Judgment :- 1. The petitioners in I.A.818 of 1982 in L.A.R.No. 57 of 1979 pending before the Sub Court, Palghat are the revision petitioners. The 1st petitioner is the husband and the 2nd petitioner is his wife. An item of property belonging to the 2nd petitioner was acquired under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The 2nd petitioner filed an authorisation dated 12-11-1974 before the Land Acquisition Officer on receipt of notice dated 30-9-1974. In that authorisation she has stated that she is authorising her husband, namely the 1st petitioner, to represent her in the proceedings and everything in connection with the case and also to receive the compensation amount. The reference application was made on 8-5-1975 by the 1st petitioner, but without mentioning that the petition is filed for and on behalf of his wife. The Land Acquisition Officer accepted the petition and referred the case to the Subordinate Judge's Court mentioning only the 1st petitioner's name. Thereafter this interlocutory application was filed to implead the 2nd petitioner also in the proceedings. The lower court held that since there is no reference at the instance of the 2nd petitioner, she cannot be impleaded. 2. On going through the records it is clear that the land acquired belongs to the 2nd petitioner and that there was in fact a letter authorising the 1st petitioner to conduct the case on behalf of the 2nd petitioner. The Land Acquisition Officer has accepted the authorisation and it was due to this reason that the reference petition filed by the husband, who is not the owner of the property, was accepted and the matter was referred to the Civil Court under S.20 of the Act. However, in the reference letter the claimant's name was shown as the 1st petitioner himself and not the first petitioner for and on behalf of the 2nd petitioner. This is obviously a mistake. 3. But the question is whether the land acquisition court can implead the 2nd petitioner in these proceedings or whether some other procedure has to be adopted so that the 2nd petitioner may not lose her rights. 4. This is obviously a mistake. 3. But the question is whether the land acquisition court can implead the 2nd petitioner in these proceedings or whether some other procedure has to be adopted so that the 2nd petitioner may not lose her rights. 4. The Supreme Court has considered the legal character of the award passed in a land acquisition case, in Raja Harish Chandra Raja Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (A.I.R.1961 S.C.1500) and held as follows: "In dealing with this question It is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under S.12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer S.18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by court, and it is the amount of compensation which the court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance." 5. S.20 of the Kerala Act corresponds to S.18 of the Indian Act and although the word used in these sections is "reference", it may be observed that a reference under the Land Acquisition Act is not similar to a reference under the Incometax Act. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector cannot refuse to make a reference in case a proper reference application is made. After a reference the Collector has no control over the file and only the Land Acquisition Court can determine the questions in issue. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector cannot refuse to make a reference in case a proper reference application is made. After a reference the Collector has no control over the file and only the Land Acquisition Court can determine the questions in issue. Under S.20 of the Kerala Act the objections relating to measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the person to whom it is payable and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested are to be determined by the civil court. In this connection it may be noticed that under S.256 to 260 of the Incometax Act, the Appellate Tribunal continues to have seisin over the appeal even after a reference. The judgment delivered by the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be, on a reference, is to be sent to the Appellate Tribunal so that the Tribunal may pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to such judgments. So much so, the Supreme Court has held that the Appellate Tribunal retains appellate jurisdiction till the reference is disposed of and therefore can pass stay of realisation of tax in a matter referred to the High Court. (See C. I. T. v. Bansi Dhar & Sons (1986;157 I. T. R.665). Unlike as in a reference under the Incometax Act, in a reference under the Land Acquisition Act the Land Acquisition Officer has no further control over the case and the Court has full seisin of the case. Therefore the Court has full power to pass any order in the case. Since after reference the Land Acquisition Officer does not have any control over the case, it is not necessary to call for a further reference showing the name of the 2nd petitioner also. Under S.59 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to all proceedings before the court save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Land Acquisition Act. The impleading petition is filed under 0.1 R.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That rule empowers the Court, among other things, to implead any person as plaintiff or defendant, whose presence before court may be necessary is order to enable the court to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit effectually and completely. 6. The impleading petition is filed under 0.1 R.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That rule empowers the Court, among other things, to implead any person as plaintiff or defendant, whose presence before court may be necessary is order to enable the court to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit effectually and completely. 6. In a reference under S.32 of the Kerala Act, a Full Bench of this Court has considered the question and held that impleading of new parties can be allowed. (See Ranee Sidhan v. Spl. Tahsildar (1974 K. L. T. 725 (F. B.). Although that judgment is rendered in an appeal from an order in a reference under S.32, the following discussion in that judgment throws considerable light on the question in issue in this case: "These decisions make it clear (and we think, with respect, these to be the correct principles) that the functions of the Collector making the award cease once the amount is deposited in court, and 'all that is left is a dispute between interested people as to the extent of their interest' is the acquired property 'represented by a sum of money paid into court' in respect of which dispute 'the parties can proceed to litigate in the ordinary way or in the ordinary manner to determine what their light and title to the property may be 10 The court so far as the subject-matter of the enquiry is concerned, exercise all powers vested in it under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and decide all questions arising in relation to it applying the ordinary rules of evidence, but subject to the rule of conclusive evidence, stated in S.31 of the Act" 7. The Full Bench also referred with approval certain other decisions including Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Umed Laloo (A. I. R.1942 Sind 82), wherein it is held that there is no reason why a person interested should not apply to be joined as a party to a reference made by the Collector, although his name does not appear in the reference made, provided the question raised by him is in essence the dispute referred. 8. In Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas (A. I. R.1968 S. C. 366) one of the contentions raised was that respondent No.1 is not a person interested in the compensation and he is not entitled to be impleaded as party to reference. 8. In Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas (A. I. R.1968 S. C. 366) one of the contentions raised was that respondent No.1 is not a person interested in the compensation and he is not entitled to be impleaded as party to reference. In that case the Supreme Court after considering various authorities on this point held as follows: "The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that all disputes about the quantum of compensation must be decided by resort to the procedure prescribed by the Act; it is also intended that disputes about the rights of owners to compensation being ancillary to the principal dispute should be decided by the Court to which power is entrusted. Jurisdiction of the Court in this behalf is not restricted to cases of apportionment, but extends to adjudication of disputes as to the person who are entitled to receive compensation and there is nothing in S.30 which excludes a reference to the Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of land has, since the award devolved. Paramsukhdas is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests which were affected by the objections. It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred under S.21 should be gone into by the Court." In that case the Supreme Court also held that the High Court was right in entertaining the revision because the Civil Judge had either refused to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him or had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. 9. In this case there is an authorisation dated 12-9-1974 of the 2nd petitioner addressed to the Land Acquisition Officer authorising the 1st petitioner to act on her behalf. The 1st petitioner, husband, has no other interest in the land acquired. The reference application submitted by him must therefore be taken to be for and on behalf of the 2nd petitioner, even though it is not specifically mentioned so in the application. Otherwise the Land Acquisition Officer would have normally rejected a reference application filed by a stranger. But in this case the reference letter is accepted and in fact a reference is made to court. Obviously this must be for and on behalf of the 2nd petitioner, namely the wife. Otherwise the Land Acquisition Officer would have normally rejected a reference application filed by a stranger. But in this case the reference letter is accepted and in fact a reference is made to court. Obviously this must be for and on behalf of the 2nd petitioner, namely the wife. The observation of the lower court that there in no reference for and on behalf of the 2nd petitioner is therefore not correct. As in Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas (A. I. R.1969 S. C. 366) the Land Acquisition Court has either refused to exercise its jurisdiction or acted with material irregularity in exercising its jurisdiction by passing the impugned order. Therefore the order requires interference. Accordingly, the order of the lower court is set aside and I. A. No. 818 of 1982 is allowed. The 2nd petitioner is impleaded as additional petitioner in L. A. R.57 of 1979 before the Sub Court, Palghat. C. R. P. allowed as above.