Judgment :- 1. Failure on the part of the respondents (landlord) to occupy within the stipulated period, the building in dispute which was taken delivery of in pursuance of an order under S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, for short the Rent Control Act, has resulted in the petitioner filing an application under S.11 (12) for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building. The Rent Control Court allowed the petition. The Appellate Authority, however, set aside the order accepting the arguments of the respondents that the petition was filed out of time. The District Judge before whom the said order was challenged, however, upheld the order of the Appellate Authority. It is against the said order, this revision is filed. 2. The only question that arises for consideration in the revision is whether the tenant who was evicted from the building in pursuance of an order under S.11 (3) can maintain a petition for restoration of possession under S.11 (12) after the expiry of the period of one month stipulated in sub-s. (13) thereof. The answer depends upon the construction of sub-ss. (12) and (13) of S.11 of the Rent Control Act. 3. Sub-s. (12) of S.11 reads: "Where a landlord who has obtained possession of a building in pursuance of an order under sub-s. (3), does not occupy it without reasonable cause within one month of the date of obtaining possession, or having so occupied it, vacates it without reasonable cause within six months of such date, the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building, and the Court shall make an order accordingly notwithstanding anything contained in S.4" Sub-s.(13) reads: "Where a tenant who is entitled to apply for possession under sub-section (12) fails to do so without reasonable cause within one month from the date on which the right to make the application accrued to him, the officer referred to in sub-s. (1) of S.4, shall have power, if the building is required for any of the purposes or for occupation by any of the officers or persons specified in sub-s. (3) of that section to give intimation to the landlord that the building is so required, and thereupon the provisions of sub-ss. (S) and (8) of S.4 shall apply to the building: Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to a building the monthly rent of which does not exceed fifteen rupees." 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the cumulative effect of sub-ss. (12) and (13) of S.11 is that where the tenant files a petition under sub-s. (12) of S.11, the same must be filed within one month from the date on which the right to make the application accrued to him. Admittedly, here the petition under sub-s. (12) was filed after a lapse of 13 months on 23-3-1981 (the possession pursuant to the order of eviction was taken on 23-2-1980) and therefore the same was out of time. However, the petitioner has not shown any cause to file the petition out of time, leave alone reasonable cause and therefore, the learned counsel submits, the petition under sub-s. (12) of S.11 is liable to be rejected on the short ground of limitation. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner however submits that sub-s. (13) of S.11 has no application to the case because the rent of the building involved in the case admittedly does not exceed Rs. 15/-per month and therefore sub-s. (13) of S.11 will not apply to the building. It has been so declared by the proviso appended to this sub-section: "Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to a building the monthly rent of which does not exceed fifteen rupees." 6. It is fundamental that an enactment must be interpreted giving the words used in it their natural, literal or grammatical meaning. Indisputably another interpretation can be had provided however, it is shown that the words have been used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical meaning. To avoid absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, also, it is permissible to give the go-by to the golden rule of interpretation namely, to take the words used by the legislature to express its intention, in their natural, literal or grammatical sense. If the words used in a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the language in such cases has got to be taken as decisive of the intention of the legislature and it shall not be departed from even if the said construction produces hardship and injustice. 7. If the words used in a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the language in such cases has got to be taken as decisive of the intention of the legislature and it shall not be departed from even if the said construction produces hardship and injustice. 7. The words used in the proviso are plain, precise and unambiguous and as such there is no escape from the conclusion that the said words must be given their natural, literal and grammatical meaning. Therefore there can be no doubt that sub-s. (13) of S.11 will have no application Ho a building, the monthly rent of which does not exceed fifteen rupees. 8. It therefore follows that the application of the tenant under sub-s.(12) of S.11 cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation. 9. Finding it difficult to grapple with the situation, the learned counsel advanced an ingenious argument. This argument can be stated thus. Sub-s. (13) consists of two limbs; the first limb is in respect of the period within which an aggrieved tenant shall prefer the petition under sub-s. (12) and the second limb conferring power on the Accommodation Controller to notify to the landlord that the building is required for any of the purpose or for occupation by any of the officers or persons specified in sub-s. 3 of S.4 provided the tenant who is entitled to apply for possession under sub-s. (12) fails to do so. In short, according to the learned counsel, irrespective of the rent a building would fetch, the petition, the tenant intends to file under sub-s. (12) of S.11, shall be filed within the period stipulated under sub-s. (13). This argument, no doubt, is attractive; but the plain, precise and unambiguous language used in the proviso, does not warrant such an interpretation. If the above argument is accepted, the proviso requires to be redrafted and new words added which is not the function of the court. 10. The wordings of sub-ss. This argument, no doubt, is attractive; but the plain, precise and unambiguous language used in the proviso, does not warrant such an interpretation. If the above argument is accepted, the proviso requires to be redrafted and new words added which is not the function of the court. 10. The wordings of sub-ss. (12) and (13) of S.11 would indicate that these two sub-sections are mutually exclusive and intended to cover two different proceedings; sub-s. (12) enabling a tenant who was evicted by a landlord in pursuance of an order under sub-s. (3), to apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession notwithstanding anything contained in S.4 provided the building has fallen vacant in the manner indicated in that sub-section, and sub-s. (13) investing power on the Accommodation Controller to treat the buildings mentioned in sub-s. (12) as available for allotment in terms of sub-s. (3) of S.4 unless it be, he has accepted the explanation of the tenant that he could not prefer the application under sub-s. (12) with in one month from the date on which his right to apply for restoration of the building under that sub-section accrued. This, in short, is the scheme of sub-ss. (12) and (13) of S.11 11. This Court in the decision in Thomas v. Kunji Thommen, 1981 K.L.T. 708, has held thus, while interpreting sub-s. (13) of S.11: "Where the tenant fails to apply for restoration in time, the Accommodation Controller can step in under sub-s. (13); and even then the tenant can show that he bad reasonable cause for the delay. It is for the Accommodation Controller in proceedings under sub-s.(13), and not for the Rent Control Court in proceedings under sub-s. (12), to examine the reasonable cause the tenant may have; and til) the Accommodation Controller does so and arrives at a decision, the tenant's right under sub-s. (12) would survive. When sub-s. (13) prescribes the consequences of the tenant's failure to apply, that consequence alone can follow, and not others." With respect I concur with the view of my learned brother M. P. Menon J. 12. When sub-s. (13) prescribes the consequences of the tenant's failure to apply, that consequence alone can follow, and not others." With respect I concur with the view of my learned brother M. P. Menon J. 12. In the light of the above dictum, the landlord can successfully oppose the petition of a tenant under sub-s. (12) only if he could show to the Rent Control Court that the Accommodation Controller has rejected the claim of the tenant for restoration of possession of the building, in exercise of the power vested in him under sub-s. (13). If that is not possible, the application of a tenant under sub-s. (12) though filed after one month cannot be opposed by the landlord on the ground of limitation. 13. The contention of the landlord-respondent that the application of the tenant-petitioner under sub-s. (12) before the Rent Control Court is barred by limitation, therefore is rejected. 14. For the reasons stated above the order under challenge is set aside and the order of the Kent Control Court is restored. 15. Nothing stated in this order however would disentitle the second counter petitioner from agitating his rights if any, before appropriate authorities by initiating appropriate proceedings. The civil revision petition is allowed. No order as to costs.