JUDGMENT - V.P. SALVE, J.:---In this petition petitioner Shamrao Madhavrao Bodhankar, who is the General Secretary of the Pratibha Niketan Education Society, Holi, Nanded, has challenged the order of the College Tribunal for Marathwada and Nagpur Universities Aurangabad, dated 8th June, 1983 by which the dismissal order dated 23-2-1982 issued by the present Secretary against respondent No. 1, is held improper and invalid and was, therefore, set aside. The petitioner-management was directed to reinstate the dismissed teacher.---Respondent No. 1, who was Lecturer in Mathematics in the Pratibha Niketan College, Nanded. 2. The facts of the case are that respondent No. 1 joined the said Pratibha Niketan College as Lecturer in Mathematic on 1-7-1972. This College is run by the society known as Pratibha Niketan Education Society, Holi Nanded. It is an admitted fact that Shamrao Madhavrao Bodhankar is the General Secretary of the said Society. Respondent No. 1 was made Principal of the said college with effect from 1-4-1976 and worked in that capacity till 13-11-1980 on which date he was reverted to his original post of Lecturer in mathematics. It was case of the management that the four teachers who started the college decided in the beginning amongst themselves that all these four teachers should work as Principals by rotations, each having a term of three years. This agreement was approved by the society. The first principal Shri. S.R. Patak resigned after three years and Shri S.R. Rode was principal for next three years, i.e. from 1973 to 1976. Respondent No. 1 as per the agreement, became the Principal in the year 1976. His term of office ended on 30-3-1979 as three years period came to an end. However, respondent No. 1 back out of the rotation agreement and did not resigned as required by the said agreement. The management, therefore appointed one Shri L.S. Deshpande as Principal in his place by order dated 13-11-1980. Respondent No. 1 filled an appeal before the college tribunal against this order of reversion and appointment of Shri L.S. Deshpande. The appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal and against this dismissal respondent No. 1 field a Writ Petition No. 1071 of 1981 and the said writ petition is being heard along the present writ petition. Respondent No. 1 filled an appeal before the college tribunal against this order of reversion and appointment of Shri L.S. Deshpande. The appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal and against this dismissal respondent No. 1 field a Writ Petition No. 1071 of 1981 and the said writ petition is being heard along the present writ petition. However, in that petition an interim order came to be passed on 29-4-1981 maintaining status quo as to the appointment of respondent No. 8 in that petition, Shri L.S. Deshpande to continue as principal of the college till the disposal of the petition. It, is therefore, an admitted position that by virtue of the said order respondent No. 8 in that petition, Shri L.S. Deshpande, continued to function as Principal of the College. 3. In the meanwhile, some complaints were received by the management and the management gave a notice to respondent No. 1 pointing out irregularities and lapses on his part. The irregularities related to the matters of accounts, finance, moneys debited without actual payment and similar such allegations. Respondents No. 1 was called upon to reply to those charges within a week. Respondent No. 1 replied that since his case was pending before the College Tribunal he was not in a position to explain the charges. It is the case of the management-petitioner that inspite of various chances given to respondent No. 1 he did not reply to the charges levelled against him. On 6th May, 1981, therefore, the college committee was pleased to appoint one man committee to inquire to the allegations and appointed one Shri Sudhakarrao Doiphode, Advocate a member of the College Committee. Shri Doiphode by a notice dated 12-5-1981 asked respondent No. 1 to give reply to the charges. It appears that respondent No. 1 did not co-operate with this one Man Committee and did not either present himself before Shri Doiphode not submitted any explanation or reply. Shri Doiphode, therefore returned the case papers to the College Committee stating that the matter was of serious nature, and therefore, it was not possible for him to conduct the inquiry. Respondent No. 1 on the other hand took recourse to publishing statements in the press against the proposed inquiry and made false allegations. One Shri K.R. Auradkar, Advocate (not a Member of the society) was appointed by the secretary, Pratibha Niketan Education society, to inquire into the matter. Respondent No. 1 on the other hand took recourse to publishing statements in the press against the proposed inquiry and made false allegations. One Shri K.R. Auradkar, Advocate (not a Member of the society) was appointed by the secretary, Pratibha Niketan Education society, to inquire into the matter. A statement of allegations and charge sheet was sent to respondent No. 1 on 12-8-1981 and he was asked to appear before Shri Auradkar. Respondent No. 1 did not gave any reply to these allegations and charge sheet, nor did he appear before Shri Auradkar. Shri Auradkar, therefore, proceeded to inquire into the matter ex parte finding that respondent No. 1 was avoiding to appear before him or to give any reply to the allegations and submitted his reports on 19-1-1982. Out of eight charges levelled against respondent No. 1, Shri Auradkar, the inquiry officer, held that seven charges were proved against him. 4. A second show cause notice was given by the Secretary of the Society to the respondent No. 1 as to why he should not be removed from service. This notice is dated 3rd February, 1982. Respondent No. 1 was called upon to send his reply within ten days. Respondent No. 1 refused to accept this notice. Therefore, by an order dated 23-2-1982 respondent No. 1 was ordered to removed from service of the college with effect from 24-2-1982 B.N. 5. Against this order, respondent No. 1 filed an appeal before the Presiding Officer, College Tribunal for the Marathwada and Nagpur University, Aurangabad, under section 42-B(1) of the Marathwada University Act, 1974. The appeal was heard and decided by the College Tribunal on 8th June, 1983, who held that the dismissal order dated 23-2-1982 was improper and invalid and the management was directed to reinstate respondent No. 1. 6. We find that the main contentions of respondent No. 1 have been negatived by the College Tribunal and he was held that the Enquiry Officer. Shri Auradkar, held the inquiry properly. 6. We find that the main contentions of respondent No. 1 have been negatived by the College Tribunal and he was held that the Enquiry Officer. Shri Auradkar, held the inquiry properly. On the touchstone of the five principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1914 (Sur Enamel and Stampings works Ltd. v. The workmen)1, the college Tribunal came to the conclusion that the inquiry was properly held and these five principles, namely, (i) the employee proceeded against has been informed clearly of the charges levelled against him; (ii) the witness are examined ordinarily in the presence of the employee in respect of the charges; (iii) the employee is given a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses; (iv) he is given a fair opportunity to examine witnesess including himself in his defence if he so wishes on any relevant matter; and (v) the Enquiry Officer recorded his finding with reasons for the same in his report, were observed by the Enquiry Officer while conducting the inquiry against respondent No. 1. however by a strange reasoning, the College Tribunal came to the conclusion that the order of dismissal dated 23-2-1982 must stand vitiated since the managements with whom lies the power to appoint teachers did not order termination of respondent No. 1, but the petitioner-Secretary, it was found, himself ordered the termination of respondent No. 1 and that the post facto sanction accorded by the Working Committee of the managements did not cure the initial infirmity in the terminating order. The College Tribunal therefore held that the terminating order 23-2-1982 issued by the secretary of the society is not proper as the Secretary should have taken the approval or consent of the Working Committee and the Working Committee, instead of giving post facto sanction or approval to the said action of the secretary should have itself removed respondent No. 1 being the appointing authority. 7. The College Tribunal tried to construe the words of Statute 174 which provided terminating of services of a permanent employee in Clause (viii)(b)(6). In that clause, it is stated, "the services of teacher shall not be terminated without holding a full scale inquiry in the matter college authorities, if he so demands". 7. The College Tribunal tried to construe the words of Statute 174 which provided terminating of services of a permanent employee in Clause (viii)(b)(6). In that clause, it is stated, "the services of teacher shall not be terminated without holding a full scale inquiry in the matter college authorities, if he so demands". The learned College Tribunal, relying on the last clause," if he so demands", has made a cursory remark that in the instant case the appellant (respondent No. 1) was not prepared to face the inquiry at all underlying the words "if he so demands". We fail to understand what the college Tribunal wanted to decide here. It is not clear whether the College Tribunal wanted to say that if the employee did not demand an inquiry, there was no need for an inquiry and he could straight way be terminated. In fact, holding an inquiry, according to us, is in observance of the principles of natural justice, which is always a good observance of rule if law and, as such, we do not find any significance or otherwise whether a teacher demands a full scale inquiry or not. 8. As stated by us earlier, the only ground relied upon by the College Tribunal in quashing the terminating order was that the Working Committee has not terminated services of respondent No. 1, but gave post facto approval to the action of the secretary of the Society, According to us, the jurisdiction of a Tribunal is limited to the powers given to him under the Marathwada University Act. They are, contained in section 42-C of that Act. The powers of an appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, have been given to the College Tribunal. Therefore, we have to see whether the Appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure can question the acts of a society. 9. Is not disputed that by a resolution dated 23-4-1982 the action of the petitioner (the General Secretary of the Society) was rectified (ratified) by the Working Committee of the society in its meeting dated 23rd April, 1982. We have the constitution of the Society before us annexed at Page 86 of the Paper Book. Functions of the working Committee are given in the said constitution in Clauses 10(3). We have the constitution of the Society before us annexed at Page 86 of the Paper Book. Functions of the working Committee are given in the said constitution in Clauses 10(3). Sub-Clause (vii) therefore gives the working Committee the authority "to appoint teacher and to her servants and retrench or dismiss them " there is further power with the Working Committee at sub-clause (xiiii) to consider and take decision after every six months, for sanction after perusal of six monthly reports of all bodies and office bearers except those of the General Body, to give necessary instructions. "Obviously the Working Committee is authorised to consider and take decision in matters which are past and sanction the same. There is a residuary power with the Working Committee mentioned at sub-clause (xviii) "to do any such work which shall not be against the aims and objects of the society as mentioned in the constitution and which is in the interest of the Society". Thus, from reading of the functions of the Working Committee, we are left in no doubt that validation of any act previously done by any office bearers or rectification which may also be loosely termed as "post facto sanction" can be done by the Working Committee. We had, therefore, asked Shri A.G. Godhamgaonkar, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, to show us any clause by which such a post facto sanction or rectification is barred under the constitution of the society. He was unable to show any such bar. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Working Committee did not act ultra vires the constitution of the Society. If it cannot be shown that the Society has not acted ultra vires the constitution, any act of the Society or its Working Committee cannot be challenged in any Court or Tribunal since it would be an internal affairs of the society and no Court has powers to direct the management of internal affairs of the Society except under certain circumstances. 10. We are fortified in our view by the judgement of Kania, J., reported in A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 312 (A.S. Krishnan v. M. Sundaram and others)2, in which a similar situation had arisen. In fact, in that matter the plaintiff was the member of the society and he was challenging the acts of the society was illegal and invalid. 10. We are fortified in our view by the judgement of Kania, J., reported in A.I.R. 1941 Bom. 312 (A.S. Krishnan v. M. Sundaram and others)2, in which a similar situation had arisen. In fact, in that matter the plaintiff was the member of the society and he was challenging the acts of the society was illegal and invalid. The facts in that case were, a society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act was founded for the promotion of education among the boys and girls of Southern India. Not having sufficient funds to erect a building to house the school the society thought of issuing debentures. But the scheme failed. On 6th July, 1936 a general meeting of the society was called at which a Managing Committee was elected. At the next general meeting of the society on 4th December, 1938 eight persons were elected to the managing committee which co-opted one member in April 1939. The managing committee on a consideration of the situation resolved to borrow money and entered into an agreement with certain persons for that purpose. A general meeting of the society convented on 15th October, 1939 validated the election of the managing committee which bad been functioning till then and their acts. The plaintiff, a member of the society, then filed a suit on behalf on himself and to her members of the society except the defendants who were the nine members whose appointment to the managing committee was confirmed by the general meeting held on 15th October, 1939 for a declaration that the loans raised by the defendants were unauthorised and that a managing committee be constituted under the direction of the Court. It was held that as the acts of the defendants which were challenged by the plaintiff were in respect of the alleged wrong done to the society as a body and were not alleged to have infringed the personal rights of the plaintiff it was necessary that the Society should be a party to the litigation and it was not competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than the defendants to bring an action without ascertaining wishes of the society. Consequently the suit as framed was not maintainable and the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society. Consequently the suit as framed was not maintainable and the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society. Kania, J., in his judgement at page 314, has in very clear words brought out the authority of judicial review in the matters of society. According to him, the courts have no powers to go into the question of alleged irregularity in the internal management of the society. He observed :- "The first questions is whether the suit as framed is maintainable. It was argued on behalf of the defendants that the society was not a party to the suit. The allegations contained in the plaint amounted to an alleged irregularity in the internal management of the society. Taking them all together they did not amount to an allegation that the acts were ultra vires the society. They were all acts within the powers of the society. The only dispute raised by the plaint was whether within the powers of the society, the managing body had acted according to its rules and by-laws. It is further argued on behalf of the defendants that as the society itself did not challenge the acts the question was one of the internal management of the affairs of the society and the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. If the society complained that the acts of the defendants were irregular and the society was not bound by same, the position may be different. In such a case the Court cancel a meeting of the members of the society and inquire whether the society as a body approved of the challenged acts of the defendants or even if they were outside the powers of the defendants, but being within the scope of the society's affairs, it ratified the same. Such a situation cannot arise in this suit because the society was not a party to the litigation." 11. Kenia, J., has further cleared the position of the members of the society and the acts challengeable qua the society, He says :--- "In my opinion as the position of the members of this society is similar to that of the share holders of the company and as the acts of the defendants which are challenged are in respect of the society it is necessary that the society should be a party to this litigation. I do not think is competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than defendants to bring a suit. The only grievance in respect of the disputed acts can be of the society, it is not open to the plaintiff, without ascertaining the wishes of the society, to file a suit on behalf of himself and all other except the defendants. The reason for that conclusion is obvious. Even if the Court decides in favour of the plaintiff, the society can call meeting of its members tomorrow, confirm the act of the defendants and confirm their position as members of the managing committee, thus rendering the decision of the Court a nullity. As I have pointed out, there is no suggestion here of an infringement of the individual right of the plaintiff. The suggestion is only in respect of the alleged wrong done to the society as body. In the absence of the society as a party to this litigation, I am of opinion that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society." 12. According to us, it was not within the competence of the College Tribunal to enter into the internal affairs of the society. It was entirely upto members of the society or its Working Committee either to approve or not to approve the action taken by the Secretary. If the Working Committee decides to approve the action taken by the Secretary of the society, it is not left open to respondent No. 1 to come up with a plea that the society has not acted within their powers. It is, in fact, a plea tantamount to saying that a wrong has been done to the society by the Working Committee of that society in ratifying the orders passed by the General Secretary. As found by Kania, J., even if the Court decides in favour of the plaintiffs, here respondent No. 1 (i.e. the appellant before the College Tribunal) the society can call a meeting of its members tomorrow, confirm the acts of the respondent in the appeal before the College Tribunal and confirm their positions as members of the Working Committee, thus rendering the decision of the Court a nullity. The only exception found by Kania, J., is that a suit by members could be maintainable in case there was infringement of individual right of a member, such as, his removal from the society without notice. 13. In this view of the matter, since we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has exceeded its Jurisdiction by trying to interfere with the internal with the internal affairs of the society, the order of the Tribunal must stand vitiated and must be set aside. 14. Shri Chapalgaonkar learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon three decisions : (A) A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 66 (T.R. Bhavani Shankar Joshi and another v. Gordhandas Jamnadas and another)3; (B) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2389 (Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union of India) (C) (Punjabrao and others v. V.M. Molkar others)5, 1974, Mh.L.J. 428 at P. 438. The first two decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court deal with the question of ratification and it has been held by the Privy Council as well as the Supreme Court that the principle of ratification is a recognised principle of law and can be safely invoked by the societies of their Working Committees in appropriate case. The relevant portions of the two decisions are us under :--- "The question whether ratification would in law validate an assignment executed by an agent who was not authorised at the time of execution of an assignment of a decree, depends on the exact language of sections 196 to 200 (of the Contract Act, 1872) Under these sections it is open to the decree-holder to ratify the act of the unauthorised agent who had purported to act on the decree-holder's behalf in assigning the decree. Ratification is in law equivalent to previous authority it may be express or it may be effected impliedly by conduct." (Emphasis supplied) (Page 68 of the Report) "The agenda of the meeting of the Board of Directors held on December 23, 1953 shows that one item of business was the confirmation of minutes of the meeting of the Directors held on December 16, 1953. The confirmation of the minutes of the meeting of the Directors held on 16-12-1953, would not in any way show that the Boards of Directors adopted the resolutions to terminate the services of the appellant passed on December 16, 1953. The confirmation of the minutes of the meeting of the Directors held on 16-12-1953, would not in any way show that the Boards of Directors adopted the resolutions to terminate the services of the appellant passed on December 16, 1953. It only shows that the Board passed the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting held on December 16, 1953. But the resolution of the Board of Directors to confirm the action of the Chairman to terminate the services of the appellant by this telegram and letter dated December 17, 1953, would show that the Board ratified the action of the Chairman. Even if it be assumed that telegram and the letter terminating the services of the appellant by the chairman was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting if the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant he was acting on behalf of he company undoing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of he Board of Director to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of he appellant were validly terminated on December 17, 1953." (Para 14 on page 2391 of the Report). The third decision reported in 1974 Mh.L.J. 428, at page 437, 438 also reiterates the same principle. The relevant portion is as under :--- "Then a grievance is made….. that assuming that the said rules were applicable to the employees working in the Municipal Council…… the then Municipal Council......the then Municipal Council had failed to follow the said Rules and in effect the appointments of the petitioners were made in contravention of the provision of the said rules themselves, and, therefore, the appointments being bad in law are void ab initio and will not confer any legal right upon the petitioners. (Further) the Rules 9 and 10 of the Recruitment Rules clearly show that it is the Municipal Council who has to appoint a Selection Committee consisting of 5 members of whom one shall be either the President or the Vice-president of the Municipal Council who shall also be the Chairman of the Selection Committee. In the present case the applications were invited by the president himself and not by the Municipal Council as such. Further the Selection Committee was also appointed by the President and not by the Municipal Council as contemplated by Rule 10 of the rules. Further said Committee consisted of four members only and not five. Therefore, it is quite clear from the record that Municipal Council has not followed the provisions of Rules 9 and 10 before making the appointments of the petitioners ……….. It is quite clear from the record that the Municipal Council in its general meeting held on 25-9-1970 passed a resolution delegating its power to the President and the Standing Committee as contemplated by section 76 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act and thereafter the applications were invited as per provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules. A selection Committee was also constituted under the order of the president for the said purpose, which scrutinised the applications, interviewed the candidates and made a recommendation. It is no doubt that the said Selection Committee consisted of four members only instead of only five as contemplated by Rule 10. However, it is further clear that after the recommendation were made by the Selection Committee the whole matter was placed before the Standing Committee which was competent to make the appointments and the entire matter was considered by the stand Committee and the appointments made by the president and the procedure followed in these behalf was duly approved and adopted. This shows that the action taken by the president was not only rectified but was duly adopted by the standing committee which was competent to make appointments." 15. Shri Godhamgaonkar learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 raised the question of maintainability of the petition questioning the locus of the petitioner to file the petition. No doubt nomenclature used by the petitioner is not proper. It should have been the reserve, namely, the society should have been mentioned first and it should have shown as represented by the General Secretary. No doubt nomenclature used by the petitioner is not proper. It should have been the reserve, namely, the society should have been mentioned first and it should have shown as represented by the General Secretary. However according to us, it is not a material infirmity in the petition and, therefore we reject these plea. 16. Relying on the authority reported in A.I.R .1984 S.C. 38 (Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim and others)6, Shri Godhamgaonkar argued that in the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Construction of India, a mere wrong decision without any thing more is not enough. According to the learned Counsel, the College Tribunal may have committed an error in coming to the conclusion that a post facto sanction by a society or its Working Committee does not validate the previous actions of its office bearer and even if this Court comes to the conclusion that this finding is incorrect, it is merely a technical error and the Court should not correct the same. We cannot agree with this submission of the learned Counsel since we are of the view that this is a matter in which the College Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and we have held that the College Tribunal has no power to exceed its jurisdiction and enter into a field not permitted by law, namely, the internal management of a society. 17. Shri Godhamgaonkar further argued that neither section 42-C of the Maharathwada University Act in its Clause (d) or (e) nor statute 174 prescribe the procedure to be followed in initiating the disciplinary proceedings nor does it lay down the procedure to be followed during the inquiry. As such, the common law must prevail. He argued that there was no authority vested in the secretary to initiate the proceeding as per the constitution of the society. As such, the common law must prevail. He argued that there was no authority vested in the secretary to initiate the proceeding as per the constitution of the society. We have persuade the constitution of the society and we find that amongst all the office bearers, the General Secretary is the most powerful office bearer, who has been given the authority "to inspect and safeguard legally the educational and financial interest of the society, to instruct the Chief authority in this respect and to manage the affairs in the interest of the society." He has also been given the authority "to take decisions on ordinary type of questions and take temporary decisions on important questions." He can "sanction leave, appoint temporary hands, take necessary steps against the defaulters such as suspension, fine, stopping increments and payments or the salaries, the sanction of which shall be obtained in the next meeting of the Working Committee." He is also authorised "to execute all documents for and in the name of the society." It is futile to argue for the learned Counsel of respondent No. 1 that the Secretary did not have the authority to issue a notice or show cause notice in respect of the defaults committed by respondent No. 1. 18. Shri Godhamgaonkar, relying on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1348 (The Imperial Tobacco Company of India v. Its Workmen)7, laid emphasis that in the absence of standing orders an inquiry cannot be properly conducted and must stand vitiated. The reported case dose not come to his help since in that case there were standing orders which were not allowed. In the instant case, there are no standing orders or guidelines or rules of procedure, but that by itself, will not Vitiate an inquiry which was held conforming to the principles of natural justice and has also been so held by the Collage Tribunal. 19. Shri Godhamgaonkar then object to the non- filling of the ratification resolution dated 23rd April, 1982. 19. Shri Godhamgaonkar then object to the non- filling of the ratification resolution dated 23rd April, 1982. We find that even this objection is devoid of any substance in view of the admission in the return filed at page 94 of the paper book in the paragraph 6 of the return, the admission is to the following effect :--- "………The petitioner was not authorised to issue that removal letter-cum-order dated 24-2-1982 (and) the subsequent rectification of the action of the petitioner by working committee in its meeting dated 23-4-1982 dose not cure the defect". It is obvious from this that respondent No. 1 is not challenging the meeting of the Working Committee on 23-4-1982 nor passing of the ratification resolution, but it is his specific case that this ratification resolution passed on 23-4-1982 dose not cure the initial defect in the passion of the termination order by the General Secretary of the Society. 20. Shri Godhamgaonkar has also relied upon A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 193 (Shardul Singh v. The State of the Madhya Pradesh others)8, and A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 182 (C.S. Rajagopala Ayyar v. State of Madras etc.)9. He was contending that only the appointing authority can institute an inquiry, which is the ration of these two decisions. We are not in disagreement with this proposition of law. However, we are of the view that by the process of ratification the Working Committee is deemed to have initiated the proceedings of inquiry. If it was not so, then they would not have ratified the termination order which is admittedly the result of the inquiry held by Shri Auradkar appointed by the General Secretary of the Society. In fact, we find that the appointment of Shri Auradkar was even ratified earlier by the Working Committee of the society in its meeting held on 30-10-1981 and the college Tribunal has held as under :--- "Thus, the appointment of Shri Auradkar as E.O. was initially made by the College Committee and subsequently ratified by the Working Committee of the society." 21. In view of our discussion, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the appointing authority had or caused the inquiry to be held against respondent No. 1. 22. For the reasons recorded, we are of the view that the order of the College Tribunal dated 8th June, 1983 is illegal and bad in law. In view of our discussion, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the appointing authority had or caused the inquiry to be held against respondent No. 1. 22. For the reasons recorded, we are of the view that the order of the College Tribunal dated 8th June, 1983 is illegal and bad in law. It is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. Petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute with costs . Petition allowed. -----