JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - The Petitioner who has been arrayed as an accused in G. R. Case No. 471/85 and against whom charges have been framed under Sections 468/471/477-A/409/34. I.P.C., by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jeypore has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the said charges. At the relevant time he was a Reserve Inspector. Home Guards being posted at Koraput and the prosecution alleged that he along with opposite party No. 1 prepared a false claim in the list of Home Guards by attaching false command certificates and forged the signatures of the payees on the vouchers and in the process misappropriated a sum of Rs. 9130/-. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, (Home Guards) gave a written report on 17-8-1981 alleging therein that while he was verifying the payments of pending dues of some of the lady home guards he could know that the Petitioner drew Rs. 1979.80 presenting false bills claimed and drew a total sum of Rs. 69869.12 out of which misappropriated a sum of Rs. 9130/-. This report was treated as an F. I. R. and then investigation was taken up by the police. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the Petitioner and one V. Raghuram Reddy opposite party. No. 1. on 31-12-1983. Cognisance was taken by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate on 23-1-1984 and summons were issued to the 'accused persons for their appearance. On 29-7-1965 the case was taken to the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the matter was adjourned to 1.8-1985 for consideration of charge. Thereafter three or four adjournments were allowed and ultimately the question of framing of charges was considered on 20-11-1985. On that date on consideration of the materials before him the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate framed charges against the accused persons as has been stated earlier. 2. Mr. Swain, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner raises the following contentions in support of the plea of quashing of charges: (i) The Court is bound to record reasons while framing charges indicating the materials on record on which he considered as well as indicating the fact that there has been proper application of mind. 2. Mr. Swain, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner raises the following contentions in support of the plea of quashing of charges: (i) The Court is bound to record reasons while framing charges indicating the materials on record on which he considered as well as indicating the fact that there has been proper application of mind. Since no reason has been recorded in the present case, the .order .of framing charges is liable to be quashed; (ii) the materials on record are net sufficient enough fer prima facie recording .of a conclusion whether the .offence is committed by the Petitioner and, therefore, the charge must be quashed. (iii) the order in question does not indicate that the Court considered all the materials en record and, therefore, the order of framing charges is vitiated;and (iv) the alleged act having been committed by the Petitioner in course of discharge of his .official duties, the Court is debarred from taking cognizance in the absence of a sanction as required u/s 197 of the Cede .of Criminal Procedure and since admittedly there is ne sanction the cognizance is bad and consequently the .order .of framing .of charge is to be quashed. 3. Before considering the aforesaid contentions, it would be appropriate to note the parameters of invoking the inherent power far quashing .of a charge in a criminal case. The inherent power of the High Court is recognised u/s 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But by its very nature, it can be exercised .only in .extraordinary cases to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which Courts exist. The High Court in exercise of its inherent power should net interfere with the judicial exercise of discretion vested in the lower Court and, therefore, several authorities have indicated that the High Court should be careful to see while invoking its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code that the decision is based on sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. In the case of Satrughana Dalabehera and other's v. State 56 (1983) C. L T. 405 a learned Judge of this Caurt indicated same categories of cases where the High Caurt can interfere in exercise of its power u/s 482 of the Code. In the case of Satrughana Dalabehera and other's v. State 56 (1983) C. L T. 405 a learned Judge of this Caurt indicated same categories of cases where the High Caurt can interfere in exercise of its power u/s 482 of the Code. According to the learned Judge in that case ordinarily a criminal proceeding initiated against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere at an interlocutory stage. The learned Judge observed that though it is not possible, desirable and expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would give the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, but some of the categories of cases which were categorised are: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the offencealleged; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. The learned Judge also added a word of caution that the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence is reliable or not. The Supreme Court has considered the provision u/s 482 of the Code in several cases some of which may be noted. In the case of R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab it was observed by Their Lordships that where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety do not constitute the offence alleged, the inherent jurisdiction can be exercised. In the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Vs. Mohan Singh and Others the Court observed that if the impugned order brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of Court, then for the purpose of securing the ends of justice the High Court can exercise its power u/s 482, but this power, however, is to be exercised very sparingly. In the case of Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala and Ors. In the case of Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala and Ors. AIR 1978 S.C. 1968, the Supreme Court had interfered with an order of this Court where this Court had quashed the cognisance and observed that as the Magistrate is restricted to finding out whether there is a prima facie case or not for proceeding against the accused and cannot enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case and the scope of the revisional jurisdiction is very limited, the High Court cannot launch on a detailed and meticulous examination of the case on merits and set aside the order of Magistrate directing issue of process against certain persons. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others the Supreme Court observed test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers u/s 482." It is not necessary to multiply authorities on the point and it can be said in one sentence that the High Court can exercise its inherent power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been gross abuse of the process of Court or any manifest injustice has been perpetrated by the lower Courts. Bearing in mind these principles win now examine the submissions of Mr. Swain. 4. Coming to the first contention, Mr. Swain relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others where the Supreme Court was considering an order of discharge of accused passed u/s 227 of the Code. It may be noted that u/s 227 if upon considerations of the records of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, a Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so, doing. The language of Section 227 is unambiguous and, therefore, it is obligatory on the Judge to record his reasons for passing an order of discharge. The language of Section 227 is unambiguous and, therefore, it is obligatory on the Judge to record his reasons for passing an order of discharge. It is in that context the Supreme Court, observed in the aforesaid case that the object of the provisions requiring the Sessions Judge to record the reasons is to enable the superior Court to examine the correctness of the reasons for which the Sessions Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. According to Mr. Swain, the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court also indicate that even where a charge is framed the Judge must record his reasons so that those reasons can be tested by a higher forum. Power to frame charge is contained in Section 228 of the. Code and reading Section 228 as it is, I do not find any requirement of 'recording reasons. It is no doubt true that Sections 227 and 228 have to be read together in jukta position and therefore, the Sessions Judge is required to sift and weigh the evidence for a limited purpose to find out whether or not a prima facie case has been made out against the accused. In otherwords at that stage the Sessions Judge is required to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court as well as any basic infirmity appearing in the case. u/s 228 if the Judge is satisfied after app]ying his judicial mind to the records of the case, there is ground for presuming that the accused has prima facie committed an offence, then he would be free to frame the charge and in my opinion, it is not necessary at that stage to give a detailed discussion of the materials or to give a finding which would be a matter for the trial. In that view of the matter, and applying my mind to the impugned order whereunder charges have been framed in the case, I do not find any infirmity in the same and Mr. Swain's contention on 'this score cannot be accepted. 5. Coming to the next submission, namely, that the materials on record are not sufficient for framing of charge, I also do not find any force in the same. Though Mr. Swain's contention on 'this score cannot be accepted. 5. Coming to the next submission, namely, that the materials on record are not sufficient for framing of charge, I also do not find any force in the same. Though Mr. Swain was permitted to argue at length for a considerable period, but he could not satisfy as to on what basis advanced the aforesaid contention. On the other hand, his submission in this regard was to the effect that the Court must at this stage fully weigh the evidence and come to the conclusion one way or the other. At the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to form an opinion prima facie as to whether there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence or not. If the materials on record being considered in the light of submissions of the parties, furnish a reasonable basis for the presumption that the accused has committed the offence, then the Court would be free to frame the charge. It may be that at the trial the materials on the basis of which the charge has been framed may be rendered unacceptable. But that consideration would be available only at the conclusion of the trial and not at the stage when the Judge makes up his mind whether or not to frame charge. The Court at that stage has to look to the records and documents submitted. This being the legal position and if the case diary is examined in his case) it cannot be said that there was no material for presuming that the accused has prima facie committed an offence nor can this case come within the ambit "taken in entirety the materials on record on its face value, no offence is committed" so as to be interfered with by this Court) at this stage by invoking the inherent power. Mr. Swain's contention on this score must) therefore, be rejected. 6. So far as the third contention of Mr. Swain is concerned, there cannot be any manner of doubt that while framing of a charge, the Court must consider the materials on record as well as the documents submitted to it. Mr. Swain's grievance on this score is that the Court did not consider the supervision note which according to him would have vitally weighed with the Court in not framing the charge. Mr. Swain's grievance on this score is that the Court did not consider the supervision note which according to him would have vitally weighed with the Court in not framing the charge. Section 173 (5), Criminal Procedure Code indicates as to what are the papers to be forwarded to the Magistrate along with the report and obviously a supervision report will not come within the ambit of I Clause (1) or (b) of Section 173 (5) Criminal Procedure Code That apart, the impugned order of framing charge indicates that the counsel for both parties were heard at length and thereupon the learned Magistrate framed the change in question. I also enquired from the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as to why he is raising the contention that all the materials have not been considered and which is that important material which would lead to take a contrary decision. Mr. Swain excepting reiterating about non-consideration of the supervision report, is not in a position to place his hand on any other statements or documents in support of his aforesaid contention. On perusal of the case diary, as well as other documents on record, I am fully satisfied that there are sufficient materials for the learned Magistrate to frame the charge. 7. The only question which survives for consideration is whether sanction for prosecution is necessary in the facts and circumstances of the present case ;is required u/s 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. u/s 197 (1) Criminal Procedure Code, if a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, then no Court shall take cognisance of such offence except with the previous sanction. Sub-section (2) of Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code prohibits taking cognisance of an offence committed by a member of the Armed Forces purporting to act in discharge of his official duty except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. Sub-section (3) of Section 197. Criminal Procedure Code authorises the State Government to state by notification that Sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein. The Petitioner being an Inspector. Sub-section (2) of Section 197. Sub-section (3) of Section 197. Criminal Procedure Code authorises the State Government to state by notification that Sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein. The Petitioner being an Inspector. Sub-section (2) of Section 197. Criminal Procedure Code will not apply since he is removable from his office by Public Officer subordinate to State Government. But the Petitioner states that under Sub-section (3) the State Government has issued a notification making Sub-section (2) applicable in case of Police Inspectors. But no such notification has been produced before me. Even assuming there is such a notification, yet to make Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code applicable, the further fact must be considered as to whether the acts complained of can be said to have been committed by the Petitioners while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty. A public servant committing criminal breach of trust in respect of moneys belonging to Government by interpolating and forging some documents cannot be said to be acting or purporting to act in the execution of his duty as a public servant. The act and the official duty must be so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused hi the performance of the official duty. In other words there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty and the act must bear such relationship to the duty that accused can lay reasonable claim, but not pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in course of performance of his duty. In several decisions, Courts have held that misappropriation of panchayat money by a servant cannot be said to have been committed by him in discharge of official duty. In the case of Dr. Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor, it was held that for the offence u/s 409, no consent is necessary for prosecution. In the case of S. B. Saha and Ors. v. M. S. Kochar, it was held that the dishonest misappropriation or conversion of goods by public servant they had seized and thereby committed offence under Sections 409 and 120-B, I.P.C. does not require any sanction for prosecution. In the case of S. B. Saha and Ors. v. M. S. Kochar, it was held that the dishonest misappropriation or conversion of goods by public servant they had seized and thereby committed offence under Sections 409 and 120-B, I.P.C. does not require any sanction for prosecution. This being the position of law, the acts complained of in the present case cannot be said to have been committed by the Petitioner in discharge of his official duty and, therefore, Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code has no application. I would, therefore, reject the last submission of Mr. Swain appearing for the Petitioner. 8. In the ultimate result, therefore, all the contentions of Mr. Swain fail and this criminal revision accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed