M. B. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) IN these three petitions the common question which requires determination is whether the Urban Land Tribunal constituted under sec. 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Urban Land Ceiling Act has jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for default or whether the provisions of Order 41 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the Tribunal and that the Tribunal can dismiss the appeal for default. ( 2 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 2635 of 1986 the Additional Urban Land Tribunal and Ex-Officio Secretary to the Government. Revenue Department Ahmedabad by the order dated 15/03/1986 dismissed the Appeal No. APL/ul/rajkot-138/1983 filed under sec. 32 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act on the ground that when the appeal was called out neither the appellants nor their advocate were present. Restoration application was filed by the petitioner. In the said application number of grounds for restoration were given. The Tribunal dismissed the said application by holding that there was no sufficient ground shown for re-admitting the appeal. ( 3 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 2660 of 1986 the same Tribunal by the order dated 15/03/1986 dismissed the Appeal No. APL/ul/ RAJKOT-14/1983 as neither the appellants nor their advocate remained present at the hearing of the appeal. It is the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioners that the petitioners advocate had sent a telegram requesting the Tribunal to adjourn the matter. Thereafter the petitioners filed an application dated 19/ 20/03/1986 requesting the Tribunal to restore the appeal by pointing out various grounds for restoration. The Tribunal dismissed the said application by holding that no sufficient cause was shown for re-admitting the appeal. It be noted that no hearing was given to the petitioners before dismissing the restoration application. ( 4 ) SPECIAL Civil Application No. 1702 of 1986 against the judgment and order dated 18th January 198g passed by the same Tribunal in the Appeal No. APL/ul/surat-107/1983. The Tribunal has dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant was absent when the appeal was called out for hearing and no application for adjournment of hearing was received. The Tribunal thereafter relied upon Order 41 Rule 11 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code and dismissed the appeal and vacated the stay order. The Tribunal has dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant was absent when the appeal was called out for hearing and no application for adjournment of hearing was received. The Tribunal thereafter relied upon Order 41 Rule 11 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code and dismissed the appeal and vacated the stay order. It is the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that telegram was sent on 17-1-1986 requesting the Tribunal to adjourn the matter. ( 5 ) AGAINST the aforesaid orders the petitioners have filed these Special Civil Applications. ( 6 ) AS the Tribunal had dismissed the appeal for default the learned advocates for both the sides requested that the hearing of the matters be expedited as it was a pure question of law. All the three Special Civil Applications are therefore taken up for hearing to-day. ( 7 ) THE learned advocates for the petitioners vehemently submitted that there is no provision in the Urban Land Ceiling Act which empowers the Tribunal exercising power under sec. 33 of the Act to dismiss the appeal for default and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for non-appearance of the parties. It is the duty of the Tribunal to decide the appeal on merits even in absence of parties or their advocates. The proceeding before the Tribunal is in the nature of inquisitorial inquiry. In my view this contention of the learned advocates deserves to be accepted. For this purpose it would be worth-while to refer to certain provisions of the Act. The relevant part of sec. 12 reads as udder:12 (1) The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette constitute on or more Urban Land Tribunal or Tribunals (2) xx xx xx xx (3) xx xx xx xx (4) If any person is aggrieved by an order of the competent authority under sec 11 he may within thirty days of she date on Which the order is communicated to him prefer an appeal to the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the vacant land (in relation in which the amount has been determined) is situated or where such land is situated within the jurisdiction of more than one. Tribunal to the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which a major part of such land is situated or where the extent of such land situated within the jurisdiction of two or more Tribunals is equal to any of those Tribunals:provided that the Tribunal may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time (5) In deciding appeals the Tribunal shall exercise all the powers which a Civil Court has and follow the same procedure which a Civil Court follows in deciding appeals against the decree of an original court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908sec. 12 (1) empowers the State Government to constitute one or more Urban Land Tribunal or Tribunals. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 12 provides that if any person is aggrieved by an order of the competent authority under sec. 11 he may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Sub-sec. (5) provides that in deciding appeals the Tribunal shall exercise all the powers which a Civil Court has and follow the same procedure which a Civil Court follows in deciding appeals against the decree of an original court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Because of this sub-sec. (5) the Urban Land Tribunal while deciding the appeal filed against the order which is passed under sec. 11 of the Act is required to- follow the procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code. Sec. 13 provides that subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applicable to appeals from original decree an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the decision of the Tribunal under sec. 12. Therefore these secs. 12 and 13 categorically provide that the provisions of entire Civil Procedure Code would be applicable to the Urban Land- Tribunal while deciding the appeal against the order which is passed under sec. 11. It should be noted that sec. 11 provides payment of amount for vacant land acquired by the State Government under sub- sec. (3) of sec. 10. Further sec. 11. It should be noted that sec. 11 provides payment of amount for vacant land acquired by the State Government under sub- sec. (3) of sec. 10. Further sec. 29 of the Urban Ceiling Act provides that no person shall construct any building with a dwelling unit having- a plinth areas: (A) where the building proposed to be constructed is situated in an urban agglomeration falling With category A or category B specified in Schedule I in excess of three hundred square metres; (b) where the building proposed to be constructed is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category C or category D specified in Schedule 1 in excess of five hundred square metressec. 30 (1) of the Urban Ceiling Act empowers the competent authority to pass an order directing demolition and stoppage of building in certain cases. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 30 empowers any person aggrieved by an order of the competent authority passed under sub-sec. (1) to prefer an appeal against the order to the Tribunal. Sub-sec. (4) provides that the provisions of sub-sec. (S) of sec. 12 and of sec. 13 shall apply to or in relation to an appeal preferred under sub-sec. (2) as they apply to or in relation to an appeal preferred under sub-sec. (4) of sec 12 This would mean that the Tribunal would be required to follow the procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code while determining the appeal which is filed against an order passed by the competent authority under sec. 30 (1) of the Urban Ceiling Act. ( 8 ) AS against this if we refer to the provisions of secs. 31 and 33 it would be abundantly clear that the Legislature has not provided that while deciding the appeal under sec. 33 the authority is required to follow the procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code for deciding the appeal. ( 8 ) AS against this if we refer to the provisions of secs. 31 and 33 it would be abundantly clear that the Legislature has not provided that while deciding the appeal under sec. 33 the authority is required to follow the procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code for deciding the appeal. Sec. 31 reads as under:31 The competent authority shall have all the powers of a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in respect of the following matters namely : (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) receiving evidence of affidavits; (d) requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any court or office: (e) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; and (f) any other matter. which may be prescribed. Referring to this section it is clear that certain specific powers under the Civil Procedure Code on certain specified matters are conferred on the competent authority but not that the competent authority is entitled to exercise all powers which the Civil Court has while trying a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure. Sec. 31 (f) provides that for other specified matters also it can be prescribed that some other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would be applicable. This by implication shows that entire provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not made applicable Under sec. 46 the Central Government has jurisdiction to make rules for conferring further powers on the competent authority. It is an admitted fact that no such rule is framed by the Central Government or that the entire Civil Procedure Code is not made applicable. Therefore the provisions of Order 9 which provides the consequences of non-appearance by the parties are not made applicable. In my view this is done for a valid reason. Suppose after filling the necessary form the party fails to remain present. Then it cannot be said that the competent authority would dismiss the matter without deciding that the person is holding land in excess of the ceiling area. This would mean that even if the parties are not present before the competent authority it would be the duty of the competent authority to decide the question which he is required to decide by taking into consideration the material before him. This would mean that even if the parties are not present before the competent authority it would be the duty of the competent authority to decide the question which he is required to decide by taking into consideration the material before him. Hence the inquiry would be in the nature of inquisitorial one. He has to inquire and find out whether the person is holding the land in excess of the ceiling area and to what extent. He has to decide after taking into consideration the relevant factors laid down under the Act. ( 9 ) SAME is the position with regard to the powers of the appellate authority under sec. 33. Sec. 33 reads as under:33 (1) any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under this Act not being an order under sec 11 or an order under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30 may within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed (hereafter in this section referred to as the appellate authority):provided that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-sec. (1) the appellate authority shall after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. (3) Every order passed by the appellate authority under this section shall be final. Sub-sec. (1) in terms provides that any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under the Act and the order not being an order under sec. 11 or an order under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 30 may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority as may be prescribed. Sub-sec. (2) provides that the appellate authority shall after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. Therefore under see. (2) the appellate authority is required to afford an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and is also further required to pass reasonable orders as expeditiously as possible. Sub-sec. (2) provides that the appellate authority shall after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. Therefore under see. (2) the appellate authority is required to afford an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and is also further required to pass reasonable orders as expeditiously as possible. Sec. 33 nowhere provides that the procedure prescribed under Civil Procedure Code for deciding the appeals would be applicable to the appellate authority. It is not provided that provision of sec. 12 (5) would be applicable when appeal under sec. 33 is decided. Sec. 12 sub-sec. (5) in terms provides that the Tribunal while deciding the appeal against the order under see. 11 shall follow the same procedure which a Civil Court is required to follow in deciding the appeal against the decree of an original court under the Civil Procedure Code. In my view when the Legislature has made a clear distinction and provided two Separate procedures one for the Urban Land Tribunal constituted under sec. 12 (1) and another for the appellate authority under sec. 33 it cannot be said that the appellate authority (maybe it may be Urban Land Tribunal itself) is entitled to exercise the same powers as those of a Civil Court while deciding the appeal under the Civil Procedure Code. ( 10 ) WHILE dealing with a similar question under sec. 74 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kallappa Joteppa v. Murigappa Rudrappa 57 B. L. R. 178 held as under:it is clear that an appellate authority can only exercise its power of dismissing an appeal for default provided a notice is given to the appellant and there is an obligation upon the appellant to appear in answer to that notice. It is sometimes forgotten that powers to dismiss appeals for default are not powers which are inherent in a Tribunal. It is precisely because they are not inherent that the Civil Procedure Code has made specifical provision for dismissal of appeals for default. It is sometimes forgotten that powers to dismiss appeals for default are not powers which are inherent in a Tribunal. It is precisely because they are not inherent that the Civil Procedure Code has made specifical provision for dismissal of appeals for default. Now be have often been told that Revenue Tribunals are not bound to hear advocates in support of their clients; we have been told that Revenue Tribunals are not bound to hear parties and they can dispose of appeals by perusing the papers at heme or even by circulating them. But today for the first time an argument is advanced that Revenue Tribunals are entitled to dismiss appeals even without applying their minds to them. At least we are on strong ground when we reject the last argument. Therefore in our opinion the Prant Officer was clearly fin error in disposing of this appeal for default without going into the merits. In the case of Hiralal Virchand v. Vithalbhai 2 G. L. R. 548 the similar view has been taken while interpreting the provisions of sec. 72 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950. The Division Bench after taking into consideration the similar provision held that even though there are same powers with the Charity Commissioner as provided under sec. 73 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which states that the officers acting under the Act shall have certain specific powers under the Civil Procedure Code on certain specified matters yet these powers do not include the power of dismissing a proceeding or an appeal for default of appearance. The Court emphasized that the provisions of sec. 73 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act by implications show that the whole of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before these officers and that the Code Only applies to certain specified matters. That being the position it was clear that Order 41 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code was not applicable to the proceedings before the Charity Commissioner. Order 41 Rule 17 provides dismissal of appeals for appellants default in appearing when the appeal is called on for hearing. That being the position it was clear that Order 41 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code was not applicable to the proceedings before the Charity Commissioner. Order 41 Rule 17 provides dismissal of appeals for appellants default in appearing when the appeal is called on for hearing. ( 11 ) WHILE dealing with the provisions of sections 32g and 63a of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Haji Begum v. Raisang 6 G. L. R. 810 the Division Bench of this Court held that the inquiry under sec. 37g is of entirely different nature and it is the duty of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to decide it according to law having regard to the factors laid down by the Act and the Rules. The Court held as under:the inquiry before the Agricultural lands Tribunal is rot initiated as a result of any application made by a party moving the Agricultural Lands Tribunal for redress and the other party opposing such application. If such were the case it would be possible to say that she burden of leading the evidence relevant to the issues in the inquiry could be on the parties and it any party on whom the burden of proving a particular issue lies does not lead evidence to prove such issue he must fail. But the inquiry which is to be held by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal is of a different character and the purpose of the inquiry is to fix the purchase price consequent upon the tenant being declared to be the owner of the land tilled by him. Sec. 32g lays an obligation on the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to determine the purchase price of the land and in doing so the Agricultural Lands Tribunal is required to given an opportunity to the tenant landlord and all other persons interested in the land to be heard and to hold an inquiry for the purpose. The section also lays down the method of computation of the purchase price and the factors which are required to be taken into account by the Agricultural lands Tribunal in determining the purchase price. The section also lays down the method of computation of the purchase price and the factors which are required to be taken into account by the Agricultural lands Tribunal in determining the purchase price. The Agriculture Lands Tribunal is therefore not tied down to the evidence which may be adduced before it by the parties but can also rely on other material before it provided of course the parties are given an opportunity to say whatever they want to in regard to such material and to render their explanation in regard to it. This last qualification is plainly nothing but a requirement of the principles of natural justice which must be observed by Agricultural Lands Tribunal as a quasi-judicial body. If neither the landlord nor the tenant appears at the hearing of the inquiry or leads evidence relating to the factors set out in sec. 63a sub-sec. (3 the Agricultural Lands Tribunal cannot refuse to determine the purchase price on the ground that no material has been placed before it by the parties The purchase price has got to be determined by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and the material on the basis of which the purchase price is fixed may be material produced by the parties or material which is otherwise available to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. The Collector was therefore clearly in error in observing that since the parties had not led any evidence in regard to the factors set out in clauses (c) and (d) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 63a she was not bound to take those factors into account. In my view same would be the position with regard to the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the competent authority or the appellate authority also would be required to determine the matter on merits after taking into consideration the relevant factors laid down by law. The Division Bench (in 6 G. L. R. 810 the aforesaid judgment) in terms had held that the inquiry before the authority was a statutory inquiry and that this was not an adversory system but an inquisitorial inquiry where the authority could not refuse to determine the question on the ground that no material had been placed before it by the parties or that the parties had failed to appear before the authority. The aforesaid decision is followed in the case of Mafatlal v. Girdharilal 11 G L R. 186. The aforesaid decision is followed in the case of Mafatlal v. Girdharilal 11 G L R. 186. In this view of the matter it is abundantly clear that the appellant authority while deciding the appeal under section 33 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act had no jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for non-appearance of the parties. The authority was required to determine the appeal on merits even in absence of the appellant or appellants advocate. ( 12 ) IN the result all the three Special Civil Applications are allowed. The impugned orders are quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute in each matter with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .