Saikia, J. - Pursuant to the sale notice issued by the Chief Administrator, Mangaidai Mahakuma Parishad on 7.8.85 inviting tenders from Baldev Fishery for a period of three years with effect from 1.9.85 to 31.8.88 fixing 23.8.85 as the last date for receiving tenders, which was later altered to 24.8.85, the follow­ing three persons submitted tenders : (1) Shri Prasanna Sarma .. Rs. 41,111.00 (2) Shri Jayanta Barua .. Rs. 34,999.00 (Petitioner) (3) Shri Kumud Ch. Bora .. Rs. 33,501.00 (Respondent No. 4) 2. The Chief Administrator opening the landers on 30.8.85 found the tender of Shri Prasanna Sarma to be defective and rejected it. Finding the petitioner's tender valid and accep­ting it settled the fishery with the petitioner at his bid of Rs. 34,999.00 and communicated the decision vide his order dated 9.9.86 (Annuxure 'B' to the petition) requiring the petitioner to deposit one fourth of the kist money by 15.9.85, to execute a lease deed and to pay the first installment on 30.5.86 second instalment on 30.4.87 and the third instalment on 30.4.88. The petitioner deposited Rs. 8,748/- on 13.9.85 and took possession of the fishery after executing the lease deed. 3. The respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal against the settlement order before the State Government purportedly under section 138(1)(b) of the Assam Panchayati Raj Act, 1972, here­inafter referred to as 'the Act' on the grounds, inter alia, that he belonged to the Other Backward Classes (Nath Community) and the petitioner being a High Caste Hindu, the Chief Admi­nistrator ought to have settled the fishery with him giving him (respondent No. 4) preferential treatment as laid down by Govern­ment ; and that the Chief Administrator did not state in his order as to why his tender was rejected or why the Chief Ad­ministrator did not give preferential treatment to him. By the impugned order dated 29.3.86 the appellate authority after hea­ring the parties set aside the settlement order and settled the fishery with the respondent No. 4 mainly on the ground that the Chief Administrator of the Mahakuma Parishad, while settling the fishery with the petitioner, did not take into consideration the preferential claim of the respondent No. 4 who belonged to the the Other Backward Classes in accordance with Clause 10 of the sale notice. It was also observed that the petitioner did not fully comply with the requirment as to security. Hence this petition. 4. It was also observed that the petitioner did not fully comply with the requirment as to security. Hence this petition. 4. Mr. D.N. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the peti­tioner, first submits that the Chief Administrator's order dated 9.9.85 was yet to be confirmed by the Mahkuma Parbhad and, as such, no appeal lay under the Act and the appellate autho­rity acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal, setting aside the settlement order and in settling the fishery with respon­dent No. 4. Mr. Choudhury relies on two unreported Bench decisions of this Court in Civil Rule No. 427 of 1974 (Dhuliram Bayan vs. State of Assam and others) decided on 21-4-1978 and Civil Rule Nc. 471 of 1975 (Pithu Ram Deka vs. State of Assam and others) decided on 5.9.75. However these two decisions do not deal with fishery settlement. In Dhuliram (supra) it has been held that approval of the Mahkuma Parishad will be necessary for any order passed by the Executive Committee in exercise of the powers of the Mahkuma Parishad and till so approved, no appeal under Sec. 138 (1) will lie, but revision under Sec. 138 (2) will lie against the order. Pithu Ram (supra) reiterated it. Mr. P.C. Kataki, the learned counsel for respon­dent No. 4, submits that the settlement order of the Chief Administrator could not be taken to be one passed by the Execu­tive Committee of the Mabkuma Parishad; and as only an order passed by the Executive Committee in exercise of the powers of the Mahkuma Parishad was required to be approved by the Mahkuma Parishad, the instant settlement order, being not one so passed by the Executive Committee of the Mahkuma Parishad, it was not required to be approved by the Mahkuma Parishad and, as such, the appeal under Section 138 (1) (b) of the Act was competent; and that even assuming, but not conceding, that no appeal lay, revision under Section 138 (2) of the Act surely lay to the State Government and the impugned order may be treated as an order passed in revision. The scopes of appeal and revision, according to Mr. Kataki, are more or less the same. We find reasons in the submission of Mr. Kataki. Mr. Chowdhury has submitted that the Chief Administrator himself, and not the Executive Committee, was authorised to make the settlement and no confirmation by the Executive Committee was necessary. The scopes of appeal and revision, according to Mr. Kataki, are more or less the same. We find reasons in the submission of Mr. Kataki. Mr. Chowdhury has submitted that the Chief Administrator himself, and not the Executive Committee, was authorised to make the settlement and no confirmation by the Executive Committee was necessary. However, S. 73 (1) of the Act clearly provides for settlement of fisheries by the Chief Executive Councillor and S. 73 (2) says that subject to confirmation of the settlement made under sub-section (1) by the Executive Committee of the Mahkuma Parishad the lease in the prescribed form shall be issued by the Chief Executive Councillor of the Mahkuma Parishad to the person in whose favour settlement is confirmed. Confirmation is, therefore, necessary. It is, however, seen that in this case the settlement was not made by the Chief Execu­tive Councillor but by the Chief Administrator. This was beca­use the Governor of Assam was pleased by Notification dated 12.1.84 (Annexure 'A' to the petition) to constitute an Ad hoc Committee of the Mangaldoi Mahkuma Parishad and the Chief Administrator of the Ad hoc Committee was empowered to per­form the functions of the Chief Executive Councillor of the Mahkuma Parishad. By the same Notification the Governor was pleased to appoint a Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and an Executive Committee of the Ad hoc Committee to perform the functions of the Chairman and the Executive Committee of the Mahkuma Parishad respectively. Under these circums­tances we are not persuaded to hold that the absence of con­firmation by the Executive Committee of the Ad hoc Committee would affect the right of appeal by the respondent No. 4. The submission about lack of jurisdiction is, therefore, rejected. We are also of the view that even if no appeal lay, revision under S. 138 (2) surely lay and the impugned order could be treated as one passed in revision. As was ruled in AIR 1958 SC 398 (Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner) in para 13, there being no indication as to grounds of interference in appeal and revision the jurisdiction in both will be co-extensive with the primary settling authority. 5. Mr. As was ruled in AIR 1958 SC 398 (Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commissioner) in para 13, there being no indication as to grounds of interference in appeal and revision the jurisdiction in both will be co-extensive with the primary settling authority. 5. Mr. Choudhury next submits that the Act and the Assam Panchayati Raj (Administrative) Rules, 1973 (for short, 'the Administrative Rules') and the Assam Panchayati Raj (Financial) Rules, 1974 (for short, 'the Financial Rules') fra­med thereunder do not provide for preferential treatment to ackward classes and as such the appellate authority could not have given preference to respondent No. 4 on basis of clause 10 of the sale notice which itself did not prescribe the procedure for preferential treatment. Mr. Choudhury relies on an unreported Bench decision of this Court in Civil Rule No. 269 of 1977 (Lalit Chandra Saikia vs. The State of Assam and others) decided on 21-2-78. Mr. P. C. Kataki, answers that the petitioner, the Mahkuma Parishad and the State Government are equally bound by clause 10 of the sale notice and the appellate authority simply has given effect to it and, as such, the impugned order is perfectly valid and suffers from no infirmity. 6. We accept the submission of Mr. Kataki. Consistently with the provisions of Articles 39 and 49 of the Constitution of India the Act has been passed with a view to enable the Panchayati Raj institutions to function more effectively as units of Self-Government and rules have been framed thereunder. Sec. 5 of the Act makes the Mahkuma Parishad and the Gaon Panchayat subject to all the rules, regulations, bye-laws and order under the Act or any other enactment in force in the area within the jurisdiction of the Mahkuma Parishad. Under Sec. 64(1) all sums levied by or according to the Mahkuma Parishad from public ferries and fisheries vested in the Mah­kuma Parishad shall be credited to the Mahkuma Parishad Fund. Under Sec. 72(2) of the Act the State Government may transfer Government fisheries as it may decide, with power of their control and administration, to the Mahkuma Parishad within the jurisdiction of which such fisheries are situated. Under Sec. 72(2) of the Act the State Government may transfer Government fisheries as it may decide, with power of their control and administration, to the Mahkuma Parishad within the jurisdiction of which such fisheries are situated. Sec. 73(1) provides for settlement of fisheries by the Mahkuma Parishad by inviting tenders by the Chief Executive Councillor of the Makuma Parishad in the prescribed manner, and under S. 73(2) subject to confirmation of the settlement by the Exe­cutive Committee of the Mahkuma Parishad the lease shall be issued by the Chief Executive Councillor. 7. Rule 105 of the Financial Rules deals with sale of fisheries and ferries by the Mahkuma Parishad and provides : "Provisions of rules 12 and 28 of the Assam Pancha­yati Raj (Administrative) Rules, 1973, shall apply mutatis mutandis in case of sale by the public auction of fis­heries and ferries by the Chief Executive Councillor of the Mahkuma Parishad". No doubt this rule speaks of "public auction of fisheries". Rule 12 of the Administrative Rules prescribes the rules of procedure for the leasing out of Pounds by Gaon Panchayat by public auction. Rule 28 of the Administrative Rules gives the procedure for sale and settlement of Hats by tender. Rule 105 has not used the word 'respectively' after the words "rules 12 and 28". It would, therefore, be permissible to read Rule 28 of the Administrative Rules in Rule 105 of the Financial Rules, in which case the Rule will be applicable to settlement of fisheries. Such a reading is permissible in legislation by reference. We feel that the framers could have used the words "public auction/tender'' instead of only "public auction". 8. Even if reading of Rule 28 of the Administrative Rules in Rule 105 of the Financial Rules is not done, there is no escape from the principle that the petitioner who submitted tender pursuant to the sale notice was bound by its terms and conditions. The petitioner's tender was subject to those terms and conditions. 9. Admittedly Clause 10 of the sale notice said : "The tenderer belonging to SC, ST or OBC will produce certificate. On eligibility they will get preference as per law". The law was not specifically stated. However, in view of the provisions in Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 46 of the Constitution of India, the general circular No. ABM. 9. Admittedly Clause 10 of the sale notice said : "The tenderer belonging to SC, ST or OBC will produce certificate. On eligibility they will get preference as per law". The law was not specifically stated. However, in view of the provisions in Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 46 of the Constitution of India, the general circular No. ABM. 18/56/14 dated 4.8.1956 as amended by ABM 18/56/PI/90 dated 2.1.1960 for grant of preferential treatment in settlement of contracts, permits, fisheries, ferries, toll bridges, forest mahals, excise shops etc. laying down that such settlement should be made "with candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and Other Back­ward Classes up to the limit of 7½ per cent below the highest bid offered in any such case subject to suitability of the person belonging to the category of people entitled to preferential treatment and his ability to perform the task satisfactorily and within such limits as regards the value of work upto which this concession will be available as may be fixed for the purpose. In any case in which the bid of a candidate belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes is not within the 7, per cent limit, but he is otherwise considered suitable for the performance of the work in question, he should, as far as practicable, be given an option to take the contracts, permit or settlement at an amount to be fixed within the 7½ per cent limit according to the merit of each case", was issued. Admittedly, this circular is being followed in various settlements made by the Government. In the instant case the amount of Rs. 33,501/- tendered by the respondent No. 4 was within 7½ per cent of the petitioner's offer of Rs. 34,999/-. It is not denied that the respondent No. 4 belonged to Other Backward Classes. In the impugned order the appellate autho­rity found that the Chief Administrator ignored the legitimate preferential claim of respondent No. 4 without any valid reason. Preferential claim, however, was discussed with reference to Clause 10 (a) and (b) of form No. 101, notice of sale of fisheries, appended to the Rules for Settlement of Fisheries framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. Mr. Choudhury sub­mits that these Rules were not applicable to the settlement of fisheries by Panchayats. Preferential claim, however, was discussed with reference to Clause 10 (a) and (b) of form No. 101, notice of sale of fisheries, appended to the Rules for Settlement of Fisheries framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. Mr. Choudhury sub­mits that these Rules were not applicable to the settlement of fisheries by Panchayats. We have already seen that Government transfers Government fisheries to the Mahkuma Parishads and the power to settle those fisheries would be governed by the Panchayat's Rules for Settlement of Fisheries. Be that as it may reference to form No. 101 by itself would not vitiate the preference given to respondent No. 4. What in material is the giving of 7½ per cent preference to the respondent No. 4 as member of Other Bickward Classes in compliance with the aforesaid Government circular. Not only the Government is bound by its own circular but also the Panchayat that receives Government fisheries by transfer will not be debarred from giving the same preference. The directive principle of state policy laid down in Article 46 of the Constitution should also be accepted by the Mahkuma Parishads. As the tender notice clearly mentioned about the preference, we do not find any illega­lity in preferring respondent No. 4 on that basis. Mr. Chou­dhury relies on Lalit Chandra Saikia (supra). That was a case of settlement of a hat Bargaon Bazar under Rule 28 of the Administrative Rules. In that sale notice also Clause 10 men­tioned of 7½ per cent preference. The bid of respondent No. 5 in that case, however, was not within 7½ per cent of the highest bid but the Executive Committee raised his bid to bring it within 1½% of the highest bid. The Court observed that respondent No. 5 was allowed to raise his bid to Rs. 38,110.00 from Rs. 36,151.00 which was not his bid, which smacke of some arbitrariness on the part of the settling authority because it was destructive of the very procedure of settlement being made on the basis of sealed tender as provided under Rule 28 and, therefore, the settlement was set aside. Far from being an authority for not applying the preferential rule to settlements made by Panchayats, it indicates the application of preferential rule to such settlements. Far from being an authority for not applying the preferential rule to settlements made by Panchayats, it indicates the application of preferential rule to such settlements. On facts that case is distinguishable on the score that in the instant case the bid of respondent No. 4 was within 7½% of the otherwise highest bid of the petitioner. No illegality can, therefore, be found on this account. 10. Mr. Choudhury submits that respondent No. 4 is a man of 70 years, while the petitioner is an unemployed educated youth. It is not denied that no preference has been provided for educa­ted unemployed youth and that there is no disqualification prescribed on the ground of age. No illegality can, therefore, be found on this count also. 11. Mr. Choudhury then submits that the finding in the impugned order that the petitioner did not fulfil the require­ment as to furnishing the full details of the land holdings, right and title over the property offered as security, copy of Jamabandi, and also non-encumbrance certificate, is not correct. However, it is a finding of fact made by the appellate authority. 12. Lastly Mr. Choudhury submits that the appellate or revisional authority ought not to have lightly interferred with the settlement made by the Chief Administrator who knew the local factors and conditions and relies on Hazarat All vs. State of Assam and others, AIR 1984 Gauhati 35[(1982) 2 GLR 41], wherein it has been observed that the power of settlement is not expected to be exercised by the State Government in the absence of extraor­dinary or special circumstances, as the power to settle 'hats' has been conferred on the Panchayats and not on the State Govern­ment and that, therefore, before disturbing an order of settle­ment made by an elected body, the authority should be very slow, circumspect and cautious. Similarly, in Achan Ali vs. The State of Assam, (1985) 1 GLR 141, it has been held that the suitability of a candidate for settlement of a market is pre­eminently a question of fact and the High Court should not sit as a Court of appeal and nullify the concurrent decision., 13. The above are undoubtedly preecious and binding but fall short of the settled law that the powers of the appellate authority in the matter of such settlements are co-extensive with the powers of the primary settling authority. The above are undoubtedly preecious and binding but fall short of the settled law that the powers of the appellate authority in the matter of such settlements are co-extensive with the powers of the primary settling authority. In the instant ease the appellate authority having only acted upon a constitu­tionally recognised principle of preference to the backward clausses and that to in consonance with Clause 10 of the tender notice by which the petitioner himself was bound, we find no justification to interfere with the appellate order in exercise of our writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. In the result, this petition must fail and is accordingly dismissed. The Rule is discharged. The stay order dated 84 86 passed Misc. Case No. 485/86 stands vacated. However, we make no order as to costs.