered, what effect the speech had the occasion to exercise power did not exist is not correct. ( 5 ) BUT the constitutional guarantee of deprivation of liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law protects even the anti social, howsoever evil, he may be to the community. The action should not only be bad and dangerous to the society but its enforcement should be fair and honest. The law does not countenance casualness in approach either of the detaining or confirming authority or even the machinery through which it has to be processed at different stages. And there certainly the lapse has taken place. What is vehemently urged is the delay in consideration of petitioners representation from 11th to 14th July, then from 14th July to 17th July, from 18th July to 21st July and finally from 23rd July to 26th July. It is urged that even though the representation was received by the Home Secretary on 11th but it was marked for confidential section on 14th only. According to learned counsel this indicated causal approach in dealing with so important a matter. He urged that explanation of closure of second Saturday and Sunday is lame excuse as the representation was finally rejected on 20th which itself was Sunday. He submitted that if rejection of representation could be done on Sunday it was more imperative to take action on it on 11th when it was received in the office but by no less a person than, Home Secretary. He submitted that if rejection of representation could be done on Sunday it was more imperative to take action on it on 11th when it was received in the office but by no less a person than, Home Secretary. Learned counsel vehemently criticized the delay from 14th to 17th He urged that even after the file was received in confidential section it had to await three days for the dealing clerk who was out of station in connection with filing of counter affidavit. He submitted that even though the clearly left for Allahabad on 15th he could not get time to make note inviting comment from the District Magistrate a note which could have been made by Home Secretary himself on 11th or any other assistant in the office. The period taken by D. M. in submitting the comments from 18th to 21st has been criticised. It is urged that noting of various officers in the Secretariat from 23rd to 26th could not be appreciated. He urged that the attitude of authorities left much to be desired. They, did not pay that attention which is required by law when dealing with freedom of a person. Even the formation of opinion of the District Magistrate has been vehemently criticised. It is urged that satisfaction of District Magistrate is no doubt subjective but it can neither be mechanical nor the one to which on facts no reasonable person could have arrived. Learned counsel submitted that even though the F. I. R. and general diary do not mention about spread of communal tension due to speech delivered by petitioner yet the District Magistrate has formed opinion about these. Learned counsel urged that even though the F. I. R. mentions that the Sub-Inspector who arrested the petitioner was informed by some persons that petitioner was delivering provocative speech, the District Magistrate did not care to find out if the information was correct or the Sub-Inspector acted rashly. He urged that such F. I. R. could not furnish material for action against petitioner. Learned counsel argued that satisfaction by District Magistrate could have been recorded on material of rationally probative value only. He urged that even though sufficiency or adequacy of material which furnished foundation for action under the Act could not be examined by this Court but relevancy and proximity can be looked into. Learned counsel argued that satisfaction by District Magistrate could have been recorded on material of rationally probative value only. He urged that even though sufficiency or adequacy of material which furnished foundation for action under the Act could not be examined by this Court but relevancy and proximity can be looked into. He submitted that if the order is tested on it then it cannot stand. Some other criticisms for instance non-supply of the reports mentioned in F. I. R. about failure to recover any arms from Civil lines or Kydganj, delay lodging the F. I. R. till 10 p. m. detention at Police Station Cantonment have also been made. ( 6 ) BUT of all the procedural irregularities the most vital which of course has clinched the issue in favour of petitioner is non-compliance of section 14 of the Act. It is urged that the opposite parties having failed to forward petitioners, representation to Central Government the continued detention of petitioner has been rendered illegal. For this it is necessary to mention that although this was not specifically raised in writ petition but it was averred in paragraph 27 of rejoinder affidavit, copy of which was served on the learned Government Advocate on 17th September, 1986. It states that petitioner handed over his representation to Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini to be forwarded to Central Government along-with representation to State Government. It has not been controverted by filing affidavit of the Jail Superintendent. Presumably because it is correct, but the omission to file affidavit has lost all relevance as from circumstances to be stated hereinafter it is established that the State Government failed in its duty of for warding representation of petitioner to Central Government. A supplementary affidavit has been filed by an official of the Secretariat. It is stated in it that the State Government did not receive petitioners representation for forwarding it to Central Government. But from the record produced by the learned Government Advocate what transpires is that the copy of representation which was handed over to the Jail Superintendent contained an endorsement of copy being sent to President of India and Chief Secretary, Home. In absence of any denial or any material to show that endorsement was incorrect it has to be accepted that petitioner did band over representation to be forwarded to President of India and Home Secretary. In absence of any denial or any material to show that endorsement was incorrect it has to be accepted that petitioner did band over representation to be forwarded to President of India and Home Secretary. It cannot be termed as a letter of request for releasing petitioner as suggested by the learned Government Advocate. A letter sent by detenu may not be entitled to consideration or delay in its disposal may not vitiate detention but a representation addressed to President of India or Home Secretary submitted to Jail Superintendent cannot be ignored. From the record it further stands established that the Jail Superintendent sent copies of representation to State Government, District Magistrate, Commissioner and Advisory Board. He therefore, did not send any copy to Central Government. Even if this omission is ignored it cannot be disputed that representation received by State Government contained an endorsement of copies to President of India and Home Secretary. It was unequivocally clear and explicit declaration by petitioner that he wanted his representation to be examined by the Central Government. It was claim of a detenu detained under National Security Act. And the detaining authority being State Government it became its responsibility to ascertain if his representation had been forwarded or not. And if it was not then to take immediate steps. What is of consequence is exercise of right by detenu. And not handing over typed copies. One the right was exercised, may be by mentioning it in the representation, the State Government cannot claim immunity either because representation for being forwarded to Central Government was not received or it was not aware if they have been actually sent. The duty of State Government to send representation of detenu to Central Government has been put beyond doubt by the Supreme Court in Satpal v. State of Punjab2. ( 7 ) SECTION 14 of the Act confers a right on detenu to approach the Central Government by way of representation, which has been empowered to revoke the order. It is in addition to the power exercised by State Government. The provisions of requirements of its approval by State Government Communication of grounds of detention reference to Advisory Board, representation to State and Central Government are all Legislative manifestations of anxiety of providing safe-guard and check at every stage against arbitrary exercise of power. It is in addition to the power exercised by State Government. The provisions of requirements of its approval by State Government Communication of grounds of detention reference to Advisory Board, representation to State and Central Government are all Legislative manifestations of anxiety of providing safe-guard and check at every stage against arbitrary exercise of power. They are, therefore, construed strictly and the slightest omission at any stage results in rendering continued detention in violation of Constitutional guarantee of freedom and liberty. In Roghvendra Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur3 the detenu was set free and his detention was held illegal because there was unexplained undue long delay in the disposal of representation by Central Government. Such being construction of section 14 a detenu cannot be permitted to remain in detention if the State Government by act or omission deprives a detenu of his right of getting the detention order revoked by Central Government. The effect of such omission has been explained by the Honble Court in Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab4. It held, the failure in this case on the part either of the Jail Superintendent or the State Government to forward detenus - representation to the Central. Government has deprived the detenu or valuable right to have his detention revoked by that Government. The continued detention of the detenu must, therefore, be held illegal and the detenu set free. ( 8 ) FOR reasons mentioned above this petition succeeds and is allowed. The continued detention of petitioner having been rendered illegal the opposite parties are directed to release the petitioner and set him at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in some other connection. In the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .