JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 17-10-1986 passed by the Additional Judge to the District Judge, Dewas in C. S. No. 8-A of 1985 whereby the application of the respondent No. 1 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code has been allowed. ( 2. ) IT is not in dispute that the property in question comprising of survey No. 67 area 2. 17 acres situate at village Napakhedi Tahsil Dewas is entered in revenue papers in the names of Rahmatbai and Kallu the appellants. ( 3. ) ACCORDING to the respondent No. 1 Shivjiram the property aforesaid was purchased by Mubarik, the brother of Kallu and husband of Rahmatbai from one ghasiram. The said Mubarik with the consent of Rahmatbai and Kallu entered into an agreement dated 3-8-1982 to sell the property to him for a consideration of Rs. 28,000/-and obtained Rs. 5,000/- as part payment of the price and delivered possession of the property to him. On the following day the respondent Shivji withdrew Rs. 18,000/- from the bank and paid it to the respondent No. 2 Mubarik who signed the relevant entry. Mubarik received the remaining Rs. 5,000/- on different dates. The appellants and mubarik evaded execution of the deed and ultimately refused to do so. They want to enter into forcible possession of the land and hence the suit instituted on 8-8-1985. ( 4. ) THE application was resisted by the appellants. According to them, the land in dispute is all alone in their possession and Mubarik had no right to execute the alleged agreement. ( 5. ) THE learned lower Court observing that Mubarik had not replied to the notice by Shivji found that the payment of full price had been made. It further found that in the inquiry to which the appellants were parties, the Revenue Court has found that during the years 1982-83 and 83-84 Shivji was in possession of the land in dispute and there is nothing to indicate that Shivji has, at any time later, been dispossessed. ( 6. ) THE point for consideration is whether the impugned order deserves to be set aside. It is well-settled that a person who seeks temporary injunction must show that the three well-known concurrent conditions necessary for its grant exist in his favour. ( 6. ) THE point for consideration is whether the impugned order deserves to be set aside. It is well-settled that a person who seeks temporary injunction must show that the three well-known concurrent conditions necessary for its grant exist in his favour. He must satisfy the Court -firstly, that there is a serious question to be tried in the suit and that on the facts before the court there is a probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by him, secondly, that the Courts interference is necessary to protect him from that species of injury which the court calls irreparable, before his legal right can be established on trial, and thirdly, that the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to issue from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. ( 7. ) THE first of the above conditions is what is generally termed "a prima facie case". In other words, the prima facie existence of a right and its infringement are the first condition for the grant of temporary injunction. But the existence of a prima facie is not by itself sufficient. The applicant has to further satisfy the second condition by showing that irreparable injury will accrue to him if the injunction is not granted and that there is no other remedy open to him by which he can protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury. The term "irreparable injury" however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, i. e. , one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages. The third condition is what is called the principle of the "balance of convenience". In applying this principle, the Court should weigh the amount of substantial mischief that is likely to be done to the applicant if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted if, on such a consideration, the court thinks that pending the determination of the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction for that purpose should be issued. The person claiming the relief of temporary injunction must also show a clear necessity for affording immediate protection to his alleged right or interest which would otherwise be seriously injured or impaired. In this connection the decision in Smita Agarwals case AIR 1978 Patna 112 is pertinent. ( 8. ) IT may be stated that even where all the three well-known conditions for the grant of temporary injunction are satisfied, the relief may nevertheless be refused for other reasons. Delay on the part of the person claiming the relief is one of such reasons. The law has left the question of grant or refusal of this equitable relief or temporary injunction in the domain of courts judicial discretion so that even where the requisite conditions for its grant are satisfied the court is still free to decide one way or the other and mould its order to suit the justice of the particular case in the context of the entirety of its facts and circumstances. It has to be borne in mind that this equitable relief of temporary injunction is a serious matter and has to be granted only where it is essential to do so in the interest of justice and the parry claiming it has come to the Court with clean hands (vide Shajuddins case 1985 J. L. J. 486 ). ( 9. ) IN the instant case it is pertinent to point out that the appellants admittedly belong to the family of Mubarik who according to the respondent Shivjiram, has agreed in writing to sell the land in dispute to him. In view of the payment of the price found by the learned lower Court, the story of Shivjiram being in possession is greatly probabilised. ( 10. ) ON a careful consideration I am of the view that it cannot be held that the lower Court erred in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction in granting the relief of temporary injunction. I find that it has not exercised its jurisdiction improperly or erroneously so as to call for interference in appeal. Therefore, as pointed out in the decision in Narsingh Patidars case (1983 WN317) the impugned order is not liable to be interfered with in appeal. ( 11. ) IN the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.