Judgment B.D. Agrawal, J. 1. KRISHNA Murti Foundation India Agricultural School, Rajghat, Varanasi, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, imparted education in Agriculture and Extension Courses and awarded diplomas to students. The State Government accorded recognition to the starting of these courses provisionally on July 18, 1956 and upon permanent basis on November 13/24, 1961. The two petitioners were appointed Lecturers in the School in respect whereof there was agreement executed in the Form referred to in paragraphs 143 (F) and 293 (2) of the Education Code, 1963. The agreement in both the cases is dated 1-1-1968. Government, it appears, had under consideration whether the scheme to impart Diplomas to students be continued and hence it wrote to all the recognized agricultural institutions to stop admission of students till final decision. No admissions took place in the School in 1985 and 1986. The Secretary, society pleaded with the Government by letters dated December 30, 1985 and June 12, 1986 but there being no response, terminated the petitioners' services by order dated 30th June, 1986, stating therein that this is brought about due to the institutions being closed. 2. AGGRIEVED the petitioners have filed these petitions under Articles 226 of the Constitution seeking writ of certiorari to quash the order dated June 30, 1986 and also mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioners as continuing in service and entitled as such to all benefits. The School, it may not be doubted, is not a statutory body. The Society or the Committee of Management, which runs the institution is not a creature of statute. It is a body constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder to carry out certain specific objects but is not created by or under the statute nor does it owe its existence to the Act. This constitutes the essential distinguishing feature (Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, (1971) 2 SCC 192 ; Vaish Degree College, (1976) 2 SCC 58 ; Arya Vidya Sabha Kashi v. Krishna Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1976 SC 1073 ). See also-Agarwal Digambar Jain Samiti, Agra v. Badri Prasad Srivastava, 1984 Education Cases 154 (Division Bench) (All.). 3. SRI R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that the Society be treated an ' authority ' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. See also-Agarwal Digambar Jain Samiti, Agra v. Badri Prasad Srivastava, 1984 Education Cases 154 (Division Bench) (All.). 3. SRI R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that the Society be treated an ' authority ' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 Mathew, J. advocated a test broader and wider than that laid down in Electricity Board, Rajasthan v. Mohan Lai, AIR 1967 SC 1857 to determine whether a body would be an authority within the meaning of Article 12. The learned Judge observed that if a statutory corporation was an agency or instrumentality of the Government, it was 'other authority' and so 'State'. This test was recognised and further elucidated in International Airports Authority's Case, AIR 1979 SC 1926. Bhagwati J. highlighted the factors which made a legal person, even a registered society an agency or instrumentality of Government. Factors which Krishna Iyer, J. culled out in Somprakash Rekhi, AIR 1981 SC 212 relying on International Airport Authority (supra) were (1) financial resources of the State being the chief funding source; (2) functional character being Government in essence ; (3) plenary control residing in Government; (4) prior history of the same a duty having been carried on by Government and made over to the new body and (5) some element of authority or command. The case in Ajai Hasia, AIR 1981 SC 487 was in relation directly to a registered society. The Supreme Court held that the Regional Engineering College satisfied the tests laid down in Airports Authority and Somprakash Rekhi and was, therefore, an 'authority' within Article 12 being an agency or instrumentality of the State. 4. THE governing consideration in Ajay Hasia was thus expressed, "the reality is very much the deeply pervasive presence of the government." THE question arose in B. S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute etc. (1983) 4 SCC 582 . THE Court took note of the fact that the money required for running the institute was provided entirely by the Central Government and even if any other moneys were to be received by the Institute it could be done only with the approval of the Central Government. THE accounts of the Institute had also to be submitted to the Central Government for its scrutiny and satisfaction. THE accounts of the Institute had also to be submitted to the Central Government for its scrutiny and satisfaction. THE Institute had to comply with all such directions as might be issued by the Central Government. "THE control of the Central Government is deep and pervasive and, therefore, to all intents and purposes it is an instrumentality of the Central Government". This constitutes the ratio of that decision. Can we say this or nearly approaching the same in relation to the School or the Society which governs the same ? The answer to our mind is plainly in the negative. The State Government granted recognition on July 18, 1956 to the starting of Agriculture and Extension Diploma classes in the School. This was provisional on November 13/24, 1961, the recognition was made permanent. The institution was placed on the grant-in-aid list of the State Government. Sri Singh argued that there are various conditions attached to the grant-in-aid incorporated in the form of executive instructions (vide 1979 AWC 726 FB) in para 293 of the Education Code. Even where a provision is statutory upon being incorporated in a contract or lease it becomes a part thereof and loses its statutory character-DFO v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 238 . We have also scrutinized those conditions. There is, it would appear, a large field uncovered for the Society to act in accordance with the general law of the land. The composition of the Society is not touched; the executive of the Society need not have any nominee of the State Government; there is no restraint upon the Society raising its funds from other sources; it is not alleged that the State grant constitutes the chief funding source; the Society has the freedom to select and appoint the teachers provided they fulfil the qualifications laid down in the Intermediate Education Act and there is no general mandate to abide by the directions of Government as may be issued from time to time in order to avail the grant. The control exercised by Government is not deep or pervasive nor may this be classed as plenary. Para 293 (4) of the Education Code, referred to by learned counsel, provides in its first part for the award such as the Regional Arbitration Board gives being implemented. The control exercised by Government is not deep or pervasive nor may this be classed as plenary. Para 293 (4) of the Education Code, referred to by learned counsel, provides in its first part for the award such as the Regional Arbitration Board gives being implemented. Clause 15 of the Agreement, referred to for the petitioners, makes provision for award but we have had an affidavit from the petitioners that no Regional Arbitration Board has come to be constituted. In its second part para 203 (4) says that if a teacher is discharged without prior approval of the Inspector, where such approval is necessary, the grant-in-aid of the School shall be reduced by the amount equal to the pay of the person concerned and in case of wrongful dismissal or discharge the amount may be paid directly to the person concerned with the sanction of the Director for such period as the Director may decide. The duty which this provision casts is again nonstatutory; it is as one of the conditions attached to the grant-in-aid; there is no allegation to the effect that the petitioners have approached the Government or the Director for that matter for payment keeping this provision in view and the same has been declined so as to entitle them to a mandamus in this respect. In fact so far as the State is concerned it is arrayed as a party no doubt but there is no cause of action found set up against it in any of these two petitions. It does not appear possible, upon these facts, to place the Society in question in the category of agency or instrumentality of the State Government. 5. THE matter is capable of being looked into from another angle also. THE petitioners at the best seek enforcement of the agreement entered into by them respectively with the Committee of Management. To this the neat and necessary repellant is that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. In the words of Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the Division Bench in Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, (1976) 3 SCC 828 at p. 832 :- "What is immediately relevant is not whether the respondent is State or public authority but whether what is enforced is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation or public function of a public authority. In the words of Krishna Iyer J. speaking for the Division Bench in Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, (1976) 3 SCC 828 at p. 832 :- "What is immediately relevant is not whether the respondent is State or public authority but whether what is enforced is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation or public function of a public authority. Private law may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual or tortious actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction." 6. IN D.F.O. South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi Singh, AIR 1973 SC 205 cited for the petitioners all that was held relying upon K. N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 was that, where the source of a right was contractual but the action complained of was the purported exercise of a statutory power relief could be claimed under Article 226. In this connection a reference to Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar etc., (1977) 3 SCC 457 is apposite. Government had enhanced the rate of royalty payable under the contract and later cancelled the lease. The petitioners challenged this action of Government by filing a writ petition under Article 226. The High Court took the view that the writ petition was not maintainable where there was no question of exercising any statutory power and the action of Government was clearly referable to any terms or conditions of the contract itself. The Supreme Court upheld this approving the decisions in Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar, (1973) 1 SCC 485 and Lekhraj Satramdas v. Dy. Custodian-cum-manager, AIR 1966 SC 334 with the observation that " no writ or order can issue under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases, " " to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. " The petitioners' case, it was pointed, was primarily that of a breach of contract for which the State would be liable ordinarily to pay damages if it had broken it. Until and unless as the breach is involved violation of certain legal and public duties or violation of statutory duties to the remedy of which the petitioner is entitled by issuance of a writ of mandamus, mere breach of contract cannot be remedied by the Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution Lekhraj Satramdas's case (supra). In Radhakrishna Agarwal, there was a submission made to the effect that whenever a State or its agents or officers deal with the citizen, either making a transactions, or after making it, in exercise of powers under the terms of a contract between the parties, there is a dealing between the State and the citizen which involves performance of "certain legal and public duties ". The Supreme Court repelled this pointing out :- "If we were to accept this very wide proposition every case of a breach of contract by the State or its agents or its officers would call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. We do not consider this to be a sound proposition at all." 7. IN the cases before us, as in the above, the agreements do not contain any statutory terms or obligations and no statutory power or obligation which could attract the application of Article 14 of the Constitution is involved here. 8. IN Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (1983) 3 SCC 379 the Supreme Court significantly proceeded upon the finding that :- "The agreement to advance the loan was entered into in performance of the statutory duty cast on the Corporation by the statute under which it was created and set up." The loan granted to the respondent therein was in exercise of the Corporations statutory function under Section 25 (1) (g) of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Mandamus was issued thereupon directing the Corporation to perform its statutory duty. 9. LEARNED counsel cited Aley Ahmad Abidi v. District Inspector of Schools, 1976 AWC 731 . There it was held that the Committee of Management of an educational institution recognised under the Intermediate Education Act is not a statutory body not being constituted under a statute. The Committee is amenable still to writ jurisdiction of the High Court, where such Committee, the Full Bench remarked, is entrusted " with performance of statutory duties or conferred with statutory powers ". This also consequently does not avail the petitioners. See also : Smita Conductors Pvt. Ltd. v. M. P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1984 M. P. 44 ; Kumkum v. Principal Jessus and Mary College, AIR 1976 Delhi 35 ; G. Misra v. Orissa Association of Sanskrit Learning Culture, AIR 1971 Orissa 212. This also consequently does not avail the petitioners. See also : Smita Conductors Pvt. Ltd. v. M. P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1984 M. P. 44 ; Kumkum v. Principal Jessus and Mary College, AIR 1976 Delhi 35 ; G. Misra v. Orissa Association of Sanskrit Learning Culture, AIR 1971 Orissa 212. In M/s. R. B. Jadhamal Bishan Lal v. State of J. K., AIR 1984 J. K. 10 the distinguishing feature is that the forest contractors did not challenge the Government action based upon any terms of the contract or conditions between them and the State but challenged the executive fiats of the Government whereby Government ordered that no extension would be given to forest leases. 10. THE petitioners before us have as appearing from their pleadings assailed the impugned order dated June 30, 1986, issued by the Secretary of the Society on grounds that :- (i) there is breach of clause 10 of the Agreement in as much as no prior approval had been taken by the Society from the Deputy Director of Agriculture or the Inspector ; (ii) there is no closure of the institution and the action is arbitrary. Upon the view we take as to the writ petitions being not maintainable, we would not like to say anything concerning the merits of these pleas lest that causes prejudice to either side. Both of these are questions of fact determinable appropriately upon evidence adduced on both sides. The decision in Agarwal Digambar Jain Samiti (supra) (Division Bench) relied by the petitioner's counsel, to which one of us (B. D. Agrawal, J.) was a party is authority for the proposition that in a suit against the Committee of Management of a registered society a non-statutory body, there could be no relief claimed of declaration ; the plaintiff could only claim damages. This cannot be made the basis to contend that even though there is no statutory duty or the breach of any statutory provision involved, the petitioners may take recourse to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, against an alleged breach of contract. The petitioners have evidently to resort to a suit in the civil court for such relief as may be obtained under the substantive law on the subject. 11. LEARNED counsel urged that the petitioners have sought for writ of certiorari also, and not mandamus alone. The petitioners have evidently to resort to a suit in the civil court for such relief as may be obtained under the substantive law on the subject. 11. LEARNED counsel urged that the petitioners have sought for writ of certiorari also, and not mandamus alone. The Courts have been reluctant to issue this writ in these matters arising from the private college Vidyoday University of Ceylon v. Silva, (1964) 3 All. ER 865 See : Vidya Ram Misra, AIR 1972 SC 1450 ; Gurpreet Singh v. Punjab University, AIR 1983 P and H 70 ; Shakuntala Sahawala v. Director of Public Instructions, AIR 1977 AP 381 in which the earlier decision in Harijander Singh v. Kakatiya Medical College, AIR 1975 AP 35 was not followed ; Arun Narayan v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1976 Karnataka 174. 12. THE claim of the petitioners being basically to enforce a contract on the plea of its alleged wrongful breach, this cannot be disguised under a camoflauge of statutory or constitutional obligation so as to be made the subject matter of writ petition. The petitions are for these reasons dismissed in limine. Petitions dismissed.