Saikia, J.- The writ petitioner, an Executive Engineer (Me­chanical), Electricity Department, Manipur, challenges the vires of Column 12 of the MPSC-FORM 8 annexed to the Manipur Electricity/Superintending Engineer (Electrical) Recruitment Rules, 1977 (Annexure A/3 to the petition) which prescribes the qua­lification for promotion to the post of superintending Engineer, and the appointments of Respondents 3 to 7 as Superintending Engineers made there under. Column 12 reads : "Promotion.- Executive Engineer (Elect/Mech) and Surveyor of Works-possessing Degree or equivalent in Elect/Mech. Engi­neering of recognised Institute with 6 years regular Service in the grade." 2. Holder of a Diploma in Mechanical Engineering, the petitioner was first appointed as Section Officer under the Go­vernment of Manipur in 1962 on regular basis, and he was recruited as Assistant Director (Mechanical) in 1965 on regular basis in the Industries Department of Manipur and was later promoted to a post of Executive Engineer (Electricity) in 1972 on ad hoc basis putting him in the common pool of Executive Engineers (Electricity) in the Electricity Department of the Go­vernment of Manipur and that appointment was regularised in 1975. 3. Mr. N. K. Singh, the learned counsel for the petiti­oner submits, inter alia, that while at the stages of Assistant Engineers and Executive Engineer in the Electricity Department no distinction is made between Engineering Diploma Holders and Engineering Degree Holders, the Electricity Department/Superintending Engineer (Elect) Recruitment Rules, 1977, shortly "the Rules', in column-12 provides that only Executive Engineer (Electrical/Mechanical) and Surveyor of Works-possessing Deg­ree or equivalent in Electrical/Mechanical Engineering of recog­nised Institute with six years' regular service in the Grade shall be eligible for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer (Electricity). Because of this provision it is submi­tted, the petitioner being a Diploma Holder even after having more then ten years' experience as Executive Engineer is not eligible for promotion as Superintending Engineer, while the respondents 3 to 7 who are junior to him have already been promoted to that rank. Hence the challenge to the vires of the column 12 of the MPSC-FORM 8 annexed to the Rules and the impugned appointments of respondents 3 to 7 as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 4. The petition is resisted by the State of Manipur filing the counter affidavit dated 17.4.85. Hence the challenge to the vires of the column 12 of the MPSC-FORM 8 annexed to the Rules and the impugned appointments of respondents 3 to 7 as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 4. The petition is resisted by the State of Manipur filing the counter affidavit dated 17.4.85. It is stated in para-7 there­of that the Electricity Department was bifurcated from the P.W.D., in 1970 and the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Engineer as per the common Recruitment Rules which existed in 1969 in respect of A. E./PWD/IFC/PHE and Electricity De­partment. He was appointed as Executive Engineer (Elect) as per Recruitment Rules framed in 1973. Under the recruit­ment Rules of 1973 for the post of Superintending Engineer (Electrical) only the Executive Engineer (Electrical) and Surveyor of Works possessing Degree in Electrical Engineering of a recognized institution with 7 years' service in the grade rendered after the appointment thereto or regular basis was eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of Superintending En­gineer (Electrical). Neither the Executive Engineer (Electrical) possessing Diploma in Electrical Engineering nor the Executive Engineer (Electrical) possessing Diploma in Mechanical Engineering, as in the case of the petitioner, was eligible for con­sideration for promotion to the post of Superintending Engi­neer under the Recruitment Rules of 1973. 5. Mr. Y. Imo Singh, the learned Advocate General, Mani­pur inter alia, submits, that the Recruitment Rules of 1973 are substantially the same as the impugned Rules of 1977, except that the incumbent should have seven years' service as Executive Engineer on regular basis in the former, while six years under the latter, and that the petitioner who was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Electrical) on 9.1.73 on ad hoc basis and on 9.5.75 on regular basis duly accepted the said Recruit­ment Rules of 1973 which did not provide for promotion of Diploma holder Executive Engineer to the post of Superintending Engineer. The learned Advocate General further submits that the Recruitment Rules of 1969 were so framed as to suit the then prevailing circumstances when there was dearth of qualified En­gineering Degree holders, and hence, the Diploma holders had to be made eligible. The learned Advocate General further submits that the Recruitment Rules of 1969 were so framed as to suit the then prevailing circumstances when there was dearth of qualified En­gineering Degree holders, and hence, the Diploma holders had to be made eligible. Gradually, on the one hand more and more Degree holder Engineers become available and on the ot­her hand nature of work and public interest demanded higher scientific knowledge in Engineering at least at the stage of Superint­ending Engineer; and that new projects undertaken by the Electricity Department of the State Government for the last decade have been demanding higher mental equipment in the Ele­ctricity and in that view of the matter the State Government had taken a policy decision that the administrative efficiency in the engineering service of the State should be geared up in the public interest and accordingly the classification was made between the Degree holder and Diploma holder in the Recrui­tment Rules of 1973 and the Rules of 1977 with a view to ac­hieve administrative efficiency in the Engineering Service; and that the classification of the Executive Engineers into Degree holders and Diploma holders for the purposes of promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer cannot, therefore, be held to rest on any unreasonable and unreal basis as the classificat­ion has got nexus with the achievement of administrative effi­ciency in the Engineering Service. It is submitted that the posts of Superintending Engineer and upwards being at the apex hi­erarchy of the technical department requires" higher technical-knowledge in the field and are of supervisory nature and should be manned by the engineering personnel who possess higher educational qualification in whose case there is at least presum­ptive evidence of higher mental equipment. The Rules, it is submitted, therefore, are not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 6. Mr. N. K. Singh replies, on the basis of the petitioner's affidavit, that there was neither any public policy nor any norms decided by the State of Manipur as is evident from the Govt. Letter dated 7.2.85 written by the Deputy Secretary (Power) ad­dressed to the Secretary/Chairman, M. P. S. C. (Annexure-A/10) enquiring about the cause of debarring diploma holders, which shows that it was the M. P. S. C. which decided the matter and not the -Govt. It is the State of Manipur which is to decide the policy and not the Manipur Public Service Commission (MPSC). It is the State of Manipur which is to decide the policy and not the Manipur Public Service Commission (MPSC). Mr. Singh accordingly submits that there being no Govt. policy behind the classification the same is discriminatory, being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution of India. 7. The only question to be decided, therefore, is whether column 12 of the MPSC-FORM 8 annexed to the Rules in so far as it makes the degree holder Executive Engineers eligible but does not make Diploma holder Executive Engineer, eligible for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer is liable to be struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India ? 8. To our mind the question is no longer res-integra. Ad­mittedly, the classification between Diploma holder Executive Engineers and the Degree holder Executive Engineer is based on educational qualifications, namely, holding of engineering de­gree. In State of J. & K. v. T. N. Khosa, AIR 1974 SC 1 a si­milar provision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. The J. & K. Engineering (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules (1970) provided in the Schedule annexed thereto that re­cruitment to the cadre of Executive Engineers and above was to be made only by promotion. But as regards promotion to the posts of Executive Engineers, and to those only, it was provided that those Assistant Engineers would be eligible for promotion who possess a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering-or hold the qua­lifications of A. M. I.E. and who have put it at least eight years' service in the J. & K. Engineering (Gazetted) Service. The diploma holder Assistant Engineers were not eligible for similar promotion. It was contended that the discrimination made by the Rules between Degree holders and Diploma holders was arbitrary and capricious because academic or technical qua-Jubilations could be germane only at the time of recruitment, and for purposes of promotion, efficiency and experience alone must count. It was further contended that once the Government appointed candidates with different academic or technical qualifications to the same cadre, having same pay scale and similar duties, such candidates would form one class and they could not be further classified for purposes of promotion on the basis of their educational qualifications; and the Rules, therefore, were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitut­ion of India. As against that the State contended that in the Rules the Government had laid down a method of recruitment and prescribed qualification for appointment to various categories of posts in the Government Department keeping in view the nature of duties and responsibilities attached to those posts and classification for purposes of promotion on the basis of educational qualification had an intelligible differentia and was, therefore not violative of the constitutional provision of equality. Their Lordsh­ips of the Supreme Court while upholding the validity of those Rules (1970) held that there was always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden was upon him who attacked it to show that there had been a clear tra­nsgression of the constitutional principles. It was so held also in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC538: 195) SCR 279, 297 (b). A rule cannot be struck down as discriminatory on a priori reasoning. 9. It is settled law that where a party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule made by a competent authority on the ground that the rules offended Art. 14, the burden is on him to plead and prove the infirmity. The burden thus is on the instant petitioner to set out facts necessary to sustain the plea of discrimination and to adduce "cogent and convincing evi­dence" to prove those facts, for "there is a presumption that every factor which is relevant or material has been taken into account in formulating the classifications". Applying the ratio in the State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Triloknath Khosa (Su­pra), State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Kartar Singh, 1964 (6) SCR 679 , 687: AIR 1964 SC 1135 , G. D. Kelkar vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. (1967) 2 SCR 29 at p. 34 : ( AIR 1967 SC 839 , it can be taken to be settled law that unless the classification is unjust on the face of it, the onus lies upon the party attacking the classification to show by placing the necessary material before the court that the said classification is unreasonable and violative of Art. 16 of the Constitution. Thus, it is no part of the respondents' burden to justify the classification or to establish its constitutionality. Thus, it is no part of the respondents' burden to justify the classification or to establish its constitutionality. Higher educational qualification, formal education may not always produce excellence but a cla­ssification founded on variant educational qualifications for pur­poses of promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer, cannot be said to be unjust on the face of it, and the onus therefore cannot shift from the petitioner on whom it origina­lly lay. It must also be remembered that classification is pri­marily for the legislature or the rule making authority charged with the duty of prescribing the terms and conditions of ser­vice, and if, looked at from the standpoint of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld and the Court cannot sit in app­eal over the legislative judgment in this regard. The conten­tion that qualification classification can be germane only at the stage of initial recruitment is untenable. Of course the relevant materials will be admissible in support of the reason is and the justification for the classification and such reasons need not always appear on the face of the Rule or law which effects classification, to our view it is impossible to accept the sub­mission that the classification of Executive Engineers into De­gree-holders and Diploma holders is based on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification was made as has been shown by the learned Advocate General with a view to achie­ving administrative efficiency in the Engineering Services. If this be the object, the classification clearly correlated to it has nexus with the object or administrative efficiency sought to be achieved, for higher educational qualifications are "at least presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment." It can not, of course be suggested that administrates efficiency can be achieved only through those possessing engineering degrees but that is not relevant here. What is relevant is the object sought to be achieved and it is not shown to be a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities; and the instant classification cannot be characterized as arbitrary or absurd. What is relevant is the object sought to be achieved and it is not shown to be a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities; and the instant classification cannot be characterized as arbitrary or absurd. A rule-making authority may be guided by the realities of the time, just as the legislature, while making a classification; and " is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest." If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be over-thrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. Mr. Singh relies on Roshan Lal's case, AIR 1967 SC 1889 : (1968) 1 SCR 185 . But what has been laid down in that case is that direct recruits and promotees lose their birth marks on fusion into a common stream of service and they cannot thereafter be treated differently by reference to the consideration that they were recruited from different sources. Their genetic blemishes disapp­ear after they are integrated into a common class and cannot be revived so as to make equals unequal once again. Roshan Lal was no authority for the proposition that if direct recruits and promotees are integrated into one class, they cannot be classified for purposes of promotion on a basis other than the one that they were drawn from different sources. In T. N. Khosa (supra), as in the instant case, classification rests fairly and squarely on the consideration of educational qualifications : Graduates alone shall go into the higher post, no matter whe­ther they were appointed as Assistant Engineers directly or by promotion. The classification, therefore, is not on the basis of the source of recruitment as in Roshan Lal's Case. In Narsing Rao's case AIR 1968 SC 349 : (1958) 1 SCR 407 it has been held that higher educational qualifications are relevant consi­derations for fixing a higher pay scale. If such classification on the basis of educational qualifications was valid, there is no reason why there could not be a classification on the basis of educational qualifications for the purposes of promotion. If such classification on the basis of educational qualifications was valid, there is no reason why there could not be a classification on the basis of educational qualifications for the purposes of promotion. Applying the law as enunciated above we are of the opinion that though the Diploma holder and Degree-holder Engineers were integrated into a common class of Executive Engineers, they could for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Super­intending Engineers be validly classified on the basis of edu­cational qualifications and the column 12 of the MPSC-FORM 8 annexed to the Rules providing that Degree-holder Engineers shall alone be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of the Diploma-holder Engineers does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and must accordingly be held valid. 10. The view we have taken in this case is also in con­sonance with the decisions in T.N. Khosa's case (Supra), State 4 Mysore vs. Narasinga Rao, AIR 1958 SC 349 : (1953) I SCR 407 where matriculate tracers were given higher pay than non-matriculate tracers, Union of India vs. Dr. (Mrs.) S. B. Kohli (1973) 3 SCC 592 where prescribing a post graduate degree for the post of Professor of Orthopedics, B. Venkata Reddi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1108 : 1983 Lab. I. C. 1296 where the third class post graduates were eliminated from promotion of junior lecturers as Principal of junior College while first and second class post graduates were made eligible. 11. In view of the admitted fact that even the 1973 Rules did not make the Diploma holder Engineers eligible for pro­motion to the post of Superintending Engineers and in view of the statements made by the learned Advocate General, on the basis of the submissions made in the affidavit-in-opposition we entertain no doubt that the column 12 of the MPSC-FORM 8 annexed to the Rules is based on State po­licy. The letter dated 7.2.85 written by the Deputy Secretary (Power) to the Govt. of Manipur to the Law Reference-cum-Research Officer, Manipur Public Service Commission indicates consultation with the M. P. S. C., but casts no doubt as to the existence of the policy. The MPSC FORM-8 embodies the State's policy. The submission that there was no State po­licy is accordingly rejected. The appointments of Respondents Nos. of Manipur to the Law Reference-cum-Research Officer, Manipur Public Service Commission indicates consultation with the M. P. S. C., but casts no doubt as to the existence of the policy. The MPSC FORM-8 embodies the State's policy. The submission that there was no State po­licy is accordingly rejected. The appointments of Respondents Nos. 3 to 7 cannot therefore be assailed on the ground of in­validity of the Rules where under they were appointed. 12. No other point has been urged on behalf of the pe­titioner. In the result this petition is found to be without merit and it is rejected; but without costs. The Rule is dis­charged.