Judgment :- 1. Though normally I would have relegated the petitioner to his remedy by way of claim under R.90 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, I am refraining from doing so, and entertaining this original petition for more than one reason. First, the Sales Officer before whom the claim is to be made has himself effected the attachment, and foreclosed any claim or enquiry by his conclusion in the Mahazar Ext. P2 (prepared at the time of attachment) that he was satisfied on his own enquiry that the moveables attached belonged to the defaulter. Having arrived at such a categoric finding, based on his own alleged enquires, it is futile to expect the said Officer to hold otherwise in a claim petition. Secondly, the facts disclosed smack of mala fides as set up by the petitioner. 2. The award under execution is one passed against the petitioner's daughter Vijayakumari. The said daughter is unmarried, and she is admittedly living with the petitioner in the same house under his care and protection (vide the counter affidavits of the Sales Officer, and of the decree holder Cooperative Society). The buildings from which the articles were attached, both belong to the petitioner, one being his residential house and the other, the Padippura or outhouse. This fact is positively proved by Exts. P3, P4 and P5, apart from the fact that the averments about the petitioner's ownership of the buildings are not controverted is either of the two counter affidavits. The movables attached are mostly old furniture-tables, benches and cots-such as are found in any ordinary household. The petitioner, in whose house, and under whose care and protection the defaulter daughter lives, claims these articles as his own, kept in his own house. The petitioner objected to the attachment on this score, but no heed was paid to it by the Sales Officer. This averment in the original petition is also not controverted by the respondents in their counter affidavits. The averment in reply, in the counter affidavits (which are practically identical), is that the attachment was effected from the residence of the defaulter, that the petitioner's claim that the movables belong to him, and that his daughter had no right or ownership over them, was not true, the averment was not bona fide, and that there was no evidence to support this contention. I am unable to understand these pleadings when the undisputed fact remains that the buildings from which the articles were attached belong to the petitioner and it is further admitted that the defaulter was residing with her father under his care and protection. The mere residence of the defaulter, as an inmate in her father's house, cannot make the movables in that house or in the outhouse, belong to her. Mere residence is not the criterion, nor is it relevant in itself. When the house and the outhouse belong to, and are in the possession of the petitioner-father, and be reigns there as the paterfamilias, the presumption should be that the movables therein also belong to him and are in his possession. Cogent material or evidence is called for. before any such movables can be treated as belonging to the defaulter, liable to be attached as such. The articles attached are common place articles of everyday use in any household, and not special or personal items like jewellery or the like, which could be connected with the defaulter. The decree-bolder is entitled to attach only property belonging to the defaulter. The movables here were not attached from the possession of the defaulter, but from that of the petitioner, with whom the defaulter was residing. The onus in such cases to prove that the movables belonged to the defaulter is on the decree-bolder. If the movables are attached from the possession of the defaulter, prima facie it can be held that they belonged to the defaulter. But if the movables were not attached from the possession of the defaulter, no such presumption can arise. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Ramji Lal Mohinder Kumar v. Naresh Kumar (AIR 1984 Delhi 90) supports this conclusion. 3. Ext. P2 mahazzar prepared by the Sales Officer recites that the decree-bolder Society and the witness present (described as Thadassar) asserted that the movables belonged to the defaulter. I wonder on what material such assertions were made, for I cannot conceive of total strangers ordinarily having special inside knowledge of the ownership or possession of household articles and furniture in a residential house, to fasten the ownership on one of the inmates only, in preference to the bead of the family. Not that it is impossible, but then such assertion should be based on material. No such material is disclosed in the counter affidavits. Not that it is impossible, but then such assertion should be based on material. No such material is disclosed in the counter affidavits. Equally glib is the statement of the Sales Officer in Ext. P2 that his enquiries also confirmed this assertion. He has not however, chosen to take the court into confidence as to what were the enquiries made by him, with whom and when. Obviously this is one of those recitals made by him in a routine manner without any serious attempt to vouchsafe its correctness. 4. I do not understand the law to be so drastic as to let the authorities walk into anybody's household, one of whose inmates is a defaulter, and attach whatever movables they can lay bands on in the premises as belonging to the defaulter, leaving the real owner to fight it out with the authorities in claims, revisions and suits merely for the sin of having had a defaulter in his house. Something more tangible than the mere joint existence of the defaulter and the movables under the same roof is required to connect the said movables with the defaulter. No such material has been placed before this Court. It is certainly possible for the movables in any house to belong separately to any of the in (pates, but then, that requires material or circumstances or evidence to support it. Mere residence with the father in his house is too tenuous a connection to enable attachment of the movables in the house as those of the defaulter. I have therefore, no hesitation in holding that respondents 1 and 2 have acted illegally in attaching the movables in the petitioner's house as those of the defaulter without an iota of evidence to connect the two. 5. The claim if any has to be filed only before the first respondent. He has already formed an opinion in the matter as is evident from Ext. P2. It is therefore futile to leave the petitioner to pursue his alternate remedy by way of claim under R.90 of the Co-operative Societies Rules before the Sales Officer-first respondent. 6. The petitioner has a case that the Secretary of the second respondent Society was enemical towards him, for the reasons stated, and that attachment of his assets was effected to humble and humiliate the petitioner. 6. The petitioner has a case that the Secretary of the second respondent Society was enemical towards him, for the reasons stated, and that attachment of his assets was effected to humble and humiliate the petitioner. It appears a large crowd had gathered and even the police was present (vide Para.4 of the original petition). The petitioner has alleged that he objected to the attachment of the movables, but the "Sales Officer did not heed his objections, even though the police too told him that what he was doing was high handed." There is no specific denial of these averments. I am not however, going into this question in detail as it is unnecessary in the view I have taken, except to point out that the petitioner's case of mala fides does not appear to be unjustified. 7. The other contentions put forward by the respondents that the petitioner himself is indebted to the Society and that the petitioner had made payment towards the defaulter's dues earlier, are, even if true, irrelevant, so long as the award is not against the petitioner but against his daughter, Vijayakumari. I allow the original petition and quash the proceedings and the attachment evidenced by Ext. P2. There will be no order as to costs.