Judgment Umesh Chandra, J. 1. THIS is a revision under section 25 Provincial Small Causes Courts Act directed against the judgment and decree, dated 2-11-1985 passed by Special Judge (E. C. Act) Banda, decreeing the plaintiffs suit for ejectment of the petitioner Sheo Ratan Lal Srivastava from the premises in suit described at the end of the plaint, for recovery of arrears of rent and for damages for use and occupation. 2. PLAINTIFF Manohar Lal filed a suit claiming these reliefs on the ground that the defendant, the sitting tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- had made a default in payment of rent due from 19-5-1981 inspite of the service of notice on him on 16-3-1982. The defendant contested the suit on the ground- 1. that the rate of rent was Rs. 25/- per month and not Rs. 40/- per month as alleged by the plaintiff. 2. that there has been no default in payment of the arrears of rent, the entire amount of rent till May, 1982 having been paid. 3. At the first hearing of the suit the tenant has unconditionally deposited the entire amount as required under sub-section (4) of Section 20 of Act No. 13 of 1972. Thereafter, the plaintiff opposite party moved an amendment application and para 5 A added to the plaint under order dated 18-10-82 it was alleged that the defendant on 10-6-76 had purchased plot 5ft. long and 22ft. wide and in October, 1981 he had constructed thereon two rooms, a kitchen and a bath room and the sitting tenant was using the same for residential purpose. This allegation was denied by the defendant by filing an additional written statement and therefore, the last point of dispute between the parties was as to whether the plaintiff's suit for the ejectment of the defendant from the premises in suit could be decreed. On these pleadings three points for consideration were framed by the Special Judge, firstly, as to the rate of rent, secondly, as to whether there was default in payment of arrears of rent and lastly, whether the tenant was relieved against his liability for eviction on the ground mentioned in sub-clause (4) aforesaid. 3. THE revisional jurisdiction under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not as wide as the appellate jurisdiction under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. 3. THE revisional jurisdiction under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not as wide as the appellate jurisdiction under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is a settled law that the court exercising power under section 25 of this Act has no jurisdiction to re-assess the evidence on record on pure issues of facts. Under section 25 of this Act, the High Court cannot constitute itself a court of appeal. Unless there was no evidence before the Judge to support the finding or unless the finding was impossible or perverse one, it is unfair to interfere on the revisional side. Therefore, when the finding of fact recorded by the trial judge is supported by the oral and documentary evidence and circumstances appearing from the evidence on record, it is not assailable in revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. In Hansraj v. Puran Lal Sharma, 1981 ALJ 35 this Court has held that "under section 25, the High Court has limited jurisdiction to find whether the judgment given by the Small Cause Court is in accordance with law. Where the Small Cause Court after considering evidence comes to a finding that the defendant was defaulter of rent, it being a finding of fact, the High Court cannot reappraise evidence and arrive at a finding different from that of the court below." 4. ON the first two points raised above, namely, as to the rate of rent and secondly, as to whether there was default in payment of arrears of rent, the findings of the Special Judge (E. C. Act) is based on the evidence on record. As to the rate of rent, according to Manohar Singh, the agreed rate of rent was Rs. 40/- per month, agreed to between Sheo Ratan Lal, petitioner and the respondents grand mother Smt. Piyaria. ON the other hand the defendant asserted vide paragraph 2 of the additional plea taken in the written statement that the agreed rent was Rs. 25/- per month. A few points may be mentioned. Firstly, the defendant in the written statement has not taken the case that originally the agreed rent was Rs. 20/- per month and it was enhanced to Rs. 25/-per month after about 3-4 years. 25/- per month. A few points may be mentioned. Firstly, the defendant in the written statement has not taken the case that originally the agreed rent was Rs. 20/- per month and it was enhanced to Rs. 25/-per month after about 3-4 years. Secondly, the oral evidence consisting of the statements of Shiv Ratan Lal DW 1 and Laxmi Narain are conflicting on these two points inasmuch as according to the defendant the agreed rent was enhanced in April 1976 and before 3-4 years before, it was only Rs. 20/- per month. But according to Laxmi Narain it was only in 1975 that the agreed rent was Rs. 20/- per month. It may be mentioned that Laxmi Narain was not present when the rent was enhanced. Thirdly, Shiv Ratan Lai, the defendant did not state that Laxmi Narain was present when the rent was originally agreed. In fact he stated that he has no evidence to establish that the agreed rent was Rs. 25/-per month. Lastly, though a notice of demand dated 16-1-1982 was served on the defendant claiming rent from 19th of May, 1981 at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month, the defendant remained silent, the defendant's explanation as to why no reply was sent to this notice has been, rejected by the trial court for very good reason. Consequently, the plaintiff succeeded in establishing that the agreed rent was Rs. 40/- per month. The defendant asserted payment of the entire rent. According to him rent till January, 1982 had been paid directly to the previous landlady. He had sent money order of Rs. 100/- being rent for four months from February 1982 but the same was refused by the plaintiff. There is no evidence regarding payment of rent till January 1982 and the Special Judge was justified in recording a finding that the defendant felt in arrears of rent and inspite of the service of notice the same was not paid by him and therefore, he committed default in payment of the arrears of rent. The findings on both these points are confirmed. 5. THE last point for consideration is as to whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of sub-Clause (4) of Section 20 of Act No 13 of 1972. Two points arise for consideration, firstly, as to whether there has been unconditional deposit of the amount as required under section 20 (4). The findings on both these points are confirmed. 5. THE last point for consideration is as to whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of sub-Clause (4) of Section 20 of Act No 13 of 1972. Two points arise for consideration, firstly, as to whether there has been unconditional deposit of the amount as required under section 20 (4). On this point, the Special Judge has found that the entire amount due has been deposited. THE deposition does not become conditional merely because the agreed rent has been deposited and in this regard the finding of the trial court cannot be upheld in view of Smt. Vijay Laxmi Gangal v. Mahendra Pratap Garg, 1986 AWC 517, in which it was held that- "THE deposit made by the tenant of the amount on the first hearing date, made up of rent at the rate as claimed in the plaint and interest and costs does not become not unconditional merely because the tenant had contended in the written statement that the agreed rent was not at the rate claimed in the plaint and he did not succeed in proving it at the trial. To construe Section 20 (4) otherwise would amount to foreclosure of any defence regarding the quantum of rent even in cases where the amount alleged by the landlord is more than the real rent agreed between parties. THE Rent Controller has a discretion in Section 20 (4) in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on the ground of failure to deposit the arrears, interest and costs within the period mentioned in Section 20 (4) to pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. But it is not possible to lay down any broad and general proposition that the discretionary relief should be denied to the tenant in all cases where he fails to prove his case regarding the quantum of rent even though he had deposited the rent at the rate claimed by the landlord in the plaint together with interest and costs within the time as required by Section 20 (4)." 6. THE plaintiff asserts that the defendant revisionist is not relieved of his liability for eviction inasmuch as proviso to sub-clause (4) is attracted. THE plaintiff asserts that the defendant revisionist is not relieved of his liability for eviction inasmuch as proviso to sub-clause (4) is attracted. This proviso says that- "Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area." In order to attract the proviso as referred to above, the oral evidence and the circumstances of the case must establish that (1) the tenant or any member of his family (2) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state (3) or has got vacated after acquisition any residential building and lastly, in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. After considering the oral evidence of the case, the learned Special Judge found that "Since the sons of defendant own residential building just by the side of the demised premises immediately towards the north of the land independently purchased by the defendant in his own name, and further since the defendant and his sons live together as the members of the joint family, deposit of rent, damages, interest and costs under the provisions of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 cannot absolve him from eviction from the building. This finding is based on the evidence on record and needs no interference in the revisional jurisdiction under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 7. IN this connection few facts may be mentioned. 1. It is not denied that the defendant petitioner had purchased a building 45' X 22' on 10-6-76 (Annexure 9), the sale deed executed by Smt. Piyariya widow of Dhani Ram in favour of Sheo Ratan Lal, petitioner for a sum of Rs. 24,750/-. The property involved is described as a 'Takhta plot'. The north boundary is important and it is described as 'house of Raja Ram and Parishit Dimar. 2. Annexure-10 is the sale-deed dated 8-7-1983, executed by Durjan son of Gangadin who was then minor and was under the guardianship of Ram Dayal son of Raja Ram deceased. It is a sale-deed executed for a consideration of Rs. 3000/- in favour of Sri Krishna Behari Srivastava son of Sheo Ratan Lal, petitioner. 2. Annexure-10 is the sale-deed dated 8-7-1983, executed by Durjan son of Gangadin who was then minor and was under the guardianship of Ram Dayal son of Raja Ram deceased. It is a sale-deed executed for a consideration of Rs. 3000/- in favour of Sri Krishna Behari Srivastava son of Sheo Ratan Lal, petitioner. The property involved is described as "Kotha Kham Khaprail". The southern boundary is important and it is described as 'House of Sri Krishna Mohan Srivastava Badahu Markanat Sheo Ratan Lal. 3. Reference may also be made to the commissioner's report dated 13-5- 1983. IN paragraph 5 it is mentioned that there are three rooms on the land lying to the south of the house of Durjan. Their doors have opening towards the South on the petitioner's plot. Two of these rooms were locked but the petitioner was in possession of the key by which he had opened the middle room in presence of the commissioner and its width was found to be 12' 3". Three doors have been shown in the site plan attached to the report. 4. Reference may also be made about the commissioner's report dated 4-11-1984 in which it is mentioned that these doors have recently been closed. 8. LASTLY, reference may be made to the statement of the petitioner recorded by the trial court.. He admitted that he had purchased a plot originally belonging to Smt. Piyariya and after purchase he had constructed a kitchen and latrine thereon. In the cross-examination he admitted that Krishna Behari and Krishna Mohan are his sons and live jointly with him. But, to his knowledge they have not purchased any open land. He also does not know if there are three rooms to the north of his plot and denied that rooms of this plot open on the land purchased by him. This statement has been proved to be false by the commissioners' reports. In view of the facts mentioned above, the Special Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and his finding that the defendant's sons who live jointly with him, have purchased a house, have also made constructions and they and the defendant have been using the same for residential purposes, cannot be held to be perverse. In view of the facts mentioned above, the Special Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and his finding that the defendant's sons who live jointly with him, have purchased a house, have also made constructions and they and the defendant have been using the same for residential purposes, cannot be held to be perverse. The Special Judge, therefore, rightly found that the conditions of the proviso were satisfied and the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of sub-clause (4) of Section 20 of Act No. 13 of 1972. 9. LEARNED counsel for the parties had agreed that the revision be decided at the admission stage itself ; consequently, they had filed supplementary affidavit and counter affidavit in support of the documents which they had filed in the trial court. The counsel for the petitioner filed 23 documents, supporting them by a supplementary-affidavit, dated 5-3-1986. Another supplementary-affidavit was filed on 8-3-1986 by which few other documents were filed. Therefore, the revision is decided at the time of admission itself. 10. IN the result, as discussed above, the revision has no force and is dismissed in limine. The judgment and decree, dated 2-11-1985 passed by the Special Judge (E. C. Act) Banda, is confirmed subject to the modification that the defendant is ordered to vacate the premises in dispute and deliver possession to the plaintiff by or before 30-11-1986. Revision dismissed.