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1986 DIGILAW 9 (GUJ)

Mukesh v. A. I. Saiyed

1986-01-15

P.R.GOKULAKRISHNAN, S.B.MAJMUDAR

body1986
MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who is ordered to be externed from the limits of Ahmedabad City and Ahmedabad Rural for a period of one year as directed by the Appellate Authority, has sought intervention of this Court seeking reversal of that order. ( 2 ) THE few facts leading to this petition are required to be noted at the outset. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was sewed with a notice dated 25th Jan. 1984 by the 1st respondent-Deputy Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City, calling upon him to show cause, under Sec. 59 of the Bombay Police Act as to why he should not be externed from Ahmedabad City, Ahmedabad Rural, Gandhinagar, Kheda and Mehsana Districts for a period of two years. Various allegations were made against him in the said notice. In response to the notice issued to him, the petitioner showed cause, filed his written reply and examined 50 witnesses in defence. The Competent Authority, after prolonged enquiry, came to the conclusion that the allegations made against the petitioner in the show cause notice were found to be well established on record and consequently by order dated 18-2-1985, Annexure-b to the petition, the Competent Authority, namely the Deputy Police Commissioner, Traffic Branch, Ahmedabad City, directed externment of the petitioner for a period of two years from the limits of Ahmedabad Police Commissioners jurisdiction area, Ahmedabad Rural, Gandhinagar, Kheda and Mehsana Districts. The petitioner thereafter carried the matter in appeal under Sec. 60 of the Bombay Police Act. The said appeal was heard by the Deputy Secretary, Home Department. The appeal was partly allowed. The period of externment was reduced from two years to one year and the direction of the Competent Authority ordering externment of the petitioner from contiguous districts, i. e. Gandhinagar, Kheda and Mehsana was set aside and instead the petitioner was directed to be externed from the limits of Ahmedabad City and Ahmedabad Rural Districts. Mr. The period of externment was reduced from two years to one year and the direction of the Competent Authority ordering externment of the petitioner from contiguous districts, i. e. Gandhinagar, Kheda and Mehsana was set aside and instead the petitioner was directed to be externed from the limits of Ahmedabad City and Ahmedabad Rural Districts. Mr. Surti, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised the following contentions in support of the petition: (1) that the impugned order of externment as originally passed by the competent authority in the first instance suffered from gross delay and laches and, therefore, the order of externment showed complete non-application of the mind on the part of the competent authority about any genuine and felt need to extern the petitioner from the area where he is alleged to have carried on his nefarious activities and, therefore, the order was null and void; (2) The show cause notice referred to allegations about the alleged nefarious activities of the petitioner in a general manner. Allegations were so vague that no effective representation could be made by the petitioner against the said notice. Consequently, the impugned order of externment as passed by the first authority and confirmed by the appellate authority with modification is liable to be set aside on the ground that the petitioner was denied reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. (3) The externment order went beyond the show cause notice inasmuch as the show cause notice referred to only three types of alleged activities in paras 1, 2 and 3 of the show cause notice while the order of externment mentioned that the alleged activities which the petitioner carried on fell within Chapters XVI and XVII of the Penal Code, that there was no reference to these Chapters in the show cause notice and consequently the order travelled beyond the show cause notice and hence was void; (4) Under Sec. 56 of the Act, two remedies are provided in cases of persons who are alleged to be head-strong and terror to the society : (i) preventive action and (ii) punitive action. According to Mr. Surti, externment is a punitive action and the authorities could have resorted to the preventive action by taking suitable bonds for good behaviour from the petitioner instead of externing him. We shall deal with the aforesaid contentions canvassed by Mr. Surti seriatim. According to Mr. Surti, externment is a punitive action and the authorities could have resorted to the preventive action by taking suitable bonds for good behaviour from the petitioner instead of externing him. We shall deal with the aforesaid contentions canvassed by Mr. Surti seriatim. So far as the first contention is concerned, it is true that the show cause notice was issued on 25-1-1984. It is equally true that the order of externment passed by the first authority is dated 18th Feb. 1985. Thus, it was passed after expiry of about one year and a few days. However, the externing authority has filed his affidavit-in-reply in this petition explaining the delay. In para 6 of the affidavit-in-reply it has been pointed out that after the show cause notice dated 25-1-1984 was issued by the Superintendent of Police to the petitioner, the enquiry before the Authority remained pending on account of various adjournments asked for by the petitioner in the meantime. It has to be kept in view that during the enquiry, the petitioner examined 50 witnesses in his defence. It is obvious that examination of 50 witnesses would take its own time. It has been pointed out in the aforesaid paragraph of the affidavit-in-reply that after the witnesses were examined, the case was adjourned for giving final reply to 14-9-1984. On that day the petitioner was asked to remain present before the Deputy Commissioner of Police. As the Advocate of the petitioner was not able to come for arguments, the case was adjourned from time to time to 15-1-1985 and again to 21-1-1985 and on his request, it was adjourned to 22-1-1985. On that day the arguments of the advocate for the petitioner were heard and, thereafter, within less than a month, the authority passed the impugned order. It is obvious that when proceedings lingered on the file of the authority for quite some time and when 50 witnesses were examined, the marshalling of the evidence of the witnesses, application of mind on the same and passing of the order would obviously take some time, after the arguments were finally heard. On the facts of this case, therefore, it cannot be said that there was any undue delay on the part of the respondent in passing the impugned order. The first contention, therefore, has to be rejected. ( 4 ) SO far as the second contention is concerned, Mr. On the facts of this case, therefore, it cannot be said that there was any undue delay on the part of the respondent in passing the impugned order. The first contention, therefore, has to be rejected. ( 4 ) SO far as the second contention is concerned, Mr. Surti, placing reliance on a Delhi High Court judgment in the case of Arun Kumar v. The State reported in (1985) 2 Crimes 935, submitted that if the allegations in the show cause notice are vague, it can be said that the proposed externee is not given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. Now it must be kept in view that the aforesaid Delhi High Court decision was rendered in the context of Sec. 47 of the Delhi Act and in the peculiar facts of the case before the Delhi High Court. So far as the present case is concerned, we are governed by S. 56 read with S. 59 of the Bombay Police Act. What type of allegations are to be put forward in a show cause notice under S. 56 read with S. 59 of the Act is a question which is no longer res integra. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Mehbubkhan reported in AIR 1968 SC 1468 , the Supreme Court, considering this very question in the context of these very sections of the present Act, took the view that only material allegations of a general nature are to be mentioned in the show cause notice as contemplated under S. 59 of the Bombay Police Act. The notice in question before the Supreme Court generally mentioned that the proposed externee was carrying on nefarious activities in certain areas from Nov. 1963. These allegations were held to be vague by this Court. Reversing the decision of this Court, the Supreme Court, speaking through Vaidialingam, J. in the aforesaid decision, came to the conclusion that considering it from the point of view of the party against whom an order of externment is proposed to be passed, it must be emphasized that when he has to tender an explanation to a notice, under S. 59, he can only give an explanation which can be of a general nature. It may be open to him to take a defence, of the action being taken, due to mala fides, malice, or mistaken identity, or he may be able to tender proof of his general good conduct, or alibi, during the period covered by the notice and the like. The allegations made in the notices issued under S. 59 were held to contain material allegations of general nature and the said allegations could not be said to be vague. It is pertinent to reproduce the allegations in the show cause notice examined by the Supreme Court which were found to be satisfying the requirements of S. 59. They read as under :"1. You way-lay, rob and extort money from the persons at the point of knife and under threats of violence, 2. You demand money from the persons and on their refusal to pay you beat them; 3. You consume eatables from the place of public entertainment without payment and when legal dues are demanded you beat the person. "it is obvious that all the allegations in the present case are almost of a similar nature and run on similar lines. When such allegations are not found to be vague by the Supreme Court, it is not possible for us to accept the contention of Mr. Surti that these allegations should be treated to be vague allegations and dehors provisions of Ss. 56 and 59 of the Act. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner has been clearly informed in the show cause notice that he was carrying on the nefarious activities listed at items 1, 2 and 3 in different areas clearly specified in the show cause notice, namely near Panchsheel Talawadi, near Lakhudi Talawadi, near Lakhudi Talawadi hutments, near Usmanpura Garden, near Usmanpura Circle, near Sardar Patel Colony Four Roads, near Naranpura Crossing, near Sardar Patel Colony, opposite Dr. Amins Dispensary, near Lakhudi Talawadi Circle, Rang Kunj Society, near Naranpura and in Jai National Society. It is further alleged that these activities were being conducted by the petitioner in these areas from 1983 April. It must, therefore, be held that the show cause notice, as issued to the petitioner, cannot be said to contain any vague allegations as submitted by Mr. Surti. That disposes of the second contention of Mr. Surti. ( 5 ) SO far as the third contention is concerned, Mr. It must, therefore, be held that the show cause notice, as issued to the petitioner, cannot be said to contain any vague allegations as submitted by Mr. Surti. That disposes of the second contention of Mr. Surti. ( 5 ) SO far as the third contention is concerned, Mr. Surti is right when he submits that in the show cause notice it is not mentioned that the alleged nefarious activities are offences under Chapters XVI and XVII of the Penal Code, while in the externment order the offences under these Chapters are specifically referred to. However, the fact remains that the main allegations regarding the alleged nefarious activities of the petitioner are already listed at items 1, 2 and 3 in the show cause notice. It has been alleged therein that the petitioner is beating innocent people residing in the areas listed in the show cause notice, and those persons who are frequenting these areas for the purpose of business, that showing Rampuri Knife he is beating them with fists and kicks and having threatened them, he is robbing them of their monies. It is also alleged that he also beats people residing in these areas who are carrying on business there on the suspicion that they are intimating to the police about the illegitimate activities of the petitioner in connection with illicit liquor. It is also alleged that the petitioner is molesting ladies residing in the locality and frequenting these areas. These allegations can certainly form part of offences listed in Chapters XVI and XVII of the Penal Code which deal with offences against human body and offences against property respectively. Consequently it cannot be said that the allegations about the petitioners nefarious activities as listed in the show cause notice fall outside either of the aforesaid two Chapters of the Penal Code. Merely because the legal provisions under which these offences can be fitted in, were not expressly mentioned in the show cause notice, it cannot be said that any prejudice is caused to the petitioner inasmuch as all the legally permissible details about the alleged nefarious activities amounting to offences under these two Chapters of the Penal Code were clearly stated in the show cause notice. Consequently, the third contention also cannot be sustained. So far as the last contention of Mr. Consequently, the third contention also cannot be sustained. So far as the last contention of Mr. Surti is concerned, it is true that under Sec. 56 of the Bombay Police Act, it is open to the authority in case of concerned head-strong person who is a menace to the society either to extern him or to bind him over for good behaviour. But both these powers are vested in the authorities concerned who have to take decision on relevant facts. It is not possible to agree with Mr. Surti that externment is a punitive measure. In fact both the measures are preventive in nature. Section 56 gives power to the externing authority to press in service any of the two measures as required by the facts of the given case. Merely because one of the two powers was exercised in the present case, it does not mean that the exercise of power was in any way dehors the provisions of S. 56. The last contention, therefore, also fails. In view of the rejection of all the contentions canvassed by Mr. Surti, this petition would fail and will have to be dismissed. ( 6 ) PETITION dismissed. .