Judgment Nazir Ahmad, J. 1. A statement of the case has been submitted by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench "A", Patna (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), under Sec. 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), referring the following question of law for the opinion of this court: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the provisions of Sec.10 of the Estate Duty Act were not applicable to the instant case ?" 2. The facts as found from the statement of the case and the assessment order of the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty and the order of the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty and the Tribunal may be briefly stated so far as they are relevant. 3. Late Dharari Kant Roy (briefly called as "D.K. Roy") died on June 13, 1968. During the years 1957 to 1963, the deceased made gifts of cash amounting to Rs. 63,000 to his son, Shankar Kumar Roy (briefly called as "S.K. Roy"), who is the accountable person. S.K. Roy invested Rs. 28,000 in fifteen year annuity certificates and Rs. 35,000 in 4 per cent. Postal Treasury Savings Deposit Certificates in his own name. While making the assessment in respect of the estate duty of late D.K. Roy, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty (hereinafer referred to as the "Assistant Controller") included the value of the investments in the principal value of the estate as hereunder: Rs. 1.Commuted value as on the date of the death of D. K. Roy relating the 15 year annuity certificates issue price of which came to Rs. 21,0006,286 2.4% Treasury Savings Deposit Certificate35,000 41,286 4. These details are available at pages II and 12 of the paper book relating to the order of the Assistant Controller. 5. The Assistant Controller found that the interest income accruing on 15 year annuity certificates and treasury savings deposit certificates were deposited in the bank account which was originally in the name of the deceased alone and subsequently was converted into a joint account of the deceased and his son, S.K. Roy, According to the Assistant Controller, the provisions of Sec.10 of the Act were applicable and gifts were made with reservation within the meaning of that Section. He, therefore, included the above amount of Rs. He, therefore, included the above amount of Rs. 41,286 for the purpose of estate duty assessment. A copy of the assessment order of the Assistant Controller has been annexed and marked as annexure A forming part of the statement of the case. 6. On appeal before the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty (hereinafter referred to as "the Appellate Controller"), the Appellate Controller considered the contention made on behalf of the accountable person that the investments in question were purchased in the name of the accountable person and the gift was complete as the cash had been delivered and the investment stood in the name of the donee. It was also contended before him that these gifts were before the statutory period of two years and were, therefore, not dutiable. He further considered that during the lifetime of the deceased, the interest income from investment had been credited to the individual bank account of the son. The Appellate Controller found that the beneficial possession and the enjoyment of the gift was immediately taken over by the donee. He also found that the gifted amount was turned into investment in the donees name as the donor was entirely excluded from the subject-matter of the gift. The Appellate Controller further found that the donor did not derive any benefit from the subject-matter of the gift by contract or otherwise and that the donor did not have any enforceable right or legal right or beneficial interest to enable him to have any benefit out of the subject-matter of the gifts. The Appellate Controller, therefore, excluded the addition of Rs. 41,286 from the principal value of the estate of the deceased. A copy of the order of the Appellate Controller has been annexed and marked an annexure B forming part of the statement of the case. 7. The Department appealed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also held that the investment stood in the name of the accountable person. The interest on the investments was too remote a benefit and that for attracting the provisions of Sec.10 of the Act, the benefit to the donor had to accrue from the subject-matter of the gifted property. 7. The Department appealed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal also held that the investment stood in the name of the accountable person. The interest on the investments was too remote a benefit and that for attracting the provisions of Sec.10 of the Act, the benefit to the donor had to accrue from the subject-matter of the gifted property. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in CED V/s. Chandravadan Amratlal Bhatt [1969] 73 ITR 416 (Guj) and George Da Costa v. CED [1967] 63 ITR 497 (SC) and held that the right to receive the interest exclusively belonged to the accountable person and the mere fact that the accountable person sought to put it in a joint account with the deceased would not amount to the deceased deriving any benefit from the gifted property. For this purpose, the Tribunal also relied on the decision in M. Ranganatha Sastri v. CED [1966] 60 ITR 783 (Mad) and the Tribunal also held that the reservation of benefit to the donor should be one enforceable by him. The Tribunal also held that in the instant case, the deceased enjoyed no benefit from the gifted property and had no right to receive the interest. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the provisions of Sec.10 of the Act were not applicable in the case of the accountable person. A copy of the order of the Tribunal has been annexed and marked as annexure C forming part of. the statement of the case. 8. The accountable person also suggested certain questions for reference to the Tribunal but the Tribunal held that the questions suggested by the accountable person did not arise out of the order of the Tribunal and so refused to refer those questions and so only the above question has been referred for our opinion. 9. It is not disputed that the deceased gifted Rs. 63,000 to his son, S.K. Roy, the accountable person, and the son invested the amount in annuity certificates and postal treasury savings certificates as mentioned above and these certificates were in the name of the accountable person himself. It is also not disputed that the interest income derived from the aforesaid certificates were deposited in the bank account which was originally in the name of the deceased alone and subsequently converted in the joint name of the deceased and his son, the accountable person. It is also not disputed that the interest income derived from the aforesaid certificates were deposited in the bank account which was originally in the name of the deceased alone and subsequently converted in the joint name of the deceased and his son, the accountable person. It was also asserted by the accountable person that the certificates remained in the custody of the son and he was operating these certificates and that in the later years, the interest income was being credited in his individual pass book. 10. Thus the only question which has to be seen in this case is as to what will be the effect if the interest income was deposited originally in the name of the deceased alone and subsequently converted into the joint name of the deceased and his son the donee. It cannot be doubted that when the certificates were in the name of the son, unless the son endorsed that the interest should be credited to the account of the deceased or to the joint account, the interest would not have been credited in that account. There is no evidence in this case whether the interest amount was utilised by the deceased during his lifetime. The Tribunal has held that the mere fact that the accountable person sought to put it in a joint account with the deceased would not amount to the deceased deriving any benefit from the gifted property. 11. It was also asserted before the Appellate Controller that in the later years in the lifetime of the father, the interest income from investments was credited to the sons own individual bank account. Unfortunately, the Appellate Controller has not mentioned as to when the individual account was opened but the fact remains that during the lifetime of the deceased, individual accounts were opened. 12. Now, the question is whether only because the interest account was credited for some time in the individual account of the father and subsequently in the joint account of the father and the son and subsequently in the individual account of the son during lifetime of the father, it can be said that the deceased was enjoying the benefits from the aforesaid certificates. 13. 13. Sec.10 of the Act lays down that "Property taken under any gift, whenever made, shall be deemed to pass on the donors death to the extent that bona fide possession and enjoyment of it was not immediately assumed by the donee and thenceforward retained to the entire exclusion of the donor or of any benefit to him by contract or otherwise: Provided that the property shall not be deemed to pass by reason only that it was not, as from the date of the gift, exclusively retained as aforesaid, if by means of the surrender of the reserved benefit or otherwise, it is subsequently enjoyed to the entire exclusion of the donor or of any benefit to him for at least two years before the death: Provided further that a house or part thereof taken under any gift made to the spouse, son, daughter, brother or sister, shall not be deemed to pass on the donors death by reason only of the residence therein of the donor except where a right of residence therein is reserved or secured directly or indirectly to the donor under the relevant disposition or under any collateral disposition". The second proviso to Sec.10 of the Act was added by the Finance Act, 1965. 14. Sec.10 of the Act came up for consideration for the first time in the case of George Da Costa V/s. CED [1967] 63 ITR 497 (SC) which is a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, on which Mr. B.P. Rajgarhia has relied, where it was laid down that the crux of Sec.10 of the Act lies in two parts: (i) the donee must bona fide have assumed possession and enjoyment of the property which is the subject-matter of the gift to the exclusion of the donor, immediately upon the gift, and (ii) the donee must have retained such possession and enjoyment of the property to the entire exclusion of the donor or of any benefit to him by contract or otherwise, and that both these conditions are cumulative and unless each of these conditions is satisfied, the property would be liable to estate duty under Sec.10 of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also laid down that the second part of Sec.10 has two limbs: the deceased must be entirely excluded (i) from the property and (ii) from any benefit by contract or otherwise, and that the words "by contract or otherwise" in the second limb of the section will not control the words "to the entire exclusion of the donor" in the first limb and that the first limb may be infringed if the donor occupies or enjoys the property or its income, even though he has no right to do so which he could legally enforce against the donee. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also laid down in this decision that, in other words, in order to attract the section, it is not necessary that the possession of the donor of the gift must be referable to some contractual or other arrangement enforceable in law or in equity; even if the donor is content to rely upon the mere filial affection of his sons with a view to enable him to continue to reside in the house which he has given to them, it cannot be said that he was "entirely excluded from possession and enjoyment" within the meaning of the first limb of the section and, therefore, the property will be deemed to have passed on the death of the donor and will be subject to levy of estate duty. In this case, a gift of house was involved and so this decision is not exactly applicable to the facts of the case before us. Similar view has been taken in the case of CED V/s. Parvati Ammal [1974] 97 ITR 621 (SC), where also a house property was gifted and the donor was residing in the house. These decisions relate to the period before the second proviso to Sec.10 of the Act was added. 15. Mr. B.P. Rajgarhia, for the Revenue, has also relied on the case of Mahabir Prasad Poddar V/s. CED [1976] 104 ITR 612 (Pat), which is a decision of the Patna High Court. In this case, D, the deceased, was the proprietor of a proprietary firm styled as MPGP. On May 23, 1959, the deceased made cash gifts of Rs. 25,000 to each of his two sons, M and G, and the two donees deposited the gifted amounts in their bank accounts. In this case, D, the deceased, was the proprietor of a proprietary firm styled as MPGP. On May 23, 1959, the deceased made cash gifts of Rs. 25,000 to each of his two sons, M and G, and the two donees deposited the gifted amounts in their bank accounts. Thereafter, M and G deposited the said amounts in the proprietary firm of the deceased on May 30, 1959, and May 26, 1959, respectively, and with effect from October, 1959, the proprietary firm was converted into a partnership firm with the deceased and his two sons as partners. Thereafter, the deceased made gifts to each of his two sons of Rs. 5,000 on October 10, 1960, Rs. 5,000 on August 16, 1961, and Rs. 5,000 on October 1, 1962, and these amounts were invested by the donees on the very dates of the gifts in the partnership firm. In those circumstances, it was held that the entire sum of Rs. 80,000 was liable to estate duty as the property deemed to pass on the death of the deceased under Sec.10 of the Act. 16. In the aforesaid eases, the entire gifted property came into the possession of the donor and, in those circumstances, it was held that Sec.10 of the Act applies. The Patna High Court also observed that the amounts were on all occasions gifted in cash and there was no transfer by adjustment in the book entries of the partnership. This clearly goes to show that the Patna High Court would have taken a different view if the amounts had been transferred by book adjustment in the firms account. 17. Mr. B.P. Rajgarhia has also relied on the case of CED V/s. R.V. Viswanathan [1976] 105 ITR 653 (SC) which is a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In this case, the deceased was the sole proprietor of two business concerns. With a view to converting the business of the two concerns into a partnership with his four major sons, the deceased transferred a sum of Rs. 45,000 from his personal account to the credit of each of the four sons on September 12, 1955. A partnership deed was executed on September 17, 1955, by the deceased and his four sons, the sum of Rs. 45,000 transferred to each of them being treated as their share capital. 45,000 from his personal account to the credit of each of the four sons on September 12, 1955. A partnership deed was executed on September 17, 1955, by the deceased and his four sons, the sum of Rs. 45,000 transferred to each of them being treated as their share capital. On September 18, 1955, two minor sons were also admitted to the benefits of the partnership and the deceased similarly transferred a sum of Rs. 45,000 from his personal account in the firm to each of his minor sons, and upon the death of the deceased on November 18, 1960, the question arose whether the sum of Rs. 2,70,000 being the aggregate of the amounts transferred by the deceased from his personal account to the credit of his six sons could be included in the estate passing on his death under Section 10 of the Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in those circumstances, held that in view of the Tribunals finding that the deceased transferred six-sevenths share in his business and retained one-seventh share therein, no question could possibly arise of the inclusion of the six-sevenths share or of the amount of Rs. 2,70,000 in the estate of the deceased under Sec.10 and that the transfer of that amount was not in cash but by means of book entries and as part of a scheme to transfer six-sevenths share in the business. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court also held there was no absolute transfer of the sum of Rs. 2,70,000 but the transfer was made subject to the condition that the sons would use it as capital not for any benefit to the deceased donor but for each of them becoming entitled to one-seventh share in the business and that no benefit was also conferred under the deed of partnership upon the deceased although some extra benefit was conferred upon two of the major sons in the form of remuneration because of their active and full participation in the business. It was also held in this decision that if the deceased donor delimits the interest he is parting with and possesses and enjoys some benefit in the property not on account of the interest parted with but because of the interest still retained by him, the interest parted with shall not be deemed to be part of the estate of the deceased donor passing on his death for the purpose of Sec.10 of the Act and that the principle is that by retaining something which he has never given, a donor does not bring himself within the mischief of that section, nor would the provisions of the section be attracted because of some benefit accruing to the donor on account of what was retained by him. 18. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad No. II has relied on various decisions. He has relied on the case of CED V/s. Kamlavati [1979] 120 ITR 456 (SC) which is a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, where it has been held that when a property is gifted by a donor the possession and enjoyment of which is allowed to a partnership firm in which the donor is a partner, then the mere fact of the donor sharing the enjoyment or the benefit in the property is not sufficient for the application of Sec.10 of the Act, until and unless such enjoyment or benefit is clearly referable to the gift, i.e., to the parting with such enjoyment or benefit by the donee or permitting the donor to share them out of the bundle of rights gifted in the property. It has also been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that if the possession, enjoyment or benefit of the donor in the property is consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case other than those of the factum of gift, it cannot be said that the donee had not retained the possession and enjoyment of the property to the entire exclusion of the donor, or to the entire exclusion of the donor in any benefit to him by contract or otherwise, and it makes no difference whether the donee is a partner in the firm from before or is taken as such at the time of the gift or he becomes a creditor of the partnership firm by allowing it to make use of the gifted property for the purposes of the partnership. In this case, the deceased was a partner in a firm having a half-share in the partnership. On March 27, 1957, M made a gift of Rs. 1 lakh to his son, L, and of Rs. 50,000 to his wife, K, by making debit entries in his account in the firm and corresponding credits to the accounts of L and K. With effect from March 28, 1957, L was taken as a partner in the firm by giving L one-fourth share out of the half-share of M. M died on January 9, 1962, and, in those circumstances, it was held that Section 10 of the Act did not apply to the gifts of Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 50,000 made by the deceased to his son and to his wife, respectively. It was also found that in April or May, 1958, J, the deceased, made gifts of Rs. 20,000 each in favour of a son and four daughters-in-law. The donees invested the entire amounts gifted to them in a firm in which J was a partner. The donees were not partners in the firm nor were they taken as partners after the gifts were made. The sums gifted were already being utilised by the firm and they remained being utilised after the gifts. Even in those circumstances, it was held that the sum of Rs. 1 lakh so given could not be included in the property passing on Js death. The sums gifted were already being utilised by the firm and they remained being utilised after the gifts. Even in those circumstances, it was held that the sum of Rs. 1 lakh so given could not be included in the property passing on Js death. Thus, it is evident that if the amount is gifted and the gifted amount is invested in the partnership firm in which the deceased is also a partner, even then Sec.10 of the Act will not be applicable, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. 19. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad No. II, for the accountable person, has also relied on the case of CED V/s. T.N. Kochhar [1973] 89 ITR 216 (All) which is a decision of the Allahabad High Court. In this case, out of the money gifted by the deceased to his wife, a house was built at Kanpur between 1931 and 1937, and was registered in the name of the wife. The deceased resided in that house till his death in 1961. The Tribunal held that the house could not be included in the estate of the deceased. In those circumstances, it was held by the Allahabad High Court that the Tribunal was right. It was also held that Sec.10 of the Act would not be applicable as the deceased had made a gift of the cash out of which the house property was built and the donor could not be said to have remained in bona fide possession of the property gifted by him and that Section 10 of the Act does not in terms apply to the properties which may have been brought into existence after converting the gifted property and that the house property was not the subject of the gift made by the deceased. After this decision is taken into consideration, then it cannot be doubted that out of the money gifted by the deceased in the present case before us, the son of the deceased namely, S. K. Roy, the accountable person, purchased from the gifted money the aforesaid certificates and so if the interest from those certificates was kept in the personal account of the deceased originally and, subsequently, it was in the joint account of the deceased and his son and, subsequently, it was in the account of the son, it cannot be said that no interest was derived by the accountable person from the gifted money. 20. In the case of CED V/s. C.R. Ramachandra Gounder [1973] 88 ITR 448 (SC), it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that where a father gifted to his sons certain house property which was occupied by a firm (in which the father was a partner) as tenant-at-will and from the date of gift the firm started paying rent to the sons by crediting the rental amount in its account books in favour of the sons, on the death of the father, such a property could not be included in the property of the deceased within Sec.10 of the Act, because the benefit the father had as a partner of the firm was not in any way referable to the gift and was unconnected therewith. In this decision, it was also held that where the father got certain amount transferred from his account in a firm (of which he was a partner) in favour of his sons and the sons were getting interest on the aforesaid amount of Rs. one lakh, it cannot be included in the property of the deceased within Sec.10. 21. All the decisions mentioned above do not relate directly to the issue involved before us. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad No. II, for the accountable person, has relied on the case of CED V/s. Sharangadkar Shamji [1977] 109 ITR 320 (Born). In this case, it was held by the Bombay High Court that as it has been found by the Tribunal that the deceased had made bona fide gifts of the securities worth Rs. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad No. II, for the accountable person, has relied on the case of CED V/s. Sharangadkar Shamji [1977] 109 ITR 320 (Born). In this case, it was held by the Bombay High Court that as it has been found by the Tribunal that the deceased had made bona fide gifts of the securities worth Rs. 1 lakh to his wife and minor children and that the corpus was undoubtedly transferred by the deceased to his wife and children, inasmuch as the securities stood in the name of his wife and minor children and even though the interest on those securities was realised by the deceased and credited to his own bank account, the deceased who was a money-lender and kept detailed books of account, showed in his books the interest as having been duly credited to the respective accounts of the donees and as there was no evidence on record to show that such interest was drawn by the deceased either for private consumption or for investment in his own name, simply because the interest was credited by the deceased in his own bank account but which interest was shown to have remained with the deceased in fact, it cannot be said that the deceased had used such interest for his benefit. It was also held in this decision that a clear finding had been recorded by the Tribunal that not only had the donees assumed bona fide possession and enjoyment of the property but also thenceforward retained it to the entire exclusion of the donor or of any benefit to him by contract or otherwise and, therefore, the Tribunal was right in excluding the value of the Government securities bona fide gifted by the deceased to his wife and sons more than two years before his death from the principal value of the dutiable estate under Sec.10 of the Act. This decision is exactly applicable to the facts of the case before us. 22. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad No. II has also relied on the case of CED V/s. Mrs. Kamala Pandalai [1976] 105 ITR 531 which is a decision of the Madras High Court. In this case, the deceased had gifted to his wife three house properties and a vacant site, on which also a house was constructed. Thereafter, the wife was collecting rents from the houses and leasing them as and when they fell vacant. Kamala Pandalai [1976] 105 ITR 531 which is a decision of the Madras High Court. In this case, the deceased had gifted to his wife three house properties and a vacant site, on which also a house was constructed. Thereafter, the wife was collecting rents from the houses and leasing them as and when they fell vacant. The deceased also acquired certain shares in a company in the name of his wife, the source for the investment having been provided by him. The rents from the houses and the dividends from the shares were being credited to a bank account in the sole name of the deceased till March 12, 1958, when a joint account was opened in the names of the deceased and his wife. The rents received from the houses, the dividends from the shares as well as the pension received by the deceased and other amounts were deposited in this joint amount. Withdrawals from this account were made by both the deceased and his wife, The deceased died on February 5, 1960. On these facts, the Tribunal held that Sec.10 of the Act was not applicable. The Tribunal found as a fact that the rents from the properties gifted were being collected by the wife and as the amounts deposited by the donor by way of his pension and dividends from shares were much more than his drawings, it held that the donor had no benefit from the income of the gifted properties, and even though the amounts collected were deposited in a joint account, the amounts still belonged to the depositor since there was no presumption of advancement in India. In those circumstances, the Madras High Court held : "(1) that the donee had assumed such possession and enjoyment of the properties as was possible in the circumstances of the case ; (2) as the donee was in perception of the rents, profits and dividends from the settled properties, her choosing voluntarily and out of her own free will to keep the amounts in deposit in the deceaseds bank account would not bring the case within the scope of the first limb of Sec.10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953; (3) mere existence of a bank account in the name of the deceased and the deposits made by the donee of the income from the settled properties does not show that the donee had not retained possession and enjoyment of the gifted properties to the entire exclusion of the deceased; and (4) the donor to the extent of the amounts deposited in his accounts was either in the nature of a banker to the donee or had a fiduciary capacity with reference to the said amounts and there was no benefit which he had contracted so as to bring it within the second limb of the second part of Sec.10." 23. In view of these reasonings, the Madras High Court held that the Tribunal was right in its view that the value of the properties gifted and the shares cannot be included in the principal value of the estate of the deceased. 24. It cannot be doubted that in the present case before us, the last two decisions of the Bombay and Madras High Courts are exactly applicable to the facts of the present case before, us. In the present case, it is admitted that the deceased, D.K. Roy, gifted Rs. 63,000 to his son, S.K. Roy, the accountable person, and S.K. Roy invested the amount in annuity certificates and postal treasury saving certificates from 1957 to 1963 and he had custody of these certificates. It cannot be said that the accountable person did not come into bona fide possession of the certificates and so it has to be held that the accountable person came into bona fide possession of the certificates and so it cannot be said that the deceased had any control over these certificates and on this ground the amount of Rs. 41,286 cannot be added to the principal value of the estate of the deceased. 25. 41,286 cannot be added to the principal value of the estate of the deceased. 25. The only ground on which the amount of Rs. 41,286 has been included in the principal value of the estate of the deceased is that the interest relating to this amount was originally deposited in the bank account of the deceased and, subsequently, in the joint account of the deceased and his son and, subsequently, in the individual account of the son which also took place before the death of the deceased. 26. It appears from the estate duty assessment order, annexure A, that the deceased had Rs. 16,592-44 as cash in bank in the joint name of the deceased and his son besides interest of Rs. 244.5 3 and there was also a fixed deposit in the bank for a sum of Rs. 32,350. The deceased had also an amount of Rs. 46,170.49 in the post office bank account besides the interest of Rs. 435. This clearly goes to show that the deceased had also sufficient money in the joint account of the deceased and his son. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased was withdrawing the interest on the certificates as mentioned above. When the deceased had sufficient amounts in the bank and in the post office, it was for the Department to show that the interest relating to the certificates in question was being withdrawn by the deceased and utilised by him during his lifetime. There is no evidence on record to show that the deceased utilised the interest amount relating to these certificates. When a joint account was opened, it cannot be doubted that the accountable person also is entitled to withdraw the amount. It also cannot be doubted that the interest relating to the certificates in the name of the accountable person could not be deposited in the account of the deceased unless the accountable person gave in writing that the interest may be deposited in the account of the deceased and in the joint account of the deceased and himself. Thus, in this case before us, the last two decisions in CED V/s. Sharangadhar Shamji [1977] 109 ITR 320 (Bom) and CED V/s. Mrs. Kamala Pandalai [1976] 105 ITR 531 (Mad) are applicable, and so it cannot be said that the. Thus, in this case before us, the last two decisions in CED V/s. Sharangadhar Shamji [1977] 109 ITR 320 (Bom) and CED V/s. Mrs. Kamala Pandalai [1976] 105 ITR 531 (Mad) are applicable, and so it cannot be said that the. donee accountable person did not assume bona fide possession and enjoyment of the gifted amount of Rs. 63,000 and did not thenceforward retain them to the exclusion of the donor or of any benefit to him by contract or otherwise. 27. Following the aforesaid decisions in CED V/s. Sharangadhar Shamji [1977] 109 ITR 320 (Bom) and CED V/s. Mrs. Kamala Pandalai [1976] 105 ITR 531 (Mad), I hold that the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the provisions of Section 10 of the Act were not applicable to the instant case. 28. In view of my above findings, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person and against the Revenue. However, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Uday Sinha, J. 29 I agree.