A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) THE short question which arises for consideration in this petition is whether in proceedings under sec. 32ppp of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Acts 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) it is open to the Revenue Tribunal to set at naught the order passed by the Agricultural Lands-Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal) on the plea that the proceedings initialed under sec. 32-G of the Act were ab initio void for want of jurisdiction. The facts which are relevant for answering this question briefly stated are as under. ( 2 ) SURVEY No. 240a admeasuring about 1 Acre 35 Gunthas and Survey No. 240b admeasuring about 30 Gunthas of village Nikol district Ahmedabad were of the ownership of Laxmanrao Bajurao. The said survey numbers were in possession of Mangaji Ramtuji as a tenant and he was cultivating the same. Ordinarily the tenant would have become a deemed purchaser by virtue of sec. 32 of the Act on the tillers day but since Laxmanrao was admittedly subject to a physical disability the tenants right to purchase the land was postponed by virtue of sec. 32-F of the Act. Laxmanrao during his lifetime terminated the tenancy of Mangaji under sec. 14 for failure to pay rent and thereafter sought possession of the land by applying to the Mamlatdar under sec. 29 of the Act. The Mamlatdar did not order eviction of the tenant but directed that the rent in arrears should be paid. Against that order Laxmanrao preferred an appeal which was allowed by the City Deputy Collector by his order dated 17/03/1954 and the tenant Mangaji was directed to hand over possession of the land to Laxmanrao. Against this order of the City Deputy Collector in Appeal No. 102 of 1963 a Revision Application No. 1105 of 1965 was preferred by the tenant to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the same was rejected on 7/06/1956 Laxmanrao therefore because entitled to possession of the land in question on the determination of Mangajis tenancy by the order passed by the City Deputy Collector in appeal which came to be confirmed in revision. ( 3 ) AFTER. the eviction decree became final on the rejection of the revision application on 7/06/1966 the landowner Laxmanrao passed away en 24th January 1567 before possession could be obtained The respondents are the legal representatives of deceased Laxmanrao. ( 3 ) AFTER. the eviction decree became final on the rejection of the revision application on 7/06/1966 the landowner Laxmanrao passed away en 24th January 1567 before possession could be obtained The respondents are the legal representatives of deceased Laxmanrao. It appears that even after his demise the possession of the lands in question continued to remain with the tenant whereupon the Tribunal initiated proceedings under sec. 32g of the Act sometime in 1972 being Case No. 73/32g/72 which was disposed of on 23rd October 1972. A certified copy of the order passed by the Mamlatdar-cum-Tribunal has been placed on record by Mr. A. J. Patel the learned advocate for the petitioners who are the legal representatives of Mangaji Ramtuji who died some time in 1977. A perusal of the order passed in the proceedings under sec. 32 of the Act shows that one of the questions raised for decision was whether Mangaji was cultivating the lands as a tenant. This question was answered in the affirmative by the Mamlatdar-cum-Tribunal. It also appears from the order that since the tenant expressed his unwillingness to purchase the land of which he was said to be a tenant the Mamlatdar-cum-Tribunal acting under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 32g declared that as the tenant was not willing to purchase the land the purchase was ineffective. It may be mentioned that notices of the proceedings initiated under sec. 32g of the Act had admittedly been served on the legal representatives of deceased Laxmanrao. It is also not in dispute that the heirs of Laxmanrao did not challenge the order passed on 23/10/1972 by way of appeal and allowed it to become final. ( 4 ) SEC. 32ppp was inserted in the Act by sec. 14 of Gujarat Act 5 of 1973. That section provides that notwithstanding anything contained in secs. 32g and 32p where on or after the date of coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act 1965 any land has been at the disposal of the Collector under sec. 32p on account of the purchase of the land by the tenant thereof having become ineffective by reason of the tenant failing to appear before the Tribunal or making a statement expressing his unwillingness to purchase the land and the land so at the disposal of the Collector has not been disposed of as provided by sec. 32p on account of the purchase of the land by the tenant thereof having become ineffective by reason of the tenant failing to appear before the Tribunal or making a statement expressing his unwillingness to purchase the land and the land so at the disposal of the Collector has not been disposed of as provided by sec. 32p the tenant may make an application to the Tribunal for a declaration that the purchase has not become ineffective. On receipt of such as application the Tribunal must issue notice to the tenant and the landlord and thereafter if the tenant appears and makes a statement that he is willing to purchase the land the Tribunal must proceed to determine the purchase price as if the purchase has not become effective. Soon after the insertion of this provision on the statute book the tenant Mangaji Ramtuji preferred an application under this provision on 27/08/1973 expressing his desire to purchase the lands in question. On receipt of this application the Tribunal issued notice to the tenant as well as the landlords and by its order dated 25/03/1976 determined the purchase price at Rs. 2 464 to be paid by five annual installments. Against this order the legal representatives of Laxmanrao preferred an appeal Tenancy Appeal No. 69 of 1976 which carne to be dismissed by the City Deputy Collector Ahmedabad on 13/07/1977. Being aggrieved by the order passed in appeal the respondents herein preferred a Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 778/77 in the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which came to be allowed on 21/06/1978. It is against the said order of the Revenue Tribunal that the legal representatives of the deceased tenant have preferred this application under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) THE Revenue Tribunal came to the conclusion that as the tenancy of Mangaji had been determined under sec. 14 and as na eviction decree had been passed against him in the proceedings lodged under sec. 29 of the Act Mangaji had ceased to be a tenant of the survey numbers in question during the lifetime of Laxmanrao a physically disabled person and hence no proceedings under sec. 14 and as na eviction decree had been passed against him in the proceedings lodged under sec. 29 of the Act Mangaji had ceased to be a tenant of the survey numbers in question during the lifetime of Laxmanrao a physically disabled person and hence no proceedings under sec. 32g of the Act could ever have been initiated against him consequently the declaration made to the effect that the purchase had become ineffective was without jurisdiction and therefore null and void ab initio and the subsequent proceedings under the newly inserted sec. 32ppp of the Act were not maintainable. Mr. A. J. Patel the learned advocate for the legal representatives of the tenant contended that since the Tribunal was competent to go into the question of tenancy in proceedings arising under sec. 32g of the Act it could not be argued that the decision of the Tribunal rendered on 23/10/1972 was void ab initio for want of inherent jurisdiction and once that decision was allowed to become final its validity could not be questioned in the subsequent proceedings initiated under sec. 32ppp of the Act. Mr. Patel therefore contended that the Revenue Tribunal committed a serious jurisdictional error in holding that the proceedings under sec. 32ppp were not maintainable as the order passed on 23/10/1972 under sec. 32g was void ab initio for want of jurisdiction. The short question which therefore arises for consideration is whether the Revenue Tribunal was right in holding that the proceedings initiated under sec. 32g of the Act were without jurisdiction and therefore its decision rendered on 23/10/1972 was null and void. In order to decide this question it would be necessary to refer to a few provisions of the Act. ( 6 ) THE deceased Mangaji was admittedly a tenant of the lands in question. His tenancy was terminated under sec. 14 of the Act for failure to pay the rent due from him. A decree in ejectment was ultimately passed against him under sec. 29 of the Act which could be executed in the manner provided by sec. 21 of the Mamlatdar Courts Act 1906 by virtue of sec. 73 (2) of the Act. His tenancy was terminated under sec. 14 of the Act for failure to pay the rent due from him. A decree in ejectment was ultimately passed against him under sec. 29 of the Act which could be executed in the manner provided by sec. 21 of the Mamlatdar Courts Act 1906 by virtue of sec. 73 (2) of the Act. It is also an admitted fact that before possession of the lands in question could be obtained from the tenant the landlord Laxmanrao passed away on 24/01/1963 It is also an admitted fact that Laxmanrao was subject to a physical disability till the date of his demise. Therefore by virtue of sec. 32-F the tenants right to statutory purchase under sec. 32 had been postponed and before it could revive the decree in ejectment came to be passed against him. However in execution of that decree the tenant was not dispossessed of the lands till the date of Laxmanraos demise and even thereafter till proceedings under sec. 32ppp were initiated in August 1973. Section 32 lays down that on the tillers day 1/04/1957 every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased from his landlord free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon the land held by him as a tenant if (a) such tenant is not a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates the land personally; and (b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally and the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under sec. 31; or notice has been given under sec. 31 but the landlord has not applied under sec. 29 to the Mamlatdar on or before 31/03/1957 for obtaining possession of the land or the landlord has not terminated his tenancy on any of the grounds specified in sec. 14 or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar under sec. 29 on or before 31 March 1957 for obtaining possession of the lands. Section 32-F which begins with a non obstante clause notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections-provides that where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land under sec. 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under sec. 31. 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under sec. 31. Section 32-G lays down that as soon as may be after the tillers day the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon all tenants who under sec. 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands all landlords of such lands and all other persons interested therein to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. On appearance in response to the notice the Tribunal is required to record the statement of the tenant whether or not he is willing to purchase the land held by him as such. If the tenant fails to appear in response to the notice or appears and states that he is not willing to purchase the land the Tribunal is expected to make a declaration that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. On such a declaration being made sec. 32-P empowers the Collector to direct the disposal of the land in the manner provided by sub-sec. (2) thereof. Section 32-PP was inserted by Gujarat Act 36/65 with a view to giving a further opportunity to tenants to purchase the land if he had failed to do so earlier within the prescribed time. Section 32-PPP was also introduced with a view to giving yet another opportunity to the tenants to purchase lands whose purchase had become ineffective after commencement of Gujarat Act 36/65. It will appear from the aforesaid provisions that sec. 32 provides for statutory purchase of lands possessed by tenants on the tillers day while section 32-G provides for the constitution of a Tribunal to determine whether or not the tenant is willing to purchase the land occupied by him. If the tenant is willing to purchase the land the Tribunal is enjoined to determine the purchase price of the land; but if the tenant refuses to purchase the land the Tribunal has to make a declaration to that effect and hold that the purchase is ineffective. In the present case after proceedings were initiated under sec. If the tenant is willing to purchase the land the Tribunal is enjoined to determine the purchase price of the land; but if the tenant refuses to purchase the land the Tribunal has to make a declaration to that effect and hold that the purchase is ineffective. In the present case after proceedings were initiated under sec. 32-G of the Act the tenant Mangaji expressed his unwillingness to purchase the land with the result that the Tribunal by its order dated 27/10/1972 declared the purchase ineffective whereupon the lands became available for disposal under sec. 32-P of the Act. One other provision to which my attention was drawn is sec. 32-0 which deals with tenancies created after the tillers day. That Section provides that a tenant cultivating personally under such a tenancy shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the expiry of one year from the commencement of such tenancy. Whereupon the provisions of secs. 32 to 32-N and 32-P 32 and 32-R insofar as they are applicable mutatis mutandis apply to the purchase of such land. Lastly reference may be made to sec. 70 of the Act which empowers the Mamlatdar inter alia to decide whether a person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. By implication therefore no other authority can go into the question whether an individual occupant is a tenant or not of the land in his possession. ( 7 ) IN an inquiry under sec. 32-G the Tribunal has to issue notice to all tenants who are deemed to have purchased the lands as well as their landlords in order to ascertain whether or not the tenant is willing to purchase the land. If the tenant is willing to purchase the lands the Tribunal has to determine the purchase price of the land in accordance with the provisions of sec 32-H and 63 -. X (3) of the Act. Section 32-H indicates two modes in which the purchase price must be determined namely (i) in the case of a permanent tenant the purchase price must be determined as provided in sub-clauses (a) (b) and (c) of clause (i) while in the case of any other tenants the price must be determined in the manner stated in sub-clauses (a) to (d) of clause (ii ). This would require the Tribunal to decide whether the tenant is a permanent tenant or not. The Tribunal would therefore have jurisdiction to decide whether the applicant before it is a permanent tenant or not in order to enable it to decide the manner in which the purchase price should be determined. No doubt under sec. 70 (b) of the Act the jurisdiction to decide whether a person is or was a tenant or a protected tenant or permanent tenant vests in the Mamlatdar. By necessary implication therefore no other forum except the Mamlatdar would have jurisdiction to go into the question of tenancy if any doubt arises in that behalf. In proceedings under sec. 32-G the Tribunal would feel handicapped in determining the price if any question arose whether the claimant was a tenant or a permanent tenant. To overcome this difficulty the Government of Gujarat issued a notification dated 9/07/1960 under sec. 2 (10) of the Act. Section 2 (10) of the Act defines Mamlatdar to include a Mamlatdar or any other officer whom the State Government may appoint to perform the duties of a Mamlatdar under the Act. By notification of 9/07/1960 the State Government appointed each of the officers appointed and authorised under sec. 67 of the said Act to be a Tribunal for any area in the State to perform duties of a Mamlatdar under the said Act within the area. Section 67 of the Act provides for the appointment of Agricultural Lands Tribunal for each taluka or mahal or for such area as the State Government may think proper. By this notification therefore all the Tribunals appointed under sec. 67 of the Act were empowered to perform the duties of a Mamlatdar under the Act which would include deciding the question of tenancy. That being so the Tribunal under sec. 32-G became entitled to decide the question of tenancy arising before it with a view to ultimately determining the price the tenant was liable to pay for the land in question. ( 8 ) MR. Zaveri the learned advocate for the respondents submitted that even though the Tribunal while acting under sec. 32g of the Act may have powers vested in the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act since the two authorities are independent when the Tribunal exercises power under sec. ( 8 ) MR. Zaveri the learned advocate for the respondents submitted that even though the Tribunal while acting under sec. 32g of the Act may have powers vested in the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act since the two authorities are independent when the Tribunal exercises power under sec. 32g of the Act it cannot simultaneously perform the functions of a Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act. That being so Mr. Zaveri argued the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide whether or not Mangaji was a tenant in respect of the lands in question and hence its decision to that effect is of no consequence whatsoever and can be totally ignored strike it is an admitted fact that an eviction order was made against him before the death of Laxmanrao. In my opinion after the decision of the Supreme Court in Kuberbhai Dahyabhai v. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Civil Appeal No. 365 of 1966 decided on 7/02/1967 and the subsequent decision of this Court in Narayanprasad v. Merubhai (1961) 8 G. L. R. 897 the contention urged by Mr. Zaveri cannot be accepted. In Bhikhabhai v. J. v. Vyas (1963) 4 G L R. 873 Bhagwati J speaking for the Division Bench had pointed out that even though the same person occupies two positions one has a Tribunal while acting under sec. 32g and the other as a Mamlatdar while acting under sec. 70 (b) he possesses distinct and independent jurisdictions in one case he would be exercising jurisdiction of a Tribunal under sec. 32g while in the other he would be exercising jurisdiction of a Mamlatdar under. No. 70 (b) of the Act. These observations were made without considering the effect of the notification issued by the State Government on 9/07/1960 under sec. 2 (10) of the Act. In Narayanprasads case these observations were referred to and it was pointed out that the notification of 9/07/1960 had made a fundamental difference since it invests the Tribunal with jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar. After considering the observations of Divan J in Kuberbhai Dahyabhai v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. 2 (10) of the Act. In Narayanprasads case these observations were referred to and it was pointed out that the notification of 9/07/1960 had made a fundamental difference since it invests the Tribunal with jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar. After considering the observations of Divan J in Kuberbhai Dahyabhai v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Special Civil Application No. 1093 of 1963 decided on 6/02/1964 and the observations of the Supreme Court while confirming that decision Bhagwati J observed in Narayanprasads case that the notification of 9/07/1960 had made a vital difference in the position and since by reason of that notification the Tribunal was vested with the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act it was obvious that the Tribunal was clothed within the powers of the Mamlatdar and had therefore jurisdiction to decide all questions which could be decided by the Mamlatdar including these arising under sec. 70 (b) of the Act. The learned Judge then proceeded so conclude as under:now in a proceeding validly commenced under sec. 32g various questions may arise for the determination of the AGricultural Lands Tribunal and one of those questions would be whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. Since the Tribunal is clothed with the powers of the Mamlatdar it would have jurisdiction to determine the question of tenancy for the limited purpose of deciding questions arising in the inquiry commenced under sec. 32g of the Act. In the instant case the Tribunal in the inquiry under sec. 32g of the Act raised the pointed question whether Mangaji was cultivating the land as a tenant and answered the same in the affirmative. In view of the fact that the Tribunal had jurisdiction after the notification of 9/07/1960 to decide questions arising under sec. 70 (b) of the Act for the limited purpose of disposing of the proceedings under sec. 32r of the Act it could not be said that the Tribunals decision was wholly without jurisdiction. To put it differently this is not a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. As discussed above the Tribunal had jurisdiction and it is a different matter to say that if all the relevant factors were placed before it it may have come to a different conclusion. To put it differently this is not a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. As discussed above the Tribunal had jurisdiction and it is a different matter to say that if all the relevant factors were placed before it it may have come to a different conclusion. That is however essentially a question of fact to be gone into by the Tribunal while disposing of proceedings arising under sec. 32g of the Act. That is why A. D. Desai J. in Special Civil Application No. 1174 of 1975 decided on 12/09/1975 observed that the question of tenancy cannot be gone into in proceedings under sec. 32pp of the Act because the tenant contemplated under the provision is one who is a tenant or a person who is declared to be a tenant under the provisions of sec. 32g or under any other provision of the Act. That was a case in which the question of tenancy was inquired into in the proceedings under sec. 32g of the Act but was sought to be reported when the proceedings under sec. 32pp commenced. It was in that context that A. D. Desai J. observed that the question of tenancy being essentially one of fact to be determined under sec. 32 of the Act could not be gone into in proceedings under sec. 32pp of the Act. On the same analogy pursuant to the decision taken by the Tribunal under sec. 32g of the Act the lands in question became available for disposal under sec. 32p and on the insertion of sec 32ppp on the statute book the tenant became entitled to apply for purchasing the same and for fixation of the purchase prize. ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter I am inclined to agree with Mr. Patel that the Revenue Tribunal was not justified in going behind the order of the Tribunal passed under sec. 32g which had become final in proceedings commenced under sec. 32 of the Act more so because as pointed out earlier the decision of the Tribunal under sec. 32g could not be said to be of an authority which lacked inherent jurisdiction. That being so the decision of the Revenue Tribunal cannot be allowed to stand. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 10 ) IN the result this petition succeeds. 32g could not be said to be of an authority which lacked inherent jurisdiction. That being so the decision of the Revenue Tribunal cannot be allowed to stand. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 10 ) IN the result this petition succeeds. The order passed by the Revenue Tribunal is quashed and set aside and the order passed by the City Deputy Collector confirming the order of the Mamlatdar/tribunal is restored. Rule is made absolute accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .