Judgment S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Reg. of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. THE property in dispute is a shop, situate in Aligarh. Petitioner Suresh Chand Gupta is the tenant of the said shop. Dharam Narain and Smt. Trilok Chand, respondent nos. 3 and 4, are the landlords. Respondent nos. 3 and 4 filed an application under section 21 of the Act for release of the shop in dispute on the ground that the respondent no. 3, Dharam Narain, was unemployed and he wanted to carry on business in the shop in question. It has been alleged by him that he had taken a licence for selling the fertilizers and, as such, he would start the business and sell the fertilizers in the shop in question. 3. THIS application under Section 21 of the Act was contested by the petitioner tenant on various grounds and it was alleged that the need of the respondent no. 3 was not genuine at all. It was further stated that Smt. Krishna Devi, the mother of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 had purchased a big building by three different sale-deeds in three different names. It was also stated that in the same building, a shop was lying vacant and, as such, there was available with respondent nos. 3 and 4 a shop and, as such, the need of respondent no. 3 was not genuine and bona fide at all. 4. THE prescribed authority, after considering the evidence on the record, by an order dated 8th October, 1982, allowed the release application holding that the need of respondent nos. 3 and 4 was bona fide and genuine and that greater hardship will be caused to respondent nos. 3 and 4 in the case the release application was not allowed. Aggrieved by the decision dated 8th October, 1982, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. THE appeal came up for hearing before the 6th Additional District Judge, Aligarh. THE appeal was dismissed by his judgment dated 19th May, 1983, confirming the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. Aggrieved by the decision dated 8th October, 1982, the petitioner filed an appeal under Section 22 of the Act. THE appeal came up for hearing before the 6th Additional District Judge, Aligarh. THE appeal was dismissed by his judgment dated 19th May, 1983, confirming the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. THE petitioner has now challenged the decisions dated 8th October, 1982 and 19th May 1983 by means of the present petition. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that a shop was available to the respondent no. 3 for carrying on his business in the portion which was purchased in the name of the mother of the respondent no. 3 and this was a very relevant circumstance to be considered while considering the bona fide need of the respondent no. 3. Since the appellate court has not considered this relevant circumstance, the finding in regard to bona fide need is vitiated in law. 6. THE second submission of the learned counsel is that the court below has not considered the effect of Rule 16 (2) (b) of the Rules framed under the Act. His contention is that unless a suitable accommodation was available to the tenant, the court below erred in allowing the release application of the landlords. In regard to the first contention, in paragraph 14 of the written statement filed by the petitioner himself in the court below, which is Annexure ' 2 to the petition, it has been categorically stated that in March, 1978, Smt. Krishna Devi had purchased a building in three parts by three different sale-deeds. The first sale deed was in the name of her two sons, Brijesh Chandra and Rajesh Chandra. The second sale-deed was in the names of Dharam Narain and Smt. Trilok Chand and the third sale-deed was in the name of herself and one minor son Bittan Kumar. In the same paragraph, it was further averred that the shop which was purchased by the mother in her name is still vacant and is available to the respondents nos. 3 and 4. In the same paragraph, it was further averred that the shop which was purchased by the mother in her name is still vacant and is available to the respondents nos. 3 and 4. In reply to this specific averment made in paragraph 14 of the written statement, Smt. Krishna Devi filed her own affidavit, which has been attached as Annexure-3 to the petition itself in which she has categorically stated that it is, no doubt, true that the property was purchased by means of three separate sale-deeds in the names of the sons, mentioned above. In regard to the vacancy of the shop in question, it has been further stated that the alleged shop was in a very bad condition. It was repaired and on 1st May, 1978, it was let out at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month. It was consequently, stated that no shop was lying vacant in the portion which has been purchased by her. 7. THE factual position, therefore, which emerges from the written statement and the affidavit filed by the parties, is that it is no doubt, true that by means of three separate deeds, three different properties were purchased. In the property, which was purchased in the name of the mother and a minor son, a shop was vacant, but, in 1978, the shop was let out by Smt. Krishna Devi to some other person. THE resultant effect was that, in fact, no shop was lying vacant in the year 1981, when the release application was filed. 8. IN support of the first submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon two cases of this Hon'ble Court. One is the decision in Manohar Lal v. The District Judge, Saharanpur, 1982 UP RCC 496. IN that case, Hon. M. P. Mehrotra, J. (as he then was) opined as under : "It is not an inflexible rule that in considering the need of a landlord, the only accommodation which can be taken into consideration, is that which is owned by him. If such were the correct legal position then the view of the Appellate Court could be correct. However, I agree with the view of K. C. Agarwal, J., in the aforementioned case. There is no rigid or inflexible rule based on title for deciding the controversy under Section 21 of the Act. If such were the correct legal position then the view of the Appellate Court could be correct. However, I agree with the view of K. C. Agarwal, J., in the aforementioned case. There is no rigid or inflexible rule based on title for deciding the controversy under Section 21 of the Act. What really has to be seen is the factum of availability of the accommodation. It is true that there are situations where the accommodation owned by a relation, even if otherwise vacant, may not be said to be available to a needy landlord. The relations between the needy landlord and his relation may be strained. There may be other circumstances also which may make it not feasible to consider such alternative accommodation owned by a relation to be available to a needy landlord. However, there are other situations also where, inspite of a division or partition in the family, the accommodation in the possession of one co-owner or co-parcener may be readily available to the other co-owner or co-parcener." Hon. M. P. Mehrotra, J. has laid down the above principle not as an absolute rule that if an accommodation is available with a relation of a landlord then it may to be considered while considering the bona fide need of the other landlord. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, as is clear from the three sale deeds executed on the same day in favour of different sons of Smt. Krishna Devi, it is clear that what was intended was that all the three of sons be settled separately. Therefore, to consider the accommodation available in the property of another son for the need of the brother of the said owner, is, in my opinion, not a relevant circumstance at all. After all, the intention was to settle all the sons separately. If the accommodation of one son has to be considered as relevant for the purpose of the need of the other son, the very intention of purchasing the property in the name of another son would become nugatory. 9. THE second case relied upon by the learned counsel is Mohd. Yasin v. Second Additional District Judge, Bijnor, 1980 ARC 106. If the accommodation of one son has to be considered as relevant for the purpose of the need of the other son, the very intention of purchasing the property in the name of another son would become nugatory. 9. THE second case relied upon by the learned counsel is Mohd. Yasin v. Second Additional District Judge, Bijnor, 1980 ARC 106. In that case, Hon. K. C. Agarwal, J. has taken the view that merely because one of the shops belonged to the father of the landlord and not to the landlord himself, was not a consideration for holding that the need of the landlord could not have been met by the shop available with the father of the landlord. This was considered to be a relevant circumstance. This case, in my opinion, is distinguishable on facts. Here, it has not been established as a fact that the shop was available and, secondly, the shop, found above, was belonging to the mother jointly with another son. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the principle laid down in this case cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 10. THE prescribed authority, no doubt, did not consider this aspect of the matter in such great detail and had rejected the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the other portion of the building in dispute did not belong to the respondent nos. 3 and 4 and, as such, could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of consideration of the bona fide need. THE appellate court, however, has considered the question of availability of shop and has found that the petitioner has failed to establish that any shop was available, as urged by him. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the courts below have ignored to consider any relevant circumstances, which could, ultimately, after the finding recorded by the courts below that the need of respondent nos. 3 and 4 was bona fide and genuine. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not well founded. In regard to the second contention, it is necessary to quote Rule 16 (2) (b) of the Rules framed under the Act. 3 and 4 was bona fide and genuine. In the circumstances, in my opinion, the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not well founded. In regard to the second contention, it is necessary to quote Rule 16 (2) (b) of the Rules framed under the Act. It is as under : "(b) where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application." 11. RULE 16 (2) (b) of the Rules framed under the Act, in my opinion, applies to a case only where a tenant has available with him suitable accommodation. If a tenant has suitable accommodation available with him then the court while considering the release application of the landlord is enjoined upon to consider the release application liberally. It is only a circumstance in favour of granting the release application in favour of the landlord. By this clause, it cannot be said that the intention of the legislature was that in every case, a suitable accommodation had to be provided to a tenant before a release application was to be allowed. This intention cannot possibly be culled out from this clause (b). If such an intention is culled out then the result would be that a release application for the purpose of business can never be allowed unless a suitable accommodation is made available with the tenant. I do not agree at all with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. IN the result, the petition fails and is, accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is granted six months' time to vacate the accommodation provided the petitioner gives an undertaking within three weeks from today, before the Prescribed Authority that he will vacate the premises within six months and hand over possession of the premises to the respondent nos. 3 and 4. If no such undertaking is given, the release order shall be enforced forthwith. IN the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.