The petitioner herein impugns the order dated 20.2.85 of the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh in Misc. (J) Case No. 6 of 1979 arising out of Title Suit No. 48 of 1976 rejecting his petitions, the first for accepting the certified copy of a decree in Suit No. 290 of 1974 of No. II Civil Judge, Gorakhpur; and the second to recall the opposite party for cross-examination. 2. The petitioner instituted the above title suit against the opposite party and few others for partition and accounts of their ancestral coparcenary properties amongst themselves claiming themselves to be the legal heirs of one late Adharant Singh. The suit was decreed exparte with costs on 10.8.76. The opposite party filed petition No. 514/79 on 16.2.79 under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Sec. 151 C.P.C. for rejecting the preliminary decree which was drawn up, whereupon Misc.(J) Case No. 6/79 was registered. The main grounds urged for setting aside the decree of the title suit were that the petitio­ner, as plaintiff, suppressed material facts of defendant-opposite party's minority on the date of filing of the suit and non-service of summons on him. In the miscellaneous (judicial) case the opposite party's evidence was closed on 6.12.82 and the next date 19.1.83 was fixed for evidence of the petitioner's party. After several adjournments the instant petitioner as opposite party filed two petitions, namely, petition No. 1797/84 and No. 1796/84 for acceptance of the above certified copy of the decree and for recalling the opposite party for further cross-examination, as stated above. By the certified copy of the aforesaid decree the petitioner wanted to show that the opposite party was major and not minor at the time of institution of the title suit. The learned trial Judge, after examining the provisions of Order 13 Rule 1 observed that as the said decree was passed on 28.2.82 and was signed by the Presiding Officer of the Court on 19.9.82, there was no valid reason or cause preventing the petitioner from procuring the certified copy of the same at an early date and the reason given that the certified copy was lying at Gorakhpur, was not believed. Besides, the petition for copy of the document was filed on 16.9.82 and the same was ready for delivery to the petitioner on 30.9.82 and consequently the document was evidently produced before the Court after inordinate and inexcusable delay and without any reasonable explanation. It was produced after the closure of evidence, including that of the opposite party himself, who was cross-examined at length by the petitioner. The learned trial Court also expressed serious doubt about the correctness, if not genuineness, of the alleged certified copy as all the pages did not bear the signature of the proper authority. The Court further observed that the said decree contained the name of one Ram Narayan Singh, aged 19 years, son of Ram Awadh Singh, resident of Village Bharah Tappa Burhej, Pargana Dhuripur, Tehsil Bongaon, Gorakhpur. The opposite party des­cribed himself in Misc. (J) Case No. 6/79 as Sri Ram Narayan Singh, son of late Adharam Singh, resident of Village Gareh, P. C. Rekahat, District Gorakhpur, U.P., presently residing at Digboi town, Mouza Makum, P.S. Digboi in the district of Dibrugarh. The application for acceptance of the certified copy of the decree having been rejected, the Court also rejected the prayer for recalling the opposite party for cross-examination as his evidence was already over and he was thoroughly cross-examined. 3. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the peti­tioner, submits, inter alia, that the certified copy of the decree being a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act doubting the genuineness and authority of the document without giving the petitioner an opportunity to explain, was wholly without jurisdiction and violative of the principles of natural justice; that the Court acted in excess of jurisdiction by assessing the probative value of the document without admitting the docu­ment itself, on materials which were not on record; that Order 13 Rules 1 and 2 are not penal provisions and hence they are to be liberally construed and costs should have been awarded ; and that the Court should have aimed at the ends of justice rather than mere technicalities of the law. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. P. G. Barua, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, refutes the contentions submitting that the petitioner has been resorting to dilatory tactics and that there could be no earthly reason why the certified copy could not be produced earlier ; that the certified copy was obtained in 1982 while the petition was filed after inordinate delay on 13.12.84 without giving satisfactory explanation for the delay; that the impugned order is purely an interlocmory procedural order and does not affect the right and, as such, it is not a case decided; and that no jurisdictional error has been pointed out by the petitioner. 5. To appreciate the rival contentions a reference to rele­vant provisions may be necessary. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 13 of the C.P.C. provides that the parties or their pleaders shall produce, at or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence of every description in their possession or power, on which they intend to rely, and which has not already been filed in Court, and all documents which the Court has ordered to be produced. Under sub-rule (2) thereof the Court shall receive the documents so produced : Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs. Rule 2 deals with the effect of non-production of documents. Under sub-rule (1) thereof, no documentary evidence in the possession or power of any party which should have been but has not been produced in accordance with the requirements of Rule 1 shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceeding unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-produc­tion thereof ; and the Court receiving any such evidence shall record the reasons for so doing. Under sub-rule (2) nothing in sub-rule (I) shall apply to document, - (a) produced for the cross examination of the witnesses of the other party, or (b) handed over to a witness marely to refresh his memory. 6. As was ruled in Kumar Gopika vs. Atal Singh, AIR 1922 PC 99 the rule of exclusion in O. 13, R. 2 only comes into-operation when the documents on which the parties rely should have been but were not, produced at the first hearing. 6. As was ruled in Kumar Gopika vs. Atal Singh, AIR 1922 PC 99 the rule of exclusion in O. 13, R. 2 only comes into-operation when the documents on which the parties rely should have been but were not, produced at the first hearing. Where according to the evidence, at the date of the first hearing cer­tain documents were not in the possession or power of the plantiff and his advisers did not know of their existence so as to enable them to inspect them and form an opinion as to whe­ther they would rely on them or not it was held that it could not be said that they should have been produced at the first hearing and therefore, the rule did not authorise the exclussion. Even where the rule of exclusion applies and documents cannot be filed without the leave of the Court, that leave should not ordinarily be refused where the documents or official records of undoubted authenticity might assist the Court to decide rightly the issues before it. So also in Madan Copal Kanodia vs. Mamraj Maniram, AIR 1976 SC 461 it has been held that Order 13 Rule 2 to CPC does not provide for any particular ritualistic formula in which the order of the Court has to be passed. The object of Order 13, Rule 2 is merely to prevent belated produc­tion of documents, so that it may not work injustice to the defendant. This provision clearly clothes the Court with dis­cretion to all production of documents if it is satisfied that good cause is shown to its satisfaction. It was observed in State of Punjab vs. Shyamlal Murari, (1976) 1 S.C.C. 719 at para 8 that "procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice." 7. In the instant case as the petitioner failed to produce the copy of the decree until the opposite party's evidence was closed, the same could not be received unless good cause was shown to the satisfaction of the Court for non-production thereof. For receiving any such evidence it was necessary to record the reasons for doing so. Order 13 Rule 2 has not made it necessary on the part of the Court to record reasons for not receiving such evidence. Even so the learned Court has given reasons for rejecting the certified copy. For receiving any such evidence it was necessary to record the reasons for doing so. Order 13 Rule 2 has not made it necessary on the part of the Court to record reasons for not receiving such evidence. Even so the learned Court has given reasons for rejecting the certified copy. If the document so produced was not found to be at all relevant it would be enough justification for the Court to refuse to receive it. On a persual of the application for acceptance of the certified copy it appears that no discrepancy in the address of the opposite party and his father's name as given in the certified copy of the decree sought to be produced and in the petition in Misc. (J) Case No. 6/79, was at all stated or indicated. If on scrutiny of the certified copy proposed to be produced the court found out a discrepancy and therefrom came to the conclusion that the certified copy would not be relevant, no fault can be found with the trial Court. If the court was not satisfied with the explanation given as to the delay in production of the certi­fied copy, then the court ordinarily would not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in this regard. It is true that the object of Order 13 Rules 1 and 2 is not to penalise the party and not to shut out the door for the party to state his case. When good cause is shown and the document is of vital importance for proper adjudication of the case and there was no apparent reason to withhold the document the party's submission deserves to be accepted. The doubt expressed as to the genuinness of the certified copy will in no way affect its validity if it is otherwise valid. In para 9 of the petition the petitioner states that Adharam Singh, son of late Mohabir Singh, grand-father of the petitioner, described himself both an Adharam Singh as well as Ram Awadh Singh ; that the identity of Adharam Singh who is also described as Ram Awadh Singh, son of late Mohabir Singh was never questioned by any of the parties ; and that it is also not disputed that Ram Narayan Singh is one of the sons of late Adharam Singh alias Ram Awadh Singh. According to the petitioner it is not disputed that Adharam Singh had properties including residence both at Village Bharah Tappa also described as Bharroah and village Garahi, but there was no such explanation in the application for production of the copy, 8. In the context of the view we have taken it is not necessary to decide whether the impugned order amounted to a case decided. As was ruled in Major S. S. Khanna v. Brig J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 , the expression 'case' is a word of comprehensive import. It is not restricted by anything contained in Section 115 C.P.C. to the entirety of the procee­ding in a civil court. To interpret the expression 'case', as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence to which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. The expression 'case' includes a suit, but in ascer­taining the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, there would be no warrant for equating it with a suit alone. As ruled in Baldevdas Shivlal vs. Filmistan Distributors, AIR 1970 SC 406 , every order of the Court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case decided. A case may be said to be deci­ded, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy ; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a 'case decided' within the meaning of Section 115. The word 'case' is more comprehen­sive than the word 'suit' and it includes a large number of proceedings which are strictly speaking not suits. Therefore, what is allowed to a party by 0. 13 Rr. 1 and 2, if illegally denied, it would amount to denial of a procedural right con­ferred by law ; and the order would be revisable. 9. Therefore, what is allowed to a party by 0. 13 Rr. 1 and 2, if illegally denied, it would amount to denial of a procedural right con­ferred by law ; and the order would be revisable. 9. Section 115 of the C.P.C. speaks of 'any case' which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies, but the High Court shall not vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where-(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party apply­ing for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Even if it is not strictly speaking a case decided, when it appears to the Court that the order, if allowed to stand would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury against whom it was made, it is open for the High Court to interfere in revision. While strictly applying the provision of 0.13. R. 1 there may be situations and circumstances where its operation might cause misca­rriage of justice. Hence 0. 13. R. 2 invested the Court with discretionary jurisdiction to accept documents filed at belated stage. The Court, however, has to be satisfied as to existence of good and sufficient grounds for not filing the document at or before the settlement of issues. What would be good and sufficient reasons will always depend on the facts and circuirstances. Where, however, the provision of O.13 R. 2 is being invoked malafide or for vexatious reasons, the cause shown cannot be held to be good and sufficient cause. Under such circumstances discretionary jurisdiction should not be exercised. Where, however, the document is vital and would assist the Court in coming to a correct decision and no oblique motive is clear for not filing the document earlier, the Court should not ordinarily refuse to receive it. If the consequence of the refusal to receive the document is such that it would result in miscarriage of justice, there will be justification for the High Court to intefere in revision with such an order. If the consequence of the refusal to receive the document is such that it would result in miscarriage of justice, there will be justification for the High Court to intefere in revision with such an order. In the instant case we do not find any jurisdiction for interfering with the order refusing to receive the certified copy. 10. As regards the recalling of the opposite party for fur­ther cross-examination, Mr. Choudhury relies on Naba Kumar Das vs. Rudra Narayan Jana AIR 1923 P.C. 95 wherein inter­preting Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it was held that a witness cannot be disbelieved without his attention being drawn to the documents inconsistent with deposition even though the documents were produced after his examination. Under section 145 of the Evidence Act a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question without such writing being shown to him, or being proved ; but if it is intended to con­tradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. We have already seen that under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 13, nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party. Thus though the certified copy of the decree was not received by the Court, it would be open for the petitioner to cross-examine the opposite party with referrence to the certified copy, if he is recalled. Considering the fact that the minority of the oppo­site party is in issue he could be contradicted on basis of the certified copy as regards his age. If that opportunity is refused to the petitioner it may result in miscarriage of justice. The learned trial court rejected the application for recalling the oppo­site party after he rejected the application for receiving the cer­tified copy of the decree. It is however felt that if the peti­tioner is not given an opportunity to cross-examine the opposite party with reference to the statements he made earlier, if embodied in the certified copy of the decree, it may result in injustice. It is however felt that if the peti­tioner is not given an opportunity to cross-examine the opposite party with reference to the statements he made earlier, if embodied in the certified copy of the decree, it may result in injustice. The impugned order rejecting the application for re­calling the opposite party is accordingly set aside and the appli­cation is remanded to the trial court for decision in light of what has been stated hereinabove. Mr. Choudhury submits that the petitioner is ready and willing to bear reasonable costs. The court should therefore, award reasonable costs to the opposite party to cover his loss and expenses and should see that the delay is avoided. 11. In the result this petition is partly allowed to the ex­tent indicated above. No costs.