ORDER Gulab C. Gupta, J.- 1. This revision, filed under section 397/401 Cr. P.C. is by accused persons charged with offences punishable u/s. 294, 506(B) and 427 IPC and is directed against order dated 28-4-1986 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Hatta, Dist. Damoh, in Criminal Case No. 323 of 1986. 2. The non-applicant is the father-in-law of Applicant No.1 and filed a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate on 17-12-1985 alleging offences u/s. 352/327, 341, 452. 342, 427, 477, 204 and 294 IPC against the applicants. Non-applicant No.2 is the brother and non-applicant No.3, the father of non-applicant No.1. It was alleged that the non-applicant No.1 was married to Vijay, the son of the complainant, about 8 years before. They could not, however, live together and obtained divorce about 3 years before, It was further alleged that on the date of incident all applicants came to him from Damoh and informed that they were on their way to Kundalpur on pilgrimage and wanted to spend the night. They were permitted by the complainant to spend the night in his house. The complainant sent his son to arrange for their food and proper reception. As soon as the complainant was alone in the house, applicant Chhedilal asked for papers relating to partnership of the Typing Institute at Seoni and wanted the said document to be handed over (sic). Applicant Dhannoo is alleged to have caught hold of the complainant by his waist and applicant Chhedilal took out the keys from the pocket of the complainant. The keys were given to applicant Hemlata who opened the almirah and took out a box containg documents. She, however, could not find the partnership deed and hence lit fire to those documents with a match-stick. The witnesses had, by then reached the spot and caught hold of applicant Chhedi. Applicant Dhannoo is alleged to have been armed with deadly weapons and threatened to kill the complainant and his son Vijay Kumar. No report was, however, lodged with the police as the complainant and his son Vijay were both afraid. The incident is said to have taken place on 13-10-1985. 3. The learned Magistrate, on receipt of the said complaint, sent the Station House Officer, Patera for investigation u/s 156(3)Cr.P.C. The report of the investigation was received on 5-2-1986. No report was, however, lodged with the police as the complainant and his son Vijay were both afraid. The incident is said to have taken place on 13-10-1985. 3. The learned Magistrate, on receipt of the said complaint, sent the Station House Officer, Patera for investigation u/s 156(3)Cr.P.C. The report of the investigation was received on 5-2-1986. Thereafter on 28-4-1986, the learned Magistrate perused the complaint, enclosed documents and the police report and registered the complaint u/s, 294 and 506 (B) IPC against the applicant nos. 2 and 3 and u/s. 427 IPC against the applicant no.1 and directed issue of summons to the applicants for their appearance in the Court on 31-5-1986. It is this order which is impugned in this revision application. 4. From the statement of facts aforesaid, it is clear that the learned Magistrate has not examined the complainant or his witnesses on oath. He has also not relied upon the complainants alone, but has taken into consideration documents and report of the police. Is this procedure correct? In Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah AIR 1964 SC 1541 the Supreme Court examined parallel provisions in 1898 Code and held that its examination makes it clear that when the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute an offence a case is instituted in the Magistrate's Court and such a case is one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by police officer, it is a case instituted in the Magistrate's Court on a police report. It is well settled now that when a petition of complaint being filed before him, a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under various provisions of Chapter XI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. When, however, he applies his mind not for such purpose but for purposes of ordering investigation under S.156(3) or issues a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. The Court, for this purpose, recalled its earlier decisions in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 SC 207 and Gopaldas v. Slate of Assam AIR 1961 SC 986 . The Court, for this purpose, recalled its earlier decisions in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 SC 207 and Gopaldas v. Slate of Assam AIR 1961 SC 986 . Application of this law to the facts of the present case would lead this Court to conclude that the learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the complaint on 17-12-1985, when he ordered investigation under section 156(3) of the Code. Under the circumstances, the police was required to submit its report under section 173 of the Code. It is only on receipt of 'police report' that the learned Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(b) of the Code. 5. A perusal of the report submitted by the police indicates that it does not satisfy the requirements of section 173(2) of the Code. Indeed, from the report it is not clear if prosecution of the applicants was at all recommended. The report dated 13-1-1986 is styled as ‘Investigation Report' ¼tkWp izfrosnu½ and appears to have been made under section 202 Cr.P.C. This conclusion is also supported by the impugned order dated 28-4-86, which indicates taking the complaint and documents into consideration The report, however, could not have been made u/s 202 Cr. P. C. as the complainant and his witnesses were not examined by the learned Magistrate under section 200 and have no report under this provision could have been called for in view of the proviso (b) to sub section (1). Even if it was to be held that the report need not contain all details mentioned in section 173(2) of the Code and its substantial compliance was enough, the position is not improved as the report really contains nothing. In Satya Narain v. Stale of Bihar AIR 1980 SC 506 the Supreme Court examined this provision in detail and held that since it was to be the basis of taking cognizance of the offence. it must contain all necessary details from which it may be possible to reach some conclusion. The Court also laid down that the Court taking cognizance of the offence can look at not only the report but its accompaniments as well for taking cognizance. If an examination of the report and its accompaniments did not help taking cognizance or the decision to the contrary, it would not be a report as required by this provision. The Court also laid down that the Court taking cognizance of the offence can look at not only the report but its accompaniments as well for taking cognizance. If an examination of the report and its accompaniments did not help taking cognizance or the decision to the contrary, it would not be a report as required by this provision. The so called report in the present Case is nothing but the information how the dispute between the parties started and the complaint was filed. Its accompaniments are the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and nothing else. The police did not even seize the burnt document. This report, therefore, could not form the basis of the impugned order. That appears to be the reason why the learned Magistrate did not rely on the report alone and also took into consideration the complaint as well and the documents filed before it. This is not the requirements of section 190(1)(b) of the Code under which cognizance could be taken. Clearly, therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable. 6. In H. S. Bains v. State AIR 1980 SC 1883 the Supreme Court clarified options available to Magistrate ordering investigation u/s 156(3) of the Code. A Magistrate, who On receipt of a complaint orders investigation u/s 156(3) and received a police report u/s 173(1) may thereafter do one of three things: (i) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action, (ii) he may take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(b) on the basis of police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report; and (iii) he may take cognizance of the offence under section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under section 200. Since the learned Magistrate has not chosen to examine the complainant and his witnesses on the original complaint, he is deemed to have adopted the second course, which he could only do on the basis of police report. The procedure following investigation or the investigation itself is not the alternative to examination of complainant and his witnesses on oath in the Court. The procedure following investigation or the investigation itself is not the alternative to examination of complainant and his witnesses on oath in the Court. The investigating officer is required not only to collect evidence for the successful prosecution of the case but also to exercise his discretion in arriving at a decision as to whether the case is fit for trial. Behind it lies is the realisation that investigating police are interested in securing the liberty of innocent citizens and, therefore, under an obligation to get the truth. That appears to be the reason why in Aghar Ch. Dev Berma v. Govt. of Tripura AIR 1952 Tripura 14 it was held that where the police report did not conform to the provisions of section 173(2), the Magistrate acted illegally in taking cognizance of the offence on such a report. Even if this Court is not inclined to go Tripura way, it cannot help the conclusion that the cognizance of offence was wrongly taken as the report contained nothing worth while for the purpose. 7. There is yet another reason why this Court finds itself unable to agree with the learned Magistrate. From the complaint and the police report it is clear that everything including abuses, was done inside the house of the complainant and hence there was no scope for taking cognizance of offence u/s 294 IPC. This provision is attracted only when obscene words are uttered in or near any public place to the annoyance of others. Similarly there is nothing either in the complaint, police report of the statement of witnesses to hold that the applicant Hemlata caused loss or damage to the amount of fifty rupees or upwards and hence no offence u/s 427 IPC could be said to have been committed by her. The complaint only alleges threat to life of the complainant and his son by the applicant Dhannoo and not by applicant Chhedilal and yet this applicant is also being tried for offence u/s 506 B IPC. Absence of FIR, previous enimical relations between the parties and nature of allegations have not received any consideration either from the investigating officer or the learned Magistrate. These observations should be sufficient to hold that the learned Magistrate has not applied his judicial mind and has acted not only illegally but also casually. Absence of FIR, previous enimical relations between the parties and nature of allegations have not received any consideration either from the investigating officer or the learned Magistrate. These observations should be sufficient to hold that the learned Magistrate has not applied his judicial mind and has acted not only illegally but also casually. It should be realised that putting a person to trial causes strain on the system of administration of justice and harassment to the person facing trial and hence taking cognizance of an offence should be done as a solemn exercise. 8. The up-shot of the discussion aforesaid is that learned Magistrate acted illegally in passing the impugned order dated 28-4-86 registering offence against the applicants. The said order is, therefore, set-aside. As a necessary consequence summons issued against applicants are cancelled.