Judgment :- 1. An order of eviction on the ground under S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, Act 2 of 1965 (for short 'the Act') has been passed by the Rent Control Court. It was confirmed in appeal and a revision under S.20 of the Act became unsuccessful. The building originally belonged to one Neelakantan Nair, which on his death had devolved on his widow and five children. They filed the application in the Rent Control Court for an order of eviction on the ground that the building is bona fide needed for the occupation of one of them (the 4th respondent) to start a business in automobile spare parts. The said claim is found to be bona fide by all the three authorities below and thus the tenant is now faced with an order of eviction. 2. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant) in this revision is this: The ground under S.11 (3) of the Act can be availed of only by a landlord who is entitled to possession of the building in his own exclusive right, and it is not available to a co-owner as he cannot exclude the other co-owners from possession. To bolster up the above contention the learned counsel has relied on the following observation of the Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal (A.I.R.1981 S C. 1113): "The expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else." According to the learned counsel, the position would have been different if all the co-owners bona tide require the building for their common use, or if there is only a sole owner and he requires it for his own use, or if the building is needed for the occupation of a member of the landlord's family who is a dependant on him. When the building is owned by more persons than one according to the learned counsel, an order of eviction to accommodate one of the co-owners is not what is envisaged in the ground under S.11(3) of the Act. I shall now consider the correctness of the above contention. 3. When the building is owned by more persons than one according to the learned counsel, an order of eviction to accommodate one of the co-owners is not what is envisaged in the ground under S.11(3) of the Act. I shall now consider the correctness of the above contention. 3. S.11 of the Act enumerates the different grounds for which a landlord is entitled to apply to the Rent Control Court for an order of eviction. The ground of the landlord's bona fide need for his own occupation is included in S.11 (3) of the Act. That sub-section is subject to four provisos, but, for the purpose of this case, none of them is relevant. The sub-section postulates two limbs for the bona fide need of the landlord. The first is the need for "his own occupation" and the second is "for the occupation by any member of his family dependant on him". The second limb is also not relevant in this case and therefore no consideration regarding that point is necessary for the disposal of this revision. Shorn of those portions which are unnecessary in this context, S.11 (3) of the Act can be read as follows: "A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation." Here, the need envisaged is the need of the landlord for his own occupation. A landlord as defined in S.2 (3) of the Act includes "a person who is entitled to receive the rent of a building", whether on his own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others. The landlord includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian. The very wide language used in the definition of the word landlord, there is no doubt, takes a co-owner of a building also who is entitled to receive the rent. It is not disputed before me that a co-owner is entitled to receive rent of a building. A property can be owned by one person, or at the same time by different persons. Duplicate ownership is a legally recognised concept and co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned. It is not disputed before me that a co-owner is entitled to receive rent of a building. A property can be owned by one person, or at the same time by different persons. Duplicate ownership is a legally recognised concept and co-ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned. A division of the co-ownership results in disruption of the integrity of the property owned and then each co-owner becomes the absolute owner of his part of the property. Until the integrity of the property is so disrupted, a co-owner of a property is an owner of that property in the same way as an absolute owner of another property is in respect of the latter. The only distinction is that in the former there is duplicate ownership while in the latter there is only singular ownership. I am fortified in taking the above view by the observation of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath (A.I.R.1976 SC 2335): "We are of opinion that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is". In that case the plaintiff who was one of the co-owners of a building had instituted a suit for eviction of a tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement of the members of the family as per S.13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. It was contended that the plaintiff is not the owner of the building, although it was conceded that he was one of the co-owners. His possession would only be that of a part owner, according to the tenant, who contested that suit. A Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court consisting of Chandrachud, J. (as he then was), Goswami and Gupta, JJ., repelled the aforesaid contention and held as follows: "Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes places." The above dictum was followed in Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak (A.I.R.1977 S.C.1599). He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change only when partition takes places." The above dictum was followed in Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak (A.I.R.1977 S.C.1599). A Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court has said that: "The law having been thus put beyond doubt, the contention that the absence of the other co-owners on record disentitled the first respondent from suing for eviction, fails." This was again reiterated by another Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court in Anupama Sen Gupta v. Deb Kumar Sen Sarma (A.I.R.1982 SC 25). 4. Therefore, the position of a co-owner in law is beyond the pale of any controversy that he is as much an owner as any sole owner is in relation to his property. When the definition of landlord includes persons of less degree of status such as an agent, or guardian, or executor, it admits of no doubt that a co-owner as a landlord, is entitled to get an order of eviction if his individual need to occupy the building is found to be bona fide. 5. In Quasim's case (AIR 1981 SC 1113) the building originally belonged to a firm and during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction the building was allotted in a partition to one of the partners of the firm. It was contended in that case that the ground of personal requirement was no more available to the person who initiated the proceedings for eviction, since the landlord must prove his requirement at the commencement of the action and also that his requirement continues throughout the course of proceedings and that he has a subsisting interest in the premises. The eviction sought for in that case was under S.11(1) (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. The definition of the landlord in that Act is identical with S.2(3) of the Kerala Act. But by an Explanation of S.11(1) (c) of the Bihar Act the scope of the definition "landlord" was subjected to a curtailment when the ground of eviction sought for is personal requirement. That Explanation says that the clause (which enables a landlord to get an order of eviction for bis personal requirement) shall not include an agent. But by an Explanation of S.11(1) (c) of the Bihar Act the scope of the definition "landlord" was subjected to a curtailment when the ground of eviction sought for is personal requirement. That Explanation says that the clause (which enables a landlord to get an order of eviction for bis personal requirement) shall not include an agent. The Supreme Court pointed out that by the said Explanation the legislature manifested its intention that the landlord who seeks eviction on the ground of his personal requirement must exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. The right of a co-owner, as landlord, was not the point of consideration in the said decision. Moreover, the Kerala Act does not contain an explanation by which the agent is taken out of the ambit of the definition'landlord' as for the exercise of right of eviction on the ground of personal requirement. The only restriction imposed on an agent in the Kerala Act by virtue of sub-section (16) of S.11 which stipulates that such a person must obtain the previous written consent of the landlord for making an application for eviction on any ground. Therefore, the observations mentioned in the decision in Quasim's case (AIR 1981 SC 1113) are not applicable in this case. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the order of eviction passed against the petitioner does not suffer from any illegality or jurisdictional impairment. I, therefore, dismiss this C.R.P., but without costs.