JUDGMENT K. N. Misra, J 1. This writ petition related to plot No. 928 Situated in village Malookpur, Pargana Mahona, Tahsil Malihabad, District Lucknow, which in the basic year was recorded in Khata No. 180 as Bunjar land vested in Gaon Sabha. Petitioner had filed an objection under Section 9A (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, for short, 'the Act', claiming that he is bhumidhar tenureholder having nontransferable rights in the above noted plot on the basis of registered lease dated 14.10.1967 said to have been executed by Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha Malookpur. This objection was dismissed by the Consolidation Officer vide order dated 6.2.1978 holding that the aforesaid lease in question is fictitious document and no right on its basis would accrue to petitioner. Aggrieved by it, petitioner had preferred appeal which was dismissed, vide order dated 23.1.1979 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Lucknow. Still feeling aggrieved by the said order, petitioner had preferred revision which too was rejected, vide order dated 25.9.1979 by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation/ A. D. M.(E), Lucknow. He had also given reasons for not placing reliance on the said lease. It has also been held that the petitioner has not been able to establish his alleged possession over the land in dispute by any reliable evidence and no reliance can be placed on the said lease which is the basis of the claim of the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to cancel the lease granted by Land Management Committee nor they can determine the question of validity of the lease granted by the Land Management Committee, and, as such, opposite parties 1 to 3 have erred in rejecting the objection of the petitioner wherein he had prayed for recording his name as a tenureholder on the basis of the aforesaid lease in question. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Similesh Kumar Vs. Gaon Sabha Uskar, Ghazipur & ors., 1977 RD 408 (FB), wherein it has been observed : The Act creates a selfcontained Code creating rights and indicating the manner of settlement of dispute. No other authority has jurisdiction to readjudicate matters covered thereby. The Consolidation authorities have to recognize and respect the action of Land Management Committee or order of the Collector or Board of Revenue, if any. No other authority has jurisdiction to readjudicate matters covered thereby. The Consolidation authorities have to recognize and respect the action of Land Management Committee or order of the Collector or Board of Revenue, if any. They cannot go behind them. 3. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench in the said decision but on the facts of the present case it is of no assistance to the petitioner because it would cover those cases wherein the validity of lease, which as a matter of fact has been granted by the Land Management Committee (for short, L. M. C.) has been challenged and not to such lease which though executed by the Chairman of L. M. C. but in fact, no decision for granting lease in respect of land in question has been taken by the L. M. C. by passing resolution in that behalf. 4. If L. M. C., as a matter of fact, has not resolved taking decision to let out the land, then the Chairman of L. M. C., in the absence of such decision by L. M. C. for granting lease, cannot of his own execute a lease and get it registered and if he does so, the lease so executed would be absolutely void and it would, therefore, not require cancellation in order to take away its legal effect and enforcibility. The decision to grant lease to any person in respect of land vested in Gaon Sabha has got to be taken by the L. M. C. and on its approval by the SubDivisional Officer Incharge of SubDivision a lease is to be executed by the Chairman of the L. M. C. Thus, in the absence of such resolution of L. M. C. no lease can be granted by its Chairman and therefore, if any lease is granted by him, the same would be altogether void and ineffective. Such a lease, therefore, cannot be taken to be a lease granted by L. M. C. requiring its cancellation, 5. Such a lease, therefore, cannot be taken to be a lease granted by L. M. C. requiring its cancellation, 5. It is well settled that the existence and quantum of right claimed or' denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be vested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory power, to adjudicate upon such, rights and interest in land, to declare a void document to be effective or ineffective, but where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it can be urged that the consolidation authorities have HO power1 to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it (See Gorakh Nath Vs. H. N. Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 ) 6. Thus, in view of the above, the consolidation courts can determine on merit as to whether a document which is relied upon by either party to the ease in support of the claim or denial, is effective or ineffective, that is to say whether it is voidable or void document. If the document is voidable and the legal effect of it can only be' taken away by setting, it aside or its cancellation, then the same would be binding and given effect to by the consolidation authorities so long as it is not set aside or cancelled b the competent civil court. But if the document is void, it will not require any cancellation and Would be ineffective and not binding. 7. It thus appears to be farily well settled that the consolidation authorities have got jurisdiction to determine and declare whether a document of conveyance or lease in respect of land, sought to be relied upon, is ineffective or not on the ground of being void document having: been executed by a person having no lawful authority to execute it or being a forged and fictitious document having been executed by an imposter or that it is void on some other grounds. 8. 8. Thus, in the instant case the consolidation authorities could very well determine whether the alleged lease said to have been executed by the Chairman of L.M.C. is effective or inefective in law on the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. If a lease, as a matter of fact, has been granted by the L. M. C. as required under Section 195 of the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act, then unless cancelled by the competent authority under Section 198 (2), Corresponding to new Section 198 (4), it would be accepted and given effect to by the Consolidation authorities because they have no power to cancel lease granted by L. M. C. Which can be cancelled under the said provision only by the Collector. But if lease has not been granted by the L. M. C,, and no resolution by it was passed for granting lease to the petitioner in respect of land vested in Gaon Sabha, then the lease executed by Chairman of L. M. C. would be void and ineffective in law having been executed by the Chairman, L. M. C., without any lawful authority and no right would accrue to the claimant on its basis and it would Mot require its cancellation. 10. In the instant case there is nothing on record to indicate that the L. M. C. had passed any resolution granting lease in respect of land in dispute to the petitioner. Thus, the Chairman of L. M. C., in the absence of any resolution of L. M. C. granting lease to the petitioner, had no lawful authority to execute the tease, which is void and ineffective. The lease in question cannot be taken to have bee n granted by the L. M. C. merely because it has been executed and got registered by the Chairman of L. M. C., who on his own, could not grant lease in the absence of resolution of L. M. C. It was also not got attested by the Supervisor Qanoongo of by Naib Tahsildar. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the lease in question is perse void and, ineffective and there arises no question of its cancellation in order to take away its legal effect. 11. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the lease in question is perse void and, ineffective and there arises no question of its cancellation in order to take away its legal effect. 11. I, therefore, do not find any merit in the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the consolidation authorities could not ignore the lease without its cancellation under Section 198(2), Corresponding to new Section 198(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. 12. The consolidation authorities, in my opinion, have committed no error of law or jurisdiction in rejecting the claim of the petitioner based on said lease, A finding has also been recorded to the effect that the petitioner is not in possession over the land in dispute and I do not find any error in that finding. 13. In the result the writ petition fails being devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. (Petition dismissed)