JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is a revision by the original defendant Akbar Ali, whose preliminary objection that the instant suit is barred in view of the provisions of section 32 of the Arbitration Act was rejected by the learned trial Court. The original defendant, Akbar Ali died during the pendency of this revision and his legal representatives are brought on record to prosecute the instant revision. The reference hereafter to the defendant would, however, mean the reference to the original defendant-Akbar Ali. Briefly, the facts are that the non-applicant-plaintiffs filed the instant suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and accounts. The plaintiffs are the sons of the defendant from his first wife who had already died. The plaintiffs and the defendant formed a partnership as per the partnership deed dated 12-12-1964, the name of the partnership being M/s. Kikabhai Rahmat Ali. Since there was a dispute between the plaintiffs on one hand and the defendant on the other as regards the business of the partnership firm, they, by an agreement of reference dated 1-11-1979 referred their dispute to the arbitration of the sole arbitrator Shri Syed Yusufbhai. The sole arbitrator Shri Syed Yusufbhai passed his award on 19-11-1979 determining the shares and liabilities of each partner and dissolving the partnership. However, no steps were taken by any of the parties to the award to file the same in the competent Civil Court to make it a rule of the Court or in other words, to get a decree in terms of the same. 2. On the contrary, the plaintiffs filed on 18-2-1980 the instant suit upon the original cause of action on the ground that the award passed by the sole arbitrators was in excess of the terms of reference and was, therefore, a nullity and was not acceptable to the plaintiffs. It was also averred in para 7 of the plaint that the award was not filed in the Court within the prescribed period of limitation by any of the parties. In the written statement filed by the defendant, it was averred by him in para 9 that the instant suit for dissolution of firm and accounts was untenable in law because the matters thereunder were finally settled as per the aforesaid award dated 19-11-1979. In the written statement filed by the defendant, it was averred by him in para 9 that the instant suit for dissolution of firm and accounts was untenable in law because the matters thereunder were finally settled as per the aforesaid award dated 19-11-1979. The allegation in para 7 of the plaint that the award was in excess of the terms of reference and that it was a nullity were denied. It was also alleged in the written statement by the defendant that it was not open to the plaintiffs to challenge the validity of the award in the suit, because there were specific provisions made in the Arbitration Act for challenging the same. 3. With these rival pleadings, the following preliminary issue was framed by the learned trial Court : "Whether his jurisdiction to entertain the suit was barred under section 32 of the Arbitration Act ?" It appears that there was an application for interim relief of temporary injunction and an appointment of a receiver which prompted the trial Court to frame the issue of jurisdiction in view of the provisions of section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was also a preliminary issue framed regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit which is not pressed in this revision on behalf of the revision applicants. The learned trial Court held that the instant suit which was filed on the basis of the original cause of action was not barred by virtue of the provisions of section 32 of the Arbitration Act and he had, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the same. He also rejected the objection about his pecuniary jurisdiction. He, thus, held that it was open to him to consider the question of grant of interim relief of temporary injunction and/or appointment of a receiver in the suit. Being aggrieved the defendant preferred the instant revision against the aforesaid order in this Court. 4. The learned Counsel for the revision applicants has urged before me that the learned trial Court has misread the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Satish Kumar and others v. Surindar kumar and others)1, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 833 and also the decision of this Court in the case of (Deluxe Silk Traders v. M/s. Satyanarayan)2, A.I.R. 1979 Bombay 149. 4. The learned Counsel for the revision applicants has urged before me that the learned trial Court has misread the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Satish Kumar and others v. Surindar kumar and others)1, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 833 and also the decision of this Court in the case of (Deluxe Silk Traders v. M/s. Satyanarayan)2, A.I.R. 1979 Bombay 149. According to him, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case cited supra and as held by this Court in the case cited supra, the view taken by this Court in the previous case of (Chandrabhaga Sadashiv and another v. Bhikachand Hansaji)3, A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 549 is no more a good law. The submission is that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court cited supra it cannot be said that an award which is not made a rule of the Court is merely a waste paper and, therefore, the suit on original cause of action is maintainable which was the view taken in the previous decision of this Court cited supra. 5. It is, however, urged by the learned Counsel of the plaintiffs that no such question is decided in the above case of the Supreme Court. According to him the said case does not deal with the question of bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In support of his contention that the suit is maintainable he his relied upon the previous decision of this Court cited supra (A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 549) the view in which according to him is not over-ruled. He has also relied upon the cases (Pamandass v. Manikyam Pillai)4, A.I.R. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 59 : (Mohd. Yusuf v. Mohd. Hussian)5, A.I.R. 1964 Madras 1 and (V. Sanjeevamma v. Yerram Puranamma and others)6, A.I.R. 1984 Andhra Pradesh 28 in support of his contention that the suit on the original cause of action is not barred if the award is not made a rule of the Court under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. All the aforesaid decisions no doubt support the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff. It may, however, be seen that except the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of A.I.R. 1984 A.P. 28, all the other decisions are prior to the decision of the Supreme Court, cited supra. All the aforesaid decisions no doubt support the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff. It may, however, be seen that except the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of A.I.R. 1984 A.P. 28, all the other decisions are prior to the decision of the Supreme Court, cited supra. It is, therefore, the submission on behalf of the revision applicants that the view taken in the above cases is no more a good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, cited supra. 6. Before considering the rival submissions, I may briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act. Chapter II deals with the arbitration without intervention of the Court. Section 3 provides that unless a different intention appears, the provisions set out in the First Schedule in so far as they are applicable to the reference shall be deemed to be included in the arbitration agreement. Section 4 provides for the agreement between the parties to refer the dispute to the arbitrator or arbitrators to be appointed under the arbitration agreement. Section 15 empowers the Court to modify or correct the award in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 16 empowers the Court to remit the award for reconsideration of the arbitrator upon the grounds mentioned therein. If there is no cause to remit or any impediment necessitating reconsideration or setting aside of the award, the Court can pass judgment in terms of the award under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. 7. Section 30 of the Arbitration Act provides that an award shall not be set aside except on one or more grounds enumerated therein. Section 31(1) provides for filing of an award in any Court having the jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates. It is provided in section 31(2) that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in the Arbitration act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been or may be, filed, and by no other Court. Section 32, which is relevant for the purpose of this revision then provides that notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, for shall any arbitration agreement or award be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in the Arbitration Act. Thus, a bar for filing a suit in regard to arbitration agreement or award is created under section 32 of the Arbitration Act. Section 33 than provides that any party to arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award.....should apply to the Court and the Court should decided the said questions in the manner provided in the said section. Another relevant provision to be noticed is contained in para 7 of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act which provides for implied conditions of the arbitration agreement. It is provided therein that the award shall be final and binding on the parties and the persons claiming under them respectively. 8. With the above provisions in mind, I may refer to the decision of this Court in the case Chadrabhaga v. Bhikamchand. A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 549. The view taken by this Court in the aforesaid case was that according to the scheme of the Arbitration Act and in particular the scheme of the provisions referred to above, all the arbitrations were brought under the control of the Court and were treated as effective only if a decree was obtained in terms of the award under the Arbitration Act so as to prevent the parties from agitating any question relating to the existence, validity or effect of an arbitration agreement or an award in any manner other than that as provided by the said Act. It was held in the said case that sections 31, 32 and 33 do not by express language or by implication, provide that a suit on the original cause of action after an abortive or incomplete arbitration would not lie. It was held in the said case that sections 31, 32 and 33 do not by express language or by implication, provide that a suit on the original cause of action after an abortive or incomplete arbitration would not lie. In para 7 of the judgment, it was held that unless the award is made a rule of the Court, it would have no validity of its own and it would not be operative and would not merge in itself the original cause of action so as to bar a suit upon the same. It was also held that there was no express language used in section 32 of the Arbitration Act to bar the suit on the original cause of action. It is not necessary to refer to the other decisions in detail relied upon on behalf of the plaintiffs viz. A.I.R. 1960 A.P. 59 (F.B. ), A.I.R. 1964 Madras 1 (F.B.) because they have taken a view similar to the view taken by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. 9. I may now turn to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 833 relied upon on behalf of the revision applicants and consider the question how far the view taken by this Court in its aforesaid judgment is departed from in the said case. It is clear from the facts of the said case that the award passed by the arbitrator was filed in the Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act for being made a rule of the Court, to which certain objections were raised under section 30 of the said Act. One of the objections raised was that the said award was not admissible in evidence for want of proper stamp duty and registration and, therefore, would not be made a rule of the Court. It was this objection which was considered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The view expressed by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in (Sheonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand)7, A.I.R. 1958 Patna 252 and also by the Punjab High Court in (Sardool Singh v. Hari Singh)8, A.I.R. 1968 Punj. Har. It was this objection which was considered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The view expressed by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in (Sheonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand)7, A.I.R. 1958 Patna 252 and also by the Punjab High Court in (Sardool Singh v. Hari Singh)8, A.I.R. 1968 Punj. Har. 294 was that the award was not necessary to be registered under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act because it was effective only when it was made a rule of the Court under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. The Supreme Curt did not accept the view in the above case. 10. In considering the question whether the award which is not registered as required by section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act is admissible or not, the Supreme Court has relied upon its earlier unreported decision in (M/s. Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. v. Union of India)9, Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1962, decided on 11-10-1962 ( see para 8), the ratio of which is more relevant to the facts in the instant case. The facts in the aforesaid unreported decision would show that after the arbitration award was passed, a second reference to arbitration was made in the said case. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid unreported decision observed: "It is well settled that as a general rule all claims which are the subject-matter of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which is pronounced in the proceedings before the arbitrator and that after the award has been pronounced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of the said claims can be determined only on the basis of the said award. After the award is pronounced, no action can be started on the original claim which had been the subject-matter of the reference....". The Supreme Court referred to with approval the following observations of the Calcutta High Court in (Bhajanhari Saha Banikya v. Behary Lal Basak)10, (1906) I.L.R. 33 Cal. 881 at page 898: "The award is in fact a final adjudication of a Court of the parties own choice and until impeached upon sufficient grounds in an appropriate proceeding, an award. The Supreme Court referred to with approval the following observations of the Calcutta High Court in (Bhajanhari Saha Banikya v. Behary Lal Basak)10, (1906) I.L.R. 33 Cal. 881 at page 898: "The award is in fact a final adjudication of a Court of the parties own choice and until impeached upon sufficient grounds in an appropriate proceeding, an award. Which is on the face of it regular, is conclusive upon the merits of the controversy submitted, unless possibly the parties have intended that the award shall not be final and conclusive...in reality, an award possesses all the elements of vitality even though it has not been formally enforced and it may be relied upon in a litigating between the parties relating to the same subject-matter." 11. The Supreme Curt further observed in the aforesaid unreported decision that the above conclusion of the Calcutta High Court is based upon the elementary principle that, as between the parties and their privies, an award is entitled to that respect which is due to judgment of a Court of last resort. The Supreme Court, therefore, held in the aforesaid unreported decision that if the award which has been pronounced between the parties has in fact, or can, in law, be deemed to have dealt with the present dispute, the second reference would be incompetent. 12. Relying upon the aforesaid unreported decision, the Supreme Court held in Satish Kumar's case that the award which is not made a rule of the Court has some legal force and is not a mere waste paper and if the award in question is not a mere waste paper but has some legal effect, it plainly effects or purports to affect property within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. In this view of the matter, it is held in Satish Kumar's case that the award before being made a rule of the Court would that the award before being made a rule of the Court would require registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. Hegde, J, who has given a separate concurring judgment in the aforesaid case has succinctly put the matter in his judgment. He has observed that the award does create rights in the property but those rights cannot be enforced until the award is made a decree of the Court. Hegde, J, who has given a separate concurring judgment in the aforesaid case has succinctly put the matter in his judgment. He has observed that the award does create rights in the property but those rights cannot be enforced until the award is made a decree of the Court. He has thus made a distinction between the two stages in the award, the first stage being of the arbitration agreement culminating into passing of an award and the second stage relating to the enforcement of the award. Referring to para 7 of the First Schedule, he emphasised that the award would be final and binding upon the parties and persons claiming under them. He, therefore, held that the award is not a mere waste paper but has legal efficacy and would operate to create or declare rights within the meaning of section (1)(b) of the Registration Act. 13. It is thus clear that the view taken by this Court in the case of Chandrabhaga v. Bhikamchand, A.I.R. 1959 Bom. 549 that the award is only operative when it is made a rule of the Court and that till then it has no vitality or is merely an abortive attempt stands over-ruled by the above view taken by the Supreme Court in Satish Kumar's case. This Court has, therefore, in a later judgment in Delux Silk Traders v. M/s. Satyanarayan, A.I.R. 1979 Bombay 149 has followed the view in Satish Kumar's case (see para 5 of the judgment). Since the very basis of the reasoning in the aforesaid previous case of this Court to held that an award which is not made a rule of the Court would not bar a suit on a original cause of action is lost due to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Satish Kumar's case or to be precise in its unreported decision relied upon in that case the previous decision of the case cited supra is of no help to the plaintiffs in the instant case. The reasoning, therefore, adopted by this Court in the aforesaid decision to hold that an award would not bar a suit on the original cause of action would not be available to the plaintiffs in the instant suit. 14. The reasoning, therefore, adopted by this Court in the aforesaid decision to hold that an award would not bar a suit on the original cause of action would not be available to the plaintiffs in the instant suit. 14. It is true, as urged on behalf of the plaintiffs, that the question whether an award which is not made a rule of the Curt would bar a suit on the original cause of action is not decided by the Supreme Court in Satish Kumar's case. But upon the view taken by it that the award which is not made a rule of the Court is not a waste paper and has its own legal efficacy and that it is final and binding upon the parties and the persons claiming under them, the conclusion is irresistible that the suit on the original cause of action would be barred. The ratio of the previous unreported judgment of the Supreme Court referred to and relied upon in Satish Kumar's case fully supports the above view. In the said unreported decision the question whether the suit on the original cause of action is barred when there is already an award was barred, which is more or less analogous to the question whether the suit on the original cause of action is barred when there is already an arbitration award. The Supreme Court held in the said unreported judgment that the second reference to arbitration is barred by the existence of the previous award in the same matter. The reason given is that after an award is pronounced, on action can be started on the original claim which had been the subject matter of the reference. 15. Since the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observations of the Calcutta High Court in the case referred to in the aforesaid unreported decision (1906) I.L.R. 33 Cal. The reason given is that after an award is pronounced, on action can be started on the original claim which had been the subject matter of the reference. 15. Since the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observations of the Calcutta High Court in the case referred to in the aforesaid unreported decision (1906) I.L.R. 33 Cal. 881, it has to be held that the award is in fact a final adjudication of a Court of the parties own choice, and until impeached upon sufficient ground in an appropriate proceeding, an award, which is on the face of it regular, is conclusive upon the merits of the controversy submitted, unless possibly the parties have intended that the award shall not be final and conclusive....in reality, an award possesses all the elements of vitality even though it has not been normally enforced....The observations referred to above thus clearly show that although the award is not made a rule of the Court, it is final and binding between the parties and is a final adjudication upon controversy raised therein. If a second reference could not be made on the basis of the original cause of action although the previous award was not made a rule of the Court by the same reasoning, in my view, the suit also cannot be filed on the original cause of action if there is in existence the arbitration award in relation to the same. 16. Para 7 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act shows that the implied condition of the arbitration agreement is that the award shall be final and binding on parties and persons claiming under them notwithstanding the fact that it is not made a rule of the Court. If the award is final and binding between the parties and is itself a final adjudication of the rights decided therein, the suit on the original cause of action would clearly be barred. As regards the law prevailing prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Act, 1940, it is the settled view, which is clear from the decision of the Privy Council and the decision of the various High Courts, including our High Court see (Laldas Jibhai v. Bai Lala)13, (1909)II Bom.L.R. 20 that an award is not a mere agreement but is equivalent to a judgment. It is binding between the parties in all matters which it professes to decide. It is binding between the parties in all matters which it professes to decide. When once a matter has been decided between the parties, the parties ought to be concluded by an adjudication whatever it may be. In order that the parties should be remitted to their previous rights. It is not enough that the award was not enforced or that even both parties objected to it, there must be positive evidence that both parties agreed that the former state of things should be restored. 17. The above settled view is approved by the Supreme Court in para 19 of the judgment in the case of (Kashinathsa Yamosa Kabadi etc. v. Narsingsa Bhaskarsa Kabadi etc.)14, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1077 in which it is observed that even if the award is not made a rule of the Court, it was regarded as a final judgment in a suit. It is true that in the said judgment the actual question whether the suit on the original cause of action if there was an arbitration award under the Arbitration act was bared or not was kept open because in the said case it was held that the award in that case was acted upon by the parties voluntarily and, therefore, by the mutual agreement between the parties, the suit was barred because by acting upon the award, it would, mean that the parties have by mutual agreement settled the dispute as per the award. However, although the above question was kept open in the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, the observations in the said case referred to above would equally apply to the arbitration ward under the Arbitration act, particularly in view of para 7 of the First Schedule of the said Act. At any rate, in my view, the said question stands concluded in the unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in Uttam Singh Dugal Co. v. Union of India, referred in Satish Kumar's case cited supra. 18. It has, therefore, to be held that the suit on the original cause of action would be barred because of the existence of the arbitration award in the instant case. v. Union of India, referred in Satish Kumar's case cited supra. 18. It has, therefore, to be held that the suit on the original cause of action would be barred because of the existence of the arbitration award in the instant case. Although in express terms it is not stated in section 32 that a suit on the original cause of action would be barred, the scheme of section 30, 31(2) and 32 would be that a suit on the original cause of action would be barred because what is provided therein is that no suit can lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect and validity of an award and no arbitration ward can be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in the Arbitration Act. Although, therefore the suit may not directly be framed to set aside the award as such or to vary its terms, the effect of the filling of a suit on the basis of the original cause of action for adjudication of the rights of the parties would be the same. In my view, therefore, the suit on the original cause of action stands barred by the provisions of section 32 of the Arbitration Act. 19. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has brought to my notice the decision of this Court in the case of (Ratanji Virpal Co. v. Dhirajlal Manilal)15, A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 101 but the ratio of the decision in the said case would not be of any assistance to the contention raised by him but on the contrary, would support the contention raised on behalf of the revision applicants. In the said case without filing the award in the Court, the plaintiff filed a suit for setting aside the said award and this Court held that no suit would lie unless the award is filed in the Court because it is only then that the application could be made under section 33 of the Arbitration Act to challenge the said award. It is observed by this Court in the said case that section 31(2) clearly lays down that all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. In the instant case, perusal of para 7 of the plaint upon which primarily the suit is based would show that, according to the plaintiffs, the sole arbitrator acted in excess of the terms of the reference and that the plaintiff did not accept the same and further that the award was not filed in the Court within the prescribed time due to which the award was a nullity. This is a question which in view of the provisions of section 31(2) of the Arbitration Act could be decided by a Court in which the arbitration award was or could be filed and by no other. As such, if the award cannot be challenged as a nullity in the instant suit upon the above grounds, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief in the instant suit on the original cause of action. As shown above, the award is final and binding upon the parties and would bar the instant suit. 20. The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs has relied upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh in V. Sanjeevamma v. Yerram Puranamma and others, A.I.R, 1984 Andhra Pradesh 28, which has considered the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satish Kumar's case, cited supra. In may view, the question whether the suit on the original cause of action is barred in view of the arbitration award although it is not made the rule of the Court was not directly considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the above case. The questions raised in the said case was whether the award, which was not registered under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act was admissible in evidence and whether it was incapable to create or extinguish rights in moveable or immoveable properties which the plaintiffs in the said case claimed to have acquired by a registered Will when the said award was not made a rule of the Court. In my view, with great respect the above decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken into consideration the view of the Supreme Court in its unreported decision which is cited with approval in Satish Kumar's case. On the contrary, in the similar set of facts where the defence upon existence of the award was raised, the Allahabad High Court in the case of (Smt. Madhavi Sirothia v. N.N. Sirothia)16, A.I.R 1974 All. 36 has referred it the said unreported decision in arriving at its conclusion that the existence of the award can be set up in defence. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court which did not consider the ratio and the effect of the unreported decision of the Supreme Court referred to in Satish Kumar's case which clinches the issue that the suit on the original cause of action is barred by the existence of an award although not made a rule of the Court. I would, therefore, prefer the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case cited supra. More direct judgment on this question is in the case of (Gourishankar Prasad v. The State of Bihar)17, A.I.R. 1973 Patna 405, which supports the view taken by me in the instant case. As already pointed out, a similar view is also taken by a late judgment of this Court in M/s. Deluxe v. M/s. Saryanarayan, A.I.R. 1979 Bombay 149. The contention on behalf of the plaintiffs that the suit based on the original cause of action would not be barred by the existence of an award which is not made a rule of the Court, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 21. The next question which is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs is that the arbitration award in the instant case created right in immoveable property worth Rs. 100/- or more and, therefore, required registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act in the absence of which it is not admissible in evidence in the instant case so as to bar it. In my view, there is no merit in the above contention. So far as the registration of the award is concerned, it is necessary if the right is claimed under the award and is sought to be enforced either by way of suit or by way of defence. In my view, there is no merit in the above contention. So far as the registration of the award is concerned, it is necessary if the right is claimed under the award and is sought to be enforced either by way of suit or by way of defence. In the instant case, what is pleaded is the existence of the award which would bar the instant suit and, therefore, there was no question of its inadmissibility for the said purpose without being registered. The above contention on behalf of the plaintiffs is, therefore, rejected. In the result, the instant revision is allowed. The impugned order of the learned trail Court is set aside. The preliminary issue framed by the trial Court whether his jurisdiction to entertain the suit was barred under section 32 of the Arbitration Act is answered in the affirmative and the instant suit is, therefore, dismissed with costs. However, in the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs in this revision. Revision application dismissed.