Judgment S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U. P. Act XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitioner is a tenant of a portion of house No. 51, Wrightganj East Ghaziabad. Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are the landlords of the said premises. The respondent Nos. 3 to 5 filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act on the ground that the property in question is bona fide required by the respondents-landlords for residential purposes after demolition and new constructions. It was alleged that the respondents-landlords are living in a portion of a shop in Wrightganj East which is neither sufficient for business nor for residential purposes. It was alleged that the disputed house was purchased by the respondents-landlords for the reason that they had shortage of accommodation, and as such they required the house bona fide for their personal use and occupation. THIS application was contested by the petitioner. It was alleged that the need of the landlord-respondents was not bona fide and that the application for release has been moved on mala fide grounds. It was alleged that the landlords had many other alternative accommodations available to them and that they have also share in several properties and as such the need was not genuine. It was also alleged that the respondents-landlords are comfortably living in the house which is presently in their occupation. In particular it was stated that portions of the house which were in occupation of Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey were ' pucca ' and that the portions in the occupation of Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey were forcibly demolished by the landlords-respondents. It was consequently alleged that in case the need of the landlord-respondents was genuine, they would never have demolished the portions in the occupation of Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey. It was also alleged that the landlords-respondents, in fact, want to get the disputed portions released so that they can raise a commercial market. 2. THE prescribed authority by his order dated 1-9-1982 allowed the release application. It was also alleged that the landlords-respondents, in fact, want to get the disputed portions released so that they can raise a commercial market. 2. THE prescribed authority by his order dated 1-9-1982 allowed the release application. THE prescribed authority after examining the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the need of the landlords-respondents was bona fide and genuine and that on a comparison of the hardship of the parties it found that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord in case the release application was not allowed. Aggrieved by the decision dated 1-9-1982, the petitioner filed an appeal being Rent Control Appeal No. 153 of 1982 under Section 22 of the Act. This appeal came up for hearing before the II Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad who by his detailed judgment dated 7-11-1985 dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. The appellate court recorded a finding that the building presently in occupation of the landlords-respondents is not sufficient to meet their requirement. The said building which is a tenanted accommodation is a part of the shop. The building does not have sufficient number of rooms to fulfil the requirement of the respondent-landlords. It was also found that the accommodation which was in occupation of Shri Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey was not in such a condition that it could have been occupied by the landlords. The landlords got it demolished only because it was not good enough for living. It was further held that the demolition of these portions did not lead to the conclusion that the application for release was mala fide. The further finding recorded by the lower appellate court was that the building cannot be reconstructed in part over the portions vacated by Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey. 3. AGGRIEVED by the decision of the appellate court dated 7-11-1985 the petitioner has filed the present petition challenging both the orders passed by the prescribed authority as well as by the appellate authority. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the two portions in occupation of the tenant, namely, Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey have been vacated by the tenants. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the two portions in occupation of the tenant, namely, Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey have been vacated by the tenants. They were lying vacant, they had been demolished by the landlords with a mala fide object and as such the need set up by the landlords is not bonafide and genuine. It was further urged that reconstruction can be made on the site of the portions occupied by Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey and as such also the case set up by the landlords-respondents that the property in dispute occupied by the petitioner is required for demolition and reconstruction is not bona fide. This circumstance was a relevant circumstance to be considered by the courts below which they have not considered and as such the findings recorded in regard to bona fide need is vitiated in law. Before examining this submission, I will examine the cases cited by the counsel for the petitioner in support of his submissions. The first case which has been relied upon by the learned counsel is the decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in M. M. Qasim v. Manohar Lal, AIR 1981 SC page 1113. Reliance has been placed on the following dictum of the Supreme Court laid down in this case :- "When examining a case of personal requirement if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison d'tre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant." 5. IN this case the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession that itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purposes of his occupation. 6. THE next case relied upon is my decision in Bateshwar Dayal v. 1st Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad, 1981 (1) UP RCC 85. Relying upon this decision, learned counsel has contended that if a piece of land is lying vacant on which a construction could have been made by the landlord, it is a relevant circumstance to be considered by the court when considering the bona fide need of the landlord. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel is the decision in Mohammad Yasin v. II Addl. District Judge, Bijnor, 1980 ARC 106. In this case the property in dispute was a shop and the landlord made an application for release of the shop on the ground of personal requirement as the landlord had completed the medical course and he wanted to start private practice in the said shop. Hon'ble K. C. Agrawal, J. on the facts of that case held that if a shop was available for being used by the landlord, his application for evicting the tenant from the premises cannot be considered as bona fide. 7. THE last case relied upon is the decision in Ram Kumar v. Ill Additional District Judge, Faizabad, 1986 Vol. II ARC 275. In this case it has been held that where the landlord intentionally and purposely damages the building and then files an application for release under Section 21 (1) (b) of the Act on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong or mischief or excesses. 8. THE propositions laid down in the above mentioned cases is not disputed. 8. THE propositions laid down in the above mentioned cases is not disputed. If the landlord has some other accommodation suitable for the purposes of his occupation, then naturally the need of the landlord in such a circumstance could not be held to be a bona fide. Similarly, in case the landlord has any other land suitable available for the purposes of reconstruction to serve his personal need, then also it cannot be said that the need of the landlord for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide. It can also not be doubted that if the landlord purposely demolishes the building for moving the release, then the need of the landlord cannot be held to be bona fide. But the question in the instant case is to find out as to whether the landlords have suitable vacant accommodation available with them which will fulfil their need, as to whether there is sufficient land available on which they can construct the building for their use and also as to whether they had purposely demolished the buildings with a mala fide object. The basis of the submission made on behalf of the petitioner is the fact that two tenants, viz. Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey had vacated the premises. The lower appellate court has already found that the portions vacated by Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey do not serve the need of the landlords ; the application for release is not mala fide and has consequently held that the need of the landlords for the accommodation in dispute is bona fide but in any case, I am also examining certain aspects which have been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me to test whether the finding in this regard is in any manner vitiated in law or not. It is not disputed that originally the owner of the house in dispute was one Raj Kishore. This house was let out to three tenants, namely, Anand Prakash Mittal, Radhey Mohan Pandey and the petitioner Phiraya Lal. On 16th March, 1972 a contract of sale was entered into between Raj Kishore and the respondent No. 3, Rajendra Kumar and hence Rajendra Kumar paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- in cash as advance and it was agreed that the sale-deed would be executed by Raj Kishore within four months. On 16th March, 1972 a contract of sale was entered into between Raj Kishore and the respondent No. 3, Rajendra Kumar and hence Rajendra Kumar paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- in cash as advance and it was agreed that the sale-deed would be executed by Raj Kishore within four months. This agreement was not honoured by Raj Kishore and he did not execute the sale-deed. Consequently in 1975 Suit No. 215 of 1975 was filed by Rajendra Kumar against Raj Kishore Gupta for specific performance of the contract of sale dated 16th March, 1972. 9. IN 1976 Anand Prakash Mittal vacated the portion of the property in his occupation. The plan of the property has been attached by the petitioner as Annexure ' RA-7 ' to his rejoinder affidavit. On 26th May, 1976 Rajendra Kumar filed an application for allotment of the said premises in his favour. It appears that after the allotment application was filed Raj Kishore Gupta, the erstwhile landlord broke the roof of the said accommodation, Consequently on 11th July, 1977 Rajendra Kumar filed an application which is annexure-1 to the writ petition, bringing this fact to the notice of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the landlord has broken the roof of the accommodation to frustrate his application for allotment. Alongwith this application an affidavit of Raj Kumar was also filed in which in paragraph 3 it was categorically stated that in order to frustrate the allotment order Raj Kishore Gupta, the erstwhile landlord after giving premium to Anand Prakakh Mittal has removed the Karis of the roof. Subsequently, on 27-10-1977 the Suit No. 215 of 1975 was compromised. Thus, before the compromise on 26th October, 1977 as is clear from paragraph 6 of the petition, the allotment application filed by Rajendra Kumar was withdrawn. The sale-deed of the house was executed on 24-11-1977. It would, therefore, be clear from the above facts that befoie the sale-deed was executed in favour of the landlord-respondents, the portion which was occupied by Anand Prakash Mittal had already been demolished by the erstwhile landlord. It cannot therefore, be said that the landlords-respondents Nos. 3 to 5 had demolished this portion. They had, in fact, applied for allotment as they had also got a contract of sale in their favour in respect of the house in dispute. It cannot therefore, be said that the landlords-respondents Nos. 3 to 5 had demolished this portion. They had, in fact, applied for allotment as they had also got a contract of sale in their favour in respect of the house in dispute. This shows that the landlords did require the house in dispute bona ride and therefore, they applied for allotment of the portion occupied by Anand Prakash Mittal as soon as they came to know that it has fallen vacant. 10. IN so far as the portion occupied by Radhey Mohan Pandey is concerned, it is not disputed that on 1-12-1980 an application was made for release. This application has been filed as Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit of Respondent No. 3. IN this application in paragraph 4 it has been categorically stated that the portion occupied by Radhey Mohan Pandey was required for demolition and reconstruction so that the respondent could make use of the same for their personal use. It was specifically stated that they will not let out the portion after reconstruction on rent. IN this application the release was not sought on the ground that the property as it existed was required for the personal need of the respondents. IN fact, the basis of the application was that the portion was required for demolition and reconstruction. On 15-12-1980 a compromise was arrived at between the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 and Radhey Mohan Pandey. The compromise application was filed before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. This compromise application is Annexure-2 to the counter affidavit of the respondent No. 3. IN this application Radhey Mohan Pandey has accepted that the portion occupied by him was very old and that for the purposes of residence, it was necessary that the same be demolished and reconstructed. It was also stated in this application that a portion of the property had already fallen down, and consequently, it was stated that he has no objection for release of the accommodation. IN view of this compromise, application for release was allowed. It was only after this release order was passed that the respondent-landlords demolished the portion occupied by Radhey Mohan Pandey. As mentioned above, the release application in regard to the portion occupied by Radhey Mohan Pandey was made on the ground that it was in a dilapidated condition and that it required demolition and reconstructions. It was only after this release order was passed that the respondent-landlords demolished the portion occupied by Radhey Mohan Pandey. As mentioned above, the release application in regard to the portion occupied by Radhey Mohan Pandey was made on the ground that it was in a dilapidated condition and that it required demolition and reconstructions. If after release the landlords demolished the portions, it cannot be said that the demolition was with mala fide purpose. In view of the above, it is apparent from the record that both the portions occupied by Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey had been demolished when the release application had been filed. It cannot, therefore, be said that the landlords had some other vacant premises in their possession. If no vacant accommodation is available to the landlords, the question of its being suitable for the purposes of occupation does not arise at all. 11. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that since the portions in occupation of Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey have already been demolished, the construction can be made on the land beneath the said portions. The plan of the house has been attached as Annexure ' RA-7 ', to the rejoinder affidavit by the petitioner himself. From the plan it is clear that the portion occupied by Radhey Mohan Pandey and Anand Prakash Mittal are very small portions. It is not disputed that the court-yard is common and in the said court-yard the petitioner's kitchen, bath-room-and store-room exist. In the circumstances, it is obvious that the respondents possibly cannot reconstruct only a small portion wherein it is not possible to construct other amenities required for living. The lower appellate court has already found that it is not possible to make constructions in these portions occupied by Anand Prakash Mittal and Radhey Mohan Pandey. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the lower appellate court in regard to bona fide need was in any manner vitiated in law. It can also not, in my opinion, be said that the application was mala fide. 12. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the need of the landlord-respondents is not bona fide as they want to get the disputed portions released so that they can raise a commercial market. This submission appears to be based on pure conjectures. It can also not, in my opinion, be said that the application was mala fide. 12. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the need of the landlord-respondents is not bona fide as they want to get the disputed portions released so that they can raise a commercial market. This submission appears to be based on pure conjectures. There is no evidence to support this submission. It is admitted that no plan for the proposed building has yet been submitted. In the present petition in paragraph 30 this allegation has been made which has been denied in paragraph 30 of the counter affidavit. In view of the above, I do not find any force in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. The findings recorded by the courts below, in my opinion, are not vitiated in law. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.