Granting of probate is a solemn act inasmuch as it gives form and content of the last wish of a dead person. Un­like other documents, the will speaks from the death of a testator and so when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed from the world cannot say whether it is his will or not, and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed test tator. To take care of this, the courts have laid down that the onus of proving a will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execu­tion of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and the sig­nature of the testator as required by law are sufficient to dis­charge the onus. Where, however, there are suspicious circum­stances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before it accepts the will as genuine. These are well-settled principles of probate law and transpire from what was stated by the Apex Court in H. Venkatchala vs. B. N. Thimmajama, AIR 1959 SC 443 , and Sashi Kumar vs. Subodh Kumur, AIR 1964 SC 529 , first of which is a rendering by a Division Bench and the second by a Constitution Bench. 2. The propounder here is the second wife of the testator, the objector is a daughter of the deceased through his first wife. She challenged the genuineness of the will by stating that the signature on the so-called will was not that of the decea­sed. It was also alleged that the deceased was not of sound mind and health at the time of the alleged execution of the will. Some other pleas were taken which led the learned trial Court to frame the following issues :- 1. Whether the petition has been duly signed, verified and filed ? 2. Whether the will has been executed by the executants with full knowledge ? 3. Whether the will is genuine ? 4. Whether the property has been duly valued ? 5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled ? 6. Whether the will is vague ?. 3. In support of her case the appellant examined herself and two other witnesses. 2. Whether the will has been executed by the executants with full knowledge ? 3. Whether the will is genuine ? 4. Whether the property has been duly valued ? 5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled ? 6. Whether the will is vague ?. 3. In support of her case the appellant examined herself and two other witnesses. The learned trial Court has answered Issue No. 1 and the additional issue in favour of the plain­tiff. Issue No. 4 also did not stand in the way. The appellant lost because Issues No. 2 and 3 were answered against her. The probate of the will was therefore refused. Feeling aggrie­ved, the propounder has preferred this appeal. 4. The appellant had lost before the learned District Judge principally on two grounds : The first is that though the will is dated 30.4.74 by which all the moveable and immoveable properties were bequeathed to the appellant, in an objection filed by her on 25.4.75 relating to the grant of mutation in favour of respondent No. 1 she had pleaded acquisition of ti­tle by inheritance. This shows that the will was not in existence by that time. It may be stated that probate was applied for on 18.6.75, though the death of the executor had taken place on 16.11.74. Shri Mahanta, learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that this cannot be regarded as suspicious circum­stance at all inasmuch as no right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice unless a Court of com­petent jurisdiction has granted probate of the will under which the right is claimed, as laid down in section 213 of the Indian Succession Act. Though the legal submission is well-founded, there is no reason on record as to why probate had not been applied for soon after the death of the testator. It is also not clear as to why the appellant despite having knowledge of the will, had raised objection in the mutation proceeding on the ground that she had come to own the property as an inheritor without disclosing that a will had also been made in her favour. Though a will does not become effective till it probated, a prayer could have been made to await Court's decision in this regard. This was, however, not done. 5. Though a will does not become effective till it probated, a prayer could have been made to await Court's decision in this regard. This was, however, not done. 5. Another ground which has appealed to the trial Court is the dissimilarity of signature appearing in Exhibit-1, the will, as compared with the admitted signatures of the testator as finding place in Exhibits-ka, Kha and Ga. Shri Mahanta has urged that a perusal of the signatures, Exhibits Ka(1), Ka(2), Kha(1), Kha(2) and Ga(1) would show that these signa­tures are also not fully similar inasmuch as the word 'ra' finding place in the title of the executor is not similar in the signatures. He has also urged that signature Exhibit-Ga(1) does not go well with those marked as Exhibits Ka(1), Ka(2), Kha(1) and Kha(2). Though this submission is factually correct, I do not propose to delve deep into this matter as the law states regard as observed in Fakhruddin vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 1326. Reference may also be made in this context to State vs. Paliram, AIR 1979 SC 14 where it was stated that although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing even without the aid of the evidence of any hand-writing expert, the Judge should as a matter of prudence and caution hesitate to base his finding with regard to identity of a hand-writing solely on the comparison made by himself. Thus, though section 73 of the Evidence Act permits a court to compare the dispu­ted signature with an admitted signature, the law would not allow a court to decide the matter exclusively on the basis of its own comparison. 6. This is, however, not all. There are some suspicious circumstances which the propounder has not been able to explain fully. One of such circumstances is taking of prominent part by the propounder in the making of the will. Such a circu­mstances has been regarded as suspicious both in Sashi Kumar and H. Venkatchale (supra). 7. In the present case, the appellant had apparently played a leading role in getting the will executed. This transpires from the fact that PW 2, who was an attesting witness to the execution of the will, had been approached by the appellant not only on 30.4.74, but also on earlier occasions. 7. In the present case, the appellant had apparently played a leading role in getting the will executed. This transpires from the fact that PW 2, who was an attesting witness to the execution of the will, had been approached by the appellant not only on 30.4.74, but also on earlier occasions. It may be stated that PW 2 was the only person among the attesting witnesses to be examined in the case. Not only this, even the scribe PW 3 had been called by the appellant to the house of the executants when he had come there for the second time. This had, of course; been done at the behest of the testator, as deposed by PW 3. There is no explanation as to why the testator himself, if he was in a physically fit condition, as is the case of the propounder, had not taken these steps. 8. If the deposition made in the will is unnatural, impro­bable or unfair, that would also be a suspicious circumstance. In the present case, all the moveable and immoveable proper­ties of the deceased have been made the subject matter of the will and the only beneficiary is the propounder. Though the deceased had no male issue, he was survived, among others, by two daughters apart from the appellant. One of the two daughters was through the first wife of the deceased and the second through the appellant herself. There is nothing in the will to show as to why the two daughters had not been given any share in the properties of the deceased. Shri Mahanta has urged that the daughters might not have been given any­thing because of the fact that they had been given their due share at the time of their marriage, as stated by PW1, the propounder. There is, however, nothing on record to show as to what had been given to the daughters at the time of their marriage. By solely relying on the statement of PW, who has to be regarded as an interested witness, it cannot be held that there was good and cogent reason to debar the two daughters altogether from any share in the property of the testator. By solely relying on the statement of PW, who has to be regarded as an interested witness, it cannot be held that there was good and cogent reason to debar the two daughters altogether from any share in the property of the testator. It may be stated that the deceased had about 45 bighas of land (as appears from the schedule of the petition for probate) and so, land was available for division among three Class-1 heirs, if so desired. 9. The will in question is in English and from the evidence of PW 2 it appears that the deceased did not know English. This by itself would not have, of course, precluded, use of English form in making the will if the contents were duly explained to the testator. PW 3 who had filled up the blanks in the typed form has deposed that after he had done so he had read out the same to the testator. That may be so, but there is no evidence as to wherefrom the testator had obtained the form of the will and when. From the evidence on record, it appears that at the relevant time the testator was somehow moving about which is indicated by the statement of PW 3 that he (i.e. the testator) could go to answer the calls of nature, as if he could not have undertaken arduous jobs. In such a state of health, the form must have been collected by some one else; who that somebody is, has not been told to the Court. 10. Thus, the execution of the will is surrounded by some suspicious circumstances. These are : (1) the silence of the propounder regarding the will when she had filed objec­tion in the mutation case; (2) unnatural disposition made in the will evident from the fact that the two daughters of the testator were debarred altogether from inheriting anything; (3) wherefrom, and when, and by whom the form of the will which is in English had been collected; and (4) the prominent part played by the propounder at the time of execution of the will. Probate of such a will cannot be granted. 11. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.