JUDGMENT A. M. Bhattacharjee, J.: This appeal, arising out of a suit for eviction of tenants decreed on the ground of the premises being reasonably required by the landlords for building/re-building, has raised some important questions relating to the interpretation of S. 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and also S. 18A thereof to which S. 13(1)(f) is expressly subjected. As is well known, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, like the other cognate Statutes operating in other States, restricts the jurisdiction of the Courts to decree eviction of premises tenants except on one or more of the grounds specified therein and Clause (f) of Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act specifies one such ground for which a Court can decree eviction of a tenant at the instance of the landlord. Section 13(1)(f) reads as hereunder:–– "Subject to the provisions of sub-s. (3A) and S. 18A, where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for purpose. of building or re-building, or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations, and such building or re-building or additions or alterations, can not be carried out without the premises being vacated." 2 Section 18A(1) provides that while decreeing eviction of a tenant on the ground of building/re-building under S. 13(1)(f), the Court shall specify the period within which such building/re-building is to be completed and S. 18A(2) provides for restoration of tenancy to the tenant on the completion of such building/re-building, Section 18A(2) reads thus :–– "(2) On the completion of the building/re-building, or the additions or alterations, on or to such premises, the Controller may, on the application of the tenant who has been elected from such premises made within three months of the date of such completion and after giving the landlord an opportunity of being heard, by order direct the landlord to put such tenant in possession of such premises or such part thereof as the Controller may specify in his order within fourteen days of the date of the order." 3. Two main questions that have arisen for our consideration in this appeal are––(1) whether or not the condition of the premises is a relevant factor for consideration while decreeing eviction for the building/re-building of such premises, and (2) whether or not the proposed building/re-building, for which eviction is claimed, must be shown to be such as would provide for the restoration of the tenancy to the tenant. 4. As to first question, we are inclined to hold that in order to decide as to whether the premises are reasonably required for building/re-building, the condition of the premises is very much a relevant factor for consideration. It is true that in some decisions of this Court as well as of other High Court, it has been observed that "the state of the premise, is not an essential factor" and reference, for example, may be made to the Bench decision of this Court in Bhulan Singh v. Chandrakumar (AIR 1950 Calcutta 74) and also to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Champa Kumar v. District Judge (AIR 1976 Allahabad 252). But such a view can no longer be accepted as good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal (AIR 1963 Supreme Court 499) decided about quarter of a century ago and also a much later decision in Metalware v. Bansilal (AIR 1979 SC 2559). 5. The relevant provisions of the Statute which wore considered in Neta Ram (supra) were as hereunder :–– "landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession in the case of any building, if he requires it for toe re-erection of that building or for its replacement by another building or for the erection of other buildings" 6. In that case while the Rent Controller was of the view "that the condition of the building also prayed an important part" and refused eviction, the High Court held that "the actual condition of the premises is a wholly irrelevant factor" and decreed eviction. The view of the High Court was negatived by the Supreme Court and in setting aside the order of the High Court it was held that "the condition of the building" and whether "the houses need reconstruction" are factors of great relevance. 7. The view of the High Court was negatived by the Supreme Court and in setting aside the order of the High Court it was held that "the condition of the building" and whether "the houses need reconstruction" are factors of great relevance. 7. In the case of Metalware (supra), the relevant statute provided for eviction of the tenant "if the building is bona fide required by the landlord" for carrying out repairs or for demolition and erection of new building and the question posted for consideration, as noted at the very beginning of the judgment, was "whether while considering the bona fide requirement of the building by the landlord - the condition of the building is a wholly irrelevant factor?" And relying on Neta Ram (supra) and after distinguishing and explaining the decisions in Panchamal Narayan Shenoy ( AIR 1971 SC 942 ) and in S. M. Gopal Krishna Chetty ( AIR 1975 SC 1750 ), it was held that "the existing condition of the building, far from being totally irrelevant, is a vital factor which will have to be considered while pronouncing upon the bona fide requirement of the landlord". 8. Going by these decisions, as we must, we can not but hold that the conditions of the premises was therefore an important factor for consideration for the determination of the question as to whether the premises were reasonably required by the landlord for building/re-building, but we find that the learned trial Judge has not adverted to this aspect at all. In deciding the relevant issue, being no. 2, all that the learned Judge has considered is whether the landlord genuinely intended to reconstruct and whether they had the means to do so and has decided these questions in favour of the landlords. While these are also undoubtedly relevant factors for consideration, the total absence of consideration as to the condition of the premises can not but render his finding unsound in law. 9. The learned Advocate for the landlords has, however, contended that even though the learned Judge failed to consider this factor, there is sufficient evidence on record as to the age and condition of the premises which would enable us in this first appeal to come to a proper finding. 9. The learned Advocate for the landlords has, however, contended that even though the learned Judge failed to consider this factor, there is sufficient evidence on record as to the age and condition of the premises which would enable us in this first appeal to come to a proper finding. We have been taken through the evidence by the learned Advocates for the parties and we find that the premises were purchased by the father of the original plaintiff who is now represented by his heirs in this suit. It is in evidence that the father of the original plaintiff died in or about and 1930 therefore the premises were obviously purchased some time before 1930. It is also in evidence that the premise had tiled roof which was replaced by the father of the original plaintiff by corrugated tin and the wall on one side, made of split bamboo, was also replaced by him by a brick wall while on the other side a tin wall was made. The original plaintiff figuring as PW-1, very clearly stated that "the condition of the disputed house is very bad" and we see no reason to disbelieve him when we find that such a structure was purchased more than fifty years ago and there is no evidence that those were materially or substantially repaired from time to time or at all. There is also no cross-examination as to the condition of the premises being "very bad" and even the defendant no. 5, figuring as the sole witness for the defendants, has all along referred to the premises as "hut" in his deposition. If this hut was constructed more than fifty years ago without any substantial repair or replacement, then it would not at all be unsafe to accept the evidence of PW-1 that "the condition of the disputed house is very bad" as such structures can not but lose almost all its usefulness during all these long years. On this state of evidence we think that it may reasonably be held that the condition of the premises is such as to need reconstruction, though the learned Judge not having adverted to this question at all, has not come to any finding on this aspect. 10. On this state of evidence we think that it may reasonably be held that the condition of the premises is such as to need reconstruction, though the learned Judge not having adverted to this question at all, has not come to any finding on this aspect. 10. The second question that arises for consideration is that whether in view of S. 18A, to which S.13(1)(f) has been expressly subjected, the requirement for reconstruction can be held to be reasonable only when it is shown that the proposed reconstruction is such as would provide for the re-induction of the tenant and would enable him to carry on with the purpose of his tenancy. Section 18A, as its marginal note would show, provides for restoration of tenancy to the tenant after reconstruction. Even if S. 13(1)(f) stood alone and was not made expressly subject to S. 18A, a tenant would have been entitled to invoke the provisions of S. 18A and to apply to the Controller for restoration of his tenancy. But the Legislature, having expressly made S. 13(1)(f) subject to S. 18A, has made it clear that the provisions of S. 18A, providing for restoration of tenancy, must be kept in view while decreeing eviction under S. 13(1)(f). In other words, the provisions of S. 18A, providing for restoration of tenancy to the tenant, are made part, so to say, of the conditions of ejectment of tenant under S. 13(1)(f). To put it differently, in view of S. 18A controlling S. 13(1)(f), a requirement for building/re-building, though otherwise reasonable, would not pass the test of S. 13(1)(f) unless it is further shown that the premises after reconstruction would afford reasonable facilities to the tenants to be restored back and to utilise the tenancy for which the same was used. For otherwise, the opening words of S. 13(1)(f), whereby the provisions thereof have been made subject to S. 18A, would be tendered useless surplusage. The entire purpose behind subjecting S. 13(1)(f) to S. 18A is to prevent the landlord from ousting his tenant on the plea of reconstruction, unless such proposed reconstruction is shown to provide reasonable facilities for the restoration of the tenancy. The landlord may otherwise reconstruct in such manner as he may like, with such increased accommodation, amenities, facilities etc. The entire purpose behind subjecting S. 13(1)(f) to S. 18A is to prevent the landlord from ousting his tenant on the plea of reconstruction, unless such proposed reconstruction is shown to provide reasonable facilities for the restoration of the tenancy. The landlord may otherwise reconstruct in such manner as he may like, with such increased accommodation, amenities, facilities etc. as he may choose, but his right to eject tenant for the purpose of reconstruction being subject to the provisions of S. 18A, the proposed reconstruction must be shown to be such as would afford the tenant reasonable facilities of being re-inducted and to carry on with the purpose of his tenancy. 11. We are of the opinion that any other interpretation would not only make the words "subject to the provisions of S. 18A" in S. 13(1)(f) superfluous and otiose, but would be against the very object for which these Rent Acts have been enacted. As observed by the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Cooperative v. Dalichand ( AIR 1969 SC 1320 at 1328) "the scheme of the various Rent Acts and the public policy underlying them are clear, the policy is to give protection to the tenants". As pointed out further by the Supreme Court in Muralidhar v. State ( AIR 1974 SC 1924 at 1929-30), the provisions in the Rent Acts are for the benefit of the tenants, but those are not to be viewed s provisions enacted just for the benefit of one class or one section of the community", " but to protect weaker section of the community with a view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by erecting equality of bargaining power" and that although the provisions are "primarily intended for the protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy". In Nataraja Studios v. Navarang Studios ( AIR 1981 SC 537 ) the Supreme Court has again observed (at 543) that "Rent Act is a welfare legislation aimed at the definite social objective of protection of tenants". In Nataraja Studios v. Navarang Studios ( AIR 1981 SC 537 ) the Supreme Court has again observed (at 543) that "Rent Act is a welfare legislation aimed at the definite social objective of protection of tenants". That such was all along been the object and purpose of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and its subsequent amendment has also been noted by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kameswar v. Sahadeb (74 Calcutta Weekly Notes 715 at 719) where it has been observed that "each time the Legislature takes up the matter into its hands, the law is made more and more in favour of the tenant and prejudicial to the landlord's rights under the general law of landlord and tenant". Our interpretation must, therefore, be inspired with such objective of giving protection to the tenants and if two or more interpretations ace possible, then the interpretation which is protective or more protective of the interest of the tenants must be preferred to the one protective or more protective of the interests of the landlords. 12. It is the evidence of PW-1 that the defendants are using the premises for ganging rickshaws. In paragraph 7 of the point it is also stated that "the defendants used the suit property as a godown for garaging rickshaws". It is also the evidence of DW-1 that "in part of the structures we have our office and residence for coolies and repairing shop for the rickshaws" and "in the vacant land 83 rickshaws are kepi". As to the proposed reconstruction, the evidence of PW-1 is that "there will he three shop rooms in the front portion of the ground floor" and "at the back side there will be three dwelling rooms and in the first floor three dwelling rooms will be constructed". Dwelling rooms and shop rooms are not obviously places where rickshaws can be garaged and there is no reliable evidence as to how much vacant space would be available after reconstruction where so many rickshaws can be garaged. The learned Judge has not considered this aspect at all. The Municipal plan for the proposed reconstruction, Ex. 23, has not yet been sanctioned and there is nothing on record to show as to whether it would be sanctioned as it is. The learned Judge has not considered this aspect at all. The Municipal plan for the proposed reconstruction, Ex. 23, has not yet been sanctioned and there is nothing on record to show as to whether it would be sanctioned as it is. It is therefore not possible to ascertain with reasonable certainty as to what would finally be the nature and extent of the proposed construction after the plan is eventually sanctioned and whether it would have reasonable provisions for the restoration of the tenancy. 13. It has been urged that the provision of S. 18A(2), quoted hereinbefore, providing for restoration of the tenancy to the tenant, use the expression "may" and therefore restoration of tenancy not being a "must", absence of provisions for such restoration in the proposed reconstruction would not make the claim unreasonable. It is true that S. 18A(2) has used the expression "may" and in view of the expression "shall" having been so conspicuously used in the preceding S. 18 and even in sub-s. (1) and sub S. (3) of S. 18A itself, it may not be possible to construe, even with the aids of the rules of interpretations, the expression "may" in S. 18A(2) to convey any obligatory mandate. But the Legislature might have for various reasons decided to confer a discretion and not to cast an obligation on the Controller to direct restoration of tenancy. For example, in a given case the landlord way deliberately, dishonestly or otherwise make the reconstruction so out of tune with the earlier construction that it may not be reasonably possible for the Controller to direct re-induction of the earlier tenants in such a case. But that would be a matter which would arise for consideration at a much later stage after the decree is passed and reconstruction is made. But at the stage of granting decree under S. 13(1)(f) which is expressly subjected to S. 18A, if the Court finds the proposed construction to be so out of tune with the existing tenancy as to make restoration of tenancy not reasonably possible, the Court, under the combined operation of S. 13(1)(f) and S. 18A, can not regard a claim for such reconstruction to be reasonable. As we have already indicated, in view of S. 13(1)(f) being made expressly subject to S. 18A, Court must take into consideration the reasonable possibilities of the tenants being re-inducted before decreeing eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for building/re-building. The learned Judge not having considered this aspect even remotely and, as conceded by the learned Advocates appearing for the landlords as well as tenants, the relevance of this aspect not being very clearly present in the minds of the parties at the trial, we would have to send the matter back for proper consideration of this aspect. 14. It has also been urged on behalf of the tenants-appellants that the evidence being that only some of the co-sharer landlords are interested in the proposed construction and the entire body of the landlords not being interested therein, the requirement can not amount to that of the "landlord" within the meaning of S. 13(1)(f) to warrant eviction. It is true that the original landlord, who instituted the suit, having died, the premises have now devolved on his widow, sons and daughters. It is in evidence that the female heirs have executed deeds of release in favour of the sons of the original landlord. It has, however, been contended that such deeds of release can not effectively transmit or extinguish the title of the releasors and, therefore, the female heirs are still the co-landlords notwithstanding such purported release and they not being interested in the proposed construction, the requirement is not that of the entire body of the landlords and cannot justify eviction. This contention cannot be rejected. So far as this Court is concerned, it is settled by a series of decisions that where the premises are owned by several co-owners, reasonable requirement of one or some of them would justify eviction of the tenant provided all the co-owner landlords have joined in the suit without any objection on any score and that it is not necessary that the premises are to be reasonably required by all the co-landlords. The decision in Tarak v. Ratan (1959 Calcutta Law Journal 136), in Kanika v. Amarendra (65 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1078) and in Debaranjan v. Swarnarani (76 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1034) are clear authorities for this proposition and all these decisions having now been approved by the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagennath ( AIR 1976 SC 2335 ), the point must now be taken to have been sealed. It may be noted that the decision in Sri Ram Pasricha (supra) has now again been referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in the later decision in Anupama v. Deb Kumar ( AIR 1982 SC 25 ). It is true that all these cases are relating to reasonable requirement for own occupation coming within S. 13(1)(f). But on principle there can be no difference on this score between cases of reasonable requirement for reconstruction and that for own occupation. If reasonable requirement for own occupation for some of the co-sharer-landlords is it reasonable requirement for the "landlord" within the meaning of S. 13(1)(f), then there should be no reason as to why reasonable requirement for reconstruction for some of the co-sharer-landlords would not be reasonable requirement for the "landlord" within the meaning of S. 13(1)(f). If the premises need reconstruction and are reasonably required for such purpose, the fact that only some of the landlords, and not all of them, are interested in building the proposed reconstruction would make no difference and the case would still be a case of requirement by the "landlord" for the purpose of S. 13(1)(f) when all the co-landlords have joined in prosecuting the action. 15. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Neta Ram (supra) and Metalware (supra), in order to decide the reasonableness of the requirement for building/re-building "all the surrounding circumstances" are to be considered including, (a) the condition of the building, (b) its situation, (c) the possibility of its being put to more profitable use and (d) the means of the landlord. We have already noted that even though the learned trial Judge failed to consider the aspect relating to the condition of the premises, the evidence on record is sufficient to indicate that the premises need reconstruction. We have already noted that even though the learned trial Judge failed to consider the aspect relating to the condition of the premises, the evidence on record is sufficient to indicate that the premises need reconstruction. We must also note that the learned Advocate appearing for the tenants-appellants have not urged that the other tests as noted above are not satisfied in this case and after going through the evidence on record we have also no manner of doubt that all the tests as indicated hereinabove are satisfied in this case. The further requirement of S. 13(1)(f) to the effect that the proposed building/re-building must be such which "cannot be carried on without the premises being vacated" is also satisfied in this case as the deposition of D.W.5, figuring as the sole witness for the defendants, to the effect that "no construction is possible without evicting us from the land" really clinches the matter. But as already noted, the learned Judge has failed to consider the matter in the light of the provisions of S. 18A and there is no satisfactory evidence on record to enable us to infer that the proposed construction would afford reasonable facilities for restoration of the tenancy to the tenants. As already indicated, in our view the consideration of this question is essential to the right decision of the suit and we, therefore, refer the same for trial by the Court below, which would take such additional evidence on the question as may be required and shall return its finding along with the evidence within 30th June, 1986. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 14th April, 1986 to receive the directions of that court as to further proceeding in the case. 16. The records of this case along with a copy of our judgment to go down at once. Sukumar Chakravarty, J.: I agree. Remanded to trial court with direction.