JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Brethren U. C. Srivastava and S. C. Mathur, JJ. having differed in their approach formulated two questions for the opinion of the third Judge. The questions are : (a) Whether the language of S. 60(5)(a) of U. P. Act No. 12 of 1983 required consideration of factors prescribed in S. 60(5)(a) viz, geographical position of the area of supply, the nature of supply and purpose for which supply is required and other irrelevant factors with reference to petitioner company for revising the existing contractual rate of H. C. tariff? (b) Whether the factors mentioned in S. 49(2) of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, having already been considered at the time of framing uniform tariff no fresh consideration of any factors mentioned in section 60(5)(a) of U. P. Act No. 12 of 1983 was required then the uniform tariff itself was being fixed while revising the rate? 2. Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Limited (for brief, Kanorias) and Laxmi Chand Bhandari, one of its share-holders are the two petitioners in the writ petition. State of Uttar Pradesh; the U.P.State Electricity Board (for brevity, the Board) and the Addl. Chief Engineer (Commercial). U.P. State Electricity Board, are the three respondents. Kanorias manufacture caustic soda. Electricity is used almost as a raw-material by it. After the Rihand Hydro Electric Generating Plant became operative and electricity was available for sale at Pipri in district Mirzapur on Feb. 1, 1982, Kanorias entered into an agreement, which is annexure 22 to the writ petition, with the State on Sept. 30, 1963. In the year 1964 the caustic soda plant of Kanorias was commissioned at Renukoot near Pipri. The other raw material for manufacture of caustic soda is salt. Kanorias get supply of salt mainly from the State of Gujarat. The Rihand Hydro Electric Project was transferred to the Board from April 1, 1985. ; 3. Under the agreement which is for a period 25 years, supply of electricity was being made to Kanorias at the rate of 2.5 paise per unit. It is made available at the Bus-bars at the Pipri Sub-station. Revision of the rates after 16 years provided for in the agreement was made at the appropriate time i.e. in the year 1969. The concessional rate contemplated by the Agreement is limited to the extent of the supply assumed to be made from the Rihand Hydro Electric System. It is made available at the Bus-bars at the Pipri Sub-station. Revision of the rates after 16 years provided for in the agreement was made at the appropriate time i.e. in the year 1969. The concessional rate contemplated by the Agreement is limited to the extent of the supply assumed to be made from the Rihand Hydro Electric System. The maximum demand of Kanorias was fixed under it at 6500 KW. 4. Kanorias are getting other supply also from the Board for which the rates are higher. The dispute in the present petition is confined to the supply which Kanorias are receiving under the Agreement of Sept. 30, 1963. 5. The Electricity Laws Uttar Pradesh (Amendment) Bill 1983 was introduced in the State Legislature on February 23, 1983. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill mentions in para. 9 that ; "Under certain long-term agreements entered into by the State Government with bulk consumers supply of electrical energy was agreed to be at nominal rates in public interest. These agreements have been in operation for nearly twelve years and no revision of rates is provided for in these agreements during the first sixteen years and even after the said period, the revision is stipulated to an insignificant extent. The rates formulated nearly twelve years back have proved to be completely uneconomic. The cost of generation has continued to rise, and this inevitably means increasing loss to the Board. The agreements are holding back the development and functioning of the Board on sound commercial lines and in the public interest as contemplated in Sections 18 and 59 of the Act. The rates are now proposed to be brought to the level of the rates applicable to other bulk consumers in accordance with uniform tariffs fixed by the Board under S. 49 of the Act". 6. The Bill took the shape of the Electricity Laws (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1983 U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983 on May 20, 1983. Section 7 of this Act has amended S. 60 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It inserted sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) in S. 60 with effect from April, 1,1965. 6. The Bill took the shape of the Electricity Laws (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1983 U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983 on May 20, 1983. Section 7 of this Act has amended S. 60 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It inserted sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) in S. 60 with effect from April, 1,1965. These sub-sections read as follows : "Sub-section (3) : All expenditure which the State Government may, not later than two months from the commencement of the Electricity Laws (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1983, declare to have been incurred by it on capital account in connection with the purposes of this Act in respect of the Rihand Hydro Power System shall also be deemed to be a loan advanced to the Board under S:. 64 on the date of commencement of this subsection and all the assets acquired by' such expenditure shall vest in the Board with effect from such commencement. (4) The provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (1-A) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) apply in relation to the debts and obligations incurred, contracts entered into and matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government in respect of the Rihand Hydro Power System after the first constitution of the Board and before the commencement of this sub-section as they apply in relation to debts and obligations incurred, contracts entered into, matters and things engaged to be done by, with or for the State Government for any of the purposes of this Act before the first constitution of the Board. (5) All such contracts entered into by the State Government for supply of electrical energy based on or connected with the generation of electricity from the Rihand Hydro Electric Generating Station to any consumer and any contract entered into by the Board on or after April 1, 1965 for the supply of electrical energy to such consumer shall operate subject to the modifications specified in the following clauses, which shall have effect from the date of the commencement of the Electricity Laws (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the said date) : - (a) the rates to be charged by the Board for the energy supplied by it to any consumer under any contract for which the payment will be due for the first time on or after the said date shall be such as may with the previous approval of State Government be fixed by the Board, having due regard to the geographical position of the area of supply, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factor; (b) if the State Government directs the Board under S. 22-B of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 or under any other law for the time being in force to reduce the supply of energy to a consumer and thereupon the Board reduces the supply of energy to such consumer accordingly, the consumer concerned shall not be entitled to any compensation for such reduction and if the consumer consumes energy in excess of the reduced limit fixed under the said Section 22-B or any other law for the time being in force, as the case may be, then the Board shall have the right to discontinue the supply to the consumers without notice, and without prejudice to the said right of the Board, the consumer shall be liable to pay for such excess consumption at double the normal rate fixed under clause (d); (c) any arbitration agreement contained in such contract shall be subject to the provisions of this sub-section." 6A. Through annexure 20 to the writ petition, the Additional Chief Engineer of . the Board wrote to the Kanorias on Feb. Through annexure 20 to the writ petition, the Additional Chief Engineer of . the Board wrote to the Kanorias on Feb. 6, 1984 that though the bills were being drawn on the basis of the Agreement, the rates subject to revision with effect from May 20, 1983 with the approval of the State Government and a supplementary bill shall be sent for the arrears as and when the rates were revised in pursuance of S. 60(5)(a). On April 5, 1984, the Kanorias, filed the present writ petition assailing the validity of S. 7 of the amending Act and the right of the Board to enhance the rates. The same day, while admitting the writ petition for further hearing, an interim order was passed by the Lucknow Bench of this Court, on an application made in that regard, to the effect that the State Government would provide an opportunity of hearing to Kanorias before bringing about any change in the terms and conditions of the Agreement or tariff rates and that no revised rates shall be charged from Kanorias till they are heard and the matter decided by the State Government. On June 11, 1984, the Law Officer of the Board wrote to Kanorias requesting them to give in writing the points which they wanted to urge before the rates were approved by the State Government. Kanorias replied to this letter through their undated letter No. 213 (annexure B-2 to the affidavit dated June 7, 1984 of Sardar Inderjeet Singh filed in support of the Boards application dated Aug. 7/10, 1984 for vacating the interim order dated April 5, 1984). It was said that the letter from the Law Officer did not amount to compliance with the order of the Court dated April 5, 1984. The Board filed its counter affidavit. It also filed supplementary counter affidavit to the applications made by the Kanorias for the amendment of the petition. One such application was made when, during the course of the hearing of the writ petition by the Lucknow- Bench, the Additional Chief Engineer of the Board wrote to Kanorias on Jan. 31, 1985 intimating them that the State Government had approved rate schedule HV 2 as mentioned in the U.P. Gazette Notification dated Oct. 29, 1982 and applicable to heavy power consumers in substitution of the rates mentioned in the Agreement of Sept. 20, 1963. 31, 1985 intimating them that the State Government had approved rate schedule HV 2 as mentioned in the U.P. Gazette Notification dated Oct. 29, 1982 and applicable to heavy power consumers in substitution of the rates mentioned in the Agreement of Sept. 20, 1963. The letter was received by the Kanorias on Feb. 8, 1985. In between, a demand for over Rs. 3 crores on account of the arrears for the period between May 20,1983 and Dec. 30, 1984 was raised by the Executive Engineer concerned of the Board against Kanorias. Further details, including the fact that disconnection notice was also issued to Kanorias for their failure today up the arrears, do not merit a mention for it is only the two questions which are to be answered by me. But this may be mentioned that in their opinion expressed on Jan. 24, 1986 in their separate judgments brother U.C. Srivastava and brother S.C. Mathur have both found that U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983 was not ultra vires the competence of the State Legislature and that the alteration in the rates of supply to Kanorias could be made by the Board unilaterally and that it was not necessary to give a hearing to Kanorias before the alteration was made by the Board. They differed on the aspects reflected in the two questions formulated by them. They have referred to Section 49(2) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 specifically in question (b). It would be of help to read S. 49 as it stands after its retrospective substitution by Parliament Act No. 30 of 1966 in its entirety. "49. Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees-(a) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs. (2) In fixing the uniform tariffs the Board shall have regard to all or any of the following factors, namely - (a) the nature of supply and the purposes for which it is required; (b) the coordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee; (c) the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies; (d) the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas. (3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors. (4) In fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person." 7. Brother U. C. Srivastava has said in his judgment that it had been candidly admitted before the Bench by the counsel for the opposite parties that there was no other person who was getting supply of energy from the Rihand Hydro Electric System and was affected by U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983 and that the said legislation was only a single person legislation, that is, only for Kanorias. 8. Amongst other things he also said that from the material on record, it did not appear that all the factors enumerated in S. 60(5) were taken into account by the Board before fixing the rate or by the State Government before according to its approval to the same, that the revision of rates for Kanorias was not considered afresh in the light of the factors mentioned in S. 60(5) and the consideration of factors mentioned in S. 49 (2) of the Act of 1948, while framing uniform tariff, was taken to be the full consideration of factors mentioned in S. 60(5)(a) for putting the petitioner at par with other consumers. Further, that the factors mentioned in S. 49(2) of the Supply Act would not fulfil the purpose and object mentioned in S. 60(5)(a) of U.P. Act. Further, that the factors mentioned in S. 49(2) of the Supply Act would not fulfil the purpose and object mentioned in S. 60(5)(a) of U.P. Act. No. 12 of 1983 and the fixation of uniform tariff, without consideration of the factors required for an individual consumer, that is, the Kanorias will not even be compliance with provisions of S. 60(5)(a). According to brother U.C. Srivastava the intention and purpose of U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983 is to revise the existing contractual rate of energy charges and charge higher rates up to the extent uniform tariff rates for the supply of electricity to the consumers whose contract stands modified by the said statute....The rate so fixed is dependent on considerations of certain guidelines prescribed in the Statute itself. The non-consideration of these guidelines for arriving at a decision would not be compliance of statutory provisions and would vitiate the decision itself. 9. Brother Mathur opined, after noticing in detail the facts appearing from the file dealing with the modification of the rate of supply placed before the Bench on behalf of the Board, that the move for amendment of the Act and enforcement of HV-"2 Tariff was initiated by the Board and that the nothings contained a detailed justification for enforcing the said tariff. Also, that from paras. 9 and 10 of the statement of objects and reasons of the amending bill (quoted by brother Mathur) it appeared that the matter of supply of electricity at concessional rates despite losses and the desirability of replacing the said rate by uniform tariff came up for discussion in the State Legislature and that the Board did not act wrongly or illegally if it felt that it had no option but to apply uniform rates in view of the statement contained in the objects and reasons of the Bill and the discussion in the State Legislature. He also felt that the factors contemplated by S. 60(5)(a) being similar to those envisaged by S. 49(2) and consideration having been given thereto while framing the uniform tariff, no consideration of factors relevant to individual consumers also was required. 10. In their submissions before me Sri S.P. Gupta, appearing for Kanorias, Sri R.N. Trivedi, Addl. He also felt that the factors contemplated by S. 60(5)(a) being similar to those envisaged by S. 49(2) and consideration having been given thereto while framing the uniform tariff, no consideration of factors relevant to individual consumers also was required. 10. In their submissions before me Sri S.P. Gupta, appearing for Kanorias, Sri R.N. Trivedi, Addl. Advocate General, appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh and Sri Gopal Subr amanium, appearing for the Board, who have argued the case with great ability, covered wide ground and placed reliance upon a number of decisions. In view, however, of the limited enquiry, reflected in the two questions formulated by my brethren, which have to make, it would not be necessary to notice them all. What, however, is necessary shall be considered at the appropriate place. 11. The Rihand Power Station was transferred to the Board with effect from April, 1, 1965, U.P. Act. No. 12 of 1983 has amended S. 60 of the Electricity (Supply) Act by adding sub-ss. (3) to (5) with retrospective effect from that date. By Sub-section (5) the State Legislature has provided that a contract like the one which was entered into by Kanorias with the State Government, shall continue to be operative subject to the modifications mentioned in the sub-section which shall have effect from May 20, 1983, namely, the date of the commencement, of U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983 12. On analysis, sub-s. (5) which has been read earlier, shows that with effect from May 20, 1983 the contract is made to operate in future by force of the Statute subject, inter-alia, to cl. (a) providing for the rate to be charged by the Board for the energy supplied by it to a consumer, like the Kanorias. The rate fixed in terms of cl. (a) shall be operative with effect from May 20,1983. The rate which would be operative from that date is to be fixed by the Board, with previous approval of the State Government, having due regard to : (a) the geographical position of the area of supply; (b) the nature of supply; (c) the purpose for which the supply is required; and (d) any other relevant factor. 13. The unmistakable indication is that the rate is to be fixed by the Board by itself, i.e. the concept of participation in its fixation by the consumer is excluded. 13. The unmistakable indication is that the rate is to be fixed by the Board by itself, i.e. the concept of participation in its fixation by the consumer is excluded. In other words, the fixation is to be made by the Board unilaterally as also held by my learned brethren. The question which still remains to be considered is whether in proceeding to fix the rates, the Board is, in law, under an obligation to take into account factors peculiar to the consumer who is getting supply from it in pursuance of a contract referred to in sub-s. (5) or as contended by Sri Trivedi and Sri Subramanium, such factors cannot be considered at all. Any answer to this question would necessarily require consideration of the further question whether " factor" spoken of in clause (a) would be a factor relevant from the point of view of the board or of the consumer. The answer may be attempted a little later. 14. In a recent decision in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board v. M/s. S. N. Govinda Prabhu and Brothers, AIR 1986 SC 1999 the Supreme Court examined the scheme of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 in the matter of fixation and revision of tariffs by the board. After noticing the amendments made in S. 59 by Parliament Acts 23 of 1978 and 16 of 1983 and the other relevant provisions, as also many of its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court ruled that it is the mandate of the Parliament that the Board should adjust its tariffs so that after meeting the various expenses properly required to be met a surplus is left, which, after the 1983 amendment, is to be not less than 3%. This decision lends support to the basic submission of the counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Board that in fixing the rare of supply the Board has, of necessity, to take into consideration the fact of recurring losses incurred by the Board year after year. Loss is undoubtedly a relevant factor which the Board has to take into account while fixing its tariffs and if in fixing the rate of supply the Board takes into account the factor of loss incurred by it and its expenditure, the Board cannot be said to have taken into account a factor which is not ' relevant. In fact, Sr. In fact, Sr. S. P. Gupta had to concede that even in the absence of a statutory obligation to generate a surplus. The board would be well within its rights, as a prudent supplier of electricity, to take the factor of loss into account while fixing its tariffs. 15. In the same decision, the Supreme Court, considered the question of fixation of different tarries for different consumers having regard to the factors neume rated in S. 49(3) of the Supply Act. While dealing with the submission that it was not open to the Board lo give favoured treatment to low tension Domestic and Agricultural Consumers at the cost of the rest of the consumers, it was observed (in para. 16 of the report) that : "....Section 49(3) expressly reserves the dower of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient, to fix different tarries for the supply of electricity to any person having regard to the geographical position of any . area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and other relevant factors. Different tariffs for High and Low Tension consumers and for different classes of consumers, such as Industrial, commercial. Agricultural and Domestic have been prescribed and the differentiation appears to us to be reasonable and far from arbitrary and to be based on intelligent and intelligible criteria." 16. Section 49(3) was dealt with by the Supreme Court earlier in the case of India Aluminium Co. v. Kerala State Electricity Board, AIR 1975 SC 1967 . That was a case where in S. 59 of the Supply Act, prior to its amendment in the year 1978, had been considered. At that time the requirement of S. 59 was that the Board shall not "as far as practicable" and after taking credit for any subventions from the State Government under S. 63, carry on its operations under the Act at a loss". The Supreme Court said that the mandate to the Board was that as far as practicable it was not to carry on its operations at a loss and the Legislature had not issued a rigid direction to the Board that it shall on no account carry on its operations at a loss and if there was any loss for any reason whatsoever, Board was to adjust its charges so as to wipe off such loss. In this view of the matter, the Supreme Court felt that S. 59 did not confer any power on the Board to enhance the charges for supply of electricity in disregard of a contractual stipulation entered into by it under sub-s. (3) of S. 49. The Supreme Court proceeded then to observe (in para 19 of the report) that : "There is also one other circumstance which supports this view. If, under S. 59, charges have to be adjusted for the purpose of avoiding operational loss, what is the basis on which such adjustment would be made? Obviously, it cannot be on the basis of cost of production, distribution and supply of electricity to each consumer or class of consumers, for there may be certain consumers or classes of consumers who may have to be supplied electricity at special tariff less than the cost, having regard to the geographical area or the nature of purpose of the supply. That means that the adjustment of the charges would have to be left to the discretion of the Board to be made in such manner as it thinks fit and proper in the light of relevant circumstances and since cost is not the sole or only criterion for fixing tariff, the Board would be free not to enhance the charges in case of some consumers or class of consumers even though such charges may be less than the cost in case of others, enhance them even beyond the cost, provided, of course, the relevant factors are taken into account and there is no undue preference of one consumer as against another. If that be so, it must follow a fortiori that there is nothing in S. 59 which requires the Board to enhance the charges in a case where it has bound itself by a contractual stipulation not to claim anything more than certain specified charges." 17. What the Supreme Court observed in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board v. M/s. S.N. Govinda Prabhu and Brothers, AIR 1986 SC 1999 in paragraph 16 in regard to S. 49(3) seems to be a reiteration by it of the principle that on account of this provision it was possible for the Board to prescribe a tariff for a consumer which may appear to be giving to him a favoured treatment at the cost of the rest of the consumers. The charge, on account of the amendments made in S. 59, in the legislative mandate is only to the effect that the over-all financial position of the Board should be such that it should result in a surplus of not less that 3% and its tariffs can be adjusted by the Board, from time to time, to achieve the surplus. The power of the Board to supply electricity to any person on special tariff, fixed having regard to the factors enumerated in S. 49(3), is not taken away. The Board continues to have the right to do so subject to the overriding consideration of not showing undue preference to any person in fixing the tariff and the terms and conditions of supply of electricity as enjoined by S. 49(4). Due preference can, however, always be given and that can be given having regard to the factors mentioned in sub-s. (3) when a special tariff is made for any person where it is found necessary or expedient to depart from the uniform tariff fixed under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 49. If the Board were to enter into an agreement with a consumer like Kanorias today and found it necessary or expedient to do so, it could make the supply to them by framing a special tariff different from the uniform tariff. There is nothing in the supply Act which precludes it from doing so. 18. The scheme of S. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. 1948 is that uniform tariff may be framed by the Board as provided by sub secs. (1) and (2) for the supply made by it to its consumers. Such uniform tariff would be framed having regard to the factors contemplated by sub-sec. (2). The uniformity of tariff would, thus, appear to be the rule. But, exception can be made by the Board when it finds it expedient or necessary to do so, in case of any consumer for whom it can provide a special tariff under sub-sec. (3). The scheme remains the same irrespective of the change made in S. 59. In other words, in spite of the legislative mandate to ensure a minimum surplus of 3% the Board is permitted to make supply of energy to a consumer on rates different from the one provided for in the un-inform tariff framed by it. (3). The scheme remains the same irrespective of the change made in S. 59. In other words, in spite of the legislative mandate to ensure a minimum surplus of 3% the Board is permitted to make supply of energy to a consumer on rates different from the one provided for in the un-inform tariff framed by it. This rate may either be higher or lower than the one provided for in the uniform tariff. The special tariff has, however, to be framed with reference to the factors mentioned in sub-s. (3) and is to be such which does not amount to undue preference to the consumer for whom it is made. 19. Under S. 60(5)(a), brought in by U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983, the fixation of rate is to be made by the Board on consideration of the factors enumerated therein. These factors are akin to those mentioned in S. 49(3). The Board is competent to fix the rate of supply to a consumer under sub-s.(5) (a) on consideration of these factors, and with the previous approval of the State Government at a level lower or higher than the rate of supply envisaged in the uniform tariff fixed by it. The fixation of rate by the Board under S. 60(5)(a) may be made also having regard to the fact that eventually there is a surplus of not less than 3% left with it in terms of S. 59. The factum of loss which it incurs in its overall operations can, thus, be taken into account by the Board when fixing the rate of supply under S. 60(5) (a) but the factors enumerated in this section have to be gone into by the Board with reference to the consumer to whom the supply is being made under the contract spoken of in S. 60(5). The reason is obvious and it is this : 20. The U.P. Legislature by enacting sub-ss. (4) and (5) of S. 60 kept: the contract with a consumer entered into by the State Government alive qua the Board while permitting liberty of fixing the rate of supply to the Board for the period commencing May 20, 1983. It gave a mandate to the Board under sub-sec. The U.P. Legislature by enacting sub-ss. (4) and (5) of S. 60 kept: the contract with a consumer entered into by the State Government alive qua the Board while permitting liberty of fixing the rate of supply to the Board for the period commencing May 20, 1983. It gave a mandate to the Board under sub-sec. (5) that it would fulfil the obligations undertaken by the State Government under a contract and would charge from the consumer a rate fixed by it, with the previous approval of the State Government, having due regard to the three specified factors, namely, the geographical position of the area of supply, the nature of supply and the purpose for which supply was required and any other factor which the Board considered to be relevant. The language of S. 60(5)(a) is quite clear. It contemplates the determination of the rate by the Board for continued supply of energy to a consumer under the contract spoken of in this provision. It does not in terms, permit application of a predetermined rate in respect of consumers or any category of consumers generally to a consumer who is getting supply under a contract mentioned in it. The U. P. Legislature could have done so if it intended such a result as was done by the State Legislatures of Rajasthan, Orissa and Karnataka through the amending Acts which will be seen a little later. These amendments were made prior to the enactment of U.P. Act No. 12 of 1983. U.P. Legislature could have adopted similar phraseology if it intended a like result, that is, application of the uniform tariff without requiring the Board to undergo the exercise of determining the rate with due regard to the factors enumerated in the provision. 21. It was urged by Sri Trivedi with some emphasis that having regard to the prevailing judicial practice the meaning that this court should give to S. 60(5) should be that on its terms the provision permitted application of the uniform tariff to the supply made to Kanorias under the agreement with effect from May 20, 1983 without having a look at the rates afresh with reference to the enumerated factors peculiar to the said supply. He invoked the rule of interpreting the ordinary meaning of a word with reference to its context and not having regard to the text of the statute. He invoked the rule of interpreting the ordinary meaning of a word with reference to its context and not having regard to the text of the statute. The precise submission of Sri Trivedi was that the intention of the Legislature being application of uniform tariff in the matter of supply to consumers and the avowed object for the enactment of U. P. Act No. 12 of 1983 being to bring the rates of supply under the agreement to the level of rates applicable to other bulk consumers in accordance with uniform tariffs fixed by the Board under S. 49 of the Act, the application of the uniform tariff rates to Kanorias by the Board could not be said to be illegal. 22. The occasion for interpretation arises in case the words used in a Statute admit of meanings more than one. It is in this connection that it was urged by Sri Trivedi that the fact that Brethren U.C. Srivastava and S.C. Mathur have differed in the meaning to be given to the words used in sub-s. (5)(a), particularly in regard to the aspect whether factors of an individual consumer were to be taken into account while fixing the rate, showed that two views of the same provision were possible. As such, according to the submission the need for interpretation by taking recourse to the rule of interpretation of words with reference to their context. This submission proceeds upon over simplification of the matter. It seems clear that it is not permissible first to read the words so as to find ambiguity in their otherwise plain meaning and then to take recourse to some principle of interpretation to give a meaning to those words. The rule is that where the meaning of the words used by the Legislature is clear, it is not permissible to overlook them or to look for the legislative policy by applying some rule of interpretation. The rule is that where the meaning of the words used by the Legislature is clear, it is not permissible to overlook them or to look for the legislative policy by applying some rule of interpretation. In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while dealing with the question as to what was the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction was prerequisite for the prosecution of a public servant mentioned in S. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, observed (in paragraph 18 of the report) that : "Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction at the hands of the court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the events of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self-defeating. The court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the Legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the Statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief when the Statute was enacted and to remove which the Legislature enacted the Statute. This rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a provision it would be the duty of the court to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act " 23. Both Sri S.P. Gupta and Sri Trivedi have put their own emphasis on these observations in support of their respective submissions. But the emphasis which the Supreme Court placed in these observations is clear enough. 24. If the words of the Statute are clear, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of there being ambiguity or where the words used in a Statute on their plain meaning would be self-defeating. 25. 24. If the words of the Statute are clear, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of there being ambiguity or where the words used in a Statute on their plain meaning would be self-defeating. 25. Applying this rule to the words used in S. 60(5)(a) it would appear clear that the U. P. Legislature while providing that the contractual obligation to maintain the supply of energy to Kanorias under the Agreement would subsist, permitted the Board to fix the rates having regard to the factors mentioned in Cl. (a), borrowing, as it were, verbatim the language, used in S. 49(3) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. There is no ambiguity in the words used in Cl. (a) of S. 60(5). They provide in unmistarate terms that the at which energy was to be supplied to Kanorias with effect from May 20, 1983 was determinable by the Board having regard to those factors. The language in which those factors have been mentioned in Cl. (a) being identical to the one in which there is a mention about them in S. 49(3) they should reasonably be construed in a similar manner. The construction which S. 49(3) received at the hands of the Supreme Court not only in Indian Aluminium, AIR 1975 SC 1967 but also in Kerala State Electricity Board v. M/s. S. N. Govinda Prabhu, AIR 1986 SC 1999 is clear enough. It says that where the Board considers it necessary and expedient to do, it can fix different tariff for the supply of electricity to any person having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of supply and the purpose for which supply is required and other relevant factors. The departure from the uniform tariff which is contemplated in a provision like this is, thus a permissible differentiation. When one thinks of a departure from the uniform tariff in the matter of rate of supply to a consumer under an agreement, it is difficult to conceive that the' Legislature intended that consideration of factors of the nature mentioned in the provision peculiar to the supply to that consumer was not in its mind. Otherwise, the provision would become otiose. Otherwise, the provision would become otiose. The consideration of these factors generally for purposes of framing a uniform tariff would not be the same thing as considering them in the context of supply to a consumer under a special agreement. If consideration of these factors in connection with the framing of a uniform tariff was to be equated with their consideration in the context of supply to a consumer under an agreement, the very purpose of permitting supply to a consumer under a special tariff may be defeated. Instances are not inconceivable where having regard to the geographical position of the area in which supply is to be made to a particular consumer it may become necessary for the Board to make the supply to that consumer at a rate higher than the one at which supply is contemplated under the uniform tariff to similar consumers in other areas of the State. Likewise, it may become necessary' for the Board, in order to ensure an uninterrupted supply of electrical energy in a substantial measure, due to the nature of the need of the consumer, to require him to pay at a higher rate than the other bulk consumers of electrical energy. The possibilities where the rates, higher or lower than those envisaged in the uniform tariff, may have to be charged in respect of a supply to a consumer are numerous. And, it is for situations like this that the enabling provision of the nature contained in S. 49(3.) and engrafted in S. 60(5)(a) has been enacted. Clearly, therefore, while proceeding to determine the rates of supply under these provisions, the Board cannot overlook the peculiarity of the supply to a consumer as distinct from the general consideration of these factors while framing a uniform tariff. 26. The object with which U.P. Act 12 of 1983 was enacted, as reflected by the statement of objects and reasons for the Bill, was to enhance the rate of supply to bulk consumers made under long term Agreements entered into by the State Government with a view to make the functioning of the Board commercially sound. The rates were proposed to be brought to the level of the rates applicable to other bulk consumers in accordance with the uniform tariff fixed by the Board under Section 49. The rates were proposed to be brought to the level of the rates applicable to other bulk consumers in accordance with the uniform tariff fixed by the Board under Section 49. In spite of the intention expressed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, what the State Legislature actually did was to incorporate the phraseology used in S. 49(3) in S. 60(5)(a) and thus charge the Board with the obligation of determining the rates having regard to the factors mentioned therein. By the express enactment, therefore, it asked the Board to consider these factors with reference to the consumer to whom the supply was being made under the Agreement and fix the rate of supply for him. It did not ask the Board to apply the rates provided for in the uniform tariff. The Board, under the statutory mandate contained in S. 60(5)(a), is to give due regard to the factors mentioned in it with a view to fix the rate of supply to a particular consumer who was to receive supply under an Agreement, falling within the ambit of the provision, every time it wished to fix the rate of supply afresh. It has undoubtedly to take into account the loss factor with a view to obviate a situation where it might not be able to leave an over-all surplus of not less than 3% as per the mandate contained in S. 59 but it must undertake the exercise with reference to the particular supply to a consumer under an agreement spoken of in S. 60(5) and cannot rest content with a blind application of the rates provided by the uniform tariff on a consideration of these factors generally in the case of supply made to the consumers in general. 27. Apart from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, my attention was drawn to the debates in the U.P. Legislative Assembly of April 5, 1981 in respect of this Bill. In his speech, the then Finance Minister referred to the fact that prior to the transfer ,.of the Rihand Dam to the Board, supply of electricity was agreed to be made from it at very low rates under some agreements and that it was intended to do away with them so as to provide for supply of electricity to them at the current rates. In the Legislative Council also the same thing was stated by the Finance Minister on April 6, 1981. There was some discussion before me whether it was permissible, while interpreting the provision of a Statute, to look into these debates. Without going into this question, assuming that it is permissible for this Court to do so, all that can be said is that it was intended by the Government, while proposing to enact the provisions of U.P. Act 12 of 1983, to do away with concessional rates and to bring them to the level of the current rates. Even if it was so, it is clear that by the provisions enacted by the Legislature the enhancement of the rate was to be made after due consideration of the factors laid down by the Legislature itself in the provision. The increase in the rates could not be brought about without doing so. 28. Section 69 of the Supply Act, as amended from time to time, provides, inter alia, the accounts of the Board being laid before the State Legislature annually. As and when these accounts are laid, they are open to inspection and discussion. The accounts are duly audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India or a person authorised by him. My attention was drawn by the counsel appearing for the State of U.P. and the Board to certain paragraphs of the Report relating to the year 1973-74. One of the suggestions which was given by the Public Accounts Committee, while considering this Report, was that the rates of supply to bulk consumers should be enhanced so that the Board does not incur loss and until such time that it was done, the State should make substantial subvention to the Board to meet the loss that it was incurring due to supply of energy to some bulk consumers at concessional rates. But the Committee also made a recommendation that , in order to make up the losses, the expedient of increasing the rates of supply to consumers should be the last measure and in the first instance the Board should try to improve upon its functioning and effect economy in its operations and prevent leakages and theft. But the Committee also made a recommendation that , in order to make up the losses, the expedient of increasing the rates of supply to consumers should be the last measure and in the first instance the Board should try to improve upon its functioning and effect economy in its operations and prevent leakages and theft. While looking at the meaning to be given to the words used by the State Legislature in S. 60(5)(a), the context spoken of by Sri Trivedi cannot be one bereft of these factors as well. 29. There was some discussion about the lack of discretion in the Board while fixing rates under S. 60(5)(a) which, according to the submission made on behalf of the respondents, obligated the Board not to charge anything less than the rates provided in the uniform tariff unlike the discretion that it had while fixing the rates under S. 49(3). Emphasis in this regard was placed upon the opening words of S. 49(3) where it says "nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Section shall derogate from the power of the Board..." and the absence of similar words in S. 60(5)(a). The submission made was that while entering into an agreement under "S. 49(3) the Board could depart from the uniform tariff fixed under Sections 49(1) and (2), which it could not do under S. 60(5)(a). The submission overlooks that the Legislature does not, in terms, mention that the rate to be charged by the Board for supply of energy to consumers under an agreement spoken of in S. 60 would be the one provided for in the uniform tariff. It could have done so, as was done by the State Legislatures in Rajasthan and Orissa by adding Sections 49-A and 49-B to the Supply Act through Rajasthan Act 28 of 1976 and Orissa Act XIX of 1981 and providing for framing of uniform tariff for purposes of supply to the consumers who were getting supply at concessional rates under agreements after saying that those agreements shall be void. It could also have provided like the Karnataka Legislature, which added sub-ss. (5), (6) and (7) to S. 49 by Karnataka Act XXXIII of 1981, that notwithstanding anything in an agreement, the price payable by such consumers would be the one calculated in accordance with the uniform tariff framed from time to time. It could also have provided like the Karnataka Legislature, which added sub-ss. (5), (6) and (7) to S. 49 by Karnataka Act XXXIII of 1981, that notwithstanding anything in an agreement, the price payable by such consumers would be the one calculated in accordance with the uniform tariff framed from time to time. These enactments are anterior, in point of time, to the enactment of U.P. Act 12 of 1983 and the pattern was thus available to the U.P. Legislature. In spite thereof, the State Legislature of U.P., in its wisdom, chose a different pattern and required consideration of factors enumerated by it by the Board before fixing the rates of supply and made them applicable subject to the approval of the State Government. 30. The requirement that due regard shall be given to the enumerated factors, or those others considered relevant by the Board, while determining the rate of supply to a consumer like Kanorias with effect from August 20, 1983 engrafted in S. 60(5)(a) carries with it the obligation to do so as and when the rates are sought to be changed. The absence of the words from time to time in the provision or of words with similar import does not meant that the Board would not be competent to alter the rates from time to time as was sought to be suggested by Sri S. P. Gupta. As supplier of a commodity like electrical energy, the Board cannot be denied the right to bring about variation in the price payable by a consumer for it in accordance with law. The variation can, however, be made in terms of the statutory provision, namely, cl. (a) of S. 60(5). Compliance with it must be made by the Board every time that it seeks to alter the rates of its supply. The exercise may necessitate examination of the factors qua the particular supply made under an agreement, again and again, but that is inevitable in view what the Legislature has said. 31. Some anxiety was expressed on behalf of the respondents in regard to the consequence of a construction that the provisions of S. 60(5)(a) necessitate consideration of factors peculiar to a particular supply. 31. Some anxiety was expressed on behalf of the respondents in regard to the consequence of a construction that the provisions of S. 60(5)(a) necessitate consideration of factors peculiar to a particular supply. It was urged that this may bring in a dispute between the Board and the consumer in regard to the nature of the factor relevant to that particular supply as also about the fact whether due consideration of any factor, required by sub-s. (a) to be considered, was done. It may also bring in the element of judicial review in the matter of rates fixed by the Board under this provision. Further, may arise the question whether the same exercise was to be undergone by the State Government, while according its approval, as was done by the Board and would such exercise by the State Government be open to similar disputes and judicial review. These difficulties are more fanciful than real. The Board is made the sole judge of what are the factors, other than the named ones, which are relevant for consideration. It has also teen left free to determine the rates unilaterally. The fetter upon the power of the Board is twofold, first that in respect of the supply in question it has to take into consideration the named and other relevant (actors and, second, that it has to obtain approval to the rates determined by it from the State Government. The Board may consider it worthwhile inviting the consumer 10 place its view point in the matter but it is not bound to do so. When challenged, the fixation may be found to be bad, on the material disclosed by the Board, for non- consideration of some named or relevant factors-or for arbitrariness. The ambit of judicial review in the matter of fixation of price for a commodity supplied is limited and the court may intervene in exceptional cases. No objection can reasonable be taken to such judicial review. Even assuming, as was canvassed for the respondents, that the Legislature has itself called upon the Board to supply' energy to Kanorias at a rate different from the one envisaged in the agreement and has vested the Board with the discretion in the matter, exercise whereof is in the nature of a legislative function, a judicial review of the resultant of the exercise of such discretion cannot be completely excluded. If authority is needed for this principle, it is to be found in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515 . The action of the Board is open to scrutiny when it does not conform to statutory or constitutional requirements. The power of the Board is no doubt discretionary but it is not unrestricted. 32. In conclusion, my answer to the two (questions is that (a), the language of S. 60(5)(a) (as amended by S. 7) of U.P. Act 12 of 1983 requires consideration of the factors prescribed in it with reference to the petitioner company for revising the existing contractual rate and (b) fresh consideration of the factors mentioned in S. 60(5)(a) was required irrespective of the fact that factors mentioned in S. 49(2) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 had already been considered at the time of framing of the uniform tariff which was being fixed for the petitioner company while revising the rates. 33. With the aforesaid answer, the papers of the case may be laid again before the appropriate Bench for disposal of the case.