JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the orders passed by the consolidation authorities. 2. The facts in brief are that u/s 9A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the Act) the Petitioners filed an objection stating that Smt. Hakiman and Smt. Sharifan (in the pedigree given in para 2 of the petition) have remarried, hence their interest devolved upon the Petitioner Abdul Razzaq and he became the sole bbumidhar. 3. The Petitioners' case was denied by Smt. Sharifan, Respondent No. 4, whereas Smt. Hakiman had died earlier and in her place Atiq, Respondent No. 5 was made party and he contested the case that Smt. Hakiman did not re-marry ; and in any case, she had deposited ten times rental and became bhumidoar along with the Petitioner and other co-tenure holders including Smt. Sharifan and had acquired bhumidhari rights under the provisions of U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges; Act. She even much before her remarriage became bhumidhar to the knowledge of the Petitioner, who did not object nor he filed any objection, hence he was estopped from denying the same and in any case she acquired transferable interest and became full-fledged bhumidhar and alter her death her interest cannot devolve on the Petitioner. 4. The consolidation authorities decided the case against the Petitioners and these orders have been challenged in the present petition. 5. Sri R.H. Zaidi appearing for the Petitioner urged that Smt. Sharifan, Respondent No. 4 has re-married, hence her interest devolved on the Petitioner. But it is worth mention that she died long ago and she had executed a will also in favour of Haneef, Chotey, Kalua, Bhure and Aqeel, sons of Tausif, resident of village Neknampur, Pargana Putha, Tahsil Garh, District Ghaziabad and these legatees had later on transferred their interest in favour of Smt. Mahmmoda and Smt. Nafeesa both of village Wiat, Pargana and Tahisl Garh, District Ghaziabad by a registered sale deed dated 8.3.82. An application was filed by the Petitioner that these transferees may be made Respondents in place of the deceased Sharifan. But when the writ petition came up for hearing the application for impleadment moved by the Petitioner was also listed for hearing. An application was filed by the Petitioner that these transferees may be made Respondents in place of the deceased Sharifan. But when the writ petition came up for hearing the application for impleadment moved by the Petitioner was also listed for hearing. Earlier the counsel for the applicant pressed the application for impleadment and an order was passed on 17.12.85 for impleadment of Smt. Mahmmodan and Smt. Nafeesa. But before the order could be signed the counsel for the Petitioner made a statement that the order may not be signed and he would think over the matter in respect of pressing the application for impleadment. On the next date he made a statement that he does not want to press the application, hence that may be dismissed as not pressed. Therefore, I have no option but to dismiss the same as not pressed and now the result is that Smt. Sharifan Respondent No. 4 has died and no substitution application has been filed and an order was passed on 28th September 1983 that Smt. Sharifan had died and her name was deleted. There is an endorsement to this effect on page 2 of the writ petition. I have accordingly no option but to dismiss the writ petition against Smt. Sharifan, Respondent No. 4 as having abated. 6, There is also an application purported to have been filed on behalf of the legatees and their transferees for abatement of the writ petition and in view of the facts stated above, this application has to be allowed and the writ petition is ordered to have abated against Respondent No. 4. 7. As regards the remarriage of Smt. Hakiman, learned Counsel for the Petitioners urged that after her re-marriage the succession would be governed in accordance with Section 171 of the Act and the Petitioner would succeed being father's father son's son. The learned Counsel placed reliance on Ramjeewan v. Smt. Phoola AIR 1976 SC 864. 8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent on the other hand urged that Smt. Hakiman appears to have remarried before 1336 Fasli (1928 AD) and the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 was then in force and thereafter U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 was enforced and thereafter UP ZA and LR Act came into force and she was tenant in her own right immediately before the enforcement of the UP ZA and LR Act. Hence u/s 19 she became a Sirdar and having deposited ten times rental she acquired bhumidhari rights and the Petitioner did not take any step to eject Smt. Hakiman and in his knowledge she deposited ten times rental, hence in any case she became a co-tenant by estoppel and acquiescence. It was further urged that she became full-fledged bhumidhar after depositing ten times rental and she was a Mohammedan lady and she did not have a life estate and was not a limited owner Section 172(2)(a)(ii) of the Act was applicable and the holding shall devolve on her own heirs mentioned in Section 174, and Section 172(2)(a)(i) would not apply nor the holding shall devolve on the nearest surviving heir in accordance with Section 171 of the Act. In this connection Kishan Singh v. Babu Singh, 1973 RD 142 was relied upon. 9. I am in respectful agreement with the principles of law laid down in Ramjeewan v. Smt. Phoola (supra). But as the facts of the present case are entirely different, I am of the opinion that the principles laid down in that case would not apply. That was a case not in respect of a lady who was, according to the present law applicable, entitled to the holding absolutely. Whereas in the instant case Smt. Hakeeman was entitled to the holding absolutely in accordance with the present law applicable to her. For the last about 50 years the Petitioner did not take any step to file a suit for her ejectment. Further she had deposited ten times rental and became bhumidhar under the provisions of U.P. Agricultural tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act. I am, accordingly, of the view that the provisions of Section 172(2)(a)(ii) would apply and not the provisions of Section 172(2)(a)(i). I am of the view that the facts of Kishan Singh v. Babu Singh (supra), were similar and Hoo'ble J. S. Triyedi, J. held that in such circumstances similar to the present case the succession would be governed not by Section 172(2)(a)(i). 10. There is another aspect of the matter. Smt. Hakiman has acquired Sanad Bhumidhari and the declaration granted in her favour was not got cancelled by the Petitioner in view of the procedure provided u/s 137A within a period of three years as provided in Appendix III Serial 11A. Hence the claim of the Petitioner to get the certificate cancelled became time burred. Smt. Hakiman has acquired Sanad Bhumidhari and the declaration granted in her favour was not got cancelled by the Petitioner in view of the procedure provided u/s 137A within a period of three years as provided in Appendix III Serial 11A. Hence the claim of the Petitioner to get the certificate cancelled became time burred. 11. There is yet another aspect of the matter that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is not like an appellate court. Even though some order may appear to be erroneous or even without jurisdiction, this Court can decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case substantial justice has been done. In the instant case I find that Smt. Hakiman was a widow since prior to 1336 Fasli for the last about 50 years and the Petitioner being quite alive to the situation, did not take any initiative to eject her or to file a suit against her either under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 or under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. Even before the commencement of consolidation operation the Petitioner did not file any suit either u/s 229B or u/s 209 of the Act and she has died long ago and her son Ate from her second husband has been made a party as Respondent No. 5. Under these circumstances I am of the view that the substantial justice has been done between the parties. Further there is a Latin Maxim "VIGILANTIBUS NON DORMIEN TIBUS JURA SUBVENIENT" which obviously means that law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. In the instant case Smt. Hakim an became widow about more than 50 years ago and the Petitioner was sleeping over the matter, hence I am of the view of that now it is too late to grant discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to him under the circumstances of the case. 12. In view of the discussions made herein-above, the petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.