A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IN the annals of history it is difficult to discover a dictator a feudal lord or a monarch who openly discarded `public interest and asserted his legal right to rule the people and consider `public interest as irrelevant. Even military dictators while exploiting the people and inflicting miseries on them they cover their faces by the veil of `public interest. But in a democracy wedded to welfare of the people and where the Constitution of the country has promised the people to establish an egalitarian society based on socialist principles a nationalised bank (which is `state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution) asserts through its Senior Counsel (Mr. M. S. Sanghvi) that the Bank is under no legal obligation to take into consideration `public interest while executing a money decree and therefore it shall disregard the same. Shocking as it is this is the stand of the Bank and not a mere legal point raised by an attorney of the Bank. Therefore while complementing the Bank for being candid in its stand we do feel dismayed and pose a question to ourselves-`if the State disregards `public interest can the goal of establishment of a socialist society be anything but a mirage-and beautiful dream always receding in background and incapable of being realised ? ( 2 ) THEREFORE further questions arise; (1) Why and to achieve which purpose such a stance is adopted by the Bank? (2) Whose interests are sought to be served by disregarding the public interest ? (3) Should the Court become an instrument in the hands of the Bank and accord its approval to the action and steps taken by the Bank which are against public interest and which tend to serve the private interest of certain individuals ? ( 3 ) THE history of the litigation reveals that the State of Gujarat (applicant herein) wanted to assist an undertaking known as Ahmedabad Jupiter Spinning Weaving and Manufacturing Company Ltd. the original defendant No. 1 (hereinafter referred d to as the Mill Company ). Probably with a view to see that unemployment problem be not accentuated the State of Gujarat stood as guarantor of the Mill Company for an amount of Rs. 55 lakhs (Rs. 35 lakhs and Rs. 20 lakhs on two different occasions ). The guarantee was for a limited period of five years. Probably with a view to see that unemployment problem be not accentuated the State of Gujarat stood as guarantor of the Mill Company for an amount of Rs. 55 lakhs (Rs. 35 lakhs and Rs. 20 lakhs on two different occasions ). The guarantee was for a limited period of five years. The Central Bank of India (respondent No. 1 and original plaintiff) also extended its help to the Mill Company mainly with a view to extricate it out of difficult situation. The Central Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) stood nationalised as per the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Banking Companies Act ). Both the State Government and the bank were acting in the best interest of the public But at the stage of execution of the decree obtained by the Bank it has adopted a hyper technical stand which according to the Bank is based on the provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 (hereinafter referred to as Code of 1903) The Bank asserts that since it is easier for it to realise the decretal dues from the State Government and other public authorities and since there is no legal impediment in pursuing the State Government first for the realisation of its dues it would not be guided by the consideration of public interest. In such matters according to the Bank. it has free choice and the law permits the Bank to take such a course. ( 4 ) LET us have a quick look at the facts The Bank had advanced huge amount to the Mill Company. The advances were made before it was closed sometime in June 1971. When the Mill Company was taken over by the National Textile Corporation on 10/10/1971 the outstanding amount which remained due against it was to the tune of Rs. 2 83 76 463. 93 Ps. (two crores eighty three lakhs seventy six thousand four hundred and sixty three and paise ninty three only ). When the Mill Company was taken over by the National Textile Corporation on 10/10/1971 the outstanding amount which remained due against it was to the tune of Rs. 2 83 76 463. 93 Ps. (two crores eighty three lakhs seventy six thousand four hundred and sixty three and paise ninty three only ). Thereafter the Mill Company was declared as `relief undertaking under the provisions of Bombay Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act 1958 for a short period which was extended from time to time up to October 197 4/09/1974 the Ordinance regarding sick textile undertakings came into Force which later on took the shape of Sick Textile Undertakings Nationalisation Act. Thus the Mill Company came under the management of the National Textile Corporation. ( 5 ) ON 11/04/1977 the Bank filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 3 94 72 934. 63 Ps. which remained outstanding against the Mill Company. (The principal amount was Rs. 3 78 1 294. 55 Ps. and the rest of the amount represented interest which had accrued from 1-1-1977 to 4 calculated at the rate of 15. 5 and 16. 5 per cent ). In the suit the Mill Company was joined as defendant and other private iudividuals who were erstwhile Directors of the Mill Company and who had stood as guarantors for the dues of the Bank were also joined as defendants. Other defendants were the National Textile Corporation New Delhi State of Gujarat and the National Textile Corporation (Gujarat ). After recording evidence and after trial ultimately on 29/10/1982 the City Civil Court Ahmedabad decreed the suit in its entirety against the Mill Company private individuals i. e. the erstwhile Directors and others who had stood as guarantors for the dues of the Bank and against the National Textile Corporation. However the decree against the State of Gujarat (applicant herein) was passed to the extent of Rs. 59 69 422. 5 Ps. One important feature of the above decree be noted. The trial Court directed the defendants to pay the aforesaid amount to the plaintiff- Bank together with interest at the rate of 6% per amount from the date of the suit till realisation hereof by the plaintiff. 59 69 422. 5 Ps. One important feature of the above decree be noted. The trial Court directed the defendants to pay the aforesaid amount to the plaintiff- Bank together with interest at the rate of 6% per amount from the date of the suit till realisation hereof by the plaintiff. The judgment and decree was signed by the learned City Civil Judge on 18/01/1983 ( 6 ) THE Mill Company and most of the erstwhile Directors and guarantors i. e. private individuals against whom full decree has been passed by the trial Court did not file appeal. Thus they have accepted the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The National Textile Corporation (New Delhi) and the National Textile Corporation (Gujarat) have preferred appeals and they are pending. The State of Gujarat also filed an appeal being First Appeal No. 1993 of 198 3/04/1983 which came up for preliminary hearing on 15/03/1984 On the same day it was admitted. The present application has been filed in this F. A. on 22/03/1984 The application appears to have remained under office objection for a considerably long time. Ultimately on removal of office objections the application has been numbered as Civil Application No. 953 of 1985. It does not clear as to whether the application had come up for hearing on earlier occasion except on 22/03/1985 whent he present Bench was hearing first appeals and other miscel aneous matters. The application was heard on 29/03/1985 On that day partly because the Court was pressed with other work and the sitting was coming to an end very soon; and partly because the Counsel for the Bank requested that the Bank be given some time to show that the Bank was sincere enough to take genuine and effective steps for recovering its dues from the private individual-judgment debtors the matter was adjourned. During the course of hearing the Court had made it expressly clear that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Court was inclined to stay the execution of the decree against the appellant the State of Gujarat (and for that matter against any other public authority) unless the Bank showed that it had taken sincere genuine and effective steps to recover the decretal amount from individual-judgment debtors. Hence the aforesaid request by the counsel for the Bank. Hence the aforesaid request by the counsel for the Bank. This happened in open court when the officers of the Bank were also present. ( 7 ) THIS is how from 29/03/1985 onwards this matter remained pending. Unfortunately thereafter we could not assemble. However the Bank filed Civil Application No. 870 of 1986 in the office of the High Court on 21/01/1986 By this application the Bank sought permission to place on record an affidavit dated 23/01/1986 sworn by one Mr. C. J. Shah Chief Manager of the Bank. Nobody drew our attention to this application till 17/03/1986 When it was brought to our notice we passed an order directing the same to be placed before the Court on 21/03/1986 at 2. 45 p. m. along with the main matter i. e. the present Civil Application. On 21/03/1986 both the applications were placed before us and we found that on earlier dates hearing had proceeded on the assumption that Rule had already been issued in the application. The Court as well as both the sides had proceeded on this footing. Since the necessary formalities were required to be completed we passed the following order on 21/03/1986 rule to respondent No. 1 original plaintiff. Mr. N. J. Mehta waives service on behalf of the respondent No. 1. Stay of execution of decree passed in Civil Suit No 1169 of 1977 of the City Civil Court Ahmedabad against the appellant State of Gujarat till further orders. S. O. to 28-3-86 at 2. 45 p. m. ( 8 ) ON 29/03/1986 the matter was placed for hearing and at the request of the counsel for the Bank (Mr. N. J. Mehta) we permitted Senior Counsel Mr. M. S. Sanghvi to address us. We have noted the contentions raised by the Senior Counsel as well as by the counsel Mr. N. J. Mehta who had made elaborate submissions on earlier occasions. Thereafter till today we could not assemble and deliver our order because both of us were assigned court work in two different Division Benches and also due to personal circumstances of one of us (A. P. Ravani J.) it was almost impossible to deliver the order. N. J. Mehta who had made elaborate submissions on earlier occasions. Thereafter till today we could not assemble and deliver our order because both of us were assigned court work in two different Division Benches and also due to personal circumstances of one of us (A. P. Ravani J.) it was almost impossible to deliver the order. ( 9 ) BY Civil Application No. 870 of 1986 the Bank has sought permission to take on record the affidavit dated 23/01/1986 The application is hereby allowed and the affidavit is ordered to be taken on record of Civil Application No. 953 of 1985. ( 10 ) AS stated in para 6 hereinabove on 29/03/1985 the matter was adjourned sine die. Immediately thereafter within a week i. e. on 2/04/1985 (this date is taken as per the statement made at the Bar) the Bank filed execution application being Execution Application No. 240 of 1985 in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad for execution of the decree and sought execution against the State of Gujarat (and not against the private individual-judgment debtors ). Hence the State of Gujarat filed an application being Civil Application No. 880 of 198 6/03/1986 and inter alia prayed for stay of the further proceedings of execution application. In this application the Bank filed affidavit-in-reply dated 21/03/1986 and also a detailed affidavit sworn by one Mr. M. R. Goel Chief Manager of the Bank. This application filed by the State has been disposed of as per our order dated 21/03/1986 which reads as follows : In view of the order passed today on Civil Application No. 953 of 1985 the applicant-state of Gujarat does not press this application at this stage. Hence rejected as having not been pressed. It may be noted that further affidavit dated 28/03/1986 sworn by Mr. M. R. Goel Chief Manager of the Bank has been tagged on with the record of this Civil Application By consent of the parties this affidavit is ordered to be read as a part of the record of Civil Application No. 953 of 1985. ( 11 ) NOW the contentions of the Bank be examined. M. R. Goel Chief Manager of the Bank has been tagged on with the record of this Civil Application By consent of the parties this affidavit is ordered to be read as a part of the record of Civil Application No. 953 of 1985. ( 11 ) NOW the contentions of the Bank be examined. It is contended that in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dhanjibhai K. Umrigar v. Disboa reported in I. L. R. 13 Bombay 241 no slay of execution of the decree should be granted by the Court inasmuch as the decree under execution is a money decree. It is further submitted that there is a rule of practice that execution of money decree is ordinarily not stayed unless the judgment debtor deposits the amount in Court. In Dhanjibhais case (supra) the Bombay High Court has held that:a party appealling against a decree which directs him to pay money may obtain stay of execution of the decree so far as it directs payment on his lodging the amount in the Court unless the other party gives security for the repayment of the money in the event of the decree being reversed. If such security be given by the successful party then stay of execution should not be granted. Hence it is contended that the Court should not stay the execution of the decree. ( 12 ) THE contention so raised cannot be accepted Dhanjibhais case (supra) was decided by the Bombay High Court on August 31 1888 under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code 1882 In the Code there was no provision similar to Order 41 Rule of Civil Procedure Code 1908 Therefore the order must be taken to have been passed by the Court in exercise of its inherent powers. On the other hand the facts and circumstances of the present case are governed by the provisions of Civil Procedure Code 1908 wherein there is express provision regarding grant or refusal of stay of execution of decree. Hence it is not permissible to the Court to have recourse to the inherent powers of the Court. This distinction makes the world of difference between the two situations. Hence it is not permissible to the Court to have recourse to the inherent powers of the Court. This distinction makes the world of difference between the two situations. Therefore even if it were to be conceded that the Bombay High Court has laid down general proposition as is sought to be contended by the counsel for the Bank on the aforesaid ground alone the decision in Dhanjibhais case (supra) will not be of any help while deciding the question as to whether the execution of money decree should be stayed or not. ( 13 ) IT may also be noted that in Dhanjibhais case (supra) the suit was for injunction restraining the defendant from making further construction so as to interfere with the free access of light and air to certain ancient windows of the plaintiffs house. The plaintiff had obtained decree in respect of the windows and has also obtained decree for compensation by way of damages for the injury done to the windows The decree also directed the defendant to pay the plaintiffs cost of the suit. The defendant had filed an appeal and the question arose regarding the execution of decree so far as it related to casts. In this context i. e. where the prayer was for recovery of the amount of costs awarded by the trial Court the aforesaid observations were made by the Bombay High Court. Therefore the submission cannot be accepted that the Bombay High Court laid down a principle that in all money decrees the defendant should be directed to deposit the decretal amount in Court and then only the question of grant of stay be considered. ( 14 ) THE provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of 1908 govern the question of grant or refusal of stay of execution of the decree by the appellate Court. Mere reading of the provisions makes it clear that it does not make any distinction between the money decree and other decrees. The powers of the appellate Court to order stay of execution of decree are not fettered in any way if there is sufficient cause for passing such an order. Even with regard to the money decrees the discretion of the Court is circumscribed by the same limitations imposed under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 5. The powers of the appellate Court to order stay of execution of decree are not fettered in any way if there is sufficient cause for passing such an order. Even with regard to the money decrees the discretion of the Court is circumscribed by the same limitations imposed under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 5. There is no reason why decrees for payment of money should receive a consideration different than the decrees in the matter of stay pending appeals. In suitable cases where the Court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant if no stay is granted the Court may grant stay as prayed for either with or without any condition whatsoever. ( 15 ) MERE filing of an appeal would not operate as stay of execution of decree but appellate Court may for `sufficient cause order stay of execution of decree (see Order 41 Rule 5 (1) of Code of 1908 ). The other relevant part of the rule is contained in sub-clause (3) of Order 41 Rule 5. As per the provisions of sub-clause (3) of Order 41 Rule 5 the Court has to see- (1) Whether there will be substantial loss to the party applying for stay; (2) Whether the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and (3) Whether the security has been given by the applicant for due performance of the decree. Thus the provisions of the rule are very clear and they do not make any distinction between money decrees and other types of decrees. ( 16 ) WE may have a look at the case law on this point: In the case of a. K. Khan v. Ameer Khan reported in AIR 1950 Mysore 11 the High Court of Mysore has observed as follows:the Court can stay execution of money decrees pending appeal on such security as it deems fit in proper cases in which sufficient cause for a stay has been made out without requiring in all cases that the decretal amount should be deposited in Court In the case of movie Enterprises v. Periasang Mudaliar AIR 1952 Mysore 78 the High Court of Mysore has observed as under: order 41 Rule 5 cannot be read as imposing any limitation that the decrees for payment of money should receive a consideration different from the other decrees in the matter of stay pending appeal. Therefore there could be no restriction on the discretion of the Court for staying a decree for payment of money in suitable cases where the Court is satisfied that substantial loss will result to the applicant if no stay is made. In this view it cannot be contended that a decree directing payment of money should not be stayed unless the decretal amount is lodged into Court. The aforesaid decisions of the High Court of Mysore have been followed by Rajasthan High Court in the case of bansidhar v. Pirbhu Dayal reported in AIR 1954 Rajasthan 1. It may further be noted that Rajasthan High Court has not preferred to follow the decision of Bombay High Court in Dhanjibhais case (supra ). ( 17 ) SIMILARLY the Division Bench of Saurashtra High Court in the case of jamnagar Municipality v. Firm of Ramji Vashram AIR 1950 Saurashtra 113 has in terms held that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dhanjibhai (supra) cannot serve as a useful guide for the cases under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of 1908. It is further observed therein that when the Bombay High Court decided the case of Dhanjibhai (supra) the provisions of Civil Procedure Code 1882 were applicable and therein there was no provision similar to that of Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of 1908. ( 18 ) THUS on the basis of the case law it cannot be said that as per the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dhanjibhais case (supra) there is an established principle of universal applicability that in all cases of money decree the defendant should be directed to deposit the amount in Court and then only the question of stay be considered. ( 19 ) THEN the question is: Is there an established practice that the execution of money decree should not be stayed unless the judgment debtor deposits the decretala mount in Court and on such deposit the successful party be permitted to withdraw the money on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Court. We do observe that in large number of cases where money decree is passed this Court generally does not grant stay unless the defendant deposits the amount in Court. But this appears to be a rule of prudence and not a principle of law of universal application. We do observe that in large number of cases where money decree is passed this Court generally does not grant stay unless the defendant deposits the amount in Court. But this appears to be a rule of prudence and not a principle of law of universal application. We also believe and hold that this practice based on rule of prudence should ordinarily be followed by appellate Courts. The practice of not granting stay in money-decree except on condition that the decretal amount be deposited in the Court and the successful party be permitted to withdraw the same on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the trial Court appears to have been well entrenched and for good reasons. The basis of this practice appears to be the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Dhanjibhais case referred to hereinabove. However as stated hereinabove the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Dhanjibhais case does not lay down any principle of law of universal application. However this judgment cannot be made applicable when there is specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code 1908 with regard to grant or refusal of stay of execution of decree by the appellate Court. Therefore the only question is whether the practice which is based on rule of prudence can and should be applied to all cases of money decree without having regard to special facts of a particular case and wherein public interest looms large. In our opinion this practice based on rule of prudence cannot be applied mechanically to the present case. The very rule of prudence on which the aforesaid practice is based also requires that when public interest so demands there should be exception to the ordinary rule. The powers of the appellate Court to order stay of the execution of the decree cannot be said to have been fettered in any way if there is sufficient cause for passing such order of stay of execution of money decree. In such cases public interest alone would certainly be a sufficient cause which would satisfy the conditions laid down in Order 41 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. In such cases public interest alone would certainly be a sufficient cause which would satisfy the conditions laid down in Order 41 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. In cases where the appellate Court is satisfied that public interest would suffer by execution of a decree even if it is a money decree the appellate Court has the power and discretion to grant stay with or without conditions as may be necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the Bank has also referred to the order of another division Bench (D. C. Gheewala J. and one of us is R. A. Mehta J.) in Civil Application No. 3248 of 1984. It is submitted that there also a nationalised bank has obtained a decree for the dues of a sick textile mill (Himabhai Mill) and the State Government had stood as guarantor and the decree against the State of Gujarat has been passed and in the appeal (F. A. No. 1943 of 1983) against that decree the Civil Application was filed by the State and in that case the Division Bench has passed the usual order of stay of money decree namely stay of the decree on condition to deposit the entire decretal amount and in fact the State Government has deposited the amount. However it is to be noted that in that case there are no private individuals and private judgment-debtors. Therefore that order is not applicable in the present case. The facts are entirely and materially different. Nor the question of public interest was involved or considered. . ( 21 ) THE learned Counsel for the Bank relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Dr. Damodar Prasad and Anr. reported in AIR 1969 SC 297 . In that case the Bank filed a suit against the principal debtor as well as against the guarantor. While passing the decree the trial Court directed that:the plaintiff-Bank shall be at liberty to enforce its dues in question against defendant No. 2 only after having exhausted its remedies against defendant No. 1. The plaintiff-Bank filed an appeal challenging the legality and propriety of the aforesaid direction contained in the decree itself. The High Court dismissed the appeal and the matter was carried before the Supreme Court. The plaintiff-Bank filed an appeal challenging the legality and propriety of the aforesaid direction contained in the decree itself. The High Court dismissed the appeal and the matter was carried before the Supreme Court. While deciding the matter the Supreme Court held that under sec. 128 of the Indian Contract Act save as provided in the contract the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor. The surety became thus liable to pay the entire amount. The liability of the surety was immediate. It was not deferred until the creditor exhausted his remedies against the principal debtor. Relying on these observations occurring in para 3 of the judgment the learned Counsel for the Bank submits that the Bank is free to choose any of the judgment debtors and execute the decree obtained by it. ( 22 ) BE it noted that the question before the Supreme Court was not as to whether the execution of money decree can be stayed or not by the appellate Court. The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether direction can be given by the Court while passing decree that the decretal amount be first realised from the principal debtor and only if the principal debtor fails to satisfy the decree then the execution against guarantor or surety be proceeded further. In essence the question before the Supreme Court was: `could the Court passing decree has discretion to limit the rights of the creditor ? In the instant case no such question arises. In this case the question that arises is: `has the State free choice in the sphere of execution of money decree so as to disregard the public interest ? Further question is: `whether the phrase sufficient cause occurring in Order 41 Rule 5 of Civil Procedure Code is capable of taking within its sweep consideration of public interest or it has to be construed literally having no relation whatsoever with public interest ? Further question is: `whether the phrase sufficient cause occurring in Order 41 Rule 5 of Civil Procedure Code is capable of taking within its sweep consideration of public interest or it has to be construed literally having no relation whatsoever with public interest ? Therefore this decision of the Supreme Court does not help the Bank: ( 23 ) MOREOVER the decision of the Supreme Court is required to be read in extenso and not in piecemeal In para 4 of the judgment the Supreme Court has held that:in the absence of some special equity the surety has no right to restrain an action against him by the creditor on the ground that the principal is solvent or that the creditor may have relief against the principal in some other proceedings. Therefore even as per the decision of the Supreme Court in a given case where there are `special equities the same may be considered by the Court and where the Court finds that the defendant has good case on this score the Court may restrict the right of the creditor. In this decision all that the Supreme Court has stated is that the creditor has a free choice. The Supreme Court does not say that the public authority or any instrumentality of the Government which is covered by the definition of `state within the meaning of Article 12 of Constitution of India can exercise that free choice arbitrarily and in total disregard of public interest or against the public interest. Thus it is clear that this decision of the Supreme Court does not help the Bank. ( 24 ) THE learned Counsel for the Bank has also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of state Bank of India v. Shaksaria Sugar Mills Ltd. reported in 1986 (2) SCC 145 . We do not see how this decision is relevant as far as the paint at issue is concerned. Therein the question was with regard to the effect of notification issued by the Central Government under the provisions of Sugar Undertaking (Taking Over of Management) Act (49 of 1978 ). The question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial of the suit filed by the State Bank of India against the sugar company and its guarantors should be stayed or not. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial of the suit filed by the State Bank of India against the sugar company and its guarantors should be stayed or not. It was clearly stated in the notification that it did not apply to secured liabilities due to Banks and financial institutions. Hence the Supreme Court held that the suit could not be stayed Incidentally the Supreme Court has referred to the case of Bank of Bihar (Supra) and has observed that in view of the provisions of sec. 128 of the Contract Act the liability of surety is co-extensive wit that of the principal debtor. This is not the point at issue. The question is: Has the bank (or any public authority which is an instrumentality of the Government `state) free choice in matters of execution of a decree and can such free choice be exercised in total disregard of or even against the public interest ? In this view of the matter this decision of the Supreme Court also does not help the Bank. ( 25 ) WHEN execution of a decree is stayed all that the Court does is; it refuses to extend its help for the process of execution of the decree. If State refuses to take into consideration the `public interest the Court cannot be oblivious of its own duty. In such circumstances the Court can certainly refuse to help and must decline to put in motion its executing machinery. ( 26 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank has relied upon the following decisions: (1) Anandiprasad v. Govinda Bapu AIR 1934 Nagpur 160. (2) Fakira Mandaji Marathe v. Mt. Rumsakhibai air 1946 Nagpur 428. (3) N. C. Iyanna v. N. Channamma and Ors. AIR 1967 Mysore 209. In substance the decisions say that while deciding the question of stay of execution of decree under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code the Court should be satisfied regarding the substantial loss to the party applying for stay. Thus over and above the presence of `sufficient cause for stay of the decree the factors regarding substantial loss and /or irreparable loss should also be present to the satisfaction of the Court. Thus over and above the presence of `sufficient cause for stay of the decree the factors regarding substantial loss and /or irreparable loss should also be present to the satisfaction of the Court. ( 27 ) THERE is no dispute with the principles stated in the aforesaid decisions on the contrary as we have stated in para 15 hereinabove that all the three aspects indicated in clause (3) of Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code together with the `sufficient cause contained in clauses (1) of Order 41 Rule 5 are required to be taken into consideration by the appellate Court while granting or refusing stay. Hence this aspect does not require to be repeated. ( 28 ) IT may be noted that it is not the contention of the Bank that if the execution against the State Government and other public authorities which are guarantors is deferred for the time being and in the first instance if the private judgment-debtors are persued the public interest would not be served. The stand of the Bank is that it is easier to realise the money by pursuing the State Government and since law does not enjoin a duty upon it to take into account public interest it would not defer the execution against State Government. This stand is patently erroneous and absurd. In order to understand why it is imperative for the Bank to he guided by public interest it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Banking Companies Act. By this Act the existing Banks meaning there by the Banks specified in column 1 of Schedule 1 to the Act carne to be nationalised. The respondent- Bank is one of the scheduled banks which stood nationalised as per the provisions of the Banking Companies Act. If one analyses the Preamble of this Act it is very clear that the Banking companies including the respondent-Bank have been nationalised with a view; (1) to control the heights of the economy (2) to meet progressively the needs of development of the economy (3) to serve better the needs of development of the economy and (4) to perform the acts stated in point No (2) and (3) hereinabove in conformity with the national policy and objectives and matters concerned therewith or in incidential thereto. As per the provisions of sub-sec. As per the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec 3 of the Banking Companies Act the entire capital of each correspond new bank stood vested in and allotted to the Central Government. Thus as per this provision the entire capital of the respondent-Bank also vests in the Central Government. The cumulative effect of secs. 3 4 11 and 14 of the Banking Companies Act is that the nationalised bank can be treated as a government company for the purposes of sec. 617 of the Companies Act 1956 It may also be noted that in view of this statutory provision an employee of such bank is a `public servant as defined under sec. 21 (12) (b) of the Indian Penal Code. ( 29 ) PRIOR to independence the Banking Companies were being governed by the provisions in the Companies Act 1913 Later on the Banking Companies were being regulated by the provisions of the Banking Companies Regulation Act 1949 The new legislation was necessary in view of the fast changing socio-economic scenario of the country. This legislation also was not sufficient to meet with the requirements of the developing economy and hence introduction of social control by enacting Banking Companies Amendment Act 1968 This also failed to achieve the objects and hence the nationalisation of banks. ( 30 ) AFTER the nationalisation of banks the banking companies and in particular respondent No. 1 ceased to be a mere commercial undertaking. It was required to fulfil the twin objects of achieving the necessary commercial efficiency as well as serving the national interest. Without serving the national interest no nationalised bank can legitimately claim any right to exist. National interest in the context would and should mean `public interest. Even so. we fail to understand that after the enactment of the Banking Companies Act and after its implementation with full vigour and even after the introduction of the word socialist in the Preamble to the Constitution in the year 1976 the management of the Bank refuses to take into consideration the `public interest while executing decree wherein crores of rupees are involved. ( 31 ) NOW let us examine whether interest can be taken into consideration while interpreting the phrase sufficient cause occurring in Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of 1908 ? But what does `public interest mean ? ( 31 ) NOW let us examine whether interest can be taken into consideration while interpreting the phrase sufficient cause occurring in Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of 1908 ? But what does `public interest mean ? In Blacks Law Dictionary 5 Edition it is stated :something in which the public the community at large. has some pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. . . . . . Interest shared by citizens in affairs of local state or national Government. It is further stated:the circumstances which clothe a particular kind of business with a public interest as to be subject to regulation must be such as to create a peculiarly close relation between the public and those engaged in it and raise implications of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reasonable in dealing with the public. The entire nation has interest in all the banks which are nationalised The entire capital of the banks vests in the Central Government. Every citizen has share and interest in the capital of the Bank. By virtue of the provisions of the Constitution and having regard to the object underlying the nationalisation of the banks all the nationalised banks have corresponding obligation to perform all their duties and functions in the best interest of the nation i. e. in the best interest of the public. ( 32 ) IN the light of the history of the banking legislation and the concept of `public interest as narrated hereinabove and the object with which the banking companies have been nationalised it is difficult to hold that any vital decision or action can be taken by a nationalised bank by disregarding the public interest. In other words public interest can be said to be the very oxygen by which it gets life and sustains its existence. It may be noted that with the enactment of the Act the bank ceased to be an ordinary company. The role of the Bank as a powerful instrument for the rapid socio-economic development of the country has been recognised by the Parliament. The Bank as well as its employees have a duty towards the entire nation. That is why the employees of the Bank have protection of Chapter III of the Constitution with regard to terms and conditions of their employment. The Bank as well as its employees have a duty towards the entire nation. That is why the employees of the Bank have protection of Chapter III of the Constitution with regard to terms and conditions of their employment. The employees of the Bank including the top officers of the Bank enjoy the privileges almost akin to the civil servants. Yet this very management and the officers say privileges all right we will enjoy the same but we shall not abide by the considerations of public interest. This they are saying as a relic of bygone days and the attitude smacks of private sector management where the philosophy of laissez-faire and the company being considered as a unit of the ownership of shareholders had its full sway. We are constrained to make this observation because such is the stand of the bank and not mere legal argument. In response to our specific query in this connection the learned Senior Counsel of the bank has made this position clear. ( 33 ) HOWEVER the daws are changed. Even in the private corporate sector the old notion of company as a separate entity owned by shareholders and having free choice to act as it liked has undergone a seachange. This is recognised by the Supreme Court in the case of national Textile Workers Union v. P. R. Ramakrishnan reported in AIR 1983 SC 75 . In para 4 of the judgment after referring to the developments in this country i. e. the adoption of a socialist pattern of society and adoption of Constitution and particularly Part II and IV of the Constitution the Supreme Court has observed : But one thing is certain that the old nineteenth century view which regarded a company merely as a legal device adopted by shareholders for carrying on trade or business as proprietors has been discarded and a company is now looked upon as a socio-economic institution wielding economic power and influencing the life of the people. In para 5 of the judgment it is further observed:a company according to the new socio-economic thinking is a social institution having duties and responsibilities towards the community in which it functions. Again after referring to the modern trend in foreign countries the Supreme Court has in terms observed :that the company should be guided by considerations of national economy and progress. Again after referring to the modern trend in foreign countries the Supreme Court has in terms observed :that the company should be guided by considerations of national economy and progress. Regarding approach of the Courts the Supreme Court has observed: law must therefore constantly be on the move adopting itself to the fast changing society and not lag behind. It must shake off the inhibiting legacy of its colonial past and assume a dynamic role in the process of social transformation. In the background of this socio-economic scenario and the principles of law declared by the Supreme Court the question as to whether an instrumentality of the State can disregard public interest has got to be examined. ( 34 ) EVEN the private companies are not free to act in the manner they like. They are also required to be guided by considerations of national economy and progress. Therefore it is inconceivable that a nationalised bank which is an instrumentality of the Government and which is capable of wielding powerful weapons for the purpose of transformation of socio-economic structure of the society can act without taking into account public interest ? Even so if the Bank were to take an action which is legal but it is in total disregard of public interest then the question would arise: Can the Court say that it shall not extend its help to the Bank because it has disregarded the public interest ? ( 35 ) EXACTLY similar question arose before this Court in the case of Wood Polymer Ltd. In re. and Bengal Hotels Private Ltd. reported in 47 Company Cases at page 597. In that case a scheme of amalgamation of companies was produced before the Court. All the necessary legal formalities were complied with. But the Court could perceive that the only purpose of amalgamation of the companies was to transfer capital asset and escape capital gains tax. The question was: When all the legal formalities were completed could the Court say that having regard to the public interest it would not sanction the scheme ? The Court (D. A. Desai J. as he then was) held that since the sole purpose of amalgamation was to avoid tax on capital gains (Mark Avoid and not (Evade) the Court refused to grant its sanction. The Court (D. A. Desai J. as he then was) held that since the sole purpose of amalgamation was to avoid tax on capital gains (Mark Avoid and not (Evade) the Court refused to grant its sanction. The Court held that public interest looms large and the machinery of judicial process was sought to be utilised for defeating public interest and hence the Court refused to accord its sanction to the scheme of amalgamation of companies. This decision has been approvingly referred to by the Supreme Court in the case of Mcdowell and Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer reported in AIR 1986 SC 649 . ( 36 ) HENCE the term sufficient cause occurring in Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code has got to be interpreted and understood in the light of the afore3aid discussion. After all what Is sufficient ? One may again turn to Blacks Law Dictionary. Sufficient means adequate - enough- as much as may be necessary - equal or fit for end proposed - and that which may be necessary to accomplish an object. In the facts and circumstances of the case what is an object or what should be an object ? The object should be to serve public interest and the public interest can be served by which methods. The sufficiency or otherwise of the cause is to be determined by applying this test. On the other hand as far as the Court is concerned the public interest can best be served by refusing to assist the plaintiff s-hose duty it is to serve the public interest and yet it says that it shall disregard the public interest and shall stick to its legal right of free choice. If this be the attitude of the Plaintiffs it is not obligatory upon the Court to give its accord to such an action and the Court would he well within its right in saying that the machinery of the judicial process shall not be available to such a plaintiff. By granting stay of the execution of the decree after all what does the Court do ? The Court only refuses to assist the plaintiff in executing the decree. The Court does not do anything further. ( 37 ) AS far as the Bank is concerned the public interest cannot be served best by adopting an easy course for releasing its decretal dues. The Court only refuses to assist the plaintiff in executing the decree. The Court does not do anything further. ( 37 ) AS far as the Bank is concerned the public interest cannot be served best by adopting an easy course for releasing its decretal dues. As stated hereinabove it has to keep in mind the socio-economic interests if the entire nation. It cannot decide the course of its actions by choosing the line of least resistance. We will discuss little later as to how it would be in the interest of the entire society if the decree is executed first against. the private judgment debtors. Moreover the contention based on line of least resistance is fraught with danger and if allowed to be pursued by public authorities it would do more harm to she public institution concerned and to the society at large. ( 38 ) IN circumstances where an instrumentality of the government that is to say the State itself comes forward and tells the Court that it wishes to disregard the public interest and because it is an easier course to proceed against other public authority it would like to adopt such easier course the Court can very well say that it shall not be oblivious of its own duty and shall not disregard the public interest. On the contrary it is she duty of the Court to see that before it lends its assistance to such a plaintiff the Court must ask a question to itself: Will the public interest he served by assisting the plaintiff? If not even though the action of the plaintiff (be it State ) may be perfectly legal the Court would be justified rather it would be duty bound to say that assistance of judicial process will not be made available to such a plaintiff. One may go go the extent of saying that ill such circumstances if the Court helps such a plaintiff the Court would be becoming a party to disregard the public interest which will be the last thing which can be expected of a Court functioning under the Constitution which has promised the people of the country to establish an egalitarian society based on socialist principles. ( 39 ) NOW let us see how the public interest will be served better by refusing to assist the plaintiff in execution of the decree against the State Government or for that matter against any other public authority which would be covered by the definition of State occurring in Article 12 of the Constitution. If the stay is not granted and the plaintiff is allowed to execute the decree against the State Government or against any other public authority such public authority or the State will again be forced to take steps for recovering the amount from the principal debtors. This again will lead to further litigation. Multiplicity of litigation is certainly not in public interest. Litigation by public authorities and the States always at the cost of public money. Whenever it is possible to prevent such litigation it should be the duty of the Court to see that such litigation is prevented and loss to public exchequer is avoided. Therefore we feel that the execution of the decree passed against the State of Gujarat cannot be permitted to be executed at this stage. ( 40 ) AS per the provisions of sec. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code the trial Court while passing the decree could have awarded agreed rate of interest (i. e. 15% or 16 1/2%) till the date of realisation. But the trial Court has directed the defendants to pay the decretal dues together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. For reasons which cannot be explained or understood without drawing adverse inferences the Bank has not filed cross-objections against this part of the decree. Therefore the resultant effect is that ultimately when the private judgment debtors are required to pay the decretal dues they will pay this amount together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum and not 15 or 161 which was the agreed rate of interest. This means a net gain of interest calculated at the rate of 9 to 10 1/2% which again means a net gain of about Rs. 35 to 36 lakhs every year to the private judgment debtors. This means a net gain of interest calculated at the rate of 9 to 10 1/2% which again means a net gain of about Rs. 35 to 36 lakhs every year to the private judgment debtors. It does not require any commercial expertise or high banking skill to understand that every days delay in execution of the decree against private judgment debtors from whom the money should be ultimately realised by the State Government or other public authorities would be to their benefit to the extent of lakhs of rupees every month. Are we to understand that top officers of the Bank who took decision not to file cross-objections against this part of the decree and who appear to be interested in deferring the execution against the private judgment debtors are incapable of understanding this simple arithmetic? This collossal loss will be ultimately suffered by the society. Therefore it is clear that longer the delay in execution of the decree against the private judgment debtors greater will be the loss to the society and there will be more damage to the public interest to that extent. Calculating in terms of difference of interest rates only the private judgment debtors stand to gain to the extent of about Rs. 15 0 (fifteen thousand) per day. Why ? Because the Management and top officers of the Bank prefer to adopt the line of least resistance ? It is difficult to agree with this logic. . ( 41 ) IT may further be noted that if the Bank proceeds against private individual judgment debtors and realise its decretal dues the position would be that those who were primarily responsible for the loss and who were primarily accountable to the society would be pursued and would be made to disgorge the ill-gotten money which they have been able to retain with them for such a long time. Moreover they will not stand to gain further on account of difference in rate of interest and the recurring loss to the society to the extent of more than Rs. 15 0 (rupees fifteen thousand) per day will be permanently prevented. Further the State or other public authorities (which are nothing but the society) will be saved from the pangs of litigation and the society at large will also be saved from further cost of litigation. 15 0 (rupees fifteen thousand) per day will be permanently prevented. Further the State or other public authorities (which are nothing but the society) will be saved from the pangs of litigation and the society at large will also be saved from further cost of litigation. Thus delay also will be mininised and the social cost also will be reduced. These are certainly considerations which must weigh with the Court and therefore there is sufficient cause for stay of the execution of the decree. ( 42 ) OVER and above the consideration of sufficient cause if one looks at clause (3) of Order 41 Rule 5 of Civil Procedure Code there are other considerations also which must weigh with the Court. The Counsel for the Bank has harped on these factors and by citing certain authorities which have been referred to hereinabove has tried to make out a case that there will he no substantial loss to the applicant-State if stay is not granted. Further he has submitted that there was unreasonable delay in making the application and unless the money is deposited there is no security for the satisfaction of decree. Therefore according to him the Court should not grant stay. ( 43 ) AS far as substantial loss to the applicant is concerned there is no merit in the submission. At this stage the State Government cannot be deprived of its money. The private individual judgment debtors are primarily responsible for the debt due to the Bank and probably on account of their mismanagement the debacle of the undertaking was brought about. The State of Gujarat entered the scene solely with a view to help the undertaking and see that the employment potential is not reduced and further unemployment is not generated. In such circumstances if the applicant-State is pursued first the society at large will be put to substantial loss. In such cases the Courts must be guided by micro view of the matter and should not be guided by narrow considerations stemming from micro view. Therefore this condition is also sufficiently complied with in this case. ( 44 ) NOW take the case of unreasonable delay. In the facts and circumstances of the case we venture to say that this submission does not lie in the mouth of the Bank. Therefore this condition is also sufficiently complied with in this case. ( 44 ) NOW take the case of unreasonable delay. In the facts and circumstances of the case we venture to say that this submission does not lie in the mouth of the Bank. The decree was passed on 29/10/1982 and it was signed by the learned City Civil Court Judge on 18/01/1983 The applicant-State Government filed appeal on 19/04/1983 and the appeal was admitted on March 15 1984 The application praying for stay of the execution of the decree was filed by the State Government on 22/03/1984 which ultimately became ready sometime in the year 1985. Till this date or thereabout the Bank had not even obtained the certified copy of the judgment and decree. The Bank obtained the certified copy of the judgment and decree on 26/03/1985 Whether delay on the part of the applicant or for that matter on the part of any party is reasonable or unreasonable has got to be understood in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case. Be it noted that it was because the Court pestered the Bank the Bank was rather obliged to move its machinery and rush for getting the certified copy of the judgment and decree in March 1985. On the other hand the State Government had filed the application for stay of the decree as far back as in March 1984. ( 45 ) AT this stage it is stated at the Bar that at an earlier point of time i. e. in September 1983 the Bank had obtained certified copy of the judgment and decree but that was sent to the Solicitors of the Bank and they in turn had sent the same to the Central Office of the Bank at Bombay. This is still worse. Despite the knowledge of the Central Office of the Bank the execution application was not filed against any of the judgment debtors. Till the application for stay of the execution of the decree came up for hearing (on 22/03/1985 the Bank had not even filed execution application against any of the defendants. The execution application was filed on 2/04/1985 and that too after this Court made certain uncomfortable queries to the Counsel for the Bank. Till the application for stay of the execution of the decree came up for hearing (on 22/03/1985 the Bank had not even filed execution application against any of the defendants. The execution application was filed on 2/04/1985 and that too after this Court made certain uncomfortable queries to the Counsel for the Bank. In these facts and circumstances of the case it can never be said that there was unreasonable delay on the part of the applicant in approaching the Court and praying for stay of execution of the decree. ( 46 ) AS far as the security is concerned one must not forget that the applicant is the State of Gujarat. In such type of cases the mere statement of the Counsel representing the Government that the money shall be returned or paid to the plaintiff or deposited in Court as and when the Court directs should be considered sufficient. This is the practice which is being followed by this Court. However in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we are going to insist that an undertaking be filed by an appropriate officer of the State Government. It shall be stated in the undertaking that within one month from the date of receipt of intimation of the direction given by the Court the Government shall deposit the amount in Court. This should be considered sufficient to safeguard the interest of the Bank. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case. this aspect of security also does not assume much significance and on that count the stay cannot be refused. ( 47 ) THE contention that the Bank has chosen to execute the decree against the State Government and other public authorities first because it is easier to realise the money has also no merits. On the contrary it appears that this so called line of least resistance is adopted with a view to shield the private judgment debtors. In the affidavit-in-reply dated 29/03/1985 sworn by one Shri P. K. Padalia it is inter alia stated that there was no likelihood of recovering more than Rs. 2 crores from the private respondents looking to the financial data available with the Bank. Then the question arises: Who prevented the Bank from proceeding further against these private Judgment debtors and realise an amount of Rs. 2 crores from them ? 2 crores from the private respondents looking to the financial data available with the Bank. Then the question arises: Who prevented the Bank from proceeding further against these private Judgment debtors and realise an amount of Rs. 2 crores from them ? Many of the private judgment debtors have not even filed appeal and in the appeal filed by some of them there is no stay order. The extent to which the decretal dues may be realised from the private judgment debtors would reduce the liability of the State Government and other public authorities. To that extent the decree would stand satisfied. In the instant case as far as the State Government is concerned the entire decree would have stood satisfied. ( 48 ) THE subsequent affidavit-in-reply dated 23/01/1986 sworn by one Shri C. J. Shah Chief Manager of the Bank shows that the property of the private judgment debtors was not worth more than Rs. 50 lakh. Later on in the affidavit-in-reply dated 28/03/1986 sworn by one Shri M. R. Goel Chief Manager of the Bank it is stated that one individual judgment debtor Shri Arvind C. Parikh had property to the tune of about Rs. 50 to 75 lakh assessed at the then market value. One does not know what was the date of this valuation. But it is strange that with the passage of time as per different affidavits the worth of the properly of the private judgment debtors has gone on dwindling. This is either a case of distortion and mutilation of facts or a clear case of helping the private Judgment debtors by allowing time to pass so that they can transfer their property safely and keep the same away from being attached and sold for the satisfaction of the decretal dues. ( 49 ) THE judgment and decree were passed by the trial Court on 29/10/1982 The Bank did not file execution application till 2/04/1985 This action had to be taken by the Bank because during the course of hearing of this application the Court had pestered the Bank for taking appropriate actions for realisation of the decretal dues. ( 49 ) THE judgment and decree were passed by the trial Court on 29/10/1982 The Bank did not file execution application till 2/04/1985 This action had to be taken by the Bank because during the course of hearing of this application the Court had pestered the Bank for taking appropriate actions for realisation of the decretal dues. It is clear from the statement made by the Counsel for the Bank that in September 1983 the Bank had obtained certified copy of the decree and was sent to its Solicitors and who in turn had sent the same to the Central Office of the Bank at Bombay. There why this inordinate delay in filing execution application ? Was it under the advice of the Solicitors ? If the Solicitors suggested that was was there any obligation on the part of the officers of the Bank to accept such advice ? The Bank knew that there was wide gap between the agreed rate of interest (15 to 16 1/2%) and the rate of interest awarded (6% ). One may here pose the question: Had the top officers of the bank obtained the decree in their individual capacity and they were to realise this amount by executing the decree would they have gone for advice of the Solicitors and in case the Solicitors advised not to execute the decree would they have adhered to such advice? It the absence of the entire correspondence exchanged between the Solicitors and the ii is difficult to say that the Solicitors of the Bank advised to the effect that the Bank should not proceed further with the execution. Even assuming that the Solicitors did advise accordingly the officers of the Bank are not absolved from their responsibility. In the interest of the Bank they ought to have disregarded such advice which was purely against the interest of the Bank. 47-A On 29/03/1985 the Court had heard the learned Counsel for the Bank Mr. N. J. Mehta) and thereafter adjourned the matter. As stated in para 6 hereinabove the matter was adjourned partly on account of the request made by the Counsel for the Bank so as to enable the Bank to take sincere genuine and effective steps to recover the decretal dues from the individual judgment debtors. At that time the Court had made it expressly clear that it was inclined to grant the stay. Mr. At that time the Court had made it expressly clear that it was inclined to grant the stay. Mr. Mehta orally stated that on earlier occasion he had made a proposal on behalf of the Bank and the Court had rejected the proposal by not granting the stay of execution of decree. Therefore in his understanding and submission the Bank was free to execute the decree- even against the State Government. Therefore according to him the Bank proceeded to execute the decree against the State Government on 2/04/1985 i. e. immediately after the matter was adjourned sine die. We felt that Mr. Mehta was shifting his stand and therefore we requested him to make his submission in writing as regards the proposal of the Bank and his understanding. On 21/04/1986 he has produced written submission which read as follows: the Bank submits that at the hearings of Civil Application No. 953 of 198 5/03/1985 no stay of execution of the decree against the Government of Gujarat was granted but the matter was deferred for orders. Neither the Government Pleader Mr. R. M. Vin who appeared at the hearings nor the Government in Civil Application No 880 of 1986 have stated that the Honble Court had directed the Bank not to proceed with the execution of the decree against the State Government in March 1985 The fact that the Government of Gujarat has deposited the decretal dues in the Executing Court without any condition fortifies this submission. The aforesaid written submission is conspicuously silent and evasive with regard to the so-called proposal of the Bank and his understanding and the reaction of the Court. Mr. Mehta was required to clear the mist as regards the proposal made by the Bank. If the proposal was to proceed against all the judgment debtors including the State Government simultaneously then what was the reaction of the Court despite the fact that the Court had clearly expressed its views that unless the Bank takes sincere genuine and effective steps for recovery of the amount from private judgment debtors it would not permit the Bank to execute the decree against public authorities ? On all these points there is no clarification in the written submission. We have no doubt in our mind that the Bank officers were present in Court when we had expressed our views. On all these points there is no clarification in the written submission. We have no doubt in our mind that the Bank officers were present in Court when we had expressed our views. We feel that it is only because of the fact that we had not passed any order regarding stay of execution of the decree the Bank has tried to take undue advantage of the same and has rushed for execution of the decree against the State Government. It was on account of the fact that the State Government filed an application being Civil Application No. 880 of 1986 and prayed for stay of the execution of the decree the matter came to our knowledge. Earlier the bank filed application praying that an affidavit be taken on record and in that affidavit subsequent development regarding execution application having been filed was mentioned. But this application was filed in the office and it was not brought to the notice of the Court. Thus there was a deliberate attempt to keep the Court in dark. Despite enough opportunity being given the Bank has not been able to explain its conduct as to why it rushed to execute the decree after taking time from the Court on the ground that it wanted to take sincere genuine and effective steps to recover the money from the private judgment debtors. ( 50 ) MR. N. J. Mehta has referred to Shri R. M. Vin the then Government Pleader. Mr. Via had appeared at an earlier stage of hearing and he had left the Court after taking our permission. In fact he is no longer Government Pleader now. The default if any on the part of the Government Pleader and the Government officers cannot change what transpired before us. The fact that the Government has deposited the decretal dues in the executing Court without any condition does not fortify the submission made by Mr. Mehta. The Government appears to have deposited the amount to avoid forcible recovery of the decretal dues through the process of Court. The Government immediately filed Civil Application No. 880 of 1986 and prayed for stay of execution of the decree. Details have been given hereinabove as to how and in what way the attempt of the Bank to execute the decree against the State Government by keeping the Court in dark has been frustrated. The Government immediately filed Civil Application No. 880 of 1986 and prayed for stay of execution of the decree. Details have been given hereinabove as to how and in what way the attempt of the Bank to execute the decree against the State Government by keeping the Court in dark has been frustrated. We are sorry to say that the written submission made by Mr. N. J. Mehta is clearly evasive. Even as confessed by the learned Senior Counsel Shri M. S. Sanghavi it is ridiculous. To say the least the written submission made by Mr. N. J. Mehta does not in any way satisfactorily explain his own conduct and the conduct of the officers of the Bank. We would have very probably passed severe strictures but we refrain ourselves from doing so by saying that this type of conduct is not approved by the Court. We hope and trust that in future no Counsel would try to shield himself or his client who has tried to take undue advantage after obtaining an order of adjournment on altogether different ground. ( 51 ) ON 29/03/1985 after hearing the Counsel for the Bank the Court had adjourned the matter. By no stretch of reasoning it can even be understood that the Court deferred the order with a view to enable the Bank to proceed against the State Government. It was just the contrary. The matter was adjourned partly with a view to enable the Bank to show that it had made sincere genuine and effective efforts to make substantial recovery from the private judgment-debtors. Still however the Bank had kept this Co urt in dark and had proceeded to execute the decree against the State Government The Bank has persisted in this a+tempt even at a later stage when it filed the application in the office of the High Court and did not bring the same to the notice of this Court Worse still even when we requested for written submission the learned Counsel for the Bank has persisted in his attempt to mislead the Court and create confusion. In fairness to the Bank it must be stated that they have not disputed the fact that the Court had clearly expressed its view that it was inclined to grant stay of the execution of the decree against the State Government and for that matter against other public authorities also. In fairness to the Bank it must be stated that they have not disputed the fact that the Court had clearly expressed its view that it was inclined to grant stay of the execution of the decree against the State Government and for that matter against other public authorities also. In this background a question was put to the learned Senior Counsel Shri M. S. Sanghvi: Despite this undisputed position would the Court defer passing of order so that the Bank could execute the decree against the State Government? Shri Sanghvi could not substantiate the stand of the Bank and frankly conceded that the stand taken in the written submission and produced in Court was ridiculous. ( 52 ) IN view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances we do not accept the contention of the Bank that it did not proceed against the private judgment debtors because it was easier for the Bank to realise the decretal dues from the State Government and other public authorities. We do feel that the Bank has adopted this course deliberately with a view to shield the private judgment debtors. The Bank has tried to invent the causes and excuses and has projected the imaginary difficulties in executing the decree against the private judgment debtors. This is certainly commercial efficiency par excellence. But the commercial efficiency in reverse i. e. against the interest of the Bank and the society at large. ( 53 ) HERE an important aspect may be noted. If public officers could exercise their choice so as to disregard public interest and pursue public authority instead of private judgment debtors then such a course is likely to be chosen for oblique motives. The private judgment debtors would be shielded and the public authorities would be pursued vigorously If this could be legally done as is sought to be contended by the Bank a possibility cannot be ruled out wherein the private individuals and the public officers may join hands and perpetrate fraud on the public financial institutions including the Bank. Therefore over and above the considerations of public interest which have been narrated hereinabove it would be conducive to the clean public administration that such a course be not permitted by the Court. At any rate the Court cannot be indifferent with regard to its obligation regarding clean public administration. Therefore over and above the considerations of public interest which have been narrated hereinabove it would be conducive to the clean public administration that such a course be not permitted by the Court. At any rate the Court cannot be indifferent with regard to its obligation regarding clean public administration. Therefore to eliminate the possibility of fraud being perpetrated and to eliminate the further possibility of making the Court an instruments in the perpetration of fraud such a course should not be permitted to be taken by the Bank and other public financial institutions. It may be noted that in this very case with the passing of such successive day the private judgment debtors stand to gain to the extent of about Rs. 15 thousand a day merely by way of difference in the rate of interest. This gain of private judgment debtors is the loss to the Bank and other public authorities that is to say the loss to the society at large. Thus to avoid possibilities of fraud on the society at large and to prevent the Court becoming an instrument in fraudulent scheme which may be devised by private judgment-debtors in league with public officers it is safer rather it is in the interest of the nation at large that in such type of decrees the plaintiff be not helped by the Court in execution of the decree against another public institution or the State unless such plaintiff first proceeds against private judgment-debtors and satisfies the Court regarding its bona fides. ( 54 ) THE learned Counsel for the Bank submitted that the State Government had already deposited the amount in executing Court and therefore the Bank had become the owner of this money and it should be permitted to withdraw the same if necessary by putting the Bank to terms. The submission cannot be accepted. The title to the property has not passed in favour of the Bank. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of ramanathan v. Ramanathan AIR 1968 SC 1047 when the judgment debtor deposits a sum in Court it would not amount to passing title to the money to the decree-holder. In view of this judgment of the Supreme Court the submission that the title to the money has passed in favour of the Bank is rejected. In view of this judgment of the Supreme Court the submission that the title to the money has passed in favour of the Bank is rejected. ( 55 ) IN this case it is clear that the Bank attempted to realise the decretal dues from the State Government by keeping the Court in dark. The Bank as a matter of fact is trying to shield the private judgment debtors by ostensibly showing that it pursues public authorities as a line of least resistance. The Bank has sought to execute the decree against the State Government after obtaining adjournment from the Court. Such a device cannot and should not be countenanced by the Court. Therefore the request made by the counsel for the Bank to the effect that the Bank should be permitted to withdraw the amount even by putting the Bank to terms cannot be accepted. ( 56 ) WE hops that in the light of the discussions and observations made hereinabove the Bank will refrain from executing the decree against other public authorities i. e. National Textile Corporation New Delhi and National Textile Corporation (Gujarat ). We further hope and observe that before proceeding with the execution against the judgment debtors which are public authorities the Bank shall try to make sincere and genuine efforts to recover the decretal dues from the private judgment debtors. The Bank should not defer the execution against the private judgment debtors on the ground that it shall not be able to realise the entire decretal dues from the private judgment debtors because the extent to which the private judgment debtors satisfy the decree the State Government and other public authorities will not be required to initiate litigation against the private judgment debtors. Thus if the private judgment debtors are pursued first and from them the decretal dues are realised even to a smaller extent the further litigation to that extent will he eliminated Moreover the private judgment debtors would cease to get benefit arising out of the difference of rate of interest. ( 57 ) IN the result the application is allowed against respondent No. I Central Bank of India. The execution of the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 1169 of 1977 by the City Civil Court Ahmedabad is stayed. ( 57 ) IN the result the application is allowed against respondent No. I Central Bank of India. The execution of the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 1169 of 1977 by the City Civil Court Ahmedabad is stayed. ( 58 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the unfair tactics adopted by the respondent No. 1 Bank and attempts having been made to over-reach the Court it is directed that the trial Court shall return the amount deposited by the State of Gujarat immediately on receipt of the writ of this Court or on production of a copy of the operative portion of this order and shall report compliance to this Court immediately. ( 59 ) MR. M. C. Patel the learned Assistant Government Pleader states and assures that the Under Secretary to Industries Mines and Power Department will file an undertaking as indicated hereinabove in this Court as early as possible and in no case later than three weeks from today. ( 60 ) THE direction contained hereinabove shall be implemented by the trial Court immediately without waiting for the undertaking to be filed by the State of Gujarat in this Court. . ( 61 ) THE learned Senior Counsel Mr. M. S. Sanghvi appearing for the respondent No. 1 -Bank submitted that if the operation of this order is stayed for some time no prejudice will be caused to the State Government and on the other hand if not stayed prejudice will be caused to the respondent-Bank. The submission cannot be accepted. If the operation of the order passed hereinabove is stayed the amount will remain with the trial Court and not with the Bank. If the amount remains with the trial Court the Bank is not likely to get any fruits whatsoever of the amount lying in the coffers of the trial Court. On the contrary the amount will not be used for public purpose which we are sure that the Government will use the same for public purpose. As far as the interest of the Bank is concerned it is properly safeguarded by putting condition on the State Government that within a period of one month from the date of receipt of intimation the Government will deposit the amount in Court as and when the Court gives such direction. As far as the interest of the Bank is concerned it is properly safeguarded by putting condition on the State Government that within a period of one month from the date of receipt of intimation the Government will deposit the amount in Court as and when the Court gives such direction. Therefore the question of any prejudice whatsoever being caused to the Bank does not arise at all. On the contrary if the amount of about Rs. 88 lakh and odd is allowed to remain idle in the trial Court there would be a great loss to the society. Such a huge amount will remain idle and the Government will not be in a position to use the same for some fruitful purpose. Therefore even from the practical point of view it is necessary that the amount belonging to the society should be put to some use and should not be allowed to remain idle. Hence the request made by the Counsel for the Bank is rejected. ( 62 ) HOWEVER it is clarified that it will be open to the respondent Bank to approach this Court after tasking appropriate steps for recovery of the amount from the private judgment debtors. If and when the Bank shows its bona fides and shows to the Court that the Bank has taken genuine and substantial steps for recovery of the amount from the private judgment debtors and if the Bank approaches this Court after taking such actions the Court will certainly examine the question as to whether the stay should be vacated or not. ( 63 ) RULE made absolute to the extent indicated hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .