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Allahabad High Court · body

1986 DIGILAW 98 (ALL)

Moti Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation

1986-01-28

B.L.YADAV

body1986
JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 16.5.1974 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the order dated 1.9.1972, passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in proceedings Under Sections 48 and 12 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. The facts leading to the present petition are that on 8th July, 1969 the Petitioner executed a sale-deed to the extent of half share is his chak No. 114 in favour of his son Khuchun, whereas the remaining half was sold is favour of Dukharan, Respondent No. 3, who made application u/s 12 of the Act for mutating his name over the share sold to him, 3. The Petitioner filed an objection to the application of Respondent No. 3, stating that the sale-deed was not valid and that 20 times rental was not deposited to acquire Bhumidhari Sanad nor the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was obtained before executing the sale-deed and that the execution of the sale-deed would amount to fragmentation of holding and the same was hit by Section 168A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (for short the Act) and was liable to be dismissed. 4. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 24.4.1972, decided the Case in favour of the Petitioner. The appeal of the Respondent No. 3 was allowed and the Petitioner's revision was dismissed. The last two orders are impugned in the instant writ petition. 5. Sri Sripat Narain Singh, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, urged that the entire amount of 20 times rental was not deposited; rather the deficiency was made good, on 9.10.1969. In view of Section 134 as it was then in force, Bhumidhari Sanad cannot be granted. The sale-deed was hit by Section 5C(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and by Section 168A of the Act. Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act did not apply. 6. Sri Shashi Nandan, appearing for the Respondent No. 3, urged that on the date of deposit i.e. 8.7.1969, 10 times rental was deposited whereas 20 times rental ought to have been deposited and the remaining 10 times rental was deposited on 9.10.1969. That could be deemed to be sufficient compliance of Section 134 of the Act. 6. Sri Shashi Nandan, appearing for the Respondent No. 3, urged that on the date of deposit i.e. 8.7.1969, 10 times rental was deposited whereas 20 times rental ought to have been deposited and the remaining 10 times rental was deposited on 9.10.1969. That could be deemed to be sufficient compliance of Section 134 of the Act. The sale-deed was not hit by Section I08A of the Act and Section 43 was not applicable. Reliance was placed on Ram Devi v. Board of Revenue 1983 RD 36 and on Jagat Narain v. Laljee 1964 AWR 646 . 7. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties I am of the view that the submissions Taised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner are without any merit. The first point that falls for consideration is as to whether a sirdar who deposits only ten times rental, even though twenty times rental was required can he acquire bhumidhari rights. Section 134 of the Act contemplates that if any sirdar either " pays or offers to pay ", to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to 20 times rent, he would acquire Bhumidhari rights It means that the legislature in its wisdom deliberately provided that ' either a sirdar pavs or offers to pay ". The clause " offers to pay " is unambiguous. It contemplates that even if no amount might have been paid on the date of the application for acquiring bhumidhari rights and even though just an offer to make the deposit might have been made nevertheless that would be a sufficient compliance for making an application to acquire right. There is a maxim " omne majlis continet in se minus ". which means that the greater contains the less. In other words genus includes species. It means if just by an offer being made Bhumidhari rights can be acquired, then why not when a person has deposited 10 times rental and deposited balance later on. In the instant case 10 times rental was deposited subsequently on 9.10.1969. I am accordingly of the view that application to acquire Bhumidhari rights was correctly made in view of Section 134 and their was no illegality even though only 10 times rental was ' deposited and the remaining 10 times rental was deposited lateron. 8. In the instant case 10 times rental was deposited subsequently on 9.10.1969. I am accordingly of the view that application to acquire Bhumidhari rights was correctly made in view of Section 134 and their was no illegality even though only 10 times rental was ' deposited and the remaining 10 times rental was deposited lateron. 8. As regards the next point whether the sale-deed was legal even though no permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was obtained before making the sale as required by Section 5C(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act office it to say that in view of Section 5C(ii) as applicable in 1969 the provisions were that without the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) no transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange can be made by any tenure-holder in respect of any part of his holdings, meaning thereby that if only part of the holding was sold in that event the permission of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was mandatory and when the entire holding was sold there was no necessity for permission. This point has been settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. It is accordingly evident that including Rama Devi v. Board of Revenue (Supra) the sale-deed was not hit by Section 5C(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 9. As regards the last submission that Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that as only ten times rental was deposited and not twenty times hence depositor did not acquire Bhumidhari rights on the date of deposit when sale-deed was executed and subsequent acquisition of Bhumidhari rights cannot go to the benefit of the depositor or the vendee. The argument of the learned Counsel is misconceived. Suffice it to say that even though on the date of deposit the depositor may not have acquired Bhumidhari rights but he represented that he was Bhumidhar and has all the transferable rights, in case he acquired Bhumidhari rights on a subsequent date nevertheless that would enure for the benefit of the transferee See also Brahmvart Sanathan Dharam Mahamandal, Kanpur and Others Vs. Prem Kumar and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1102 , Ram Pyare Vs. Ram Narain and Others, AIR 1985 SC 694 . 10. Prem Kumar and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1102 , Ram Pyare Vs. Ram Narain and Others, AIR 1985 SC 694 . 10. To the same effect are the observations of Hon'ble Gangeshwar Prasad, J. in Jagat Narain v. Laljee 1964 AWR 646 , relied upon by the counsel for the Petitioner, which are quoted below ; A person professed to transfer the interest of a bhumidhar in a land in which he had only the non-transferable interest of a sirdar but he subsequently acquires in the land the interest of a bhumidhar the benefit of the subsequent acquisition would go to the transferee, u/s 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. I am of the view that this case Jagat Narain v. Laljee (Supra) would help the Respondent No. 3 rather than the Petitioner. 11. Considering the above submissions the petition is devoid of merits and it is accordingly dismissed. I, however, make no order as to Costs.