JUDGMENT D. S. Bajpai, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 391976 passed by the District Judge, Kheri dismissing the Civil Appeal No. 79 of 1976 with costs and confirming the judgment and decree dated 131976 passed by the II Additional Munsif, Kheri by which he has dismissed the plaintiff's suit (Regular Suit No. 276 of 1970) for partition. 2. Facts giving rise to the instant second appeal are that one Dillipat was the original owner of the disputed house and he died about 28 years back leaving his son Moti Lal as heir. Moti Lal and defendants 1 to 3 formed a joint Hindu family whereafter Moti Lal also died in the year 1970 leaving the present plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 as his heirs and they became entitled to l/4th share each in the said house. It is undisputed that the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 remained in possession over their respective l/4th share. On May 23, 1970 the defendant No. 1 transferred her 1/4th share in the said house in favour of defendant no. 4 who was an outsider and since then defendants 2 to 4 became owners to the extent of 1/4th share each. The suit is said to have been filed against the defendant no. 4 who was threatening the tenants and demanding the rent of the entire house. The defendant no. 4 contested the suit and pleaded that Smt. Rain Lali was the exclusive owner of the disputed house and that he had purchased the same by a registered saledeed He asserted that he was the sole owner of the disputed house and was entitled to realise the rent from the tenants, inter alia, on the ground that the house had been acquired by Moti Lal who had transferred the same in favour of Parag Deen and Parag Deen in turn transferred it to Bhola Nath and Bhola Nath transferred the house in favour of Ram Lali, defendant no. 1. The defendant denied the plaintiff's title with regard to any portion of the house. He also pleaded that on the day when Moti Lal transferred the house in favour of Parag Deen the plaintiff was not conceived. 1. The defendant denied the plaintiff's title with regard to any portion of the house. He also pleaded that on the day when Moti Lal transferred the house in favour of Parag Deen the plaintiff was not conceived. On pleadings of the parties the trial court framed issues, one of which was : whether the house in suit belonged to Dillipat and If the plaintiff had any share in the house in suit. The findings on the two issues were returned against the plaintiff. The plaintiff went in appeal and the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal upholding the findings recorded by the trial court whereupon the plaintiff came in Second Appeal No. 697 of 1976 before this Court. This Court by its judgment dated 14th January, 1985 was of the view that a new issue was required to be framed and after framing the said issue to the following effect, directed the lower appellate court to record a finding on the said issue and return the case back to this Court : Whether the house in suit was purchased by Shrimati Ramlali out of the life Insurance Policy taken by Moti Lal in which Shrimati Ramlali was a nominee ? If so, its effect. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that under the provisions of Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 which is, for convenience, reproduced hereunder : 8(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court. (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange otherwise any part of the immovable property of the minor, or (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.' the natural guardian of a minor was not entitled to execute any deed or mortgage, transfer by sale, gift etc. without the previous permission of the Court and that Smt. Ramlali not having obtained the permission of the District Judge under this provision could not transfer the interest of the minor to the extent of l/4th share and, therefore, the saledeed executed by Smt. Ramlali was voidable and the interest of the minor not having been transferred he retained interest and was entitled to seek partition of the property in as far as his 1/4th share was concerned and the suit for partition was maintainable. The proposition of law that this rule would apply in the matter of transfer of properties other than the ancestaral properties is not disputed but in the case in hand it will be pertinent to see that the plea taken by the plaintiff before the two courts below consistently was to the effect that the property was ancestral property on which a positive finding has been recorded by the courts against the plaintiff. In my opinion the plaintiff cannot resile from his pleadings and rely on subsection (2) of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited a case of Kerala High Court Iruppakkatt Veettil Viswanathan's wife Santha v. Deceased Kandan's L. Rs. wife Cherukutty and others (AIR 1972 Kerala 71) wherein transfer of a minor's property by his natural guardian without the sanction of the court is voidable, was held. This view is well settled and the learned counsel for the respondent at no stage pleaded that this provision did not apply to him but, as indicated hereinabove, this ruling will not come to the aid of the appellant in view of the fact that there was no pleading to this effect. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act the suit for partition was not maintainable without a relief for cancellation of the saledeed. The provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act lay down the undernoted rule : 31. When cancellation may be ordered. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act the suit for partition was not maintainable without a relief for cancellation of the saledeed. The provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act lay down the undernoted rule : 31. When cancellation may be ordered. (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable,, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, maycause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable,, and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered ; and such officer shall note on the copy o the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act states that where a written instrument is void or voidable and is likely to cause serious injury to a person if left outstanding the party concerned may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable. The learned counsel thus submitted that without seeking the relief of cancellation the partition could not be sought inasmuch as the respondent was in possession of the property through a registered saledeed. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, laid great stress on the word 'may9 occurring in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and submitted that it was not mandatory on the plaintiff to seek a relief of cancellation of the saledeed or a relief for declaring the said saledeed void or voidable and that the plaintiff was well within his rights to file a suit for partition. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance, to support his contention that the suit ibr partition was not maintainable without making a prayer for a declaration that the saledeed was void or voidable or praying for cancellation of the saledeed, on the case of Ram Saran and another v. Smt. Ganga Devi ( AIR 1972 SC 2685 ) where defendant was in possession of the suit property and the plaintiff did not seek possession of the suitproperty but merely claimed a declaration that he was the owner of the suitproperty, it was held that the suit was not maintainable. The proposition of law laid down by their lordships in my opinion, applies on all fours to the instant case and I hold that the suit was not maintainable and that the decree of partition could not be granted in favour of the plaintiff unless the plaintiff had prayed for grant of a decree for declaration seeking declaration to the effect that the saledeed executed was void/voidable and that the plaintiff's share in the property could not be transferred. The plaintiff having failed to do so the suit was bound to fail and I hold that the courts below rightly dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 5. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs throughout. The judgments of the Courts below stand confirmed, (Appeal dismissed.)