Judgment :- M. N. CHANDURKAR C. J. This order will govern Writ Appeal No. 248 of 1987, which is listed for admission and Writ Petition No. 4818 of 1982, which is taken up for hearing since we found that there was really no substance in the writ petition The appellants-petitioners are the legal representatives of the late Pravin J. Mehta. It is enough to mention that in respect of the assessment year 1967-68, a sum of Rs. 4, 70, 844 was added to the income of the original petitioner on the ground that he was not able to explain satisfactorily the source for the purchase of 315.81 carats of diamonds of alleged foreign origin which were valued by the customs authorities at that figure. Finally, however, in the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal reduced the addition to Rs. 3, 70, 844 on the basis of the presumption that that could be the price at which he must have purchased the diamonds. The assessee, i.e., the deceased Pravin J. Mehta had asked for a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. "1. Whether, the Tribunal had any valid material for sustaining the addition of Rs. 3, 70, 844 as income from other sources ? 2. Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction or basis or material for coming to the conclusion that the diamonds seized belonged to the petitioner especially when the fact of the ownership had not been established by the Customs Authorities or even by the Income-tax Authorities ?" * This court, by an order dated January 11, 1978, held that the assessee along with certain other persons was found in possession of a large quantity of diamonds and that this would become a question of fact. This court positively observed that the conclusion of the Tribunal was that the money for the purchase of diamonds belonged to the assessee and this conclusion of the Tribunal was based on facts and that the Tribunal had not committed any error of law, so as to justify a direction to the Tribunal to forward a statement of the case. The petition under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act was thus rejected. The present petitioners who are the widow and sons of the deceased then filed in May, 1982, a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Tribunal on various grounds. The petition under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act was thus rejected. The present petitioners who are the widow and sons of the deceased then filed in May, 1982, a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Tribunal on various grounds. Admittedly, these proceedings were taken only after the recovery proceedings were commenced. The facts actually show that in recovery proceedings, after demand was issued to the deceased assessee, the assessee's house was brought to sale. The assessee, in the meantime, died on October 9, 1980. When the sale was about to be confirmed on May 20, 1982, the City Civil Court granted an injunction in a suit filed by the present petitioners. It appears that it was after that suit was filed, the petitioners came to this court by way of a writ petition. We are now informed that the petition was actually filed earlier and the suit was filed later ; but the petition came up for hearing after the injunction was granted. A stay order came to be made in this writ petition. When the stay matter came up for final orders, the learned judge found that the property attached had already been sold and recovery proceedings had already been taken and, therefore, there was no justification to continue the interim stay of the recovery proceedings which was already granted. The writ appeal is filed challenging the order of the learned judge vacating the stayOn a bare perusal of the facts of the present case, it is obvious that the entire proceedings in the court are wholly misconceived. The present petitioners being the legal representatives of the deceased assessee, all the orders passed in the assessment proceedings including the order of the Tribunal and the order of this court under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act, 1961, are binding on the present petitioners. A bare perusal of the grounds on which the assessment proceedings are challenged will show that, according to the petitioners, the income-tax authorities acted in a perverse manner when they proceeded on surmises and conjectures and that the orders are completely arbitrary and further that the Income-tax Officer had no material at all and no assessment could be made on mere suspicion or assumption and hearsay evidence. It is difficult to see how the proceedings under the Income-tax Act which culminate in the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could be questioned in the proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The order of the Tribunal shows that the fact that the Central Board of Excise and Customs had set aside the order of the Additional Collector was noticed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also went into the evidence which was mainly circumstantial in nature. The Tribunal found that Loganathan who was Police Inspector could not have been the owner of the diamonds and admittedly Loganathan was utilised as a decoy by the Customs Department. The Tribunal also found that there was no proper explanation as to how the assessee with two other associates came to be found in a room in Dasaprakash hotel. The Tribunal observed that the only person who could be expected to be the owner of the diamonds was either Loganathan, the assessee, Krishnamurthi, J. Srinivasan and the proprietors of Hotel Dasaprakash. It was found that J. Srinivasan was a salaried employee of the assessee drawing a few hundred rupees as salary, but was not rich enough to be the owner of the diamonds worth Rs. 5 lakhs. Krishnamurthi was also known to be a play wright who was not financially well off. Even the assessee did not allege that the diamonds belonged to anyone of these two persons. The only other persons according to the Tribunal who could own the diamonds were the proprietors of Hotel Dasaprakash and the Tribunal found that it would be preposterous to hold that they would throw away diamonds worth Rs. 5 lakhs in a mattress and let it out to an unknown customer. In addition to these circumstances, the Tribunal found that there was no explanation as to why the deceased assessee had come there with a pistol and with an empty box. The Tribunal also noticed the fact that according to the handwriting expert, the slip found in the purse could be in the handwriting of the assessee. In addition to these circumstances, the Tribunal found that there was no explanation as to why the deceased assessee had come there with a pistol and with an empty box. The Tribunal also noticed the fact that according to the handwriting expert, the slip found in the purse could be in the handwriting of the assessee. The Tribunal thus took the view as follows: "Summarising the position, therefore, we find that while on the one side there is ample evidence to show that of the five persons who could have owned or been in possession of the diamonds found cannot own them and the assessee alone was the most probable one to own them, on the negative side, the assessee's behaviour including his statements, such as carrying the pistol, engaging two friends, speaking of an undesignated new business, etc., shows that he is not telling the truth. As validly contended by the learned departmental representative, in matters of this type, a decision has to be made on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and an appreciation of the circumstantial evidence available. This clearly points to the fact that the assessee, himself a jewellery merchant of repute, alone would be the possible owner of the diamonds detected. The income-tax authorities, therefore, are correct in requiring him to explain the source of these amounts. Since he has flatly denied his ownership and thus not offered any valid explanation, they are entitled to include the value of the diamonds as the income from undisclosed sources." * In view of the findings of the Tribunal which, in a sense, have now been confirmed by the High Court, since the High Court has declined to entertain an application for reference under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act, it is obvious that the petition challenging the orders of the incometax authorities and the Tribunal was wholly misconceived. As a matter of fact, we are surprised as to how such a petition at all was filed and entertained. Indirectly, the petitioners are asking a learned single judge of this court to sit in judgment over the order made by a Division Bench of this court while rejecting the application under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act, 1961. In our view, the writ petition is wholly misconceived and must be dismissed. Indirectly, the petitioners are asking a learned single judge of this court to sit in judgment over the order made by a Division Bench of this court while rejecting the application under section 256(2) of the Incometax Act, 1961. In our view, the writ petition is wholly misconceived and must be dismissed. Consequently, the writ appeal which is directed against the order vacating the interim order of stay must also be dismissed. Both the writ appeal and the writ petition thus stand dismissed. However, we make no order as to costs.