Commissioner Of Income Tax v. Fair Weather Transport Corporation
1986-03-14
NAZIR AHMAD, UDAY SINHA
body1986
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. These two references under Sec.256(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961, relate to the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67. The question referred to us for our opinion is : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the amended provisions of Sec.275 were not applicable to penalty proceedings under Sec.271(1)(a) which were pending on April 1, 1971 and the proceeding is time-barred ?" 2. The assessee was required to submit returns for the two assessment years in question. The returns had to be filed by September 30, 1965, and September 30, 1966, for the two assessment years. They were, in fact, filed on February 28, 1968. In the course of the assessment proceeding, the Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings for imposition of penalty in terms of Sec.271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. It would be relevant to state here that the assessments for the two assessment years were completed on November 3, 1969. The penalty, in terms of Sec.271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, was imposed by order dated March 28, 1972. The Income-tax Officer imposed a penalty of Rs. 8,336 for the assessment year 1965-66 and Rs. 11,883 for 1966-67, The assessee filed an appeal against the order of imposition of penalty. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal and cancelled the order of penalty on the footing that the penalty had been imposed more than two years after the completion of the assessment. Being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Department filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal endorsed the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeal. The Revenue thereafter got these references made to us for our opinion. That is how the references have fallen for consideration before us. 3. Despite notice to the assessee, no one has appeared on their behalf. We have, therefore, heard the matter ex parte with the assistance of learned senior standing counsel, Income-tax Department. 4. The moot question falling for consideration hinges upon whether the law as it stood prior to April 1, 1971, would govern the subsequent assessment. Before April 1, 1971, Sec.275 read as follows : "275.
We have, therefore, heard the matter ex parte with the assistance of learned senior standing counsel, Income-tax Department. 4. The moot question falling for consideration hinges upon whether the law as it stood prior to April 1, 1971, would govern the subsequent assessment. Before April 1, 1971, Sec.275 read as follows : "275. Bar of limitation for imposing Penalty.--No order imposing a penalty under this Chapter shall be passed after the expiration of two years from the date of the completion of the proceedings in the course of which the proceedings for the imposition of penalty have been commenced. Explanation.--In computing the period of limitation for the purpose of this section, the time taken in giving an opportunity to the assessee to be reheard under the proviso to Sec.129 and any period during which a proceeding under this Chapter for the levy of penalty is stayed by an order or injunction of any court shall be excluded." 5. Subsequently, by Sec. 50 of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, Sec.275 was amended and so far as is relevant is as follows : "275. No order imposing a penalty under this Chapter shall be passed- (a) in a case where the relevant assessment or other order is the subject-matter of an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under Sec.246 or an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Sub-section (2) of Sec.253, after the expiration of a period of- (i) two years from the end of the financial year in which the proceedings, in the course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed." 6. The relevant provisions have been quoted above. It will be appreciated that in terms of the law as it stood when the penalty proceedings were initiated, the law was that the order of penalty had to be passed within two years from the date of the completion of the proceedings in the course of which the proceedings for the imposition of penalty have been commenced. If that was the law, the penalty had to be imposed by November 3, 1971. In terms of the amendment of 1971, the period of limitation for the imposition of penalty became two years from the end of the financial year in which the proceedings are completed. The financial year in this case would be 1969-70. Penalty could thus be imposed by March 31, 1972.
In terms of the amendment of 1971, the period of limitation for the imposition of penalty became two years from the end of the financial year in which the proceedings are completed. The financial year in this case would be 1969-70. Penalty could thus be imposed by March 31, 1972. Question arises which rule of limitation will apply, the law as laid down by the amendment or the law prior to it. It is well known that proceedings relating to limitation are procedural laws. No one has a vested right in procedure. In the case of CWT V/s. Ramdeo Sachdeo [1987] 163 ITR 873, this very Bench held at page 882 that the law of limitation being a procedural law, there is no bar to its having retrospective effect unless the amending statute provides otherwise. Although that case related to interpretation of the provision of Sec.14(1)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act, the abstract proposition of law enunciated in that case is unexceptionable. In Taxation Cases Nos. 193 and 194 of 1976 : (CIT V/s. Badshah Prasad [1987] 163 ITR 760 (Pat)) also it was held that the law relating to limitation being procedural and the period of limitation under the old law not having expired, the new law would govern the case. Time in terms of the old law not having run out, the amended law of limitation would take over. The view that we have taken finds support in a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Addl. CIT V/s. Watan Mechanical & Turning Works [1977] 107 ITR 743, where their Lordships observed that no one has a vested and substantive right in procedure and limitation has to be considered as a part of the procedural law as distinguished from the substantive law. We do not intend to encumber this judgment by reference to the decisions of several other High Courts. Suffice it to say that there has been no dissenting voice on this subject from any High Court. It is obvious, therefore, that the law as amended in 1971 would govern the instant case. 7. In that view of the matter, it is obvious that the penalty in this case was imposed within two years of the end of the financial year, namely, 1969-70, in which the proceeding for imposition of penalty had been initiated. 8.
It is obvious, therefore, that the law as amended in 1971 would govern the instant case. 7. In that view of the matter, it is obvious that the penalty in this case was imposed within two years of the end of the financial year, namely, 1969-70, in which the proceeding for imposition of penalty had been initiated. 8. For the masons stated above, the references are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Tribunal was not correct in holding that the amended provisions of Sec.275 of the Income-tax Act were not applicable to penalty proceeding under Sec.271(1)(a) which was pending on April 1, 1971. They were not correct in holding that the order of imposition of penalty was barred by time. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 9. Let a copy of the judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, in terms of Sec.270 of the Income-tax Act.