Judgment B.L. Yadav, J. 1. THE present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the orders dated 15-2-1975, 21-12-1973 and 13-12-1972 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Consolidation Officer in proceedings under Section 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. THE facts of the case are these. Plots in four Khatas, i. e. 156, 266, 301 and 177 situate in Village Chilbili, Pargana Mahaich, District Varanasi are in dispute. THE first two khatas were recorded in the name of Faqir, Respondent No. 4, and the plots in khata no. 301 were recorded in the name of Loknath, Gopal and Nandoo alias Nandlal, Respondent Nos. 5, 6 and 7. Whereas plots of khata no. 177 were recorded in the name of Moti Lal and Hira Lal, Respondent Nos. 8 and 9 and Jieut, Nand Lal and Purshottam, Respondent Nos. 10, 11 and 12. An objection under section 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was filed by the petitioner in respect of khata Nos. 156 and 266 alleging that Faqir, Respondent No. 4, has no concern with the land in dispute which was Sir and Khudkasht land of the petitioner before the enforcement of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951) (for short the Act) and after the date of vesting he became bhumidhar, that as the Respondent No. 4 was trying to interfers with the possession of the petitioner, consequently Suit No. 5 of 1954 (Kishori v. Faqir) for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession was filed against Respondent no. 4 by the petitioner on 5-1-1954 in the Civil Court. A true copy of j the plaint was filed as Annexure ' 6 to the petition. THE aforesaid suit was dismissed on 18-10-1956 by the Munsif. THE petitioner preferred an appeal before the Civil Judge which was allowed on 29-10-1958 and the suit for permanent injunction was decreed (vide Annexure ' 7 to the petition). Dakhal Dihani was taken on 14-11-1957 by the petitioner. Dakhal Dehani has been filed as Annexure ' 7 to the petition. THE aforesaid suit was dismissed on 18-10-1956 by the Munsif. THE petitioner preferred an appeal before the Civil Judge which was allowed on 29-10-1958 and the suit for permanent injunction was decreed (vide Annexure ' 7 to the petition). Dakhal Dihani was taken on 14-11-1957 by the petitioner. Dakhal Dehani has been filed as Annexure ' 7 to the petition. THE second appeal filed by Respondent No. 4 in this court (Second Appeal No. 2328 of 1957, Fakir v. Kishorilal) was dismissed by the judgment of this Court dated 12-7-1961 against which Special Appeal No. 323 of 1961 was filed which was also dismissed on 9-7-1965 by a Division Bench of this court. THEse judgments of the Civil Court and of this Court in favour of the petitioner in respect of land in dispute operate as Res Judicata. THE revenue enteries, however, continued in favour of Respondent No. 4, hence the petitioner has to file a suit under section 229-B of the Act for declaration of sirdari/ bhumidhari rights and for expunction of the entries in the name of Respondent no. 4. During the pendency of that suit under section 229-B of the Act notification under section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was made on 15-5-71. Consequently the suit under section 229-B of the Act was abated under section 5 (2) (a) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. In the alternative the petitioner alleged to be bhumidhar and prayed that the entries in the name of Respondent No. 4 may be expunged. Respondent no. 4, on the other hand, filed another objection denying the claim of the petitioner, stating that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession in 1954 and Civil Court judgment would not operate as Res Judicata. The entries made in his name were correct. The claim of the petitioner was alleged to be time-barred. 3. IN respect of the remaining two khatas, namely, khata Nos. 301 and 177, the petitioner filed an objection that he was in possession as bhumidhar and has got title to the land and the same was incorrectly recorded in the names of the respondents. IN the alternative, the petitioner claimed sirdari rights under section 210 of the Act. 3. IN respect of the remaining two khatas, namely, khata Nos. 301 and 177, the petitioner filed an objection that he was in possession as bhumidhar and has got title to the land and the same was incorrectly recorded in the names of the respondents. IN the alternative, the petitioner claimed sirdari rights under section 210 of the Act. The objection of the petitioner in respect of these two khatas was contested by the recorded tenure-holders and they denied the title of the petitioner and alleged that the claim of the petitioner became time-barred and that they acquired sirdari rights under section 210 of the Act. 4. ONE Kanhaiya, father of Ram Shankar, Respondent No. 19, filed an objection claiming co-tenancy rights along with the petitioner which was denied by him. The Consolidation Officer decided the case against the petitioner. His appeal and revision also met the same fate. Against the impugned orders the present petition has been filed in this court. 5. THE learned counsel for. the petitioner urged that the civil suit, in respect of the agricultural land, filed by the petitioner on 4-1-1954, in respect of khata nos. 156 and 266, was maintainable in the Civil Court, as on that date the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. He placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Thakur Dhian Singh v. Indrapal Singh, 1973 AWR 106. THE ratio in Chandraika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 para 6 that a suit for permanent injunction filed on 4th January, 1954 in the Civil Court was not maintainable and only the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, would not be binding on this court as it was based on concession of the Advocate and as relevant U. P. Land Laws Amendment Acts, deciding and changing the forum for the suit on different dates were not brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It was also urged that U. P. Land Reforms Amendment Act no. It was also urged that U. P. Land Reforms Amendment Act no. 24 of 1954 which came into force on 10-10-1954 and the U.P. Land Reforms Amendment Act No 18 of 1956 which came into force on 28-5-1956 as also the U.P. Land Reforms Amendment Act No. 37 of 1958 which came into force on 30-11-1958 in particular were not brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Supreme Court while deciding the case of Chandrika Misir (Supra). 6. THE learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that the High Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India was bound by the decisions and the laws declared by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. THE civil suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession in respect of the agricultural land was not maintainable in the Civil Court on 4-1-1954. THE ratio in Chandrika Misra v. Bhaiya Ram (Supra) was binding on this Court. In respect of the remaining khatas, namely, khata nos. 301 and 177 the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the important documentary and oral evidence including the statements of the petitioner himself and one Sukkhoo have not been considered nor any finding about the possession has been recorded. The petitioner's claim for possession was not barred by time. 7. THE learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that the relevant evidence have been considered and the findings recorded by the Consolidation Authorities are correct and need not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, the first point for determination is as to whether a suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession in respect of agricultural land was maintainable in 1954 in the Civil Court or in the Revenue Court. Second point is about interpretation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and whether ratio of a decision of the Supreme Court can be held to be binding, if it is rendered without taking into consideration the relevant statutory provisions of law and the same was based on the concession of the learned counsel. The last point is as to whether the finding of the Deputy Director of Consolidation can be held to be findings of fact when important oral and documentary evidence has not been considered. The last point is as to whether the finding of the Deputy Director of Consolidation can be held to be findings of fact when important oral and documentary evidence has not been considered. Before considering the decisions which have bearing on the questions involved it is better to decide the first point, as to whether in 1954 a suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession, or a suit for declaration and ejectment under section 229-B and section 209 of the Act was maintainable in the Revenue Court (i.e. Asstt. Collector 1st Class). Regarding a suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession, Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts that all suits of civil nature would lie before the Court i.e. Civil Court and not before the Asstt. Collector 1st Class i. e. Revenue Court. U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951) is a self-contained Code as regards the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts in respect of the agricultural land is concerned. Amendments have been made not in-frequently by the U. P. Legislature. These Amendments amending Section 331 and Schedule II (Two) decide the jurisdiction of the Civil and Revenue Courts. Section 331 (1) of the Act enacts that, except as provided under this Act, no court other than the court mentioned in column No. 4 of Schedule II, (i.e. Asstt. Collector 1st Class, i. e. the Revenue Court) shall take cognizance of any suit, application or proceeding mentioned in column No. 3 (i.e. nature of the suit or proceedings). 9. A suit for permanent injunction, in 1954, was governed by the provisions of Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Lateron it was governed by Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. A bare perusal of the Schedule II of the Act as it was in 1954 would evince that suits of the nature of sections 229-B (i. e. for declaration) and 209 (i. e. for ejectment of a trespasser), were conspicuous by their absence from Schedule II and columns 2 and 3. The only irresistable corollary is that a suit under section 229-B (for declaration of sirdari and bhumidhari rights) and suit under section 209 (for ejectment of a trespasser) in 1954 could not have been filed before the Asstt. Collector 1st Class (i. e. Revenue Court). The only irresistable corollary is that a suit under section 229-B (for declaration of sirdari and bhumidhari rights) and suit under section 209 (for ejectment of a trespasser) in 1954 could not have been filed before the Asstt. Collector 1st Class (i. e. Revenue Court). It may be clarified that a suit for permanent injunction was never maintainable before Revenue Court and if the allegations in the plaint and the relief claimed in a suit for permanent injunction was moulded in such a way that it became a suit for declaration and ejectment only then it can lie in Revenue Court, but that was possible only if Schedule II (Two) provided for filing such a suit before Assistant Collector 1st Class. On 1st July, 1952, the date of vesting, when the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force, the suit under section 209 for the ejectment of the trespasser or under section 229-B for declaration of Bhumidhari/Sirdari rights could only be filed in the Civil Court as these suits were not mentioned in column 3 of Schedule II (Two). A perusal of Schedule II (Two) (under section 331) evinces that it did not contain a forum for a suit under sections 229-B or 209. In respect of Bhumidhari or Sirdari land, the plaintiff could file a suit in the Civil Court only by moulding the relief and allegations made in the plaint in the form of a suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession. In this way a suit under sections 229-B and 209 also could not have been filed before the Revenue Court on the date of vesting. 10. IN 1954 also such a suit for injunction and possession was maintainable in the Civil Court only. After the enforcement of the U. P. Land Reforms Amendment Act (Act No. 18 of 1956) on 28-5-56, the Schedule II was amended and a suit under section 209 (for ejectment of a trespasser) was provided in Schedule II and such a suit could have been filed before the Revenue Court (the Assistant Collector, 1st Class). The First Appeal could lay before the Commissioner and the second appeal lay before the Board of Revenue. IN the instant case Civil Suit No. 5 of 1954 (Kishori v. Faqir) filed on 4-1-1954 in respect of khata nos. The First Appeal could lay before the Commissioner and the second appeal lay before the Board of Revenue. IN the instant case Civil Suit No. 5 of 1954 (Kishori v. Faqir) filed on 4-1-1954 in respect of khata nos. 156 and 266 could have been filed only before the Civil Court. Further there was a saving Clause in view of section 23 of the U. P. Land Reforms Amendment Act (Act No. 18 of 1956) which prevented the pending suits from being affected by the amendments. Similarly when the U. P. Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1958 (Act No. 37 of 1958) came into force there was a Saving Clause under section 87 to the same effect. Similar view was taken in a Full Bench decision of this court in Thakur Dhian Singh v. Indra Pal Singh, (Supra). In that case the forum for a suit for division of holdings was considered. Whereas in the instant case forum for a suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for a relief for ejectment was to be decided. It is abundantly clear that on 4-1-1954 the Civil Suit for the relief of permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession was correctly filed in the Civil Court. It was not maintainable in Revenue Court inasmuch as in Schedule II (Two) there was no mention of a suit for ejectment, permanent injunction or for declaration. 11. NOW coming to the next point as to whether the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Ram, (Supra) was binding on this Court when it was based on concession of the Advocate. To put it differently whether a decision of the Supreme Court can be binding on High Court, in view of Article 141 of the Constitution, in which the relevant statutory provisions of law were not brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and the same was based on concession of the Advocate. Ex Abundenti cutela Article 141 can be fruitfully set out below :- " The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. " 12. ARTICLE 141 of the Constitution, is not a new provision rather similar provision was contained under section 209 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Ex Abundenti cutela Article 141 can be fruitfully set out below :- " The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. " 12. ARTICLE 141 of the Constitution, is not a new provision rather similar provision was contained under section 209 of the Government of India Act, 1935. There is no doubt an unwritten rule based on what is known as Judicial Comity. The same has been explained recently in Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Chapdan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 330 . It is better to quote the relevant observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court which appears to be the basis for enacting Article 141 of the Constitution of India :- ".........in the hierarchical system of Courts' which exists in our country, 'it is necessary for each lower tier,' including the High Court, 'to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers.' It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of Courts that there are decision's of the Supreme Appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary......But the judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the. last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. The better wisdom of the Court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the Court above." 13. IN Jaket Randen v. E.S.T.C., AIR 1985 SC 90 it was held :- "Judgments of courts are not to be construed as Acts of Parliament, nor can we read a judgment on a particular aspect of a question as a holy book covering all aspects of every question whether such questions and face of such questions arose for consideration or not in that case." 14. A Full Bench of this Court in Swami Prasad Pradhan v. Hargobind Sahai Mathur, AIR 1970 All. 251 = 1969 AWR 441 held under paragraph 16 (relying on State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1967 SC 997 that the judgment of the Supreme Court which proceeds on a concession of counsel cannot be deemed to be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court on the point conceded by the counsel and the decision cannot be treated to be binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. In State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta (Supra), it was held :- "The decision made on a concession made by the parties even the principle accepted by the Privy Council, without discussion, cannot be given the same value as one given on a careful consideration of the points of question raised;" 15. IN Lakshmi Shanker Srivastava v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 451 under para 11 p. 455, it was held :- "The judgment R. J. Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 1552 proceeds on concession and not on any analysis or examination of the relevant provisions. Therefore, it in no way helps the appellant in this case." 16. IN precedent in English Law by Rupert Cross, 1961 Edition, at p. 130 there is an observation as follows :- "No doubt any court would decline to follow a case decided by itself or any other court (even one of superior jurisdiction) if the judgment erroneously assumed the existence or non-existence of a statute and that assumption formed the basis of decision. This exception to the rule of stare decisis is probably best regarded as an aspect of a broader qualification of the rule, namely, that courts are not bound to follow decisions reached per incuriam". In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 2 All ER 203 at p. 300 Lord Green observed as follows :- "Where the Court has construed a Statute or a rule having the force of a statute, its decision stands on the same footing as any other decision on a question of law. But where the court is satisfied that the earlier decision was given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having the force of a statute, the position is very different. It cannot in our opinion be right to say that in such a case the Court is entitled to disregard the statutory provision and is bound to follow decision...............given when that provision was not present to its mind. Cases of this discription are examples of decisions given per incuriam." 17. IN Jaisri v. Rajdewan, AIR 1962 SC 83 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have quoted the observations of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edition), Vol. 22, part 1687, pages 799-800 as follows :- "A Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. IN Jaisri v. Rajdewan, AIR 1962 SC 83 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have quoted the observations of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edition), Vol. 22, part 1687, pages 799-800 as follows :- "A Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision as given per incuriam when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction, which covered the case before it or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of House of Lords. IN the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords." 18. IN Ferrell v. Alexander, (1976) 1 All. ER 129 at p. 137 it was held as follows :- "If a decision was given per incuriam i.e. in ignorance of statute or other binding authority, the court is not bound by it." Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Ram, (Supra) was a case decided on the basis of the concession made by the learned counsel as is clear from paragraph 6 of the judgment, and further the relevant statutory provisions about the jurisdiction of Civil Court and Revenue Court not having been brought to the notice of their Lordships of Supreme Court with profound regards lam of the view that the case of Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Ram, (Supra) is not binding nor can it be taken to be an authority for determining the jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Court or in respect of a suit for permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession filed in 1954. In 1954 such suits could have been filed only in the Civil Court as a suit for ejectment of a trespasser under section 209 of the Act was not maintainable in the Revenue Court. Thus the consolidation authorities have committed manifest error apparent on the face of the record. Civil Suit No. 5 of 1954 Kishori v. Faqir filed on 4-1-1954 was decided in favour of the petitioner and even the second appeal, and the special appeal filed by the contesting respondents before this court were dismissed. These decisions would operate as res judicata and the contesting respondents were bound by the same. 19. AS regards the last point in respect of Khata nos. These decisions would operate as res judicata and the contesting respondents were bound by the same. 19. AS regards the last point in respect of Khata nos. 301 and 177 as the important documentary evidence on record and the oral evidence including the statement of the petitioner himself and his witness Sukkhu were not considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, hence his findings of fact in respect of possession cannot be deemed to be binding on this Court and these findings are perverse. There are catena of decisions of this Court including Ram Kishore v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1986 AWC 581 to the effect that in a controversy similar to the suit for ejectment under section 209 of the Act it is necessary to discuss and scrutinise the oral evidence led by the parties. I am, therefore of the opinion that in respect of these khata nos. 301 and 177 the decision rendered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be maintained and the case be remanded to him in order to consider the oral and documentary evidence. 20. IN view of the discussions made hereinabove, I am of the view that the orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities in respect of the khata nos. 156 and 266 deserve to be quashed. In the result, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the impugned orders dated 15-2-1975, 21-12-1973 and 13-12-1972 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Consolidation Officer in proceedings under section 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act are quashed. As a result of inescapable corollary the entries in the revenue records in respect of the khatas nos. 156 and 266 in the names of the contesting respondents shall be expunged and the name of the petitioner shall be entered over these khatas. In respect of the remaining khata nos. 301 and 177 also the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is quashed and the case is remanded back (in respect of these two khatas) to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Under the circumstances, however, the petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.